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 This study examines the organic emergence and evolution of discernible patterns in the 
tactical behavior of Major General William T. Sherman's Fifteenth Army Corps of the Army of 
the Tennessee across its first year operating within the western theater of the American Civil War. 
It analyzes the ways in which specific experiences and patterns of meaning-making within the 
corps's regiments and batteries led to the emergence of a distinctive corps-level “tactical culture.” 
This concept, introduced for the first time within the dissertation, is defined as a collection of 
shared, historically-derived, normative ideas, beliefs, assumptions, and habitual behaviors that 
inform a subordinate military command’s particular approach to the prosecution of its assigned 
objectives on or off the battlefield. The dissertation employs the research methodologies of “new 
military history” to inform an older “traditional” historiography in an effort to frame what might 
be called a “new operational history.” While historians frequently assert that generals somehow 
impart their character to their commands, this dissertation argues that the reverse was the case 
within Sherman's corps. Although Sherman habitually sought a frontal penetration of entrenched 
Rebel lines, a combination of factors – most especially the heavily wooded terrain of the 
Mississippi Valley – repeatedly prevented his corps from achieving such objectives. As a result 
of their perpetual failure, those in the ranks lost confidence whenever called upon to assault 
enemy lines, leaving Sherman with “no troops that can be made to assault.” Instead, heavily 
cluttered Western battlefields rewarded the employment of open-order “clouds” of skirmishers. 
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While these “clouds” could not breach fortified Rebel positions, they could suppress enemy units 
and allow for maneuver elsewhere. Simultaneously, repeated experiences of success in raiding 
operations inspired an embrace of “war in earnest” tactics among those in the ranks traumatized 
from bloody repulse on the battlefield. By 1864, the corps reliably displayed a tactical culture 
borne of its particular past experiences which helped to shape its behavior during the campaigns 
for Atlanta, Savannah, and the Carolinas. An awareness of this tactical culture informed 
Sherman's employment of the command, as well as his larger operational art during his famous 
late war campaigns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“They spoke of other corps … 'The Ninth' – 'The First' – 'The Fifth' – 'The Sixth' – 'The Third' – 
the simple numerals rang with eloquence, each having a meaning which was to float through many 
years as no intangible arithmetical mist, but as pregnant with individuality as the names of cities.” 
 
~ Stephen Crane, The Little Regiment (1896)1 
 
“This feeling that grows up between regiments, brigades, divisions and corps is very strong and as strange.” 
 
~ Charles Wills, 103d Illinois2 
 
 On a frigid December day in 1871, Lt. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman took the stand 
after a lengthy adjournment to finally answer for crimes allegedly committed six years prior in 
the city of Columbia, South Carolina. Partially destroyed in a violent blaze in February 1865 
while occupied by his troops plodding northward through the state, considerable amounts of 
private property and cotton – much of it foreign-owned – had been incinerated along with a 
significant portion of the city, and the responsibility for its near total destruction needed to be 
ascertained. Most Northerners remained convinced that either the retreating remnants of the 
Rebel army, drunken slaves, the wind, or some combination of the three was to blame. 
Southerners, on the other hand, maintained that Sherman’s “devils” had deliberately fired the 
town with the same vindictive spirit they were sure had motivated all of the general’s fiery 
campaigns. 
 
1 Stephen Crane, The Little Regiment, and Other Episodes of the American Civil War (New York: Appleton, 1896, 
19-20. 
2 Charles Wills to Brother, Mar. 15, 1864, John Y Simon, ed., Army Life of an Illinois Soldier (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1996), 218. 
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 Cross-examining attorney George R. Walker thought he knew precisely how to illustrate 
that Sherman had taken deliberate steps to reduce the city to ashes from the moment he selected 
which of the four corps d’armee comprising his army group would enter Columbia first. After 
meandering through a long series of questions related to prior testimony, Walker came abruptly 
to the point. “Can you tell me anything about the 15th corps?” he asked directly. The corps had 
been the first to enter the city that day, and many of its inhabitants still invoked the particular 
temperament of the “diabolical 15th,” as one of them called it, as an explanation for the ruinous 
conflagration's origins. Sherman’s erstwhile somewhat defensive demeanor shifted immediately 
at mention of the command. “Yes, indeed I can,” he quickly replied, beaming with pride. “I know 
all about it; they were as fine a body of men as ever trod shoe-leather.” Walker took this in stride. 
“They had the reputation of doing their work well?” he asked, pointedly. “Yes, sir; thoroughly,” 
Sherman replied, adding that when it came to “going into a fight and going through a fight, they 
were the men they are described to be.” Indeed, the Fifteenth Corps had earned quite the name 
for itself in the victorious United States as among the hardest fighting and furthest marching 
contingents of “Sherman’s veterans.” But the corps’s combat exploits were not what Walker was 
after. “Hadn’t they a reputation in Mississippi?” he inquired. “They had a very high reputation,” 
Sherman agreed, referencing the corps’s famed service among Grant’s “Vicksburg rats,” prying 
open the Mississippi River in the summer of 1863.3 
 Recognizing a need for more direct questioning, Walker cut to the chase. “Had they not a 
reputation there [Mississippi] for leaving their mark upon the country?” he asked. “Yes, sir, they 
 
3 United States, Who Burnt Columbia? Official Depositions of Wm. Tecumseh Sherman, ‘General of the Army of the 
United States,’ and Gen. O. O. Howard, U.S.A., For the Defence (Charleston: Walker, Evans & Cogswell, 1873), 82; 
Earl Schenk Miers, ed., When the World Ended: The Diary of Emma LeConte (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1957), 43. 
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left their marks wherever they went,” Sherman said. With this, Walker could almost smell 
victory, or so he thought. “You were aware of this?” “Perfectly.” “When you reached Savannah?” 
“Indeed, I was; I knew every officer and every private in that corps.” Likely sporting a sly grin 
and intensely satisfied with his imminent coup, Walker did his best to rub it in. “They were a 
wild set, were they not?” he asked loadedly, only to receive an unsuspected rebuttal. “No, sir; 
they were composed of first rate men – farmers and mechanics, and men who are to-day as good 
citizens as we have in our country, but who went to war in earnest.” This caught Walker off 
guard. Certainly, Sherman had meant what he had said before, he insisted: “They were good men 
for destroying property?” The aging general again concurred: “Yes, sir; when told to do so, they 
destroyed it very quickly.” But what about when “they thought they might do it and it not be 
objectionable to their officers,” Walker prodded. Sherman tellingly evaded. “They could do their 
work very thoroughly when they undertook it.” Growing frustrated, Walker began to show his 
anger: “Do you mean to say that you were not aware … before you reached Columbia, that the 
15th corps were a corps distinguished for the marks they left upon the country through which 
they passed?” Still calm, Sherman replied, curtly: “I may have known it, and very likely I did; I 
knew generally what was going on.” His avoidance further irritated Walker. “I asked you did you 
know it; I should like you to answer that question,” he demanded, “were you not aware that the 
15th corps were remarkable for the manner in which they left their mark upon the country 
through which they passed?” “Explain what you mean by mark,” Sherman asked. “Devastation,” 
Walker replied. “They killed every rebel within range of their guns and left their dead bodies to 
mark the ground,” Sherman smiled. “Devastation of property, I mean,” Walker clarified. “No 
more than the rest of the troops,” the general finally answered.4 
 
4 United States, Who Burnt Columbia?, 82-83. 
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 Sherman's answer was disingenuous. Just as divulged within one of his most famous 
dicta: “There is a soul to an army as well as to the individual man,” the Fifteenth Corps, and 
indeed every corps of Sherman’s army, had a soul all its own – a soul that, by the spring of 1865, 
Sherman knew better than all the rest.5 Writing to Major General Henry Halleck less than two 
months prior to reaching Columbia, Sherman had laid out his plans for his army’s fiery 
forthcoming entry into the first state of the so-called Confederacy. “When I move, the Fifteenth 
Corps will be on the right of the right wing,” he explained. Though later altered, his original 
plans for the Carolinas campaign would have naturally carried the corps into the streets of the 
Rebellion’s first capital: Charleston. Contemplating the likely results of their arrival, along with 
Halleck’s implication that South Carolina ought rightfully to pay heavily for its sins, Sherman 
did “not think ‘salt’ will be necessary.” After all, “if you have watched the history of that corps, 
you will have remarked that they generally do their work pretty well.” He had full confidence 
that the port city “deserves all that seems in store for her.” He also added, after a brief glance at 
his map, that he “look[ed] upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston.”6 
 Sherman had every reason to know the “soul” and “the history” of the Fifteenth Corps 
better than any other of the four which then comprised his army group. Having taken command 
of the veteran nucleus of the formation during the late winter of 1862, it had represented his first 
independent corps command in then Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s Army of the Tennessee. Much 
time had passed between those days and the moment at which he opted to send his beloved 
original corps into the streets of Columbia, and the mountain of intervening experience which he 
 
5 W. T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, Vol. I (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 879. 
6 W. T. Sherman to H. W. Halleck, Dec. 24, 1864, Brooks Simpson and Jean Berlin, ed. Sherman’s Civil War, 
Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman, 1860-1865 [SCW] (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1999), 776. 
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and the corps had mutually accrued had molded both of them into distinctive instruments of 
warfare. While historians have traditionally made much of the impress of “Uncle Billy” upon the 
character of his army, in truth the army, and even more especially the “diabolical 15th,” played a 
much more powerful role in shaping the character of “Uncle Billy” as a grand tactician and 
strategist. Although no longer commanding the corps directly since his promotion to field army 
command in the winter of 1863, even by the spring of 1865 Sherman knew just what he could 
dependably expect from the command, as well as what he could not. He was well acquainted 
with the “soul” of the Fifteenth Corps, in large part because he shared it. They had forged it 
together across a tempestuous year of bloody and intensely trying campaigns by which both the 
regiments of his command and Sherman himself were mutually molded into, to use his own 
phrase, “soldiers from experience.” 
I. “Veteran Character” 
 In his landmark 1985 study of Sherman’s army group during its famed late war 
campaigns for Savannah and the Carolinas, Joseph T. Glatthaar highlighted the importance of 
what he called the Western army’s “veteran character” in enabling its success during those 
legendary operations. “At the expense of rigid discipline, precision drills, and tidy appearance, 
all trademarks of the Army of the Potomac,” Glatthaar explained, “Sherman’s command [had] 
developed a sense of self-reliance and self-confidence based upon the lessons of several years of 
active campaigning.” The Western veterans “had learned the best ways to perform certain duties 
and how to handle themselves in all sorts of situations.” The resultant “veteran character … 
utterly dominated Sherman’s army,” enabling operations that “required company-level officers 
6 
and enlisted men to bear a much greater burden and shoulder a much larger share of the 
responsibility for success” than in most other campaigns of the American Civil War.7  
 Glatthaar never explicitly outlined the individual components of this “veteran character,” 
though he did allude to many throughout the course of his masterful work. Above all else, the 
Western army was one filled with experienced soldiers “who knew what to do and how to care 
for themselves.”8 They had, as two of them put it, already “learned nearly all that was worth 
knowing” and by the latter campaigns of the war understood “just what to do and what not to do” 
in and out of battle.9 Across a lengthy tenure in uniform, they “had learned to perform those 
small yet critical tasks that often decided engagements,” even if such mastery occasionally 
“undercut strong discipline by fostering a sense of independence and self-reliance.”10 Sherman, 
Glatthaar argues, had himself learned to masterfully realize the natural advantages accruing to 
such an army of veterans by allowing the men and officers of his army “enough freedom to put 
their experience to work.”11 
 To be sure, Sherman’s learned legions were by no means confident in all things. 
“Experience had taught Sherman’s men the foolhardiness of frontal assaults,” Glatthaar 
observed, “particularly against earthworks held by nearly equal numbers.” Instead, they much 
preferred flanking maneuvers, which usually “conserved lives and were much more successful.” 
The same lessons which had impressed upon them the “foolhardiness of frontal assaults” had 
 
7 Joseph T. Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman’s Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas 
Campaigns (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), xi-xii. 
8 Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond, 15. 
9 Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond, 28. 
10 Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond, 30, 32. 
11 Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond, 38. 
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likewise taught them the immense advantages accruing to fortified defensive positions as well as 
the accompanying “importance of pure firepower” when delivered from their protection.12 They 
had also learned to pay relatively little attention to Army-prescribed drill manuals when it came 
to tactical maneuvering under fire. After all, “marching in step elbow to elbow, [was] a physical 
impossibility in the heavily wooded South.” These rigid tactics were replaced by predominately 
open-order skirmishing in battle and an experienced soldier’s innate understanding for “the 
underlying principles that troops act as a coherent unit and remain manageable under all 
circumstances,” even when outside of tight formations.13 
 The process by which the conversion of green citizen-soldier recruits into Sherman’s 
battle-wise veterans took place, the manner in which his corps and army gained its “soul,” has 
long been alluded to, but never systematically unpacked by historians. In fact, the process of 
what might be called “veteranization” or even the expression “veteran troops” has been 
employed colloquially by both military practitioners and historians since at least the Roman era, 
but has rarely enjoyed a clear and unambiguous definition. “Veteran,” “crack,” “elite,” or 
“experienced” units are still today somehow known primarily when they are seen. One of the 
many problems with such vague employment of the terms “veteran” or “experienced” in 
reference to any individual or group, past or present, is that all experiences have specific content. 
Each of us accrues experience from the day we are born, but the differences in our experiences, 
and the different ways in which we make sense of them, play a powerful role in molding us into 
the particular individuals we become. While merely being human beings means that all of us 
share a number of experiences that are remarkably similar, even those experiences that are most 
 
12 Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond, 157-158. 
13 Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond, 157. 
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similar to those of another individual still contain distinctive and unique aspects that may 
become more or less important over the course of our lives. The very same applies to groups – 
most especially groups that maintain a lengthy tenure of stable membership, and which are called 
upon to engage in the most traumatic of human activities: warfare. Soldiers living and serving 
alongside one another naturally accrue shared experience that, just as with individuals, tends to 
produce a unique group “personality” or “character.” In large part, the distinguishable 
characteristics of such “regimental character” (as Civil War contemporaries referred to it) that an 
outside observer can discern represent artifacts of the unit’s “tactical culture”: the body of shared 
normative ideas, beliefs, assumptions, and habitual behaviors that shape the command’s 
prosecution of its assigned objectives. 
  Also like the individual volunteers that comprised them, the “character” and tactical 
culture of Civil War commands, like Sherman’s Fifteenth Corps, was forged by an interrelated 
combination of factors borne of both “nature” and “nurture.” Instead of genetic code, the 
organizational structure and doctrine to which a regiment trained and drilled represented certain 
imperatives that substantively shaped and limited the ways in which it could behave in and out of 
combat. Whether or not a regiment was an infantry or artillery command, how many regiments a 
given brigade contained and at what strengths, and the specific drill maneuvers Casey’s or 
Hardee’s Infantry Tactics or the U.S. Army Revised Regulations prescribed for movement on the 
battlefield were all structures which operated in a manner similar to that of genetic code, or 
“nature,” in shaping how Civil War units behaved. 
 Just as the behavior of individuals is not exclusively borne of genetic destiny, neither 
were all the volunteer units serving in the U.S. Army during the American Civil War confined to, 
or even capable of, responding to any particular tactical situation in exactly the same manner as 
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any other. Despite subscribing to precisely the same linear maneuver doctrine and maintaining 
more or less the same structure, Civil War military organizations frequently differed dramatically 
from one another in the manner in which they approached the tactical objectives assigned to 
them. Although all U.S. volunteers trained and drilled in choreographed maneuvers drawn from 
the very same Army-prescribed drill manuals, as late as the 1880s these works remained 
exclusively focused on the efficient maneuvering of formations of men to, about, and from the 
battlefield. In the words of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, they were “simply a collection of rules 
for passing from one formation to another,” but provided no practical instruction in “how to 
fight” – a topic which was habitually “left to actual experience in war.”14 Tactics, first concretely 
defined by the Army in 1891 as the “art of handling troops in the presence of the enemy, i.e., 
applying on the battlefield the movements learned at drill,” was during the Civil War left entirely 
to practitioners to learn from experience. Thus, to explain the differences in the ways in which 
specific commands and commanders conducted themselves under fire, the historian must 
historicize their behavior by analyzing how their distinctive past experience, or “nurture,” played 
a role in shaping future decisions or actions under fire.15 
 This study represents an attempt to illustrate how this very evolutionary process shaped 
the emergent tactical culture of Sherman’s Fifteenth Corps during its powerfully impressionable 
first year serving together across the long Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns of 1862-63. In 
doing so, it makes clear how the apparent distinctive penchant of the “diabolical 15th” for the 
destruction of Rebel property and what historians now call “war in earnest” arose from the 
 
14 Perry D. Jamieson, Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899 (Tuscaloosa: The 
University of Alabama Press, 1994), 93, 108. 
15 War Department, Infantry Drill Regulations, United States Army (New York: Army and Navy Journal, 1891), 6. 
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specific historical experiences of its component regiments. It also shows how many of these 
same experiences shaped the manner in which the corps behaved on the battlefield, how its 
members organically developed an informal doctrine which anticipated most all of the postwar 
Army’s tactical doctrine of predominately open-order light infantry tactics, a culture that 
emphasized the pairing of the strategic offense with the tactical defense, and a powerful 
preference for the indirect approach of strategic “war in earnest” over direct confrontation with 
usually entrenched Rebels on the battlefield. Finally, it offers a new window into Sherman’s own 
development as a military leader, showing how the experience of commanding the corps 
gradually transformed “Sherman the Stormer” into the famed “Sherman the Flanker.” 
II. “New Operational History” 
 Operational military historiography, the historical examination of military operations on 
and off the battlefield, has come under fire in the academy over the past half-century. Post-1970s 
trends have shifted the historiographical lens to wider social and cultural factors in an effort to 
explain war often without the need for much examination of direct military confrontation. 
Professional military historians today often exert considerable energy explaining to colleagues 
how they do not engage in what is commonly stereotyped as ‘drums and trumpets’ history. 
Academic discussions concerning why any given general zigged when he should have zagged 
have fallen dramatically out of favor. In fact, many assert that such zigging and zagging was 
often of little real import historically to the outcome of any particular conflict. For the most part, 
academic military historians have adapted to these trends by refocusing their collective efforts on 
not only warfare but organized human violence more generally. With this tack, the field has 
experienced a veritable rebirth in recent years as among the most avant garde within the 
discipline. Trends in what is still referred to as “new military history,” despite its now lengthy 
tenure, continue to push the field into an array of interesting and invaluable directions, shining 
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light into many erstwhile ignored corners of both war and warfare. Cutting-edge scholarship in 
the “war and society” school addresses the nuanced differences between historical societies and 
the ways in which they have defended themselves, organized for war, and exerted power through 
violence.16   
 For the most part, American Civil War military historiography has marched in lockstep 
with these developments. The vast majority of Civil War historians studying military topics in 
recent years have all but abandoned operational history completely. Instead, heavily influenced 
by John Keegan’s canonical Face of Battle (1976), they have applied the theories and research 
methodologies of non-military social and cultural history to produce a deluge of “soldier studies” 
scholarship aimed at understanding the motivations, ideologies, and experiences of the “common 
soldiers” of both sides. Today, the sheer extant volume of such literature is daunting. As historian 
Drew Bledsoe notes, historians have now critically assessed “common soldiers’ combat 
motivation, their will to fight, their beliefs about death and religion, their understanding of 
nations and nationalism, their feelings about the home front and morale, and their attitudes 
toward victory and defeat, courage and cowardice, slavery and emancipation, race, sexuality, 
family, class, gender, manhood, violence, and almost every other imaginable subject.” While this 
scholarship has provided substantial insight into the lives of “common soldiers,” very little of it 
has contributed to deepening our understanding of the prosecution of specific military operations 
during the war. Exploring the nuances of motivations for enlistment, disparate conceptions of 
manhood within the ranks, or the relative devotion of volunteers to emancipation provides 
compelling insight into the ways Northern society was reflected by the “Boys in Blue,” but few 
 
16 Robert M. Citino, “Review Essay: Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” American Historical 
Review 112 (October 2007): 1070-1090; Dennis Showalter, “A Modest Plea for Drums and Trumpets,” Military 
Affairs 39, No. 2 (1975): 72. 
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of these explorations claim, or even seek, any explanatory utility related to the quest for 
understanding what these men actually did on or off specific battlefields, beyond showing up and 
staying put. The effort to wrestle with the political ideologies, gendered identities, and 
motivations of the volunteers has instead been primarily aimed at developing a robust 
ethnography of Civil War soldiers as a group or “class” of nineteenth century Americans. In the 
process of this largely successful project, professional historians have mostly missed the 
opportunity to fully employ its many fruits to inform its older, perhaps more traditional, 
operational counterpart.17 
 Perhaps the most problematic trend within the voluminous “soldier studies” scholarship 
has been one of treating Civil War soldiers collectively as largely interchangeable members of a 
relatively homogeneous sociocultural bloc. Whereas a collection of Iowa corn farmers and a 
trade union of Boston mechanics would naturally, within most historiography, be treated as 
markedly distinct groups, for whatever reason once these same individuals convert their prewar 
associations into volunteer companies and take up arms, they are analyzed simply as “common 
soldiers” within the U.S. Army. While most scholars at least focus on either U.S. or Rebel 
volunteers, much recent work blurs even this critical distinction prior to embarking upon analysis 
of “randomly” selected manuscript collections. Of course, the U.S. Army, an institution 
containing nearly two million men over the course of the Civil War, never operated as a single, 
uniform, homogeneous operational entity at any point. Instead, it was divided into operationally 
manageable components: departments contained field armies; field armies were composed, after 
 
17 Andrew Bledsoe, Citizen-Officers: The Union and Confederate Volunteer Junior Officer Corps in the American 
Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2015), xi. While an exhaustive listing of “soldier studies” 
scholarship is well beyond the space limitations of this dissertation, a thorough overview and bibliography of the 
sub-field is Lorien Foote, “Soldiers,” in Aaron Sheehan-Dean, ed., Blackwell Companion to the U.S. Civil War, 2 
vols. (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 114-131. 
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1862, of multiple corps; corps of multiple divisions, divisions of brigades, and brigades of 
regiments. Moreover, unlike today’s U.S. military, most volunteers almost never experienced 
transfer beyond the confines of their original regiment. When reinforcements were needed, entire 
commands and not individual soldiers were habitually deployed by the War Department. Thus, 
although today’s U.S. Army battalions, when not deployed abroad, constitute little more than 
administrative and training containers for ostensibly interchangeable service members, many of 
whom will serve in multiple such commands over the course of their service, Union volunteers 
were fundamentally inseparable from their units. The importance of this distinction in even 
beginning the process of understanding Civil War soldiers cannot be overstated. Put another way, 
as far as the Union soldier was concerned, there was never any singular “U.S. Army,” but rather 
thousands of individually distinctive regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps, each containing 
between several hundred and several thousand men apiece. The size and scale of these “units” 
was dependent upon how many men and commands served in close proximity to one another 
over relatively lengthy tenures, naturally developing a shared identity and distinguishable tactical 
culture over time. When modern “soldier studies” scholarship divorces volunteers from these 
critical associations, “randomly” pooling them together with all other “common soldiers” 
generally, the contextual provenance of their thoughts and statements is utterly destroyed along 
with much of their analytical value.18 
 To be sure, Civil War operational historiography is not entirely extinct as a species within 
the academy. A handful of professionals continue to strive to advance and revolutionize the 
operational historiography of the conflict. Chief among these are Joseph Glatthaar and Earl Hess. 
 
18 This problematic trend in the historiography is most clearly laid out by Jason Phillips, “Battling Stereotypes: A 
Taxonomy of Common Soldiers in Civil War history,” History Compass 6 (November 2008): 1407-1425. 
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While Glatthaar’s sociocultural explorations of first Sherman’s army and then General Robert E. 
Lee’s Rebel Army of Northern Virginia have illustrated how the origins of the men in the ranks 
of particular commands played a powerful role in shaping their wartime experiences, the 
voluminous work of Hess provides another model for the analytical study of operational topics. 
Mixing more traditional operational narratives with strictly analytical monographs addressing 
particular elements relevant to military operations during the war in general (i.e., infantry tactics, 
arms and munitions, logistics, and entrenchments), Hess continues to contribute new and often 
provocative work to the operational canon. While Hess and Glatthaar represent only two of many 
historians still engaged in thoroughgoing operational history (other prominent professionals 
including Gary Gallagher, Steven Woodworth, Andrew Bledsoe, Timothy B. Smith, Mark 
Grimsley, and Brent Nosworthy all building upon older works like those of Paddy Griffith and 
Stephen Sears), they are emblematic of what could become a gradual analytical-turn within 
professional Civil War operational historiography which might even eventually be termed “new 
operational history.”19   
 Soldiers from Experience contributes to all of these broader conversations by seeking to 
bridge the growing chasm between “new” and “traditional/operational” Civil War military 
history. The dissertation retains a fine sensitivity to the structural intricacies of Civil War military 
organizations by focusing on a specific collection of regiments serving within a particular corps 
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d’armee. While deeply influenced by Keegan's canonical Face of Battle, it seeks to return to his 
original clarion call to not only examine the experiences of those in the ranks, but to employ such 
analyses in a manner that helps to better understand the relationship between individual or group 
experiences and operational behaviors and outcomes in and out of battle. Though Keegan argued 
that the “face” of any particular engagement played a pivotal role in influencing the soldiers 
fighting it, Soldiers from Experience evaluates how the accrued experience of past battles, their 
particular lessons stored within a unit’s tactical culture, likewise played a signal role in shaping 
the behavior of the men of the Fifteenth Corps on later fields. 
III. Tactical Culture 
 The study of the complex interactions between culture and human behavior by scholars 
across many disciplines has evolved significantly over the past half-century. Most now agree that 
while culture provides a repertoire, or “tool-kit” of shared values, norms, and standards of 
behavior within a society or group, it does not dictate human behavior. Rather, it functions in a 
way that brackets and directs individual vision, delimiting perceptions of what is possible, 
acceptable, or correct behavior in a given circumstance or environment.20 Military historians 
have begun to examine closely the structure and function of “military culture,” its relationship to 
prevailing cultural norms in a parent society, as well as its historical role in influencing the 
behavior of soldiers. Historian Isabel Hull has defined the concept of “military culture” as 
“habitual practices, default programs, hidden assumptions, and unreflected cognitive frames” 
embraced by the members of a nation's military.21 While usually conceived of as informing the 
 
20 Anne Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51 (2): 273-286. 
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entirety of a nation's military in a relatively homogeneous manner resulting from uniform 
training and indoctrination, like all forms of culture, military culture exists simultaneously on 
many different (and often conflicting) levels. Historians are only beginning to understand this 
multi-level structure of military culture and its historical influence on military behavior.22 
 The complicated and confusing multi-level structure of military culture was prominently 
on display within both U.S. and Rebel armies throughout the American Civil War. Only five days 
after formally taking command of his newly formed Fifteenth Army Corps, Sherman was already 
complaining to his brother, Senator John Sherman, about the perplexing challenges of bringing 
order to a polyglot collection of volunteer regiments. “Human power is limited and you cannot 
appreciate the difficulty of moulding into an homogeneous machine, the discordant elements 
which go to make up our armies,” he wrote. The vast majority were “new & strange to me,” 
making it especially difficult to anticipate their likely future behavior under fire.23 Still, 
professional soldiers like Sherman maintained an assumption borne of the antebellum Regular 
Army's military culture, that sufficient amounts of standardized drill and discipline could 
eventually produce a kind of cultural homogenization among volunteers that would mold their 
regiments into more or less functionally interchangeable units. Alas, these prevailing 
assumptions about the power of indoctrination through training ignored the natural tendencies of 
all human groups to forge their own distinct way of doing things based on shared experiences 
and learned behaviors, even if such habits ultimately represented mere “variations on a theme.” 
 
22 Tony Ingesson has recently carried this research into a study of military subcultures at the branch-level (though he 
inaccurately refers to these as “unit” subcultures). Tony Ingesson, The Politics of Combat: The Political and 
Strategic Impact of Tactical-Level Subcultures, 1939-1995, Dissertation, Lund University, 2016. This dissertation 
evaluates emergent subcultures at the truly unit-level. 
23 William T. Sherman to John Sherman, Jan. 17, 1863, SCW, 362. 
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The idea that individual military units naturally evolve their own cultures and “ways of 
doing things” over time has a deep past. Military commanders and theorists across the globe 
have long wrestled with ways of either mitigating these differences and culturally homogenizing 
their commands through uniform training and indoctrination or, alternatively, leveraging the 
distinctive capabilities of idiosyncratic subordinate units when preparing their campaign and 
battle plans. Ancient Greek commanders put considerable thought into the assignment of 
particular phalanges to certain particular portions of their battle formations, placing those 
particular units with a reputation for high performance, endurance, or raw strength in positions of 
greatest advantage.24 Despite Roman efforts to standardize the training and organization of the 
post-Marian legions, martial reformer Vegetius, in his classic De re militari (c. 4th century, C.E.), 
observed how each and every legion and auxiliary command inevitably developed its own 
distinctive consuetudinem — habits, manners, culture — which commanders ignored at their own 
peril.25 Even the French theorist Maurice Count de Saxe, in his widely influential Reveries 
(1759) lamented the “variety and … difference in their methods of performing the service” 
between even regiments of even a single brigade. “The same words [often] do not signify the 
same things among them,” he observed. As a result, brigadiers all too often were forced to look 
upon their subordinate commands, just as Sherman initially did, “as strangers to him.”26 
Today, social scientists who study the emergence of such cultural “variations on a 
theme,” which organically arise within all wider cultures, refer to such phenomena as 
“subcultures.” According to sociologist Edgar Schein, subcultures “form around the functional 
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units of [an] organization” that include most of the cultural values and artifacts of a larger 
organization, but also additional assumptions, beliefs, and habitual behaviors derived from their 
fundamentally unique responsibilities, tasks, experiences, and shared histories.27 Insofar as such 
subcultures inform the manner in which any specific “functional unit” of a particular military 
command (i.e., corps, division, brigade, regiment, battalion, etc.) prosecutes its assigned tactical 
objectives on and off the battlefield, they constitute unit-level tactical subcultures. In an effort to 
simplify language, throughout this dissertation they will be referred to as tactical cultures. 
 Though boasting an authorized strength of 800, each of the forty regiments that formed 
the nucleus of Sherman's corps averaged only about 300 men during its first year together under 
arms. This extreme deficit was not due to an inability of the government to procure recruits, but 
rather a combination of constant attrition and the Lincoln administration's politically-motivated 
policy of organizing fresh recruits into brand new regiments instead of assigning them to existing 
commands. This policy severely limited the Army's ability to replace its losses during the war, 
and Sherman, for one, regarded its reform as “more important, than any other [matter] that could 
possibly arrest the attention of President Lincoln” – even more important, in fact, “than the 
conquest of Vicksburg, and Richmond together.”28 But the policy also had another overlooked 
influence. While most regiments did eventually receive a handful of replacements late in the war, 
most remained, despite many years in service, predominately single generation organizations. 
That is, the majority of those in their ranks at the end of the war had been with their respective 
regiments from the date of their original formation. Volunteer regiments functioned as veritable 
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silos of particular shared experience and institutional memory to an extent almost singular in 
American military history. The subcultures within these commands, shared among all of their 
veteran members, rarely required transmission to newcomers because newcomers were rare. 
Moreover, due in large part to the relatively close physical proximity in which a regiment’s 
members usually conducted operations, and to the limitations of what John Keegan termed their 
“personal angle of vision,” which could make their experience of an action so different from that 
of even an immediately adjacent command, the regimental tactical cultures contained within a 
single brigade could be remarkably diverse.29 The diversity of tactical cultures within a command 
as large as a corps was entirely contingent upon the diversity of experience between “personal 
angles of vision” within its subordinate units over time. 
 Tactical cultures were the organic byproduct of cycles of perception, action, reflection, 
and adaptation within each regiment. Colonel James Powell, in his study of the 112th Cavalry 
Regiment in World War II, has offered an excellent model for analyzing such processes. Small-
units do not experience war as it exists in the minds of general officers. Instead, they simply find 
themselves “plugged into” an operational-level stream, most aloof of the specifics of large plans, 
performing some small part in the greater whole, and then reflecting on their limited experiences 
while awaiting re-insertion into the next operation. Lacking any formal “Lessons Learned” 
initiative as exists in today’s U.S. Army, Union volunteers could only reflect upon the particular 
tactical circumstances they had encountered, and thus developed highly specific assumptions, 
skills, mental models, and habits of thinking and acting derived only from the particular 
situations they had confronted together in the past.   Any given unit, Powell explains, “could only 
interpret the knowledge it acquired,” and thus each tended to develop highly specific tactical 
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“toolkits” and skills most immediately relevant to the particular battlefield problems they had 
previously come up against. Specific combat experiences imparted “the context that allowed 
leaders [and the men] to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of their outfit,” generating 
varying levels of collective confidence and efficacy when confronting particular tactical 
assignments in the future. All of this became a part of the unit’s tactical culture, a finite body of 
assumptions, skills, mental models, and habitual behaviors that could either prove useful in 
future operations, or conversely, depending upon the particular character and exigencies of such 
future assignments, prove utterly disastrous. When fate, or insensitivity to a unit’s tactical culture 
by commanding generals thrust a command into a mission for which its tactical culture was 
fundamentally incompatible, either because it had not yet had a chance to learn and develop 
adequate skills, had evolved maladaptive habits of thought or action, or lacked crucial 
confidence relevant to a specific task, disaster could strike.30 
 Although several historians and sociologists have explored the evolution of military 
culture at the national and branch-levels, few have examined its impact on tactical-level unit 
behavior, and none have yet analyzed military culture within the highly focused context of a 
particular military command smaller than an entire field army. Soldiers from Experience provides 
a model for probing the lowest levels of military culture through an investigation into the ways in 
which unit-level tactical cultures, in the form of shared beliefs, ideas, and varying levels of 
confidence emerged and played a powerful role in informing the tactical behavior of a specific 
collection of U.S. regiments during the Civil War. 
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 The Fifteenth Army Corps was born in the late winter of 1862, as Sherman hurriedly 
gathered together all the troops he could find scattered across the vast Western theater in 
preparation for an amphibious expedition to capture Rebel Vicksburg. He ultimately drew the 
raw material for the expedition from three primary sources, each embodying an already 
distinctive if embryonic tactical culture borne of specific past experiences and the impress of 
particular officers. The first chapter analyzes each of these streams of past experience which 
coalesced to forge the character of the nascent corps. It also explains the risks Sherman took by 
ignoring the many qualitative differences that existed between the regiments, brigades, and 
divisions of his new command.  
 The brutal baptism by fire the corps experienced at the battle of Chickasaw Bayou made 
clear the severe coordinative handicaps organic to a corps containing such high levels of 
diversity in the tactical cultures of its subordinate units. As explained in the second chapter, these 
handicaps were exacerbated by the nightmarish terrain of the Yazoo bottoms and an uneven 
adherence to prevailing maneuver doctrine by Sherman’s lieutenants. In the aftermath of multiple 
brutal repulses, the dejected members of the new corps forged the foundations of a new corps-
level tactical culture based primarily upon a toxic lack of trust in Sherman’s headquarters and an 
intense wariness of frontal assaults. At the same time, a very different retrospective narrative 
took shape within corps headquarters, threatening a dangerous cultural discontinuity within the 
command.  
 While historians have traditionally portrayed the battle of Arkansas Post as a resounding 
success for Federal arms, banishing the despondency of the Chickasaw Bayou defeat, the third 
chapter paints a much more complicated picture. A combination of smoke and difficult terrain 
across a broad front mixed with Rebel “shock volleys” to prevent Sherman’s corps from 
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successfully prosecuting a frontal assault against the rudest of entrenchments containing a mere a 
fraction of their number. Though the Rebel garrison did eventually surrender, almost by accident, 
the bitter sweet experience reified the rank-and-file’s lack of trust in Sherman and their 
conviction that frontal assaults were all but impossible. The experience likewise caused Sherman 
to double-down on his own convictions that the corps simply lacked the spirit and will to 
overcome enemy works from the front. This interpretation, a product of the Army’s lingering 
obsession with the aggressive “French combat method,” proved increasingly out of step with the 
tactical realities on the ground as experienced by those in the ranks of his corps. Even as 
Sherman remained fixated on employing massed close-order assault columns to achieve a 
tactically decisive, if perpetually elusive, “physical penetration of the enemy line” at the point of 
the bayonet, the men and junior officers of the Fifteenth Corps instead habitually found their 
tight formations broken up by terrain and deadly fire from enemy entrenchments. In response, 
they began to forge their own informal tactical doctrine that looked at least as much to survival 
as victory. This new “way of war,” emerging first in the ranks of Second Division, emphasized 
the employment of open-order “clouds” of light infantry skirmishers deployed well to the front 
of advancing assault columns and charged with gaining fire superiority while the massed 
formations to the rear advanced by a series of rushes. Once near enough to the enemy works to 
add the weight of their own fire to the active suppression of the enemy, the massed formations 
likewise dispersed behind cover after laying down. These new tactics were in many ways in 
diametric opposition to Sherman’s plans, but they also allowed the rank and file to preserve the 
honor of themselves and their regiments while simultaneously avoiding what they almost 
universally deemed a suicidal “physical penetration of the enemy line.”  
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 Despite this lingering discontinuity between the prevailing tactical cultures within the 
ranks of the corps’s regiments and that embraced at headquarters, Sherman took no substantive 
action to alleviate the command’s glaring tactical weaknesses across subsequent months. The 
fourth chapter examines this period, during the late winter and early spring of 1863, when Maj. 
Gen. Ulysses S. Grant assigned Sherman’s Fifteenth Corps to a variety of non-combat missions 
designed to support his efforts to capture Vicksburg without the necessity of any more 
Chickasaw Bayou-style assaults. These missions required adaptive organizational and cultural 
responses within all of the corps’s subordinate units. The experience of conducting ad-hoc 
engineering projects and aggressive area denial raids into the Mississippi hinterland produced a 
panoply of new tactical skills and widespread beliefs within the ranks of the corps which were 
added to those accumulated under fire at Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post. As the Lincoln 
Administration’s Emancipation Proclamation began to take effect on the ground, the men and 
officers of Sherman’s corps quickly recognized the strategic efficacy of “war in earnest” as they 
operated deep within the bowels of the so-called Southern Confederacy. As intense trials of 
disease and hardship took a heavy toll on the strength of every regiment in the corps, the 
command’s successes at levying “hard war” on the hamlets north of Vicksburg offered a glimpse 
of a possible alternative recipe for victory to those in the ranks hoping to both win the war and 
survive it. 
 The particular assignments Grant handed down to the corps during the subsequent 
legendary campaign for Vicksburg during the late spring and early summer of 1863 were heavily 
influenced by his abiding confidence in and friendship with Sherman, its commander. The fifth 
chapter chronicles the corps’s participation in the army’s long circuitous march from its camps at 
Young’s Point, Louisiana, across the river, and east to Jackson, Mississippi. As the Fifteenth 
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Corps trailed the remainder of Grant’s army during the daring maneuver, it suffered significant 
hardships along the way due to a severe lack of available forage not already consumed by the 
remainder of the massive Federal host. These trials forged an impressive capacity for endurance 
within the ranks, even as the cathartic culmination of the movement at Jackson offered the corps 
a chance to apply its recently fine-tuned capacity for destruction of Rebel property in the state 
capital. Intensely proud of their accomplishments on the march despite constant hardship, the 
men began to grow more confident in the capacity of “our Generals” to out-smart the Rebels. 
Unfortunately, after being launched by Grant and Sherman into a series of horrific and utterly 
futile frontal assaults immediately upon their arrival at the well-fortified gates of Vicksburg, this 
budding confidence was severely challenged and the corps once again sunk into a pit of 
despondency only slightly less traumatic than that which had followed in the wake of Chickasaw 
Bayou. Still, the army had made it to its long sought-after objective, even if it had suffered 
grievously trying to pry open the front door. While the men rightfully prided themselves on their 
accomplishments in maneuver warfare, their now deeply rooted conviction that frontal assaults 
against enemy works were suicidal affairs had been reified once again. 
 Opting to avoid any further frontal assaults against the Vicksburg works, Grant turned 
instead to siegecraft. The sixth chapter examines the long Vicksburg siege, and another at 
Jackson following it, through the lens of the many lessons it taught to the men of the Fifteenth 
Corps, as well as the many critical skills it provided them with an unparalleled opportunity to 
hone. Many weeks spent in the trenches sharpshooting at the enemy works allowed for nearly 
every member of the command to practice their marksmanship to an extent unexampled 
throughout the rest of the wartime volunteer Army. Even more importantly, it offered similar 
opportunities to the gun crews of the corps’s batteries, molding the rifled gun teams into an 
25 
almost surgical long-range tactical tool which would be used to deadly effect on future fields. In 
all, the veterans of the Fifteenth Corps found the Vicksburg siege “one of the best training 
schools” they could have ever hoped for. 
 By the conclusion of the long Vicksburg campaign and siege, the Fifteenth Corps’s 
tactical culture had fully matured. The particular experiences endured and specific tactical 
situations confronted by its component regiments had forged the command into a particular 
weapon of warfare with distinctive strengths and weaknesses. Unfortunately, when Grant called 
Sherman and his corps northward for participation in the effort to break out of the Rebel siege at 
Chattanooga, he seems to have paid little attention to these subtle realities – much as Sherman 
had done before him. 
 By the winter of 1863, the corps could reliably be expected to march great distances at 
impressive speed, even across the most inhospitable terrain. It could dependably sustain itself off 
even the most denuded of countrysides and strip even the most abundant of regions all but 
completely bare if ordered to do so. It could swiftly dismantle railroads and other strategic 
infrastructure and manage the liberation of large numbers of slaves. In combat, its extensive 
marksmanship experience paired with its long tenure of operating primarily in dispersed small 
groups led by junior leaders combined to make it a premiere light infantry force. Its brigades 
preferred to approach any and all direct combat with the enemy deployed in open-order 
skirmisher “clouds” instead of massed in tight vulnerable formations. In large part because of 
this habitual preference, nothing in the corps’s operational heritage suggested that it could or 
should have been reliably expected to successfully carry fortified Rebel positions from the front 
at the point of the bayonet. Nor had the command ever been tried under fire against an enemy 
force in the open. These two major historical liabilities were among the gravest any mid-
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nineteenth century military organization could maintain, but they had nevertheless been proven 
to be indisputable weaknesses of the Fifteenth Corps. 
 The final chapter of the dissertation analyzes the corps’s operations across the several 
battles for Chattanooga in the late fall and early winter of 1863. It illustrates the profound degree 
of self-awareness the men and officers of the command had developed about their own collective 
capabilities as a military organization, as well as the deep influence of their evolved tactical 
culture on the manner in which the corps’s veteran First and Second Divisions prosecuted the 
objectives assigned to them. Unsurprisingly, when the objectives assigned to either command 
were well calibrated for the corps’s tactical culture, they performed admirably. When they were 
not, they failed miserably. These successes and failures only served to deepen the widespread 
beliefs and convictions of the rank and file embedded within their tactical culture. Finally, the 
chapter argues that Sherman’s infamous reticence and supposedly excessive caution during the 
battle of Missionary Ridge might instead be seen as powerful evidence of his own imbibing of 
his corps’s tactical culture, and thus of the beginnings of his personal evolution into a legendary 
practitioner of maneuver warfare. 
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CHAPTER I: “SOLDIERS FROM EXPERIENCE”: CHRISTMAS DAY, 1862 
"Many are fast becoming soldiers from experience." 
 
~ Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, Dec. 14, 186231 
 
 It seemed impossible, given the warmth of the air, that it could really be Christmas. It was 
the kind of day that one doffed his coat, rolled up his sleeves, and breathed in deeply what fresh 
humid breeze was available upon the cramped hurricane decks of the forty smoke-belching 
steamers plowing southward through the drab Mississippi. With eyes closed, it could have been 
an Iowa summer or Missouri spring. Only the sight of the deserted riverbanks revealed the truth: 
this was Dixie. Dense groves of cypress festooned with long waving Spanish moss arose from 
the swamps on both flanks of the channel. Lazy alligators and monstrous snapping turtles, 
perched atop half-submerged rotting logs, watched as the boats crawled past. In many places the 
river seemed to have no discernible bank at all, its waters gradually disappearing as they slipped 
into the darkness of the woods.32 
 By now, the novelty of amphibious life had long worn off. A week aboard the boats with 
little more to do than play cards, spit tobacco over the handrails, gnaw on hardtack and raw 
bacon, or await evening portage at some unsuspecting planter’s landing had dampened much of 
the initial enthusiasm of the more than thirty thousand Federal volunteers filling the decks of 
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each steamer to the brim. Trips to the pilot house offered a quick glimpse of the impressive host 
of craft, half shrouded in their own pitch-black exhaust and extending well beyond sight in either 
direction. The awe inspired by such a sight was short-lived, and the remainder of one’s time had 
to be filled with the usual horseplay, ribald jokes, and ceaseless gambling that were the timeless 
mainstays of a soldier’s life. Occasionally, the vessels swept one-by-one past massive plantations 
“so large the only way I can distinguish them from villages is the uniformity with which all the 
[slave] cabins are built,” one observer remarked. At other times, enraptured bondsmen and 
women climbed atop the levees, guarding the property of their absentee masters from the fickle 
“Father of Waters,” and waved or shouted to the passing boats. Groups of shadowy riders 
occasionally meandered their mounts through the cottonwoods along the bank, brazenly casting 
menacing looks toward the invaders, but never dreaming of molesting the free passage of what 
those aboard referred to, somewhat ingloriously, as “the Castor Oil Expedition.”33 
 No bystander watching the vessels float past could have guessed they were observing the 
passage of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Army Corps. In fact, even those crammed aboard the 
boats were wholly unaware of this fact. Few could keep up with the seemingly constant changes 
made to their official military identity anyway. For the most part, each volunteer thought of 
himself as a member of a particular company, regiment, and occasionally brigade. His officers, 
he assumed, most especially the “big bugs,” kept track of all the rest. This time, however, even 
the highest ranking “big bug” among them, Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, then 
commanding the four divisions enroute to the Yazoo River and Rebel-held Vicksburg, was 
completely ignorant of the most recent changes to the army’s organizational structure. Three 
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days prior, and nearly two hundred miles away at Holly Springs, Mississippi, Maj. Gen. Ulysses 
S. Grant had, on the War Department and President Lincoln’s orders, formally reorganized the 
divisions of his Army and Department of the Tennessee into four corps d’armée. Cut off from all 
communication with Grant, the flotilla had no way of knowing of General Order No. 14, which 
formally assigned half of them to the command of an officer then absent —  Maj. Gen. John A. 
McClernand — officially designating them the Thirteenth Army Corps. The other half, 
embracing troops of Sherman’s own original command in Grant’s army, now led by Brig. Gen. 
Morgan Lewis Smith — along with that of Brig. Gen. Frederick Steele, which had just joined the 
flotilla from Helena, Arkansas, were to remain under Sherman’s command and thenceforth be 
formally recognized in all official dispatches and reports as the Fifteenth Army Corps.34 
 Just sixteen days prior, Sherman had departed Grant's headquarters north of Grenada, 
Mississippi with orders to return to Memphis with the 7,000 men of Smith's division. Upon 
arrival, he was to somehow rapidly acquire an additional 33,000 along with sufficient 
transportation to carry all of them 450 winding miles downriver to Vicksburg while Grant held 
the main body of the western Rebel army at bay in central Mississippi. If successful, they both 
hoped the expedition could sneakily bag the Rebel garrison at Vicksburg and finally pry open the 
river for Western commerce and the Navy after having remained shuttered by Secessionist 
batteries atop the bluffs for more than a year and a half. When apprised of the daring plan, Maj. 
Gen. Henry Halleck, then acting General-in-Chief of all Union armies, thought a force of about 
25,000 men, along with whatever troops might be gleaned while enroute downriver from the 
garrison at Helena, Arkansas would be more than ample. Ever the strategic conservative, he 
urged Grant to avoid stripping too many troops from his army for the foray, just in case the 
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Rebels had a surprise hidden somewhere up their sleeve. Despite these concerns, both Grant and 
Sherman worried that any force capable of overcoming the major defensive advantages favoring 
the allegedly 30,000 Rebels at Vicksburg required overwhelming numerical superiority. To 
attempt such an operation with any force smaller than 40,000 courted disaster. But where was 
Sherman to find such numbers of volunteers armed, supplied, trained, and ready for a long-
distance stab deep into the bowels of the Southern Confederacy? It had proven nothing if not an 
exceedingly tall order.35 
 On December 9, Sherman departed from the banks of the Tallahatchie River with Smith's 
division, and after a four-day forced march of over sixty miles, the 7,000-man nucleus of the 
forthcoming Vicksburg expedition trudged into Memphis. These men Sherman considered his 
“best fighting division.”36 After more than a year of hard service as their commander, Sherman 
was confident that their ranks were filled with “men I can depend upon.”37 An additional 14,000 
of Brig. Gen. A. J. Smith’s and Brig. Gen. George Morgan’s divisions he found in the city upon 
his arrival. These, he thought, “seem to be good troops,” but were wholly alien to him. Like 
Morgan Smith’s division, both were a mixture of “old” veteran regiments and “new” regiments 
of recruits freshly raised during the summer. The former had arrived only recently to Memphis as 
“mere skeletons” until being bolstered by the attachment of the new units that brought their 
brigades closer to, but still well short of, full authorized strength. Most of their green regiments 
hailed from Illinois and Indiana, and had originally been ordered to Memphis in anticipation of 
joining an independent operation to seize Vicksburg under the command of Maj. Gen. John 
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McClernand. McClernand had only just recently obtained Presidential authority to attempt the 
daring expedition, much to the chagrin of both Halleck and Grant, who hoped Sherman might 
covertly co-opt McClernand’s troops and thereby prevent a command crisis in the theater. It 
worked. Having not yet arrived in Memphis to take command of his private legions due to the 
combined maneuvering of Halleck and Grant to delay his orders from the War Department, 
McClernand was not available to guard against the scheme.38 
 Even after stealing McClernand’s two divisions, Sherman was still well short of his 
needs. Accordingly, he took Halleck’s advice and sent an aide southward to Helena with a 
hurriedly scrawled message for Brig. Gen. William Gorman, commanding the garrison there, 
requesting “at least” an additional 10,000. He privately hoped these would be “some good 
men,”39 but most importantly made a point of requesting that Gorman send Brig. Gen. Frederick 
Steele, with whom he was personally familiar. Beyond this, he made few other specific requests 
as to the character or quality of the troops he needed.40 They should be “organized into say three 
strong brigades,” he suggested, “with a reasonable proportion of field artillery, cavalry only 
enough for scouts, pickets, and to keep up communications; transportation say three or four six-
mule teams per regiment; camp equipage full, and at least twenty days’ rations.” He apologized 
for the “irregularity of receiving these orders,” but emphasized “the importance of dispatch” in 
preparations. “The enemy was in full retreat before Grant” when he had left Mississippi, “and it 
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is all-important that we be ready by the 18th.”41 Grant was “ready and impatient” he emphasized. 
Now was “the appointed time for striking below, and all things should bend to it.”42 
 Preparation for such a desperate operation required careful consideration of the mission’s 
many special exigencies, as well as evaluation of the real capabilities of one’s command so as to 
determine its fitness for the task at hand. In compiling his impromptu expeditionary force, 
Sherman thought in almost exclusively quantitative terms, seeking aggregate raw numbers sans 
much qualitative consideration. After all, left to beg, borrow, and literally steal any and all troops 
he could find, he did not have the luxury of being too picky. Even in this comparatively modest 
quest, however, he fell short. Gradually, it became clear that the number 40,000 was pure fantasy, 
and he reluctantly accepted 35,000. When finally all efforts to secure any more than 32,000 
proved fruitless, he grew pessimistic. 
 The lack of available manpower for what he fervently believed was likely to be the 
decisive campaign of the Western war seemed a perfect example of flagging Northern resolve. 
“Like much of Our Boasts of the ‘Myriads of the North West’ ‘sweeping a way to the Gulf’ 
‘breaking the Backbone’ &c. &c.,” he griped to his wife Ellen, “the Great Mississip[p]i 
Expedition will be [only] 32,000 men.” While by no means a paltry command — the largest he 
had ever led — the force was only slightly greater than a quarter the size of the amphibious force 
Maj. Gen. George McClellan had taken up the James Peninsula in Virginia just six months prior 
in a similar bid to swiftly bag a Rebel stronghold — the so-called Secessionist capital at 
Richmond. McClellan had failed disastrously, in large part, the vainglorious general insisted, due 
to lack of sufficient numbers. If prevailing estimates were correct, Sherman’s command would 
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only enjoy a negligible advantage of about 2,000 men, just more than two full strength regiments 
— hardly enough for the job. More than that would be required to merely guard supplies off-
loaded from steamers before offensive maneuvers could even begin. Any remaining numerical 
advantage, and then some, would be neutralized by the sundry advantages accruing to a defender 
on any ground, let alone the twisted bayous and towering bluffs Sherman knew from personal 
experience dominated the lower Mississippi bottomlands. “Therefore don[‘]t expect me to 
achieve miracles,” he cautioned.43 
 The idea that there were also very real qualitative differences in the relative operational 
capabilities of different regiments brigades, and divisions, despite their reporting comparable 
numbers of men present for duty and equipped, was by no means alien to general officers like 
Sherman. Still, comparatively little attention was usually paid to the idiosyncratic differences 
between subordinate units on or off the battlefield by most Civil War commanders when 
selecting particular commands for particular tasks. Though he would later boast about having 
personally known every soldier and officer in his corps, in private Sherman admitted that the 
truth of the matter was that generals paid about as much attention to the selection of particular 
units for specific missions as they did to the selection of horses for their daily ride. “You use 
those which are hardiest, and nearest,” he explained. He did not “know” most of the regiments 
assigned to his headquarters, certainly not those beyond the confines of his beloved "old 
Division." All he really knew was that each "by the merest accident” had somehow come under 
his control.44 
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 This willful ignorance of the distinctive differences between units that extended further 
than merely the personalities of their commanders was in part a byproduct of mid-nineteenth 
century American military culture. Professional soldiers, as well as ex-professionals like 
Sherman, believed deeply in the capacity of discipline and drill to forge erstwhile heterogenous 
individuals into cohesive and functionally interchangeable regiments, each of which had 
undergone a long process of cultural homogenization that began as soon as each recruit mustered 
into Federal service. Casey's and Hardee's Infantry Tactics, the drill manuals officially adopted 
by the Army, were founded upon a pedagogical philosophy of “progressive instruction,” 
beginning with the individualized coaching of recruits, followed by that of companies, 
regiments, brigades, and eventually even divisions and corps. At each level of instruction in drill, 
emphasis was placed on developing “precision,” “harmony,” habituation, and “above all … 
regularity.” In order to maintain cohesion and ease inter-unit coordination, the “use of the same 
commands, the same principles, and the same means of execution,” by all the regiments of an 
army was deemed absolutely “indispensable.” All regiments were to “conform themselves, 
without addition or curtailment,” to the prescribed tactical doctrine. Similarly, the 1861 Revised 
Regulations for the Army of the United States provided clear and unambiguous direction on 
nearly every conceivable aspect of Army life. Volunteers in Federal service were “at all times” to 
be “governed by these rules,” and were subsequently subject to trial by courts-martial for any 
and all deviations.45 
 The objective of such uniformity was not to create an army of veritable automatons – 
indeed, Northerners prided themselves on their army of “thinking bayonets,” capable of adapting 
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on the fly to whatever the Rebels might throw at them. Rather, doctrinal systems, along with the 
entire body of formalized military culture, was intended to impart a kind of interchangeability 
between regiments that would simplify the challenge of task assignment confronted by 
commanders in the field. Undergirding the system, though, was the central unexamined 
assumption that uniform drill and discipline could in fact make regiments more or less 
functionally identical, each similarly trained and capable of effectively conducting the same 
tactical tasks, with the single important exception of quantifiable differences in available 
manpower. Alas, this assumption was not founded in any realistic understanding of human 
groups or how they inevitably and organically develop, function, learn, and evolve. Nor did it 
contemplate the profound levels of cultural diversity that were innate to a volunteer army raised 
and organized as the Union Army had been. Though Sherman might have been mostly 
ambivalent about precisely which 32,000 men he commanded, or which particular regiments 
they happened to be organized within, in reality such specifics played a profound role in shaping 
the real character and operational capabilities of his new Fifteenth Army Corps.46 
I. The Zouave 
 One aspect of force composition that neither Sherman nor Grant were ever ambivalent 
about was the selection of officers to command the divisions of the flotilla. Both Morgan Lewis 
Smith and Frederick Steele were handpicked by Sherman for their assignments. Nor was it any 
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coincidence that, of the four divisions initially assigned to Sherman’s expedition, it was their two 
that Grant ultimately chose to remain under the control of his most cherished lieutenant 
following the army’s reorganization into corps d’armée. Grant took good care of his friends, and 
over the course of their now nearly yearlong service together he and Sherman had already 
become the closest companions either had in uniform.47 Grant knew, unquestionably, that Smith 
was Sherman's favorite subordinate. 
 Although having only known each another for fewer than eight months, Morgan Lewis 
Smith and Sherman had already developed much the same kind of relationship as the latter 
enjoyed with Grant. To “Cump,” Smith was not only his most trusted lieutenant, but also his 
personal friend, confidant, and living proof that all so-called “citizen-soldiers” were not 
necessarily inherently incompetent. To be fair, Smith was nobody’s stereotypical version of a 
volunteer officer. Having enlisted under a pseudonym into the Regular Army in the summer of 
1845, he was eventually promoted to Sergeant and spent five years as a drill instructor on the 
parade fields of Newport Barracks in Kentucky during the Mexican War.48 His natural skill in 
disciplining and training recruits who arrived at the barracks enroute to Mexico prompted post 
commander Captain Nathaniel Macrae to deny his requests for re-assignment to the active Army 
in the field. Instead, he spent five long years developing an impressive command of tactical 
doctrine and drill nearly unparalleled in the Army, even among his West Pointer peers now 
holding commands well above his grade.49 
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 After abandoning the Army in 1850 and returning to civil life as a steamboat agent in 
Newport, Smith maintained a keen interest in contemporary trends in the military art.50 Most 
compelling of all to him were the French chasseurs-à-pied ("hunters on foot"), then 
experimenting with a new form of light infantry tactics in their colonial African campaigns. 
Though their exact origins remain contested, the chasseurs-à-pied are most frequently credited to 
the visionary Duc d'Orléans, who raised his famed battalion of Tirailleurs de Vincennes in the 
late 1830s. D'Orléans's Tirailleurs broke dramatically with the tradition of linear maneuver 
systems which had dominated Western infantry tactics since the arrival of the firearm to Europe 
four centuries prior. Advances in weapons technology, most importantly the development of the 
rifled musket, along with careful observation of the fighting styles of indigenous African 
enemies, inspired an altogether fresh approach to infantry warfare. Though the Tirailleurs were 
expected to master the same system of linear maneuver officially adopted by the rest of the 
French army, the bulk of their training represented a major departure from the European and 
American norm. Beginning with a rigorous regimen of calisthenics and strenuous cardiovascular 
training, the men were required to perform all evolutions at the feverish pace of between 165 and 
180 paces a minute -- double the ordinary "quick step." Instead of aligning elbow-to-elbow and 
wheeling to-and-fro across the battlefield in a compact body, in combat each man was instructed 
to instead take advantage of any and all available cover, maneuvering with a spirit of individual 
independence, even while remaining closely coordinated with comrades dispersed to his right 
and left. Loading and firing was done uniformly from the prone or while kneeling, significantly 
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limiting the exposure of each Tirailleur to enemy fire. Extensive rifle marksmanship training and 
instruction in the "scientific" estimation of ranges completed the transformation of recruit into 
Tirailleur, and his subsequent donning of a flamboyantly colorful if somewhat gaudy uniform 
visually set he and his comrades apart from the line infantry. Success in Africa while 
commanding his Tirailleurs inspired D'Orléans to return to France and raise an additional ten full 
battalions, which he dubbed the chasseurs-à-pied. Brigaded in Africa with rugged native Berber 
fighters of the "Zouave" tribe, the Arabs were so impressed with the novel tactics of the 
chasseurs-à-pied that they promptly adopted the novel fighting style themselves. Somewhere 
along the line, D'Orléans's command was erroneously referred to as "Zouaves" in the French 
press. The name stuck.51 
 Smith was by no means alone in his fascination with Zouaves. Indeed, the entire country 
was utterly "Zouave-struck" during the summer of 1860 when the famed militia Colonel Elmer 
Ellsworth's "Chicago Zouaves" toured the major cities of the Northeast and West giving 
demonstrations of the avant-garde tactical maneuvers.52 Ellsworth's Zouaves, at that time little 
more than a well-choreographed traveling martial exposition, responded to a friendly drill 
challenge from St. Louis's militia "Guards," who were soundly trounced before an immense 
audience. Ellsworth's "corps appeared like a perfect automatic machine, all the parts of which 
were responding magically to a single volition, as if every muscle belonged equally to one and 
the same will," the Daily Missouri Democrat raved. The Zouaves had mastered the intricate and 
highly athletic maneuvers of their French examples, moving with "rapid but mathematical 
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precision" as their lines "broke and re-formed, now apparently confused and anon emerging in 
faultless order." Despite their unexampled discipline, these were not the rigid, hidebound 
maneuvers of tightly-massed Napoleonic battle-lines. Most impressive of all was "the covert and 
fleet approach and firing of lines alternately prostrate and advancing over each other" in a 
display of coordination well beyond the skills of most militias. The Zouaves bounded past and 
literally over each other as they darted from cover to cover, protected by the fire of comrades in 
the prone. The crowd roared its approval, and even the few "'old line' tacticians" in the crowd, 
perhaps including Smith himself who frequented St. Louis on business, were forced to applaud.53 
 With the outbreak of the rebellion, Smith again determined to fulfill his civic obligation 
to the republic by donning a uniform, but this time as a volunteer officer instead of a Regular 
enlisted man. Alongside his brother, Giles Alexander Smith, the two set out to organize the 
“American Zouaves,” hoping to train an especially lethal force of volunteers to maneuver and 
fight just like their Gallic counterparts.54 Initial recruiting advertisements promised service in an 
exclusively native-born outfit, but ultimately more than three of every ten of the “American 
Zouaves” were foreign-born. Moreover, although the regiment was eventually designated the 8th 
Missouri Volunteer Infantry upon muster into Federal service, the vast majority of those in its 
ranks were in fact recruited from Illinois. Their native state having far surpassed its volunteer 
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quota during the first summer of the war, these “Suckers” crossed the Mississippi in hopes of 
finding an opening in the ranks of Missouri regiments.55 
 Smith instructed himself and his new cohort of eager Illinoisans filling Lafayette Park in 
the novel Zouave drill. Taking them step-by-step through the same movements and exercises 
Ellsworth's cohort had performed the previous summer over the very same ground, the 
"American Zouave Corps" slowly started to live up to its name. In the beginning mistakes were 
commonplace, but this was to be expected given the complexity of the Zouave evolutions. Smith 
set each of his ten companies at competing with one another to master their maneuvers, jogging 
them at the double-quick around the perimeter of the park to build their stamina when they were 
not practicing skirmish or bayonet drill on the parade field. On top of their rigorous Zouave 
training like D'Orléan's chasseurs, Smith also required the men and junior officers to practice 
and master the standard tactical systems outlined within the Army's prescribed Hardee's manual. 
He knew that in order to coordinate with non-Zouave units, comprising most the rest of the 
Union Army, the regiment would have to know both forms of drill. As an ex-enlisted man, he 
also knew what tended to motivate soldiers, and accordingly incentivized martial competition 
with alcohol. "The Colonel is going to give two gallons of whiskey to the best packed 
[k]napsack," one Zouave wrote home.56 Any downtime during duty hours was filled with blocks 
of instruction on relevant topics taught by experienced junior or non-commissioned officers. The 
men were even required to regularly practice pitching and striking their tents, so as to increase 
the speed with which the regiment could be put on the march from nightly bivouac.57 Once each 
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training day finally came to a merciful end, the men completed dress parade and sang the "Star 
Spangled Banner" or "Red, White, and Blue" to bolster their spirits. In this manner, the 
"American Zouaves" were born.58 
 The regiment initially cut its teeth as most volunteer Missouri regiments inevitably did: 
on the deadly “household war” raging between neighbors in the interior of the state. After several 
months of hunting bushwhackers through the brush and trying to avoid ambush on foot patrols 
through Missouri towns and along the Northern Missouri Railroad, in the fall of 1861 the 
Zouaves were finally called east to Paducah to join Federal forces gathering for a plunge into 
Kentucky. After several more months of drill and consummate practice of their Zouave tactics on 
the parade field, Smith’s volunteers finally got their first taste of combat in February 1862 when 
Grant moved to seize Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River in an attempt to pry open a water 
route deep into the Southern Confederacy.59 
 Although still a colonel, Smith commanded what amounted to a “demi-brigade” during 
the campaign for Donelson, constituting a pair of Zouave regiments, his own and that of Brig. 
Gen. Lew Wallace's original 11th Indiana. Ordered by Wallace, commanding the division, to 
seize a wooded bluff from the enemy on the first day of the battle, Smith advanced coolly toward 
the objective with his demi-brigade while puffing a fresh cigar when suddenly a Rebel volley 
opened along the crest. This being their first experience of receiving concentrated enemy fire, the 
Zouave line initially wavered. "Try the Zouave on them, colonel!" Wallace screamed over the 
din.60 Deep snow and difficult terrain likely would have undone a conventional massed bayonet 
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charge, but Smith's attack was anything but conventional. On his order, three companies of 
Zouaves broke into four-man teams each separated by twenty-yard intervals. Each of the four 
then spread out behind any available cover and commenced firing back, two men covering the 
other two as they advanced to the next available cover.61 The two regiments of Zouaves "were 
nimble on their hands and knees far beyond the ordinary infantryman," Wallace later observed, 
"[so] that they could load on their backs and fire with precision on their bellies." Each man 
behaved “like any old Indian fighter,” one Zouave proudly recalled, patiently holding their fire 
while “waiting for secession to show its head” then firing with careful aim when it did.62 Unlike 
volunteers trained to obediently abide by the rigid dictates of Hardee's or Casey's tactics, the 
Zouaves "were instinctively observant of order in the midst of disorder," he explained. "Indeed, 
purpose with them answered all the ends of alignment elbow to elbow."63  
 Amid the pitched firefight, in the rear Wallace was terrified to glimpse Smith through his 
looking-glass, the only officer still mounted, riding immediately behind the Zouaves, still puffing 
his cigar while urging his mount uphill through the snow and smoke.64 Intent on making a show 
of his complete indefatigability, he had thrown caution, even prudence, to the wind. At one point 
a Rebel ball actually severed the smoldering end of his cigar, prompting him to calmly if 
frustratedly call out to his staff, "One of you fellows bring me a match!" This colorful display 
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was not lost on the men, upon which "it had a very quieting effect," one later remembered.65 It 
had the same effect on Wallace, who later wrote in awe how the assault "was the most 
extraordinary feat of arms I ever beheld."66 
 After driving the Rebel foe from their positions on the ridge, the dispersed Zouaves re-
consolidated and awaited further orders. His blood still up, Smith lobbied Wallace for a follow-
on attack on the main enemy works at Donelson, but was turned down.67 When the smoke had 
cleared, Rebel prisoners admitted the confusion the novel Zouave tactics had sewn amongst 
them. "They thought they had killed all of our men [with] the first fire but when their guns was 
empty we was up and a firing," one Zouave crowed. "They said that they Could see us lying on 
our backs striking as though we were in great agony and all the time we was loading," he 
explained.68 Another overheard prisoners talking about how “they could not understand our 
drill.”69 
 Less than two months later along the Tennessee River at the Battle of Shiloh, Smith’s 
Zouaves demonstrated their acumen once again. After Wallace's brigade arrived notoriously late 
onto the field, missing the entire climactic first day of the fight, the command joined Grant's 
counteroffensive on the second day of the battle. Ordered to push the exhausted Rebels toward 
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Corinth in support of Sherman's division on their left, Wallace gave Smith's brigade the foremost 
position immediately adjacent to Sherman's right flank. Impressed by the relatively minimal 
casualties sustained during the assault at Donelson by virtue of the men's laying prone while 
receiving enemy volleys, Wallace again ordered the unconventional tactic be employed liberally. 
Every time the division halted, each regiment was to lie down on their bellies until further orders 
were received.70 Accordingly, as they advanced and eventually encountered Rebel infantry, the 
battle lines "lay Zouave style, and let the shot, shell, grape & shrapnel pass over us," one 
remembered.71 Using the terrain to their advantage, Smith and Wallace masked their lines at each 
opportunity by bringing them to the prone behind undulating "frequent swells" that both hid and 
protected their commands from enemy fire.72 A dense screen of skirmishers moving 
independently from cover to cover ahead of the division kept up a rolling firefight with the 
enemy while the rest of the command surged forward at moments of opportunity before again 
returning to the prone. As soon as the Rebels began to reload, the brigade would again stand and 
bound forward to the next available cover, consolidating the gains of the skirmishers. 
 These Zouave-style tactics, Wallace later admitted, were "the secret to my small loss" 
despite the ferocity and volume of Rebel fire.73 "You better believe we learned to dodge and lay 
close to the ground," one Hoosier wrote.74 Another in Wallace's division emerged convinced that 
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"we could not possibly have escaped as well as we did" had they not been "ordered to lie down" 
with frequency.75 Brig. Gen. John Thayer, then commanding another of Wallace's brigades 
alongside Smith, now at the helm of a brigade in Steele's division of Sherman's flotilla, likewise 
agreed that in "adopting this course and continuing it throughout the day I have no doubt but that 
the lives of hundreds of our men were saved."76 The lessons learned at Donelson had been 
reinforced. 
 The efficiency and effectiveness of these tactics inspired a rather singular confidence 
within Smith, appropriately balanced with just the right amount of conservative caution. At one 
point during a lull in the fighting, Sherman later remembered, “I was sitting on my horse, when a 
strange Colonel joined my group, and after some time inquired of me what we were waiting for." 
Sherman “explained to him that in the night Gen. Buell had crossed the Tennessee with three 
divisions, and was advancing slowly and cautiously on the general left.” Further, he advised that 
“all we had to do was to patiently wait until they were abreast of us, when we could all advance 
simultaneously.” He was quite content to do this, still lacking much confidence in the offensive 
capabilities of his raw volunteers. The mysterious Colonel disagreed. Pointing to a regiment of 
Zouaves he identified as his own, he “said there was a force in front of him which he thought he 
ought to charge.” Sherman “advised him to lay low, and perhaps they would feel forward for 
him, when he could knock them to pieces.” The Colonel promptly departed, “and in a short time 
I heard the firing of skirmishers, and very soon three or four full volleys, when silence ensued in 
that quarter." Shortly thereafter, the officer “reappeared, sat on his horse with his right leg across 
in front of the pommel of the saddle and said it had occurred just as I had said, and that he had 
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'knocked' them.” Struck immediately with the officer's “undisturbed, so perfectly cool” 
disposition and his apparent capacity to “comprehend so well the whole situation,” Sherman was 
“immediately attracted to him.” Inquiring of his name, the man replied that he was “Col. Morgan 
L. Smith, Eighth Missouri."77 
 Despite their success in driving the Rebel line away from the first day's battlefield at 
Shiloh, Wallace's tardy arrival on the field led to his own lasting personal ignominy and his 
division's assignment to reserve during the army's subsequent slog toward Corinth. The 
reassignment initially promised a respite for Smith and his veteran Zouaves until early May, 
when an order arrived from Sherman's division headquarters transferring both the Colonel and 
his original regiment to Sherman's command.78 "Cump" liked what he saw at Shiloh, and had 
accordingly pulled the necessary strings with Grant in order to obtain the mysterious Colonel and 
his impressive command as a replacement for a regiment of Ohioans who had ignobly shown 
"the white feather" under fire. 
 The Zouaves joined Sherman's division on May 12, and almost immediately Smith began 
to make his mark. Shuffling the regiments of his division of Shiloh veterans to make room for 
the newcomers, Sherman gave Smith command of the new First Brigade of his Fifth Division. 
Smith's Zouaves, Col. David Stuart's 55th Illinois, Col. T. Kilby Smith's 54th Ohio, and Lt. Col. 
Americus V. Rice's 57th Ohio comprised the formation. Though none present could have known 
it, the brigade represented the future veteran nucleus of the division now churning its way 
southward to the Yazoo.79 
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II. "My 'Old' Division" 
 The battered Shiloh survivors of Stuart's, Kilby Smith's and Rice's regiments had 
emerged from their baptism by fire proud of their victory, but thoroughly shaken and with a 
growing aversion to combat. Heavy losses mixed with the blatantly obvious tactical inexperience 
(and, in some cases, even ineptitude) of their citizen-soldier officers inspired them with a general 
reluctance to pursue any objective too vigorously.80 When Grant was superseded by Maj. Gen. 
Henry Halleck in command of the Army of the Tennessee after the bloodbath at Shiloh, the men 
enjoyed a chance to catch their breath. Though still oft criticized for the painstakingly slow “feel 
our way step by step” manner by which Halleck nudged the army towards Corinth, Mississippi – 
the army’s next major strategic objective – his strategy provided invaluable opportunities for the 
regiments of Sherman’s division to learn and practice the combined arts of siegecraft and 
skirmishing.81 These particular brands of soldiering promoted tactical skillsets that were 
erstwhile unfamiliar to even most of the Donelson and Shiloh veterans in the ranks. Having thus 
far always “regarded the campaign as an offensive one,” Grant had never before required the 
army to dig in while on campaign.82 Most of the fighting during the recent battle had been 
conducted in massed lines of battle on the defense, limiting the opportunities for the employment 
of aggressive skirmishing tactics like those conducted by the Zouaves at Donelson. 
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 Still, all the requisite digging was not greeted warmly at first. According to one Illinoisan, 
the campaign “amounted to downright slavery.”83 Unaccustomed to the drudgery and 
backbreaking labor of cutting trenches following each and every slight advance of the line, few 
in the army initially welcomed the sweat and toil even if they would ultimately benefit from the 
experience in the long run. As it “dug its way from Shiloh to Corinth,” historian Edward 
Hagerman argues that Halleck’s army put on “the most extraordinary display of entrenchment 
under offensive conditions witnessed in the entire war.”84 Laborious as it was, most volunteers, 
still traumatized from Shiloh, eventually warmed to Halleck’s war-by-spade methodology. The 
respite from pitched combat and the apparent care that Halleck took with their lives converted 
many in the ranks to advocates of his conservative approach. Even the Zouaves, whose own 
experience at Pittsburg Landing paled in comparison to the rest of the traumatized regiments of 
the brigade, took heart in that “Gen. Halleck says he intends to take Corinth without losing a 
man,” as Captain David Grier, 8th Missouri, noted. “I hope that this will be the case,” he added, 
“as there has been enough lives sacrificed in this rebellion [already].”85 
 Smith and his Zouaves brought much more with them into the new brigade than combat 
experience and a winning record. They effectively cross-pollinated the still traumatized men of 
Stuart's, Kilby Smith's, and Rice's commands with the Zouave-style tactical culture that had 
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organically grown up and thrived in Wallace's now disbanded division. To be sure, just as all the 
regiments of Wallace's command never learned the finer intricacies of Zouave drill, those of 
Smith's new brigade would not either. Instead, it was the key elements, even the essence, of the 
Zouave tactical culture that gradually began to transform the fighting style of the regiments 
assigned to Smith's new brigade. To be sure, the brigade did not represent a tactical tabula rasa 
upon Smith's arrival. All the most basic elements and formations of skirmishing drill were an 
integral part of Hardee's manual, and the importance of staying low while under fire was not by 
any means news to the veterans of the hardest fighting yet to occur on the North American 
continent at Pittsburg Landing. Instead, the heart of Smith's Zouave tactical culture lay in 
emphasis and even preference for the individuality and independence of light infantry skirmish 
warfare over the more traditional use of close-order formations to push enemy units out of the 
way with a combination of massed firepower and, if necessary, the bayonet. 
 The "Suckers" of Stuart's 55th Illinois appreciated Smith's "incisive, clear-headed way of 
managing things," which "at once earned him the confidence of the men." The impressive 
display of expert skill in skirmish and bayonet drill on parade and review by his Zouaves made 
clear to all that the newcomers were no slouches. Perhaps most motivating to the survivors of 
Pittsburg Landing was the new brigadier's simple tactical philosophy: "Never ... present a line of 
battle to the enemy if a skirmish line would answer the purpose." This very mantra had kept 
casualties among his and Wallace's Zouaves remarkably low while also maximizing the 
effectiveness of his deadly light infantry. He saw no reason why the same tactic could not be 
applied to the command of volunteers who were not trained as his Zouaves had been.86 
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 Just a week after taking command, Smith had a chance to introduce the brigade to his 
particular brand of fighting. On May 17, Sherman ordered First Brigade to advance in tandem 
with the rest of the division in an assault on a strong salient of the Rebel line at Corinth dubbed 
"Russell's House," which was guarded by an enemy brigade. There were many different ways by 
which the position could be contested, some entailing a steeper price in sweat and blood than 
others. In accordance with his Zouave philosophy, Smith chose the most conservative. It also 
proved to be the most efficient and effective. That afternoon, after the brigade sallied out from its 
works and moved a short distance down the main road toward the salient, Smith ordered his 
Zouaves to disperse into their four-man skirmish teams a considerable distance ahead of the rest 
of the brigade, which he halted well outside the range of the known Rebel position. The scattered 
Zouave teams swept swiftly forward under Smith's orders to "advance briskly from tree to tree," 
keeping up a sporadic covering fire for each other as they advanced.87 As they neared the 
structure, Rebel resistance became more obstinate, prompting Smith to deploy multiple 
companies of Stuart's Illinoisans forward as skirmishers as well in support of the embattled 
Zouaves. The lack of a massed target confounded the Rebel officers, who were overheard 
shouting "not [to] run from the damned Yankees." Their defense quickly collapsed when one of 
the crack-shot Zouaves deprived it of its commander, "shot just as he was emerging from the 
door of the house, and he fell dead upon the door-step, with his brains scattered over it." Another 
Rebel lieutenant was shot "through the window of the chamber," killed by a carefully aimed shot 
from one of Stuart's Suckers. Most of the remaining eleven Rebel dead littering the ground 
around the house had succumbed to wounds in the head, neck, and chest.88 Emphasis on the 
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independent and open maneuver of skirmishers, each finding cover and taking deliberate aim 
before engaging his target and "making every shot tell," allowed for individual marksmanship 
skill to be exploited in ways that a massed close-order bayonet assault would have wastefully 
frittered away.89 "The Fifty-fifth for the first time saw the utility of a well-handled and rapid-
moving skirmish line," one of the Illinoisans later remembered, "and felt its comparative 
economy of bloodshed." Still, the two and a half hour affair was by no means bloodless.90 By the 
time the smoke cleared, Smith tallied a total of 10 killed and 31 wounded in his brigade.91 This 
Sherman judged "pretty heavy," but still considered the attack "the prettiest little fight of the 
war" all the same.92 It confirmed his opinion of Smith's tactical skill as he "witnessed with great 
satisfaction the cool and steady advance of this brigade" dispersed in skirmish teams93 All the 
while, the intrepid colonel had been among his command, "managing and urging on the 
skirmishers."94 
 Ten days later, the brigade repeated the performance when again ordered to assault yet 
another portion of the Rebel line. "With skirmishers well to the front," the main brigade line 
advanced toward the objective without ever needing to fire a shot, serving primarily as a tactical 
reserve for the fierce firefight engaged in by the sprinting, crawling, dodging, leaping cloud of 
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four-man skirmish teams to its front.95 This time supported by the twin 20 pounder rifled Parotts 
of the 1st Illinois Light Artillery, the combined effects of the brigade's adept sharpshooting and 
judiciously placed rifled shells neutralized the Rebel defense long before the main line ever 
reached the objective. As far as the Shiloh veterans of Smith's division were concerned, still 
mourning the loss of so many of their beloved friends and comrades just over a month prior, this 
was the right way to fight a war. 
 Even as the brigade came to know Morgan Lewis Smith and his distinctive brand of 
warfighting, Smith himself was learning from the careful observation of his new command. 
Ordered by Sherman to immediately entrench in order to consolidate the valuable fruits of the 
assault and defend against Rebel counterattack, Smith instructed his Zouaves to dig in for the 
first time ever. Although the detail may have seemed a maximally insipid antithesis to the 
characteristic aggressiveness and independence of Zouaves, he was pleasantly surprised at the 
flexibility of his old regiment as they took a cue from their comrades in Stuart's, Kilby Smith's, 
and Rice's regiments. "The alacrity with which the men relinquished the rifle for the spade" 
impressed Smith greatly, even more so when a sudden Rebel counterattack prompted them to 
quickly drop their shovels and repel the assault from their hastily dug fighting positions. This 
performance, he judged, "promises well for the future."96 
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 Smith was renowned across Grant's army for not only his proven tactical acumen, but 
also his unexampled vulgarity. Despite his middle-class roots, his tendency to fill almost every 
sentence with a profane expletive, and to habitually neglect any and all refined social 
conventions, were almost certainly a product of time spent among the lower classes who filled 
both the enlisted ranks of the Regular Army and the levees and riverboats of the Ohio where he 
made his living. When asked shortly after the war whether or not the rumors of such profane 
vulgarity were true, he quickly replied: "That's a damned lie. I swear very little," and further, that 
“the man who said he was a hard swearer was a damned liar.”97 The bond Smith cultivated with 
his Zouaves "could not be credited to any persuasive arts on his part," Lew Wallace observed, as 
Smith was "in speech the roughest commander I ever met."98 In reality, however, it was precisely 
this unpretentious and irreverent air, along with his "compound of good sense and badinage," that 
endeared him to those in the ranks.99 He was a soldier's general, a commissioned non-
commissioned officer, unlike so many of the erstwhile civilian "big bugs" who seemed to "put on 
airs" just as soon as they buckled on a sword. "Under the free-and-easy and somewhat rough 
exterior of Morgan L. Smith, was a kind heart and a deep interest in the welfare of his men," one 
of Stuart's Illinoisans later observed. "He bandied jokes freely with the troops in the ranks, and 
was not averse to receiving as well as giving rough language." Even Wallace was struck with the 
natural facility Smith seemed to have with the men. "The faculty of disciplining raw soldiers had 
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been in him at birth," he determined.100 One Zouave put things more succinctly when he 
observed how Smith "makes us get up and howl I tell you."101 
 Smith also proved effective at engendering support from the junior officers of his 
command. Politically, he was considered "a conservative man," which put him in the good graces 
of the vast majority of officers in Sherman's army, to include "Cump" himself.102 He also curried 
the favor of his lieutenants by pushing aggressively up the chain of command for their prompt 
remuneration during periods when paymasters were scarce.103 In return, "they rendered him 
united support," Wallace later recalled.104 Above all else, Smith benefited from being regularly 
under the eye of the army commander. Upon forwarding his recommendation for Smith's 
promotion following his unparalleled performance at Donelson, Grant admitted that there were 
almost certainly "others who also may be equally meritorious but I do not happen to no [sic] so 
well their services." Smith, after all, was an "old soldier," and thus was "in every way qualified 
for promotion."105 After being recommended once again for a brigadier's star by Grant in July, 
Smith finally became a general two weeks later.106 
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 In the wake of the Rebel evacuation of Corinth, Sherman’s division commenced a nearly 
hundred-mile grueling march westward to Memphis through the intense summer heat. Charged 
with repairing the railroad en-route, the excruciatingly slow pace and constant supply shortages 
bred considerable illicit foraging along the way. The independent spirit of Smith’s Zouaves that 
had served the regiment so well on the skirmish line in combat also tended to produce 
considerable indiscipline on the march. Theft of both Army and Southern private property was 
regularly attributed to the Zouaves, and even neighboring regiments were not safe. For the most 
part, Smith turned a blind eye to this behavior, even joking about it in his general orders in a 
manner that could only encourage more of the same. “I hear also a report concerning some 
members of the Eighth Missouri, which is too terrible for belief,”  he announced in early July, 
“nothing less than an attempt to tarnish the good reputation of their brothers of the Sixth 
Missouri by borrowing their elegant hats to steal sweet potatoes in.”107 In fact, in many cases, 
Smith almost seemed proud if not boastful of his original regiment’s capacity for liberal 
foraging. If his pride remained mostly subdued, those in the ranks unabashedly embraced their 
notorious reputation. Approaching one aggrieved farmer en-route to Memphis, one of the 
Zouaves shouted from the ranks, “Have you any forage for man or beast?” The man answered 
no, that “the troops ahead have taken everything except my soul, and I reckon a whole regiment 
can’t squeeze that out of me!” Alas, one Zouave remembered, the comment prompted another to 
reply: “Don’t be so sure of that, this is the 8th Missouri!”108 
 At every turn, slaves crowded the roadway to cheer the blue columns, and “gladly hailed 
the approach of the Union flag.” Many fell in behind the ranks and followed the army in hopes of 
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arriving somewhere nearer to freedom, assisting the Federal troops in whatever manner they 
could. While anti-black racism would always remain prominent in the Western ranks, many were 
already beginning to understand what one veteran described as “the true relation of slavery to the 
rebellion, while statesmen and generals were groping and gasping in the mazes of impracticable 
speculation.” That understanding would only grow ever more clear over the coming year.109 
 By the time the division reached Memphis, they felt like not only veterans, but “ideal 
Western soldiers; not conspicuous for handsome uniforms or waving plumes, but the very 
embodiment of disciplined, self-reliant force,” one of them later recalled. The men were proud of 
being “dirty, sunburned and ragged [and] bore the impress of their splendid brigade commander.” 
They were “manifestly journeymen in the art of war.”110 The long march from Corinth had all but 
destroyed their shoes and uniforms, and the column was "all naked nearly," one Zouave 
observed.111 Another merely observed, with more than a tinge of pride, “we are hard looking 
boys.”112 
 Spending the fall in garrison at Memphis provided the regiments of Sherman’s division 
with an invaluable opportunity to pursue a diligent program of professional development and 
“systematic drill” that acculturated the recently arrived “new” regiments to the division. It also 
provided for the consolidation of lessons learned by the veteran troops at Shiloh and Corinth. 
“The men were in some sense the [product of the] survival of the fittest,” one of the 55th Illinois 
later remembered, the survivors in every company fully appreciating the importance of mastering 
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those maneuvers most relevant to survival and effectiveness in combat. “The rudimentary period 
of ‘left, left, left,’ ‘eyes, right,’ ‘right dress,’ had passed,” he explained, replaced with an 
insatiable quest for mastery of multi-regiment coordinated maneuver, skirmish drill, and 
individual bayonet and manual exercises.113 Both Smith and Sherman monitored the progress of 
each regiment closely, levying “eccentric and epigrammatic criticisms” to officers of every rank 
whenever their performance failed to meet a lofty standard.114 Overhearing such rebukes of 
superiors on dress parade was “entertaining in the extreme” to the subalterns in the ranks, but 
also set a tone of professionalism and high expectations that pervaded the command.115  
 Smith's brigade, now veterans of multiple fierce engagements, fully appreciated the pains 
he took to maximize their effectiveness and survivability in the field. Presenting him with a new 
brigadier’s uniform, sword, saddle, bridle, and spurs upon his promotion the previous summer as 
tokens of their affection and gratitude, funded by cash donations directly from the ranks, the 
officers of the 8th Missouri spoke on behalf of the entire brigade when offering their thanks.116 
“You found us new levies,” one of them announced, “[and] you made us drilled soldiers.” The 
ex-drillmaster had found “raw recruits” and “made us equal to veterans.” His Zouaves were a 
model case for the conversion of citizens into “soldiers from experience,” and they knew it. 
Smith characteristically demurred. “The manner in which you speak of me in connection with 
the description of your regiment is entirely too flattering,” he insisted. “You were all willing to 
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submit to the restraints of your new position, as soon as the necessity for it was explained to you. 
Hence your efficiency.”117 
 In early November, the arrival to Memphis of several new regiments of “fresh levies” 
raised that summer prompted a re-organization of Sherman’s garrison. Among the most 
important of these administrative changes was the Smith’s ascension to command of a new 
division made up of a mixture of “old” veteran and “new” regiments, and his brother Giles to 
command of the division’s First Brigade. The Second Brigade was commanded by Col. David 
Stuart, originally of the 55th Illinois, an ex-lawyer who had already proven himself as a quick 
study of the military art by his admirable performance under fire at Shiloh. Stuart took pains to 
ensure that the levies assigned to his brigade, including the 83rd Indiana, 116th, and 127th 
Illinois, were trained to the same standards as his veteran regiments.118 On at least one occasion 
in early December, he ordered each of his "old" regiments to detail eight officers and eight non-
commissioned officers each "to drill the new troops in skirmishing & the Loadings & firings," 
these being by far the most highly valued skills in Morgan Smith's division.119 The opportunity to 
learn from experienced leaders instead of merely from privately purchased manuals was 
invaluable for the new regiments. It also lent a spur to the preservation of the division's evolved 
tactical culture, as all the regiments of the new command strove to meet the same standards in 
Zouave-style skirmish drill, and learned lessons derived from the same set of past experiences. A 
brief spring campaign southward into Mississippi to the Tallahatchie River with Grant’s army 
provided Smith’s division with an opportunity to break-in the stiff brogans of its newest recruits, 
 
117 “Compliment to Brig. General Smith,” Daily Missouri Democrat, Jul. 30, 1862, p. 2. 
118 Story of the Fifty-fifth, 170. 
119 Unfiled Dispatches, RG 393, 15 AC, 2 DIV, Box 2, NARA. 
59 
and by the time Sherman ordered his “best fighting division” back to Memphis in preparation for 
the downriver expedition, the command had made great strides in fully integrating its “fresh 
levies.”120 
 The raw material of Smith's division was primarily a product of the "old Northwest," and 
most especially its politically conservative lower belt. Of its ten infantry regiments, four were 
from Illinois, two from Ohio, one from Indiana, and three from a mixture of Missouri (primarily 
St. Louis) and Illinois. Those in the ranks averaged a little over 25 years of age at enlistment, 
those in the “old” regiments having already spent one birthday in uniform. Six of every ten men 
in the division identified himself as a farmer or farm laborer when prompted for his occupation. 
Only 9% considered themselves unskilled laborers, whereas more than 30% worked in a skilled 
trade prior to enlistment. In fact, the volunteers of Smith’s ten infantry regiments had plied more 
than 140 unique occupations before taking up arms. On average, each of the regiments contained 
about eighty men, or nearly a full company, who might be considered to have worked in a 
technical trade as either blacksmiths, carpenters, engineers, machinists, or mechanics. 
Unsurprisingly, predominately urban regiments, like the 8th Missouri (from St. Louis) and new 
127th Illinois (from Chicago), comprised a greatest proportion of these men. Their skills had in 
many cases already proved a boon to their regiments, and would continue to do so. About 70% of 
Smith’s volunteers were native to the free states, and 10% to the slave South. Of the more than 
20% of those born abroad, most were German or Irish. While the proportion of foreigners varied 
markedly between regiments, in none of the division’s commands did they constitute a majority.  
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 Despite these aggregate statistics, the regiments varied considerably in most of these 
measurements. Whereas the men in the ranks of the 6th Missouri were 27 years of age on 
average, those in the 54th Ohio were younger than 24. More than 8 of every 10 recruits in the 
116th Illinois came from an agricultural background. By contrast, the majority of Smith's 
Zouaves considered themselves skilled laborers back in Illinois. Whereas 80% of the 57th Ohio 
had been born in the free states, only 69% of the 55th Illinois could say the same. Nearly half of 
the 6th Missouri were born abroad, more than 20% in Ireland alone, but only 2% of the 83rd 
Indiana were Irish and fewer than 2 of every 10 of the 83rd Indiana were foreign-born.  
 In most measures, the demographic character of “old” regiments and those recently 
arrived to Memphis did not differ significantly. Those regiments raised during the summer's call 
for volunteers averaged slightly more farmers, fewer unskilled laborers, and about the same 
proportion of skilled tradesmen if modestly higher numbers of those in technical trades. Most 
were still native to the free states. “New” regiments contained fewer Irishmen but more Germans 
on average, likely an artifact of the recent perceived shift in the war effort toward emancipation 
— a dark turn in the eyes of many unskilled Irish laborers concerned about future competition 
for their jobs. On a whole, the “new” regiments of Smith’s division contained only modestly 
higher proportions of foreign-born recruits than those that enlisted in 1861.121 
 Although each regiment hailed from a distinctive sociodemographic background, and had 
endured a unique set of experiences while in uniform, the division as a whole had developed a 
coherent tactical culture born of a shared operational heritage and the careful crafting of a skilled 
commander.  As the recently arrived “fresh levies” were indoctrinated into this culture on the 
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parade fields at Memphis, they vicariously imbibed the lessons learned the hard way by the 
“soldiers from experience” that filled the ranks of Smith's “old” regiments. By the winter of 
1862, Sherman's beloved “old Division” had been molded into one of the most impressive 
combat teams in the Department of the Tennessee. Even so, its Zouave-style skirmish-centric 
tactical culture was not a panacea for all tactical problems. It also came with its fair share of 
inherent disadvantages, most especially the kinds of individual independence that fueled the 
pyromania and illicit foraging during the march to Memphis. Smith's command was undoubtedly 
Sherman's “best fighting division,” but it came with unique historically-derived baggage, just as 
any collection of volunteer regiments inevitably did. 
III. The Regular 
 Months of commanding amphibious operations up and down the meandering stretch of 
the lower Mississippi between Helena and Vicksburg made Brig. Gen. Frederick Steele an 
invaluable asset to Sherman's expedition. "You having been so long on the Miss. river looking 
toward Vicksburg are possessed of much information as to the best method of attacking that 
point that I am not possessed of," Grant wrote him immediately upon receiving Halleck's 
permission to go ahead with the expedition. "I would be very glad to have your views," he added. 
He mentioned that he was inclined to send Sherman on the foray, and "would be very glad if you 
could accompany him." He needed no coaxing.122 The black sheep of Helena, Steele openly 
despised and distrusted by both District of Missouri commander Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis and 
Brig. Gen. Willis Gorman, then commanding the garrison. The latter, a Democrat and old 
Mexican War veteran, was to Steele “an old acquaintance of mine, and I like him socially.”123 
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Curtis, though a fellow professional, Steele was convinced would “do everything in his power to 
injure me because I have denounced his damned rascality.”124 Having recently drawn 
considerable ire nationally due to his supposed backpedaling from Curtis’s politically liberal 
confiscation policies after having briefly succeeded him in command of the Helena garrison, by 
the winter of 1862 “Fred” Steele was under fire from multiple directions. 
 In one particularly notorious instance, Steele had caused Federal troops to assist the wife 
of a local planter in recovering several young girls whom she claimed as her husband's property 
then working in a Helena brothel. When this seemingly flagrant violation of Federal policy –  
which then prohibited the army's involvement in the return of fugitive slaves to their owners – 
was made public through a scathing exposé written by the abolitionist chaplain of the 3rd 
Missouri, J. G. Forman, to the Daily Missouri Democrat, it drew the attention of the President 
himself. As Steele was on the short list for promotion to Major General, Lincoln wanted to make 
sure that such rumors were not true prior to acceding to his advancement. Had he in fact blithely 
allowed a planter's wife to wrench these young women from their newfound freedom back into 
the bonds of slavery? "There was no understanding that any of these girls should be delivered up 
to their masters," Steele explained in a letter to Washington. The brothel represented a threat to 
the army's health and morale, and thus he had no choice but to promptly shut it down and evict 
its occupants just as soon as its existence came to his attention. "If they had been white I should 
have given the same order," he insisted. Likely more persuasive was the name of the woman in 
question: Mrs. Charles Craig, whom Steele firmly alleged to be a staunch Unionist, and whom 
Lincoln must have remembered personally signing a pass for authorizing passage through army 
lines during her recent visit to the White House. In truth, Steele’s consummate professionalism as 
 
124 Steele to USG, Dec. 13, 1862, OR, I:17, II, 410. 
63 
a lifelong American officer likely played a far more powerful role in motivating the incident than 
did any pro-slavery proclivities he may have harbored.125 
 Although historians still routinely refer to Steele as acting in accordance with a "staunch 
Democratic background," in reality, most of these assertions of his supposed slaveholder 
sympathies are groundless.126 His formal military education and lifelong professional service in 
the Army had indoctrinated and acculturated him into a deeply conservative officer corps that 
prided itself first and foremost on its fundamentally non-partisan approach to carrying out public 
policy.127 Like all of his colleagues, Steele certainly maintained personal opinions on slavery, 
confiscation, and emancipation, but these private convictions were not what guided his decision-
making. His personal and professional constitution would never allow them to do so. Instead, 
Steele consistently upheld what he believed to be the narrowest possible interpretation of his 
government’s intent on the ground. His public critique of Curtis's remarkably liberal 
interpretation confirmed this. Curtis "violated both law and orders, and instituted a policy 
entirely different from that indicated by the President in regard to slaves," he argued. It just so 
happened that, on the fringes of the re-claimed and rapidly transforming United States, the 
President's intent was perpetually in flux and often ambiguously expressed. In the divisive 
political climate of 1862, just as Steele accused the Republican Curtis of allowing "the interests 
of a political party" to motivate his actions in uniform, his own loyal conservatism was 
interpreted by many of a more partisan bent as rank disloyalty, or even treason. In reality, 
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however, Steele's actions represented merely a course correction in policy that guided Curtis's 
increasingly radical approach to confiscation back toward that which governed affairs in Grant's 
army across the Mississippi and throughout a still very politically conservative Union Army.128  
 Steele remained confident that the more politically conservative components of the 
garrison still thought highly of him. Many locals likewise hoped he would soon return to 
command of the post after his recent replacement by the Curtis lackey Gorman, but the ringing 
endorsements and testimonials of slaveholding planters were hardly what he needed. In the 
meantime, under the far more liberal oversight of Gorman, Union troops had “torn this country 
all to pieces,” Steele lamented.129 He was confident that alongside his fellow conservative 
professionals and longtime friends Sherman and Grant he would be “properly dealt with,” and 
thus was elated about the rumor of his imminent re-assignment. In fact, he seemed almost giddy 
at the opportunity to be free of the frustrations he found himself repeatedly mired within at 
Helena. His only fear was that Gorman, out of spite, might "refuse to give me as large a force as 
I desire, as he may well imagine that I shall not come under his command again if I can avoid it.” 
130 
 In truth, Curtis himself was a bit put-off at being passed by for a command slot in the 
expedition. The victor of the battle of Pea Ridge had “been in the advance, and do not think it 
just right to stand on the bank and present arms to a galley movement,” he lamented. “But I am 
no grumbler. I despise fault-finding, bickering, whining affairs, and stand ready to lead or follow 
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or fall back, just as circumstances seem to require or commanders arrange,” promising to “co-
operate cordially.”131 Accordingly, on December 14, both Steele and Sherman got their wish. 
Gorman ordered Steele to prepare a division to embark in four days, stripping its baggage down 
for combat in the meantime. In reality, whether or not Curtis or Gorman were willing to part with 
Steele or his command was actually of little consequence. Halleck ranked both of them, and 
Grant quietly informed Sherman that, should there be "any difficulty about getting possession of 
the forces at Helena," he should be "prepared to act positively if necessary."132 In the end, there 
was no difficulty, and upon arrival of the flotilla at Helena from Memphis, Sherman "in high 
feather" happily reported back to Grant that both Gorman and Steele had “fulfilled their parts 
handsomely" in making preparations.133 
 Approaching his twentieth year in uniform, Steele had by far the most military experience 
of any field officer in the flotilla. It was the content of this experience, however, that shaped his 
skills, abilities, and predispositions as a commander. Appointed to the United States Military 
Academy at West Point in the spring of 1839 at the unusually advanced age of twenty, he had 
taken quickly to military life. Although “somewhat of a wag” and even prankster in the right 
company, Steele was mostly reserved by nature, and averaged barely half the number of annual 
demerits as Grant and a quarter those of his friend Sherman, three years ahead of both. Entering 
the academy at an older age than most of his peers made him a natural mentor-like figure for 
younger classmates and friends like Grant.134 A remarkable ferocity of loyalty to friends and 
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family likewise made him a valuable friend to have.135 After graduating in 1843 ranked nine 
places behind Grant, Steele was assigned to the infantry and garrisoned in a series of posts prior 
to the outbreak of the Mexican War. Serving as a breveted (due to a lack of vacancies in the 
Army) Second Lieutenant in the 2nd U.S. Infantry, he was brevetted again First Lieutenant for 
"gallant and meritorious conduct" shown at the battles of Contreras and Churubusco. After 
volunteering to participate in the desperate "forlorn hope" assault party at the battle of 
Chapultepec, he earned yet another brevet to Captain. 
 Promotion in the antebellum Regular Army was notoriously infrequent, and thus after the 
war the brevetted Captain Steele became First Lieutenant Steele once again, assigned in the 
summer of 1848 to frontier duty first in California and then later in Minnesota, the Dakota 
Territory, Nebraska, and finally Kansas. Whereas the loneliness and drudgery of frontier 
assignment broke his academy classmate Grant, who swiftly resigned and returned to civil life, 
Steele adapted well to the new existence. A “confirmed bachelor” all his life, he allowed the 
work of soldiering to consume him entirely. Even so, his “fund of stories” and general sociability 
made him popular among fellow officers, and his “very peculiar … shrill, sharp” voice, along 
with his “spare built, wiry, withy, and enduring” features and “grizzly” hair and beard made him 
a distinctive and memorable character at any post. “He was best liked by those who knew him 
best,” a biographer noted shortly after his death.136 
 Captain Steele was at his post in Fort Leavenworth in the spring of 1861 when word 
arrived that Fort Sumter had been attacked, and that the seceded states were in open rebellion. 
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Just a month later, he was promoted to a Majority in the 11th U.S. Infantry and assigned a small 
four-company battalion of Regulars attached to his longtime friend and West Point classmate 
Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Lyon's army, then campaigning across Missouri in an attempt to eradicate 
the secessionist Missouri State Guard. After leading his modest phalanx under fire for the first 
time at a minor but stiflingly hot skirmish action at Dug Springs in early August, the real test of 
Steele's aptitude for battalion command came a week later at the battle of Wilson's Creek. 
Concerned about the imminent expiration of the three-month term of service agreed to by the 
majority of the volunteers in his command, Lyon rushed his army into what he hoped would be 
the decisive engagement of the campaign south of Springfield. Though initially gaining the upper 
hand, a Rebel counterattack up “Bloody Hill” tipped the scales to favor the Secessionists and left 
Lyon mortally wounded. Ordered to cover a desperate retreat with only his “gallant little 
battalion,” Steele and his Regulars stood firm through the fire, repelling successive Rebel 
charges and saving the surviving remnants of the deceased Lyon's army from almost certain 
disaster. Steele's “gallantry … from the beginning to the close of the battle,” caught the eye of 
Iowa governor Samuel Kirkwood, at that time hunting for Regular Army officers he might 
convince to accept volunteer colonelcies at the head of newly formed Iowa regiments. 
Accordingly, he offered Steele a volunteer commission as Colonel of the 8th Iowa and sent with 
the regiment to Sedalia, Missouri, where he summarily took command of a full brigade of 
volunteers. In January, having attracted the attention of not only Kirkwood but President Lincoln, 
Steele was again promoted to full Brigadier General of Volunteers and appointed to command of 
the entire Southeastern District of Missouri two months later.137 
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 Beyond the continual nagging need for vigilance and small patrols against Rebel 
partisans marauding the Missouri countryside, command of the district offered little in the way of 
vigorous field service for the newly minted brigadier. That changed when, on March 1, he 
received orders from Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck to march his humble command into Arkansas and 
join Curtis’s victorious army fresh from the fields of Pea Ridge, then enroute to Helena. The road 
from Batesville, Missouri to Helena was long and hard – no less than 150 grueling miles. Most 
of the route required “living off the land” due to Curtis’s decision to cut from his supply lines 
and make with haste for the river. Across a campaign remarkably similar to that many of its 
participants would endure with Sherman across Georgia in just over two years time, the army 
experimented for the very first time with employing liberal foraging as a tactic for punishing 
Secessionists. While Curtis hoped for the men to distinguish between loyal and Rebel families 
when pursuing their daily meals, such distinctions quickly broke down in practice. Officers 
struggled to prevent stragglers from wandering away from the columns to fend for themselves. “I 
leave nothing for man or brute in the country passed over by my army,” Curtis later reported. It 
was an invaluable lesson for all, and a preview of much to come.138 
 By the winter of 1862, while Steele had reason to be proud of his proven skill in 
maneuvering a division-sized command through the manifold trials of the slog to Helena, he had 
yet to command any more than a battalion in combat. To be sure, his performance in Mexico left 
no doubt of his personal bravery under fire, his ability to think calmly and act deliberately under 
stress, or his grasp of war as experienced as a junior company-grade officer. But these skills were 
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not all equally applicable to the novel exigencies of division command. In fact, they could even 
prove hindrances, serving to myopically focus Steele's attention on the minutiae of combat and 
distracting him from his formal responsibilities as manager of the tactical art of an entire 
division. 
IV. From the “State of Misery” to “Hell-in-Arkansas” 
 Unlike Smith, Steele had thus far enjoyed very little opportunity to make any meaningful 
impression on the seventeen infantry regiments and three batteries of his haphazardly constructed 
division, nor they on him. Also unlike the units of Smith's division, Steele's cohort lacked much 
of a shared operational heritage, instead representing a tapestry of diverse regimental tactical 
cultures evolved over the course of disparate experiences across the Western and Trans-
Mississippi theaters. Even his highest-ranking subordinates, with the exception of Charles 
Hovey, were all but complete strangers to Steele and to each other. In many ways, this 
heterogeneity was a product of the unique exigencies of the Union war effort at the strategic 
level in the Trans-Mississippi theater. Fighting a seemingly intractable insurgency in Missouri, 
all the while confronting multiple menacing field armies hovering around Arkansas with 
relatively minimal available troops necessarily meant that the kinds of concentrated mass field 
armies found east of the Mississippi were comparatively rare among Union forces in the “far 
West.” The logistical nightmare that was southeastern Missouri and northern Arkansas would 
have mitigated against such large hosts even had the strategic situation been more amenable. To 
cope with the combined challenges of a vast area of operations, abysmal transportation 
infrastructure, and the need to keep a close eye (and occasionally boot) on entire communities, 
Union authorities tended to disperse their resources in manpower and materiel, re-consolidating 
them into impromptu commands when needed for offensive operations. This practice 
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inadvertently encouraged the development of a highly culturally heterogeneous trans-Mississippi 
Union Army. 
 The most extreme example of this tendency toward operational and thus cultural 
fragmentation was on display in microcosm within most regiments assigned to counter-guerrilla 
duty in Missouri, including several of Steele's “old” regiments. The “State of Misery,” as many 
out-of-state volunteers sardonically referred to Missouri, was known among those who served 
there as being “the land of long-haired people and ‘butternut clothes’ … [and] long miles.”139 
With only one dependable railroad penetrating just a short distance from St. Louis to Rolla, and a 
notorious lack of good roads, Missouri was universally estimated by footsore infantrymen as 
slightly “better than hell,” but not by much.140 Plodding across seemingly endless distances on 
patrol, the Suckers of the 13th Illinois, the only regiment of Steele's original District of Southeast 
Missouri still under his command, had begun to refer to an altogether different unit of 
measurement: “Missouri miles,” not to be confused with the much shorter and less painful 
“United States miles.”141 The pitched battles between massive armies they read about in the 
papers unfolding east of the Mississippi seemed a world away as they traipsed through dense 
brush in all kinds of weather hunting elusive bushwhackers, interrogating the families and 
friends of known “Secesh," and laying in ambuscades along roads in the dark of night. Guerrilla 
hunting amounted to "some very hard times," one of the 6th Missouri, assigned to Smith's 
division after Corinth, observed. Still, the especial hardship of counter-guerrilla duties also 
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inspired a special pride within the ranks of regiments assigned to them. Volunteers in the major 
armies "don't know anything about hard times," one Missourian boasted to his parents. "Let them 
come to this state and they [will] find out that they can't ride in cars and steamboats everyplace," 
he jeered.142 
 For the most part, counter-guerrilla operations entailed constant patrolling mixed with 
sporadic longer-range expeditionary forays made by small detachments of usually less than a few 
hundred men. Few volunteer commands operating in the Missouri brush maneuvered as a 
regiment anywhere but the parade field. Monitoring and attempting to control multiple counties 
with limited manpower necessitated the dispersal of companies and even squads into far-flung 
outposts from which they conducted regular patrols into the countryside. These companies 
inevitably developed a degree of insularity distinct from those of regiments serving in larger 
armies east of the Mississippi. As detachments were often required to be self-sufficient in both 
logistics and operations, and underwent their own unique trials and tribulations distinct from 
those of their parent regiment as a whole, they frequently evolved a culture of independence that 
could prove both a blessing and a curse. In the context of counter-guerrilla operations, tactical 
autonomy at the company-level could be the difference between life and death. In a pitched 
“conventional” battle, however, regiments whose companies failed to maintain cohesion and 
coordination as a whole courted disintegration and disaster. 
 The experience of fighting a “household war” against guerrillas left an indelible mark on 
those units assigned to such duties.143 First and foremost, the men developed a deep distrust of 
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Southern civilians, no matter how benign they might seem at first blush. In one particularly 
jarring instance, after a brush with bushwhackers the previous fall, one of the 13th Illinois rolled 
over the body of a dead Rebel only to exclaim, “This is our old pie man!” upon recognizing the 
face of a man who had only recently been peddling pies in camp as cover for espionage. Such 
duplicity was by no means exclusively a bushwhacker tactic. Every one of the regiments with a 
guerrilla hunting past in both Steele's and Smith's command had at one time or another dressed 
their scouts in civilian clothes so as to avoid detection by the enemy.144 Fighting a “household 
war” frequently meant deliberately blurring the line between civilian and soldier — a tactic that 
came easiest to those Missouri volunteers operating within their own state or even home 
communities. 
 Steele's division also included multiple regiments which had mostly avoided assignment 
to counter-guerrilla duty, having instead participated in the more conventional campaign of Maj. 
Gen. Samuel Curtis against Sterling Price, Earl Van Dorn, and Ben McCulloch's Rebel army in 
Arkansas which culminated in the battle of Pea Ridge. Most conspicuous among these were the 
Germans of the 12th and 17th Missouri regiments now in Hovey's brigade and the 4th and 9th 
Iowa of Thayer's. Due to their experience with the traumatic sensations of combat, accrued trust 
in their leaders, and a familiarity with the challenges of maneuver under fire, these four 
commands would quickly prove invaluable to Steele’s new division. In addition to these were 
two more veteran regiments dispatched to Helena upon the dissolution of Wallace's division of 
Grant's army – the very same administrative event that had sent Smith and his Zouaves to 
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Sherman. While neither the 58th nor 76th Ohio regiments were Zouaves, both had imbibed the 
skirmisher-centric logic of the Zouave tactical culture that predominated within Wallace's 
division. They, along with Brig. Gen. John Thayer, now commanding Steele's Third Brigade, 
carried with them the indelible impress of lessons learned fighting alongside Wallace's Zouaves 
at Donelson and Shiloh.145 
 Despite each regiment's labyrinthine administrative path to Helena, all had in common 
the challenge of enduring singularly abysmal conditions upon their arrival. The flood-prone 
lowland campgrounds at Helena, which the men immediately took to calling “Hell-in-Arkansas,” 
quickly transformed into a cesspool of dysentery, typhoid, and swarms of malarial mosquitoes.146 
Ignorance of how best to diagnose, let alone treat, the manifold intestinal problems arising from 
the consumption of contaminated water led to a staggering sixth of all reported cases of diarrhea, 
or “Arkansas flux,” in Helena ended in death. These were not the so-called “crowd diseases” that 
were the scourge of all freshly raised regiments encountering alien pathogens for the first time 
before developing antibodies. The vast majority of men who fell ill at Helena were veterans. 
Many units became all but combat ineffective due to the sheer volume of men in their ranks 
physically incapable of duty.147 By December, 35% of the garrison was unavailable for duty due 
to illness. Nearly every volunteer in the garrison was stricken with some form of malaria, and 
thirteen percent died from it. The sensation of helplessness combined with a lack of rigorous 
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efforts by post commanders to alleviate their suffering crushed morale in the ranks. “Nobody 
seems to care whether we live or die,” one of the 13th Illinois lamented.148  
 The only escape from these horrific conditions consisted of periodic amphibious forays 
downriver to the plantations of the lower Mississippi in search of cotton. In an effort to 
encourage speculation in and shipment of Southern cotton to Northern and European mills still 
suffering from choked river commerce, the Lincoln Administration ordered Federal troops to 
provide security for those civilian speculators plying the Mississippi.149 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
given the sheer amount of money to be made off the cherished commodity, corruption quickly 
became rampant. Speculators and traders cut deals with officers of security detachments to 
confiscate cotton even from erstwhile loyal planters, forging their signatures on bills of sale and 
sharing the profits quietly with detail commanders. Few were as heavily involved in such shady 
transactions as Col. Charles E. Hovey, now commanding a brigade of Steele's division.150 While 
most volunteers in the Helena garrison applauded the vigor with which the Army engaged in the 
confiscation of Confederate cotton, they balked at the obvious corruption and profiteering 
engaged in by the officer corps. Moreover, the banks of the Mississippi were teeming with 
Secessionist guerrillas who could quickly turn any benign commercially-oriented outing into 
deadly combat. The loss of comrades while protecting corrupt speculators in the interest of 
padding the pockets of equally unscrupulous officers eroded morale and trust in the ranks of 
units assigned to such duties.151 Returning from downriver expeditions to the abysmal living 
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conditions at Helena, many soldiers complained about how the “big bugs” seemed more focused 
on making a profit than providing for the health of the men.152 “I know that I but reflect the 
feeling of every comrade when I say that every life that was lost in those expeditions was a 
useless and wonton sacrifice,” one Illinoisan wrote angrily.153 At the same time, these brief 
amphibious expeditions offered many regiments in Steele's command, as well as Steele himself, 
a glimpse of the very ground over which they would soon campaign and fight while serving in 
Sherman's flotilla. Indeed, it was for this very reason that Grant hoped to procure Steele for the 
foray. 
 Just as in Smith's command, half of Steele's division was filled with “fresh levies” raised 
over the past summer from loyal communities across Missouri and Iowa. The 25th, 26th, 30th, 
and 31st Iowa Infantry Regiments joined the division without much in the way of any coherent 
preexisting tactical culture. While Governor Samuel Kirkwood’s recruitment policies ensured 
that at least a fraction of the junior officers enrolled within each of these green regiments came 
from the non-commissioned officer ranks of veteran Hawkeye regiments, most were still 
commanded by neophyte field officers. Although most had received rudimentary instruction in 
the basic formations and maneuvers contained within Hardee’s or Casey’s Tactics, only by and 
through the experience of their forthcoming trials by fire would these new Iowan commands 
learn the martial trade.154 
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 By far the most prominent of the “new” soldiers were Brig. Gen. (and technically still 
sitting Congressman) Francis (Frank) Preston Blair, Jr. and his four regiments of Missourians 
who behaved much like a personal armed retinue. Having recruited many of them personally 
from his constituency back home in St. Louis, Blair had already developed a special kind of bond 
with the predominately German rank and file of his 29th, 30th, 31st, and 32nd Missouri Infantry 
Regiments. Exceptionally prominent in both St. Louis and Missouri politics, Blair had long 
wished for an opportunity to prove his mettle in the field. Although he had played a major part in 
shaping the political contours of the early war in Missouri, he had yet to take up a sword in 
actual combat. Staunchly conservative if nominally Republican, he worried about the 
revolutionary direction the war seemed to be turning, but nevertheless would never accede to the 
Union his family had long struggled to maintain to be rent in two. The son of Francis Preston 
Blair, Sr. of Jackson Administration fame, and brother of Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, 
Frank had long been a major figure in the national spotlight. It remained to be seen, however, 
whether or not he could translate that notoriety into tactical competence in battle at the helm of 
equally inexperienced “fresh levies.”155 
 Unlike those “new” regiments assigned to Smith's Second Division at Memphis, the 
majority of Steele's “fresh levies” seem never to have enjoyed an opportunity to train and learn 
from the “old” veterans prior to embarking on the expedition. The abysmal conditions of the 
garrison cantonment area in Helena mitigated against much large-scale drill or parade, and thus 
there were major limitations to opportunities for the few veterans in Steele’s command to 
transmit their hard won wisdom to the newcomers. While those few veteran officers assigned to 
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green Iowan regiments probably did their best to instill the most important distilled lessons from 
their brief prior service into the junior officers and men of their new assignments, most of 
Steele’s “levies” would necessarily exclusively rely on learning to be “soldiers from experience.”  
 On December 18, as the flotilla pushed off from Helena, a hopeful "Cump" wrote to 
Grant that the force was ready to "make something to yield and prepare your way."156 Now, a 
week later, the column of steamers finally approached the murky waters of the Yazoo on the final 
leg of their passage. Ever the consummate paranoiac, Sherman had somehow, someway, 
managed to beat the odds and still remained as good as his word to Grant that he would be at the 
appointed place at the appointed time with (close) to the appointed number of men. Lacking the 
luxury of adequate time to deliberate over precisely which troops he ought to bring with him, he 
had taken “those which are hardiest, and nearest,” hoping as he did that these would be “some 
good men,” as he put it. Indeed, many of them had already proven themselves to be such. More 
than half of the others had yet to enjoy an opportunity to do so in the field or in combat. For the 
eager, if nervous, fresh levies of the flotilla the forthcoming operation would prove their baptism 
by fire, just as it would for the two hastily assembled impromptu corps operating as coherent 
organizations. Their performance would ultimately be the product of a vast array of factors, some 
subtle and others less so. Among the most important, however, were the capabilities, skills, 
predispositions, and assumptions that each regiment, brigade, and division carried within its 
respective tactical culture, borne of lessons learned across its distinctive operational heritage. 
The raw experiences of campaigns and battles past, represented by the names inscribed upon the 
regimental standards soon to be again unfurled on the muddy banks of the river, had been   
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transformed by officers and men into habitual practices, ways of thinking, and webs of meaning 
that guided their behavior in uniform both on and off the battlefield. Sherman and his lieutenants 
ignored this nuance at their great peril. 
79 
CHAPTER II: “DISCOURAGED BY SUCH MANAGEMENT”: CHICKASAW BAYOU 
“It was complete madness of Sherman to think of such a thing.” 
 
~ Lieutenant Henry Kircher, 12th Missouri
157 
 
 Daylight broke upon a sodden shivering mass of blue-coated men huddled together for 
warmth amid the deserted cotton fields hugging the banks of the Yazoo River. The warmth of the 
holiday had proven little more than a tease when, throughout the past sleepless night, many who 
had only recently written home in astonishment over the unseasonably high temperatures were 
drenched by a frigid downpour. The inescapable wet and cold dangerously exacerbated illnesses 
that many had developed aboard the cramped transports, deemed insufficient to warrant excusal 
from the ranks.158 Having enlisted only months prior into Company A of the 116th Illinois, 
Private George Jones became sick during the journey southward while crammed aboard the 
overflowing Planet, but still found himself drenched and cold alongside his comrades on the 
levee that morning. No veterans of storied campaigns, the green Suckers of the 116th had 
foolishly left all their blankets and ponchos aboard the boat. Over the next several days of 
fighting in the bottomlands, the health of Jones and many of his brothers in arms deteriorated 
rapidly amid the unforgiving conditions. In very short time, quite a number found themselves 
clutching to life on hospital cots aboard the steamers. Jones had been married to eighteen-year-
old Sarah for less than a month when he joined the regiment at Camp Macon in Decatur. On New 
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Year's Eve of 1862, she became a widow. “It goes hard to part with Jones,” his comrade Henry 
Bear wrote. “He got tore down comeing down on the boat. So that rainy night chilled him to[o] 
much.”159 
 Remaining mostly detached from such personal tragedy in the ranks, Sherman had too 
much to accomplish in too little time to fret about the weather. He knew full well that in order for 
the larger plan to come to fruition, his humble expeditionary force had to bag Vicksburg before 
McClernand could react to the theft of his command and before the private contracts allowing 
the government's use of his steamer flotilla expired. He also knew he owed it to his superior and 
friend to be on time, ready, and willing when Grant arrived with his cooperating force from the 
north. Unfortunately, although historians continue to debate whether or not Sherman yet knew it, 
Grant and the rest of the Army of the Tennessee were not coming. Rebel cavalry raids had 
effectively dismantled his line of communication from central Mississippi back to his supply 
bases in Tennessee and Kentucky. Another struck and destroyed his supply base and prior 
headquarters at Holly Springs. Cut off from his vital lifelines, Grant and the rest of his Army of 
the Tennessee were forced to reluctantly retire from Mississippi, leaving “Cump” and his 
expeditionary force to fend for themselves.160 
 Historians have conventionally analyzed the battles of both Chickasaw Bayou and 
Arkansas Post only as minor early chapters of Grant's legendary campaign to seize Vicksburg. 
They typically depict Chickasaw Bayou as bereft of much strategic importance, occurring as it 
did after Rebel raiders had destroyed Grant's supply base at Holly Springs and forced his army 
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into retreat, condemning Sherman's expedition to inevitable failure. Even had he somehow 
slipped into Vicksburg, most historians argue that Sherman could never have captured the city 
and held it for any extended period of time without Grant's assistance. Likewise, while the 
seizure of Fort Hindman and the subsequent opening of the Arkansas River to Federal arms 
represented a major blow to the rebellion in the Trans-Mississippi theater, the clash at Arkansas 
Post has received perhaps the least scholarly attention in proportion to the number of men 
involved of almost any contest of the war. Not only was Grant unaware of the operation while it 
was unfolding, but he also strongly disapproved once he finally learned of it, arguing that the 
foray stole limited resources away from his quest for Vicksburg. Sherman and Porter were later 
able to convince their chief of the strategic logic, but Grant's continued discounting of the effort 
forced it to the fringes of the prevailing postwar narrative of the campaign.161 
 By turning the lens around, examining these battles as not merely component episodes of 
a single grand strategic narrative, but rather as distinct and poignant lessons in the practical 
military education of those who participated in them, these erstwhile neglected battles take on an 
altogether different significance. In the end, the battles of Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post 
had a far more salient impact on the men of the nascent Fifteenth Corps than they could ever 
have had on the ultimate defeat of the rebellion. Indeed, many years after he had first trod off the 
gangplanks of the Meteor and into the shin-deep mire of the Yazoo bottoms, one Ohioan still 
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recalled how “no engagement in which I was afterward involved impressed me with the 
nightmarish sensation of this one.”162 
 Sherman's plan to quickly seize Vicksburg envisioned a rapid sweep southeastward of 
multiple separate division columns from their landing points along the Yazoo up the Rebel-
controlled Walnut Hills to the south and east, along which ran the main road south into the city. 
Commanders were to advance at a steady pace, driving all opposition before them. On the off 
chance they ran into more than tacit resistance, “a prompt, quick assault will be the most 
effective and least destructive,” he advised. All were made to understand that speed was of the 
utmost necessity. While Sherman intended the advance to constitute one fluid and mostly 
uninhibited movement, circumstances subsequently forced a series of shifts in the army's 
operating paradigm. On the first full day in the bottomlands, after probing cautiously ahead on 
their approach march and meeting with relatively little resistance, each of Sherman's divisions 
arrived at the murky waters of Chickasaw Bayou and encountered the main body of Rebel forces 
ensconced behind a series of levees that rose above its eastern bank. On the far left, Steele's 
Fourth Division column met stiff Rebel resistance behind a sharp bend in the levee along which 
it marched that guarded a narrow causeway across the bayou. In the center, a single modest 
bridge was discovered in Brig. Gen. George Morgan's front, but it was too narrow to facilitate the 
swift crossing of a force sufficient to dislodge the Rebels dug-in to the hills to the south. Finally, 
along Morgan Smith's Second Division front on the right, a narrow sandbar that extended some 
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distance into the bayou was the only point shallow enough to permit a ford. Just as with the other 
two crossings, the sandbar was heavily guarded by Rebel infantry and multiple batteries.163  
 That evening, Sherman adapted his approach to these developments, ordering each 
division commander to begin the process of clearing obstructions to the crossing points and 
forcing the passage of their commands through the contested defiles. Even before the sun had 
fully risen on the second full day of operations in the swamps, each division established a base of 
suppressive fire with both infantry and artillery firing from the cover of thickets along the bayou, 
engaged in what one of the men referred to as a "sharp-shooting tournament" with Rebels behind 
the levee, while successive pioneer details armed with axes rushed forward and hacked away at 
trees and brush felled by Rebel defenders to block access. This proved deadly work. After Rebel 
fire cut down a series of pioneer details, Steele determined that further efforts would be more 
costly than they were worth. Upon request, he promptly received permission from Sherman to 
redeploy his division from the left and instead support Morgan's advance in the center. Cut off 
from the rest of the army by a wide bayou tributary, Steele's redeployment consumed the rest of 
the day and part of the next.164 
 Along the Second Division front, things were just as frustrating. During a personal 
reconnaissance of the sandbar, Morgan Smith, the driving force behind the division, was shot in 
the hip by a Rebel sharpshooter and severely wounded. Command of the division fell 
temporarily to Col. David Stuart, then briefly to Brig. Gen. A. J. Smith, until finally returning to 
Stuart. Despite the loss of their beloved commander, the change at division headquarters was not 
fated to have much of an impact on the character of the fight. Smith had already made an 
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indelible impact on the division's tactical culture over the prior months, and thus his impress was 
on full display in the way in which the command conducted itself under fire along the bayou. 
Chickasaw Bayou, fortunately, was not a battle in which a division commander could have all 
that much influence over tactical affairs anyway.165 
 That evening, Sherman altered his plans again, personally delivering detailed orders to 
each division commander providing guidance for a forthcoming attack. Though at considerable 
cost to the pioneers, access to two of the three crossing points had been more or less secured, and 
portions of the bayou bed along Morgan's front were deemed fordable on foot. The army would 
launch a coordinated frontal assault on the Rebels defending the Walnut Hills. Just as with his 
initial plan, Sherman's new orders anticipated complete success and seemed to contemplate little 
of the difficulty (one might even say impossibility) of what was expected. On the right, Stuart's 
division was to simply “cross the bayou” and form in two lines on the opposite bank “in silence 
and in good order" in order to prevent Rebel units from leaving that sector to reinforce the left, 
where the main effort would fall. Blair's brigade, detached from Steele's division, would support 
two of Morgan's brigades in a direct bayonet assault of the main Rebel works atop the hills. “The 
whole line will move as nearly east as possible as the ground will admit,” Sherman instructed, 
“simultaneously attacking the crest of hills in their front.”166 
 Without supper, fires, or blankets, exhausted from a meandering approach march, and a 
sharp skirmish along the bayou earlier that day which took the life of its senior colonel, John 
Wyman of the 13th Illinois, the men of Blair's brigade found it next to impossible to sleep during 
the night. They laid awake wondering what awaited them on the morrow. Rumors passed through 
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the ranks of a forthcoming assault, and of the treacherous ground over which it was supposedly 
to be made. At dawn, Blair pushed out skirmishers to “feel the enemy and observe the ground 
over which we were directed to charge.” The reconnaissance offered nothing of encouragement. 
At the edge of the standing timber in which his brigade was formed, an open expanse of saplings, 
cut and "thrown down among the stumps so as to form a perfect net to entangle the feet of the 
assaulting party,” stretched nearly 400 yards to the bank of Chickasaw Bayou. At the bottom of a 
nearly ten foot high levee was a bed of mud 100 yards across with water 3 feet deep and 15 feet 
wide coursing through it. More felled trees overhung the southern bank, making its ascent doubly 
challenging for men with shoes filled with bayou water and caked with mud. Just beyond this 
was a line of abandoned trenches at the edge of a stubble-filled cornfield which stretched across 
a wide open incline sweeping for hundreds of additional deadly yards up the Walnut Hills, 
scarred only by a second line of hastily dug trenches filled with Rebel infantry some 200 yards 
from the crest. Beyond these rude works was a small copse of willows standing amongst the 
stubble. Should the command survive this long approach, it would reach its main objective, the 
Vicksburg road, which sported a defensive parapet of its own thrown up on the northern shoulder 
and studded with several Rebel batteries and yet more infantry. “These formidable works, 
defended by a strong force of desperate men … would seem to require almost superhuman 
efforts to effect their capture,” Blair later confessed.167 
 In preparation, Blair arranged his two thousand men in four regiments into an assault 
formation while hidden by trees from the Rebels. He chose to anchor his right flank with his two 
oldest commands, the 13th Illinois in front with the 58th Ohio following 150 feet to their rear. 
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Though both were long-service commands, only the Germans of the 58th had ever before made 
an assault. The paltry numbers remaining in the battered regiment's ranks after Donelson and 
Shiloh illustrated the usual price of such deadly maneuvers. Two green St. Louis regiments 
formed his left, the 31st leading the 29th Missouri, both rallied to Blair's flag only months prior 
and received only the most rudimentary of instruction in drill on the parade field.168 
 Attempting to make a hurried personal reconnaissance from just beyond the tree line 
prior to the attack, Colonel Thomas Fletcher, commanding the new 31st Missouri, was stunned at 
the prospect. Even this brief exposure attracted surprisingly accurate Rebel fire at nearly the 
maximum range of their weapons, driving him back into the cover of the trees. When Blair 
approached, Fletcher told him “it was certain destruction to us … [and] that we could never 
reach the base of the hill.” Angered by such talk, Blair “turned to me and said, ‘Can’t you take 
your regiment up there?’” He could "take my regiment anywhere,” Fletcher curtly replied, but 
only because his command of naive recruits “do not know any better than to go.” Veterans would 
have none of it, he insisted. Blair, no combat veteran himself, then scoffed and pointed rearward 
to Dister’s veteran Germans. “See these men?” he asked. “They … are heroes of many battles,” 
and he was certain they would make the charge. “They might be heroes,” Fletcher retorted, but 
“did not number as many as one of my companies.” At a loss, Blair tried to reason with him. 
“Tom, if we succeed, this will be a grand thing; you will have the glory of leading the assault.” 
Morgan's brigades would do the heavy work and all Fletcher and his men had to do "was to keep 
right on and ‘keep going till you get into Vicksburg.’” Still, after Fletcher gloomily departed, and 
the reality slowly began to sink in, Blair was later rumored to have “whispered to one of his 




but we will obey if it be in the power of men.’” Whether or not it was in fact “in the power of 
men” depended entirely upon the coordinated delivery of his and Morgan's brigades through 
heavy rifle and shellfire, and all the manifold artificial and natural obstructions, to fall upon a 
single point of the Rebel line.169  
 After a heavy preliminary softening artillery bombardment lifted and the guns of every 
battery fired the agreed upon salvo to signal the launch of the assault, the nervous and exhausted 
brigade leaped from the cover of the treeline and into the open. As soon as the men exited the 
trees, Rebel artillery and rifles opened upon them from more than 700 yards distance. “The hill 
in front of them became a volcano, which vomited fire from foot to summit,” a spectator watched 
in horror. “Long parallel lines of flame indicated the rifle-pits; broad, heavy, concentrated flashes 
showed where the batteries were hurling their iron.” The pace was quickened. “Guide-right, 
double-quick, march!” Blair screamed. Maneuvering his mount through and over the branches, 
he led his brigade from the front while Rebel shells, with their characteristic “sczzzz” and 
concussive blast, slammed into the mud nearby. Rifle fire from as far away as the second line of 
trenches cut through the ranks. Still, the formation managed to hold its shape. One Illinoisan 
remembered looking down the line and noticing how “though the wings traveled a little the 
fastest, and the line curved a little … the front was bold and magnificent.”170  
 Reaching and descending the steep northern bank of the bayou marked the advent of the 
formation's rapid dissolution. Thousands of men sliding down the slippery embankment with 
fixed bayonets while under heavy enemy fire produced more than enough problems before the 
 
169 T. C. Fletcher [31 MO], Undated, in W. T. Sherman, Memoirs of W. T. Sherman (New York: Library of America, 
1990), 443-444. 
170 “The Vicksburgh Failure,” The New York Times, Jan. 19, 1863; Thirteenth Illinois, 246; Abraham J. Seay [32 
MO] Diary, Dec. 24, 1862, Virginia Sigler and A. J. Sigler, ed., The Civil War Diary of Col. A. J. Seay (Virginia A. 
Sigler and A. J. Sigler, 1968), 15-16. 
88 
brigade reached the quicksand of the bed. “The feet of the men commenced sinking the instant 
they touched it,” one later told a correspondent. Struggling forward through the mire and into the 
knee-deep water, all formational coherence was destroyed. Color bearers stumbled and fell in the 
mud, handing off their staffs to any who made it alive to the opposite bank. Nearly every 
officer’s mount became lodged in the quagmire, threw their riders in the chaos, and even Blair 
himself was forced to dismount and scramble up the southern bank on foot. Rebel gunners and 
riflemen plunged their fire directly into the madness. Those who managed to scale the levee 
found a tangled morass of disoriented, soaked, and mud-caked men. Blair and his lieutenants 
struggled to regain cohesion. This “took several minutes to put it in order,” an observer 
remarked, but was eventually achieved.171 
 As the reformed line reached the first line of empty trenches, the Illinoisans on Blair’s 
right discovered that the pits were now occupied by Federal troops from Morgan's brigades 
huddling there for cover. Paying little attention to them, the Illinoisans and Germans pushed 
through the fugitives and over the opposite parapet. This once again broke up the brigade’s right 
wing; this time permanently. As the men spilled into the cornfield's stubble, the concussion of a 
shell struck down the 13th's color bearer, who “dropped insensible” atop of the standard, leaving 
“no visible rallying point,” one remarked. The regiment's many months of sweat and diligent 
drill on the parade field at Rolla, Missouri came to this, a mad dash, “every man for himself,” up 
the slope. “Men were falling on every side,” Private Wilson Chapel of the 13th remembered.172 
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 As regimental colors disappeared amid the maelstrom, Blair himself became a final 
rallying point for the survivors still struggling up the incline. “His sword waving over his head, 
and his hearty voice cheering us on,” Chapel recalled, “we never thought of turning back.” 
Inspiring as this might have been, by charging forward boldly ahead of the command Blair was, 
like the fallen Wyman had been the previous day before being struck down by a Rebel 
sharpshooter, adhering to popular civilian notions of an officer's role in battle, attempting to 
inspire the men and lead them personally through the fire. In doing so, he neglected the role that 
tactical doctrine explicitly prescribed to him, the same doctrine he had been so strict to 
emphasize to the green volunteers of his brigade. Inattention to doctrine, Blair had reminded 
them while aboard the transports, was “one of the gravest offenses that can be committed.” In a 
desperate charge like that in which his brigade was engaged, it was the role of regimental officers 
and sergeants to inspire the men and drive them forward. A brigadier’s was one of management 
and control amidst chaos. This neglect of duty could have severe consequences. Had Blair been, 
as his drill books dictated, “about forty paces in rear of the centre” of his command in line of 
battle, he would have quickly realized that Morgan’s brigades, though intended by Sherman as 
the main effort, were in fact not advancing on his right. He would have immediately noticed that 
the fugitives passed over by his right wing, cowering in the trench, were in fact those of 
Morgan’s lead regiments, refusing to go any further forward. Thus, with little more than a 
prompt bugle blast, he might have prevented the useless destruction of his brigade. From the 
front, he could only run, yell, and hope.173 
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 As the ragged brigade leaned forward and slogged up the slope through the fire, the 
intensity of leaden resistance seemed to grow ever increasingly by the step. The successive layers 
of natural and artificial Rebel defenses acted as a kind of sifter, each barrier excising large 
numbers from the ranks and scattering the remainder from the inherent confidence of their tight-
knit formations. All the while, rifle and shellfire cut down men from each regiment, further 
eroding their numbers already weakened by days of hard fighting and campaigning in the 
bottoms. As the survivors of Blair's formation neared the crest, the psychological and physical 
capabilities of each regiment gave out in turn. The moment at which it did was governed in large 
part by its particular heritage. 
 Thus far the neophyte Missourians on Blair's left, undergoing an unforgiving baptism by 
fire, had managed to retain a “somewhat restored” battle line. Still, comparatively, “we were 
greatly disordered,” Fletcher admitted, leading his recruits through the fire at a run. As the 
Rebels occupying the second line of trenches poured in their final volley before falling back 
through the stubble to the main line, one of their rounds cut Fletcher down. His second in 
command was struck in the head and wounded severely. His third in command was killed 
outright. This sudden decapitation was more than the green St. Louisans could take, having yet 
had little opportunity to forge the kinds of deep internal cohesion and mutual trust that could 
survive the simultaneous loss of every field officer in the regiment while under fire. They 
summarily wavered, broke, and ran through the confused ranks of the terrified 29th Missouri 
following closely behind.174 
 Reaching the second line of Rebel pits, Blair and his remaining three regiments of the 
brigade took shelter from the fire. Turning to survey his dissolving brigade through the smoke, 
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he noted “the rapidly-thinning ranks” but also noticed what looked to be the encouraging sight of 
a column of blue rushing over the first line of pits off to his right. Assuming this to be Morgan’s 
division finally fulfilling their orders, he urged the survivors — now the main effort by default, 
to abandon the scant protection of the trench and rush forward across the final 200 yards to the 
Vicksburg road. The remaining veteran Germans of the 58th Ohio, most especially those who 
had seen the carnage of Donelson and Shiloh, were wary of this. Sensing the regiment's 
reluctance, their colonel, Peter Dister, climbed atop the parapet of the works. “Vörwarts!” he 
screamed to little avail. Failing, he tried leading by example, starting off alone into the open 
stubble. After only a dozen yards, he was cut down by a Rebel rifleman, his lifeless body rolling 
back down the slope to the trench. His regiment became the second of Blair’s four to reach its 
psychological limit of advance. Though by no means routing in confusion as had Fletcher's green 
levies, the veterans had seen enough. Now, only the last vestiges of the 13th Illinois and 29th 
Missouri comprised Blair's charge. Realizing at once that these scraps would not be nearly 
enough to cause a breach in the heavily defended line along the Vicksburg road, and that still no 
assistance appeared forthcoming, Blair sprinted back through the smoke to attempt to spur 
Morgan's cowering men forward himself. He was not yet ready to give up.175 
 Sherman’s original orders for the assault had not contemplated a role for any other of 
Steele’s brigades, not knowing when or even if Thayer or Hovey might arrive on the field in time 
to participate after their redeployment from across the bayou on the left.176 When Steele himself 
arrived with Thayer in tow during the preliminary barrage however, Sherman immediately 
directed him “to render General Morgan any assistance that he might ask for.” Morgan took both 
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Steele and Thayer aside personally to provide abbreviated instructions. “I want you to take those 
heights,” Thayer remembered him saying, pointing southward.177  Greatly concerned about the 
threat of sharpshooters to his front, he also advised that Thayer and the rest of the officers in the 
column dismount and proceed on foot.178 This would prove a fateful mistake. 
 Thayer was by far Steele’s most combat experienced brigadier. Having, like Morgan 
Smith, led a brigade of Lew Wallace’s division at both Donelson and Shiloh, he was the only one 
of Steele's lieutenants to have commanded more than a single regiment in battle. Even so, the 
specifics of his past experience shaped his tactical approach.  The impress of Wallace and Smith's 
Zouave-style tactics at Shiloh was evident in his advice to the new brigade to kneel or lie down 
whenever possible during the assault and to take advantage of any undulating terrain. This course 
of action, he was convinced, had saved hundreds of lives and preserved his command through 
the heaviest fighting at Shiloh.179 
 As all along the line, the awkward terrain limited Thayer’s deployment options. A single 
narrow but undefended bayou crossing necessitated launching the four-regiment brigade into its 
assault in a column of regiments, each with four-men abreast, with the intention of maneuvering 
into lines of battle once a wider frontage became available. With the brigade in line, regulation 
mandated that Thayer, like Blair, plant himself “about forty paces in rear of the centre” of his 
command, but in column his proper place was at the brigade's front. This negated any possibility 
of his directly influencing any but the foremost ranks of his lead regiment, the veteran 4th Iowa. 
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That regiment alone, in a close-packed "column of fours," stretched rearward a distance of at 
least 160 yards through the trees, rendering the rest of the brigade invisible to him and he to 
them.  Recognizing the dangers inherent in this lack of control, Thayer took two steps. First, he 
gave strict orders to every regimental commander to “keep close up and follow” the regiment in 
front of them, and “to obey this order till they received further instructions.”180 Second, he 
dispersed his staff along the flanks of the brigade column so as to provide guidance to the 
greener regiments that comprised half the formation.181 
 When Thayer and Colonel James Williamson's Pea Ridge veterans of the 4th Iowa led the 
column over the levee on the north bank of the bayou, Rebel batteries immediately caught sight 
of them and opened fire. Their shells burst along the line, prompting one of Thayer’s staff, 
having imbibed his chief’s lessons learned at Shiloh, to order Colonel Charles Abbott's green 
30th Iowa, still north of the levee, “to lie down and make ourselves as secure as possible” until 
the fusillade passed. Once it did, and Abbott arose to order that bayonets be fixed and the column 
start forward again, he was alarmed to find that the 4th “had got 10 or 12 rods [about sixty yards] 
in advance.” He had wrongfully supposed that the 4th had also gone to ground under the barrage, 
but in fact the veterans were already in the act of crossing the bayou. “I immediately put my 
regiment under a double-quick,” he reported. But before he could give the command “march,” 
Steele himself mysteriously appeared, shouting the very “further instructions” contemplated in 
Thayer’s original orders. Steele “checked us and ordered me to leave my horse, cross the next 
bayou in any way we could get across, and take my regiment to the right into the woods and 
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deploy as skirmishers,” Abbott later reported. An inexperienced volunteer, Abbott was not about 
to question the authority or competence of his division commander — a professional soldier no 
less — and immediately obeyed. The remaining regiments, apparently along with the rest of 
Thayer’s staffers, followed diligently, and disastrously, adhering to Thayer’s orders to “keep 
close up and follow” verbatim.182 
 Formed in a close “column of fours” on the parade field, the roughly 600 effectives of 
Abbott’s 30th Iowa would have stretched about 200 yards from front rank to rear. Even without 
accounting for the confusion and reluctance of a column under direct artillery fire, the 50 yard 
gap between the 4th and 30th regiments at the moment Steele delivered this fateful order would 
have placed the tail of the 4th more than 250 yards away, through drifting smoke, exploding 
shells, and thick vegetation, from the Pea Ridge veterans of the 9th Iowa following Abbott. Thus, 
by the time the head of the 9th reached the point from which Abbott had diverted to the right, 
there was no way for the Iowans to know that they were no longer following their brigadier.183 
 Unknowingly now at the head of only the 4th Iowa, Thayer and Williamson sprinted 
across the muddy bed of the bayou, over a roadway running through the same captured trenches 
filled with Morgan's cowering troops, and over a fence skirting a cornfield, tearing the 
obstruction down as they advanced. It was at this moment that Frank Blair, looking for any hope 
of support through the smoke, spotted the Iowans rushing forward and mistook them for 
Morgan’s men. The Iowans kept well closed up, spilling into the field and maneuvering into line 
as Rebel bullets zipped through the air and shells slammed into the earth. “Bring your regiment 
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into line!” Thayer shouted to Williamson over the din, ordering him to “extend them as 
skirmishers” so as to avoid massing them vulnerably in the open. This, too, showed the impress 
of his time alongside Wallace's Zouaves at Shiloh. Thayer would "bring the whole force … into a 
parallel line,” he screamed to Williamson, and turned back for the first time during the assault to 
check on the other regiments. “To my dismay and horror,” he later wrote, “I found only the 
Fourth Iowa Infantry had followed me.” Even through the smoke he could see the entire distance 
back to the column’s starting point on the north side of the bayou. No brigade, no regiment, no 
company was visible. Thinking fast, Thayer recalled Morgan's shell-shocked command the 
Iowans had passed over in the captured trenches during the advance, and decided, like Blair, to 
go himself to try and move them forward. “Hold your ground, if possible!” he yelled to 
Williamson, and was gone.184 
 The ability of Williamson’s Iowans to effectively reply to the hail of Rebel fire they 
encountered was extremely limited. Most of the enemy trenches, though less than a hundred 
yards distant, were probably provided with protective “head-logs,” concealing all but the 
weapons protruding underneath. Moreover, many of the Louisiana and Tennessee regiments 
manning them were armed with   either Mississippi rifles or brand new British-manufactured 
Enfield rifle muskets. Firing individually from a supported position at close range, even a novice 
shooter could hit his mark. Had they been comparably armed, the Iowans might have more 
effectively suppressed the Rebel works to their front, potentially decreasing their casualties. 
Sadly, they were not. While the Harper’s Ferry smoothbore muskets they responded with along 
the line were vast improvements over the Napoelonic era “Potsdam” muskets the gun-starved 
Iowa state government had originally issued them, they still put the regiment at a major 
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disadvantage when firing at such limited targets. The Army’s antebellum tests comparing rifles 
with muskets suggested that an experienced shooter with a musket could only expect to hit a six-
foot square target at a hundred yards with about every other shot taken in the calm conditions of 
a firing range. In the chaos of battle, with the enemy shrouded by smoke and presenting no more 
than a square foot of himself as a target, the Iowans were hard pressed to hit anything at all.185 
 Very quickly Hawkeye blood began to run freely. A corporal had his overcoat “Shot from 
his shoulders,” a ball snapped through the knee of a private, and a young lieutenant was struck 
by a shell fragment that sliced through his leg and severed a main artery.186 Rebel bullets and 
shell fragments hit seventeen Iowans in their legs, five in their feet, six in their shoulders, and 
five more in the side. Two were struck in the stomach, five in the chest, and three in the hip. No 
less than eighteen more were hit in the hand or wrist, while fifteen suffered wounds to the head 
or face.187 Sergeants along the line struggled to triage and stabilize these casualties to the best of 
their ability, but quickly found themselves outnumbered. When a Rebel ball careened through 
eighteen year old private William Arnett’s arm and lodged itself in his chest, his orderly sergeant 
and close friend, John Miller found he could do little for the boy under the circumstances but 
place his blanket under his head and make him “as comfortable as possible.” As orderly, it was 
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Miller’s duty to report any losses to the company commander. “Coming up he Said that Wm 
Arnett was mortally wounded,” Captain Randolph Sry remembered. It was the last time they 
spoke. Moments later Miller was struck by a Rebel shell directly “in the side of his face,” 
decapitating him instantly. Knowing that the wounded private was “warm friends” with the 
sergeant, Sry made a point of informing Arnett of Miller’s death as the boy himself lay dying. 
“What a pitty [sic],” he replied, “and shed tears with deep Emotion.” Indeed, it was a terrible 
pity. With four confirmed dead and more than a hundred seriously wounded after less than 
twenty minutes in action, the regiment had been decimated nearly twice over. The determination 
of the command to hold its ground despite the obvious futility of the situation was a testament to 
a cohesion borne amid the bloody crucible at Pea Ridge. Before half an hour had transpired, that 
cohesion began to flag, and Williamson promptly ordered the retreat. Those officers and 
sergeants still standing struggled to get “all the Boys started off,” Sry later recalled, even as two 
more Iowans were hit in the back.188 “We was in the Slaughter pen,” another officer bluntly 
remarked.189 
 The debacle was a tragedy of doctrinal structures, erroneous suppositions, and 
nightmarish terrain. Thayer and Abbott both behaved as products of the rigid tactical system they 
had striven so ardently to master over the previous months as amateurs on the parade ground. To 
this instruction Thayer added the influence of his prior experience fighting under Wallace. Had 
he not been at the head of his column, as doctrine prescribed, he might have been made aware of 
Abbott’s deviation in time to halt the advance. If Abbott had insisted upon clarification from 
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Thayer prior to blindly following Steele’s orders, the crisis might likewise have been averted. 
The fact that neither acted so prudently was due in large part to the doctrinal structures within 
which they operated. The drill manuals all made clear that the proper place of a brigadier in an 
advancing column was at its head. Army Regulations also made equally clear, on their very first 
line no less, that all subordinates were “required to obey strictly, and to execute with alacrity and 
good faith, the lawful orders of the superiors appointed over them.” No note of special 
clarification existed for situations like that confronted by Abbott, and thus, as Thayer himself 
later observed, “knowing Steele to be my superior officer, [he] obeyed the order.”190 
 The problems arising from this rigid adherence to doctrine were exacerbated by a series 
of erroneous suppositions resulting from a total breakdown of command and control once 
Thayer's brigade came under fire. The first of these was the fault of Morgan. Receiving a 
desperate call for reinforcements from a Kentucky regiment on his far right just as the assault 
was underway, Morgan spent no effort investigating its legitimacy. Instead, wrongfully 
supposing it to be authentic, he promptly asked Steele “to turn part of the troops a little farther to 
the right.” Instead of asking for clarification, Steele halted Abbott and ordered the 30th “a little to 
the right, supposing the object of this was to facilitate the crossing of the troops over the bayou 
by preventing them from all huddling into the same place.” This supposition, of course, was also 
incorrect. Meanwhile, Thayer urged his column on from its head until ordering Williamson to 
deploy the 4th as skirmishers while he brought the rest of his brigade into line. Only then turning 
around for the first time, his heart sunk. “I had supposed that five regiments were following me,” 
he later wrote, admitting his own disastrously mistaken supposition.191 
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 Rushing through the corn stubble as sheets of bullets and canister tore through their 
battered ranks, the forward edges of what was left of Blair's swarm eventually made it to the 
slight cover of the shattered copse of willows. Doing their best to keep up, a handful of surviving 
Missourians joined those from the 13th Illinois, but not before three successive color bearers 
were shot down before reaching the cover of the trees. Finally, the Missourian flag was 
abandoned. “Utterly exhausted,” a correspondent watching from the batteries observed, “they 
halted for the supporting columns. None came.” When an exhausted Blair finally returned from 
his unsuccessful attempt to find support, he was forced to accept the fact that “there was no hope 
of support from any quarter,” and ordered the survivors to fall back. “This we did in the same 
manner we advanced,” one Illinoisan recalled, “every man for himself.” Hoping to cover their 
retreat, Federal batteries opened in an effort to silence the Rebel guns, but several of their shells 
fell short. “They were thus literally hemmed in by a wall of fire, which consumed them as the 
flames consume the dry grass of the prairies,” a horrified journalist lamented. Instead of risking 
the deadly passage back to the bayou, many of the survivors surrendered to counterattacking 
Rebels. Finally following appropriately behind his shattered brigade, Blair was one of the last off 
the field, his uniform caked from head to toe in mud with “a corn-husk clinging to his saber.” 
Immediately calling for a horse, “with a countenance luminous with despair,” he mounted and 
rode off to find Steele. “Who is that officer?” someone asked. “That is Blair,” a reply came. “The 
last man to leave the hill.”192 
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 Before the war, most military theorists prophesied that the increased range and accuracy 
of rifled muskets and artillery would render massed frontal assaults all but completely suicidal. 
Any mass of men boldly charging across open ground would inevitably be destroyed in detail 
and eroded by the long-range fire of a defender long before even approaching their objective, 
professionals argued. This tactic, leveraging the distinct technological advantages of modern 
rifled weaponry, constituted an attritional defense.193 If a defender could dissolve an attacking 
force with a combination of obstacles and fire as it approached, he could rob it of its vital mass 
and render it harmless upon its final arrival at the point of attack. The bloody failures of Blair's 
and Thayer's brigades seemed to bear this out. 
 The key to any frontal bayonet charge was to deliver an overwhelming mass of men onto 
a weak portion of an enemy line, so as to physically punch a hole through the defenders. 
Brigades usually made such an attack arrayed in at least two rows of regimental battle lines 
known as an “assault column.” The formation anticipated a breach caused by the front-rank 
regiments which could be promptly exploited by those following behind. Additional units held in 
reserve could likewise be fed “into the breach” in order to further capitalize on any breakthrough. 
The key to success in making an assault against an opponent relying upon an attritional defense 
was ensuring maximal speed of forward momentum (so as to reduce time under fire) and 
maintaining coordination with adjacent formations as they endured the inevitable storm of lead 
cutting across "no man's land." Whereas vicious terrain had robbed both Blair and Thayer of the 
first of these prerequisites, slowing their advance and giving Rebel gunners and infantry more 
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time to erode their assaulting lines, their own inexperience and individual predispositions had 
undermined the second. Only speed and coordination could ensure that an attacking force fell 
upon its objective with a force superior to that defending it.194 Otherwise, attackers would 
inevitably be destroyed in detail, just as the antebellum prophesies had foretold.  
 In any case, the greater the aggregate numbers within an assault column the better. Losses 
sustained while enroute to an objective were damaging to an extent proportionate to the 
respective size and condition of the assaulting and defending forces. Circumstance and recent 
experience had significantly undermined both brigades in these regards. While Blair's and 
Thayer's new regiments had originally boasted some of the highest numbers present for duty in 
Sherman's army, a week-long passage aboard cramped disease-infested steamers, days of 
campaigning unprotected through the frigid rain and dropping temperatures in the Yazoo 
bottoms, and the fierce "sharp-shooting tournament" that raged along the bayou rapidly robbed 
the men of their stamina, health, and morale. By the time both brigadiers received their orders 
from Sherman's headquarters to prepare for the main assault, their commands were in the worst 
condition they had yet reached since disembarking onto the Mississippi mud. Indeed, Sherman's 
disregard for these human factors when planning the assault was perhaps the most damning 
evidence of his lack of attention to nuance within his new corps. 
 Beyond a small working detail drawn by Stuart from the 116th Illinois to clear 
obstructions barring access to the sandbar on Sherman's right the night prior to the assault, Giles 
Smith's brigade had remained in reserve throughout the three previous days of operations. From 
their position in the division column behind Stuart's line, much of the battle thus far had only 
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revealed itself to them in the form of artillery teams rushing by on their way to the front and the 
sound of rattling musketry filtering back. Henry Bear of the 116th Illinois intuited that the 
division was “feeling for his [the enemy's flank]” after the first day's approach march, and 
assumed the brigade would “go for them in the morning.” Bear and his comrades could “hear the 
cannon roar very heavy” to their front and left. The Rebels were evidently “on a larg[e] hill this 
side of the town [Vicksburg] with rifle pits and heavy fortifycations [sic] scattered ev[e]ry 
where.” As more rumors filtered back to the regiment, the situation at hand seemed more and 
more daunting. “They have a heavy force here,” Bear noted in his running commentary, adding 
that: “They will be hard to whip here.”195 More rumors came to the brigade that night, including 
one that startled Smith's Regulars, suggesting Rebel cavalry was sallying across a bridge to their 
front and riding down upon the unprepared line in the darkness. Dawn, of course, would prove 
that there was no Rebel cavalry. It would also prove, far more vividly, that there was no 
bridge.196 
 By the morning of Sherman's planned main assault, even privates like Bear had come to 
the conclusion that “Gen Grant is not here yet and may not get here.” The sound of artillery and 
rifle fire to the front had increased markedly in intensity and the anxious Suckers “feel the time 
has come for a great battle” into which they “may be called in any moment.”197 When their 
severely wounded and deeply beloved division commander was carried past on the evacuation 
route to the boats, the seriousness of the situation was underlined further. Though having known 
him for but a short time, the green Illinoisans sensed the passion their brother regiments 
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maintained for Morgan Smith. His wounding “throwed a damper on the whole army,” Bear 
noted.198 
 At some point during the division's “sharp-shooting tournament” Giles Smith, no doubt 
significantly shaken by his brother's plight, joined Lt. Col. James Blood of the 6th Missouri in a 
personal reconnaissance of the ground he anticipated moving the brigade onto once inevitably 
ordered to relieve Stuart at the sandbar. What he saw was not inspiring. “I found, with the 
exception of some fallen timber close down to the bank, a comparatively dry and unobstructed 
crossing until the opposite bank was gained,” he noted, “which was found to be from 20 to 25 
feet high and very steep.” Provided a force could conceivably make it across and over the levee, 
they would be forced to contend with an enemy of unknown size and character, as the Rebels 
opposite the division were “so securely posted that their existence there in force was not known,” 
he later reported. Although a heavy skirmish fire had been kept up over the entire course of the 
day, none could be absolutely certain that the force confronting them was comparable in size to 
their own. Regardless, however, as Smith noted, the sandbar itself “was from 60 to 80 yards in 
length and only wide enough for a regiment to march by the flank,” meaning that numbers in 
such a scenario would be of little tactical value.199 
 Nevertheless, early on the morning of December 29, after digesting Sherman's assault 
orders for the entire army the previous evening, temporary acting division commander Brig. Gen. 
A. J. Smith ordered Giles Smith's fresh brigade forward to relieve Stuart, and prepare “to cross 
the bayou and gain the hills on the opposite side.”200 Accordingly, Smith deployed his brigade in 
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line of battle from right to left: 6th Missouri, 8th Missouri (“American Zouaves”), 116th Illinois, 
and 13th U.S. Regulars, and moved forward to relieve Stuart, who left the relatively fresh 
veterans of the 57th Ohio scattered behind cover along the bayou to continue their sharpshooting 
during the assault.201 Along with these Buckeyes, Smith deployed his yet raw Regular recruits to 
add their own sharpshooting to the brigade's base of suppressive fire. Anxious to take on live 
Rebels for the first time, the 13th U.S. rushed quickly into position in their four-man skirmish 
teams. Major Daniel Chase, a long-service professional soldier then commanding the Regulars, 
“instead of saying 'Go in boys,' and making himself general file-closer to his men,” one Regular 
remembered, “always used to say 'Come on, boys; follow me,” and they did, deploying “close 
down to the bank” behind what cover they could find, and joining the Ohioans in skimming the 
top of the levee at will whenever Rebel heads showed themselves.202 Bear and the 116th Illinois, 
along with Smith's beloved Zouaves, were deployed in column down the road – Bear referred to 
it as “in a string” – in preparation to exploit any breach.203 
 In plotting his attack, Smith showed the unmistakable influence of his brother's 
conservative Zouave-style tactical philosophy, as well as the many lessons learned at Donelson, 
Shiloh, and Corinth that had each engendered an especial concern for strictly and efficiently 
limiting the number of troops placed into harm's way. Instead of boldly rushing a massed column 
over the bar and carrying the levee with cold steel in popular pictorial fashion, he opted to open 
the assault by sending only a single company of Blood's Missourians, along with “a working 
party of 20 men” to “cross and try to construct a road up the [opposite] bank.” Once the men had 
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rushed across the sandbar to the relative safety of the opposite bank under the covering fire of 
their comrades dispersed as skirmishers, they would begin to undermine the levee so as to 
collapse part of it into the bayou and create a rude ramp which the remainder of the regiment – 
and then brigade – could use to rush over the steep embankment in the manner of a breach. After 
Blood had hurried his Missourians over the bar and through the breach, the veteran Zouaves 
would follow, followed by the green 116th Illinois and the equally green Regulars. All of this 
would unfold in sequence at Sherman's prescribed signal for the army's main assault: “heavy 
firing from General Morgan's division,” Smith later reported.204 
 Unlike with Frank Blair's and John Thayer's massed frontal assaults on Sherman's left, 
effecting these dispositions and setting the attack in motion marked the real limits of Smith's 
ability to directly impact the engagement via his personal leadership. Presumably, if Blood's 
spearhead was successful in creating a breach, he planned to lead the brigade across the sandbar 
and over the levee in person, but for now all he could do was anxiously observe the prosecution 
of his plans through a looking glass from cover along the bayou bank. To be sure, his ability to 
provide for eventualities by adaptation was far greater than that of a division or army 
commander. Ordering additional weight onto the point of attack could be accomplished fairly 
simply, but in the absence of a breach such a deployment could be disastrous. Ultimately, any 
quick adjustments to the tip of his spear, any micromanagement of the elements of his command 
in contact with the enemy, remained mostly out of his grasp. 
 Even from his position, Bear could see clearly how the few obstructions still blocking the 
route to the sandbar extended to within 60 yards of the Rebel riflemen, who were ensconced 
behind the levee along the opposite bank, and that after clearing these “there was [still] a 
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distance of [another] Sixty yards open space before we could get to their bre[a]st works which 
was nothing more than the levee.” The single narrow approach would mean that “their whole fire 
could be centered [on the attackers], and we had to file through just as if we war [sic] going 
through a gate.” Even with most of the brigade attempting “to pick them off as they stuck their 
heads up to shoot as our men crossed the Byeau,” the maneuver would be “a hazardous 
undertaking sure.”205 
 In many ways the 6th Missouri was a natural choice to lead the attack. Smith had 
assigned the regiment to the far right flank of the brigade line, placing it in the lead of any 
column stepping off with the customary “by the right flank” – an order running counter to best 
practice in the antebellum Army but straight-forward enough that volunteers could easily 
understand it. Precisely why Smith had chosen to anchor his right with the Missourians is 
unclear. As with every regiment in Sherman's command, Blood's cohort was markedly 
understrength due to the long-term attritional effects of 19 months spent in uniform, mostly 
hunting guerillas, combined with the miserable conditions recently faced, first packed aboard the 
transports, then sopping wet and freezing in the swamps. Though unfortunately the regimental 
morning reports from December 29 do not survive, fragments of several company-level reports 
are extant, their extrapolated average suggesting that the regiment probably had a fighting 
strength of about 500 men that day. This made them the largest “old” regiment in the brigade of 
probably somewhere near 2,000 men in total. From front to rear, the regiment in column, if 
tightly dressed, would have stretched over 150 yards – exceeding the width of the bayou by more 
than a hundred yards. If launched splashing across the water before a clear breach was affected, 
the narrow band of cover provided by the levee on the south bank would force the regiment to 
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spread out further, necessitating at least 250 yards of muddy bayou silt in which to crowd for 
survival. Ideally, the work detail would be able to dig through the levee and effect a gap wide 
enough to exploit with an assault. At minimum, it needed to erode or undermine the bank, which 
was estimated at about 12 feet high, before there was any hope of an attacking column 
preventing itself from being trapped under fire at the steep levee's base like an attacking 
Medieval army caught in the meurtrière of a castle gateway.206 
 Though now less than half its original strength, the 6th remained a distinctive component 
of Smith’s brigade. Nearly half of its original enlistees were born abroad, most in Ireland. This 
made the regiment by far the most proportionately Irish command in the division. While 
probably playing little part in Smith's decision to assign the regiment to the most labor-intensive 
portion of the attack, the association of thankless, dangerous, and backbreaking work with the 
kinds of lower-class Irish immigrants that filled Blood's ranks was widespread in mid-century 
American society. The command did not enjoy a disproportionate number of recruits from 
peacetime technical trades like engineering, but in fact its original enlistees hailed from an array 
of different non-agricultural occupations second only in scope and diversity to the Zouaves. 
Granted, little in the way of technical skill would be required in the feverish spadework ahead.207 
 When the guns first became audible on the left, the Missourian spearhead detail set out on 
its deadly mission. Regulars and Ohioans redoubled their fire on the top of the levee as the men 
debouched from the cover of the trees onto the open sandbar and rushed for their lives to the 
cover of the opposite bank. Rebel balls immediately filled the crisp air. Despite the protective 
blanket of fire, several never made it. Those who did immediately began to dig away at the levee. 
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Enemy rounds, several fired blindly over the levee parapet, wildly overshot their mark and sped 
balls into the brush near Bear and the anxiously waiting 116th Illinois. “We all fell to our 
bellies,” he remembered.208 
 Watching the working party struggle against the odds to erode the levee before being 
discovered and eradicated by the Rebels immediately above them behind the parapet, Smith 
“discovered a narrow, winding path up the opposite bank about 100 yards to the left and 
sufficiently wide for 2 men to march abreast.” This would do in a pinch. “I immediately ordered 
the Sixth to cross,” he reported, and so they did.209 At its head, Blood led his loyal guerrilla 
hunters in a rush across the bar to the relative cover of the levee embankment, halting while 
struggling to find the path identified by their brigadier. “The balls played fine Music around our 
ears,” John Mains of the regiment later wrote. “They Had breastworks and we Had none [but] we 
gave them the Best we know how.”210 As Blood searched for the path, the working party 
continued to dig feverishly, knowing that the Rebels now knew full well what was happening. 
When a spent ball from a Rebel musket slapped into Blood's chest and injured him 
“considerably,” the officer required the assistance of two other Missourians to so much as remain 
on his feet, but refused to leave his regiment.211 Worse yet, when word finally made it across the 
Rebel line that an entire Yankee regiment was trapped under the levee embankment, all hell 
broke loose. Mains was close enough to hear the Rebels screaming about “the damned yankee 
sons of bitches” as several held their rifles vertically over the top of the levee and fired blindly 
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downward into the throng to deadly effect. Others tossed cornbread to mock the attackers dying 
below.212 
 Unable to respond in kind, members of the working party tried to slap at the enemy 
muzzles with their spades while others attempted to “shoot the end of their guns of[f],” but the 
slaughter continued unabated.213 After having poured in a rapid fire of shell with uncut fuze “for 
fear of endangering the infantry in front” for an hour as the working party mined the levee, 
Captain Peter Woods's supporting Illinoisan battery silenced so as to prevent committing 
fratricide.214 This left it to small arms alone to suppress the Rebel defenses, which very quickly 
brought their own erstwhile silent artillery batteries back into action. Unfortunately, attempting 
to skim the parapet with rifle balls without striking their cowering comrades left a narrow band 
of only several feet above the heads of the Missourians into which suppressive fire could safely 
be aimed. Inevitably, probably most especially from the muzzles of the inexperienced Regulars, 
many shots fell short, wounding and even killing their brothers in arms. “We could hear them 
exclaim for to 'shoot higher, for God's sake – shoot higher!'” one Ohioan on the north bank 
vividly remembered. Hearing these desperate cries, Rebel voices from behind the levee 
sardonically screamed to instead “Shute Low[er]!”215 Watching the desperate episode unfold in 
front of them, within 80 yards but unable to fire “for fear of hitting our men,” Bear could only 
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lament that it “was hard to see the brave boys of the Sixth Missouri die,” taking solace in the fact 
that “those that are dead are out of their misery.”216 
 From Giles Smith's position on the north bank, he could tell the Rebels “were now being 
heavily re-enforced,” and a “battery of four guns was placed not over 40 yards from where we 
were digging through the levee.” To send any further regiments across would clearly have only 
contributed to the slaughter. “To attempt a charge up such a defended position in two ranks I 
considered utterly impracticable,” he later reported, and thus at that moment his actions focused 
not on forcing a breach, but on effecting the withdrawal of Blood's embattled Missourians before 
they were wholly exterminated. His ability to identify the contingency, and take immediate 
action to address it stood in sharp contrast to Blair's and Thayer's impetuosity on Sherman's left. 
Instead of frantically wandering the battlefield in search of support, he calmly ordered the 
Zouaves into the brush alongside the Regulars and Ohioans as sharpshooters to contribute further 
weight to the covering suppressive fire.217 The Illinoisans he left on their bellies. “I wish you 
folks at home could have seen the 116th hug the ground for more than half a day,” Bear later 
commented. “It would make you laugh sure but there was no fun in it. We did not dare stick our 
heads up.”218 Overshot enemy rounds landed everywhere nearby. “Wonder full [sic] to relate the 
balls did not kill any of us,” he wrote. “I cant tell how it came for they [s]truck all around, right 
in front of my head and over our backs into the trees and bushes.” One spent buckshot from a 
Rebel shotgun “hit me on the leg but did not hurt me,” he explained. Another cut through a 
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comrade's overcoat “just missing a fellows head.” While it was technically the rear, Bear found it 
“a hot place sure.”219 
 As the afternoon turned to evening and the sounds of battle on the left died down, it 
began to rain.220 The added weight and accurate fire of the Zouaves to the base of fire 
temporarily muted much of the Rebel willingness to harass the traumatized Missourians at the 
base of the levee, but extraction was still out of the question even in the fading daylight. Sending 
an order across to Blood to return under cover of darkness, Smith ordered the entire line to 
redouble its fire again at dusk in order to enable the recrossing once the sun dipped below the 
trees. With the Zouaves “fireing as hard as they could,” Bear wrote, the survivors eventually 
made their way back across the sandbar in small squads, Blood along with them supported by 
two of his men.221 The regiment had lost 14 killed and 43 wounded, including two officers, one 
dead and another, Blood, wounded.222 Providing covering fire had not been without its dangers. 
The Regulars sustained their first combat death along with twelve men wounded as they fired on 
the levee, while the Zouaves, despite their brief tenure on the line, suffered three wounds. Even 
Bear's 116th, though mostly superficial, sustained five men lightly wounded. In total, Smith's 
brigade had sustained 78 casualties during the assault – 15 of whom were dead. The brigade 
withdrew from the woods guarding the crossing and moved back about a hundred yards through 
a driving rain in the dark to join the rest of the division. They were exhausted, demoralized, and 
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soaked. “We stuck our guns, our bayonets, in the ground,” Bear remembered, “and sat down 
against trees till morning.”223  
 That evening and well into the next day a frigid rain mercilessly pelted the survivors as 
they huddled still shelterless around small fires authorized only if lit well to the rear of the picket 
lines. While individual efforts to retrieve dead or wounded comrades continued all evening and 
into the morning hours, mutual suspicion on both sides prevented any formal ceasefire for 
another two days. In the meantime, Sherman and Admiral David D. Porter handcrafted a daring 
and covert maneuver whereby Steele's half-battered division alongside Giles Smith's brigade 
would silently disengage from the front, embark aboard transports in the darkness of New Year's 
Eve, and be deposited immediately under the heavy Rebel guns a short distance up the Yazoo at 
Drumgould's Bluffs to seize the same at bayonet-point. If successful, the operation would have 
significantly threatened Vicksburg's northern defenses and finally given the expedition access to 
the desperately sought-after Vicksburg road. Perhaps fortunately, thick fog in the early morning 
hours of New Year's Day forced a cancellation of the plan before the flotilla could even get 
completely underway. Knowing full well that the army would find itself adrift in a veritable lake 
instead of merely mired in muddy bottomlands if rain continued, Sherman finally conceded 
defeat and the army withdrew and reembarked upon the transports.224 
 As supplies were hauled hurriedly back onto the steamers, Sherman and his staff received 
word from Porter that an irate Maj. Gen. John McClernand had just arrived from Memphis with a 
personal note from President Lincoln guaranteeing him command of the entire expedition. 
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Though irritated, Sherman was willing to concede the point and handed authority over to the 
political general. The two agreed that the army should withdraw from the Yazoo and regroup 
nearby in preparation for and contemplation of the next move to reopen the river to Northern 
commerce. Clearly, continued frontal assaults against the Walnut Hills were not promising. 
When word arrived that the Silver Wave, a Federal mail packet, had been captured by Rebel 
forces up-river and hauled to Fort Hindman near Arkansas Post on the Arkansas River, both men 
saw an opportunity. Both recognized that a victory, however minor, was badly needed following 
the demoralizing repulse the army had just suffered. The vast numerical advantage they would 
enjoy in attacking the fort's reportedly meager garrison would make such a victory quick and 
easy by comparison to the struggle through which the army had just passed. While the specifics 
of which officer ultimately hatched the plan remain contested, the flotilla departed enroute to 
Fort Hindman on January 3. Now in command of all four of Sherman's divisions, but still in 
ignorance of Grant's recent order formally reorganizing the army, McClernand dubbed the force 
the Army of the Mississippi, and divided it into two corps d'armee of two divisions apiece. In 
accordance with his wishes, Sherman was given command of his "old" Second Division and 
Steele's Fourth, now renamed the Second and First divisions respectively of Sherman's new 
Second Corps. The two remaining divisions comprised the First Corps under Morgan.225 
 Sherman turned his otherwise embarrassing replacement by a rank amateur into an 
opportunity to lay the groundwork for a formal army-level narrative of events even before sitting 
down to craft his official report of the battle for Grant. Issuing a statement through general 
orders, read to every exhausted company by orderly sergeants at roll call aboard the boats, he 
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attempted to assist the myopic rank-and-file in making sense of what had just transpired while 
simultaneously trying to maintain some vestige of control over the conclusions they might reach 
amongst themselves. “We failed in accomplishing one great purpose of our movement — the 
capture of Vicksburg,” he explained, “but we were but a part of a whole. Ours was but one part 
of a combined movement, in which others were to assist.” He and they had been “on time,” but 
“unforeseen contingencies must have delayed the others.”226 One Illinoisan could not be sure 
“who the others were but I presume he means Grant,” he correctly surmised.227 The order 
explained Sherman's forceful pushing of the assault “as far as prudence would justify.” Many in 
formation must have scoffed aloud at this between coughing fits. Finding the Rebel defenses 
“too strong for our single column, we have drawn off in good order and in good spirits, ready for 
any new move.” McClernand had been chosen by President Lincoln, Sherman announced, in an 
awkward bid to lend his new superior legitimacy in the eyes of the dejected command. He felt 
the need to remind them, and probably himself, that the President “has the undoubted right to 
select his own agents,” and trusted “that all good officers and soldiers will give him the same 
hearty support and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me.”228 
 Sherman's official explanation of events fell upon the freezing ears of soldiers who had, 
for the most part, already made up their minds as to what had happened, why, and who was at 
fault. Even so, these conclusions and the historical narratives they were embedded within tended 
to vary dramatically between regiments based on each unit's unique experiences during the 
week-long battle and tenure serving under Sherman's command – what historian John Keegan 
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has called their “personal angle of vision.” The tangled terrain of the Yazoo bottomlands had not 
only mitigated against operational and tactical coordination, but also effectively carved the 
corps's experience of the contest into several distinctive “faces of battle,” each with its own 
narrative trajectory and moral.229 
 Dejection and defeatism, though widespread, were not by any means the exclusive 
themes of these narratives. Several, most especially junior officers, were already showing signs 
of a veteran’s aptitude for stoically absorbing reversals. Scribbling a quick note home as the fleet 
prowled northward, Colonel Kilby Smith was struck by laughter emanating from a group of 
officers playing cards nearby. It seemed remarkable to him that men, “whose lives, twenty-four 
hours ago, were not worth a rush, who have been in the imminent and deadly breach, [and] who 
have lost comrades and soldiers from their companies,” could so soon thereafter seem “entirely 
oblivious of the fact.”230  Of course they were not oblivious, but were learning that camaraderie 
could often prove a powerful salve for depression. Firm resolve could serve a similar purpose. 
“Wouldn’t it be nice to be there in our nice quiet home with you and the children, in place of here 
in the wet and noise and confusion,” Lieutenant Jacob Ritner, 25th Iowa, considered after 
narrating his recent experiences to his wife, adding that “yet I would rather stay here another six 
months than go back without taking Vicksburg.” Several of his company had fallen during the 
second day's fighting, and the moral value of Vicksburg’s capture to him thereby increased. “I 
hope we will never leave here till we take it,” he wrote.231 He was not blind to the blatant 
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mismanagement of operations at higher echelons, and admitted being “tired of the way we are 
treated and of the conduct of our leading men.” Even so, he was certain he “would have been a 
great deal more dissatisfied if I had remained at home.”232  
 Despite these bold assertions of resilience issuing from some, the vast majority of men in 
both divisions had had their fill. “I dont want to get in any hotter [place],” Henry Bear, 116th 
Illinois, admitted. “At least I want if I do to have a chance to Shoot too.”233  James Maxwell of 
the 127th Illinois agreed. “I hope I will never see another battle for I want the war to end as 
quick as possible,” he wrote to his sister. “I don’t care how they end it, only so it ends.” Maxwell 
grew increasingly jealous of his brother back home still working the fields. “Tell Benjamin I 
would like to be there a thrashing [threshing] with him,” he admitted. “I think I like thrashing 
better than soldiering and I’m not afraid to say so.” Both Bear and Maxwell insisted that while 
civilians may have thought they had some idea of a soldier’s life, they “don’t know anything 
about soldiering until they try it.” In truth, no outsider “can tell how much soldiers suffers on and 
near a battle field,” Bear explained. “You folk at home cant begin to tell what it is to be in such a 
place. I know I never thought it would be so.”234 For Maxwell’s part, “I advise never to enlist.”235 
 In Steele's division, unsurprisingly the most indignant were the survivors of Blair's 
battered brigade, who wasted no time in loudly proclaiming their outrage. Even as wounded and 
traumatized men still limped away from the shattered cornfield immediately after the repulse, a 
nearby Chicago Tribune correspondent overheard several "giving vent to extravagant charges of 
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treason, jealousy, madness and folly in high places." Despite the confusion reigning amidst the 
assault it was painfully clear to all survivors that the effort had failed principally due to a gross 
deficiency of coordination. “The day was full of misfortunes,” one later observed, adding plainly 
that “the divisions moved without concert of action.” Despite grievous losses, his 13th Illinois 
had acquitted itself well for having undergone its baptism by fire under such trying 
circumstances. Of the 600 in the Illinoisan ranks that left the protection of the tree line at the 
beginning of the assault, only 423 remained in bivouac that night. “Participants at Pea Ridge and 
Shiloh say that no Regiment there was exposed to such an awful fire as we here,” one young 
Sucker proudly wrote home.236 
 The debilitated spirits of the Pea Ridge veterans that filled the ranks of the mangled 4th 
Iowa could not be mended with such encomiums of unexampled valor. “We as yet have 
accomplished nothing,” one infuriated Hawkeye lieutenant fumed after preparing the bodies of 
two of his company for burial. “What makes this so deplorable is that it was a useless sacrifice of 
life,” he added, “and to tell the truth I am mutch discouraged & disheartened [that] our 
Gen[era]ls do not understand their business & do not appear to care for the loss of life no more 
than were we so many brutes.” Gazing up for a moment at the miserable sodden boys littered 
around him in the mud he quickly added that indeed, “that we are.” The sheer scale of the 
tragedy weighed heavily on the 4th Iowa. Prior to landing in the bottomlands, each company had 
lost an average of 32 of its original enlistees over the course of its service. Many of these had 
fallen dead or wounded in the fighting at Pea Ridge, where the regiment sustained even heavier 
casualties than at Chickasaw. Despite the reception of more than a hundred replacements at 
Helena, the unit still mustered less than half of its authorized strength. Most had departed with 
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medical discharges due to disease or disability. While potentially debilitating, these 
administrative losses were far more palatable to leaders who cared deeply for their men. “I would 
rather loose [sic] five men by discharge than one by death,” one wrote.237 
 Thayer, their brigade commander, blamed Steele for the disaster due to his failure to 
inform him of his fateful impromptu order and Morgan for failing to drive his command out of 
the safety of the captured rifle pits.238 Supported properly, “he [Thayer] felt certain that he could 
have taken possession of the rebel batteries and held them until the other divisions of the army 
could come to his assistance,” one correspondent wrote. Steele blamed Morgan. Morgan blamed 
Sherman. Sherman blamed Morgan. Round and round the fingers were pointed both officially 
and unofficially for the rest of each officer’s lifetime and beyond. The only command 
relationship that was improved by the debacle was the bond formed between Thayer and 
Williamson. “The conduct of Colonel Williamson, his officers, and men through this trying 
ordeal is worthy of the highest praise,” Thayer noted in his report. Likewise, Williamson’s 
account took the opportunity to offer “the general commanding the brigade our earnest, heartfelt 
thanks, both for the part he took in the charge … and for the manner in which he spoke of the 
action of the regiment in the field.” The two were spotted commiserating with each other and 
“crying like children over the result of their costly efforts” immediately after the repulse. When 
approached by a journalist looking for an interview, Thayer was too overcome with emotion to 
oblige. “Tears stood in his eyes, and his mingled grief and indignation so overcame him that he 
found it difficult to speak,” the reporter wrote. Mirroring the laments of his officers, Williamson 
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could only report that the heavy loss in his regiment was “doubly painful, as no advantage 
commensurate with the loss was obtained.”239 
 Outside of the 4th Iowa, the experience of Chickasaw Bayou was dramatically different 
for the remaining regiments of Thayer’s brigade. Though all of the command mourned the loss of 
their fellow Iowans, their bloody example caused many in the remaining units to quietly 
celebrate their accidental salvation. “We give God the praise, for he has preserved us amidst all 
dangers, and I feel like trusting him more in the future,” one member of the 9th Iowa remarked, 
while still admitting that “the present prospects before us are not so flattering.” Indeed, though 
spared any more than some light skirmishing during the assault following their disastrous 
diversion, the veterans of the regiment were not immune from the collective disparagement that 
infected the whole army. “The boys think there is much bad mismanagement, in the 
Commanding officers” the Iowan noted. The men had no choice but to “look to our superiors for 
examples, and in many cases, what do we see[?] … Drunkenness, Profanity, and evil of all 
sorts,” he observed. Such men were unsuited to command, and the recent disaster was but 
additional evidence of the fact. “It was po[o]rly planned,” another Hawkeye succinctly noted.240 
 Even those of Hovey's brigade spared from the ill-fated assault fumed with anger against 
Sherman. “Gen. Sherman brought this army here a healthy determined lot of men who had every 
confidence that they could open this river before turning their faces north again,” Sewall Farwell, 
31st Iowa, raged. Finding “an abrupt bluff” protected by “an almost impassable slough,” 
Sherman had foolishly opted to send “regiments there entirely unsupported by heavy guns or 
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other regiments until the whole army became discouraged and old regiments refused to obey 
orders.” Then, as if that were not enough, “he beat a retreat without trying any other point.” Was 
it any surprise, Farwell wondered, that the army was now “discouraged by such management?” 
For his part, “if we are to meet with failure and reverses such as these given over to blind leaders 
and false,” he would far prefer “peace upon any terms” over “utter destruction.”241  
 Those like Farwell, who had luckily avoided the costly assault of Blair's brigade heard 
only the hazy details of the attack from their friends in the brutalized 4th Iowa or from rumors 
accumulated elsewhere. Farwell knew only that the 4th had been “ordered up and made the 
attempt to take the batteries by a charge and were repulsed with heavy loss.” The 13th Illinois, as 
he understood it, had “also made the attempt and met with the same fate.” Vague allusions to “an 
Ohio Reg” — probably the 58th — having been captured almost to the last man frequented the 
grapevine.242 Rumors freely circulated that the army had failed at Chickasaw because “our 
Generals didn’t want to take it,” that particularly bad news had been received confidentially “by 
our Generals which is kept from the army,” that the Rebels had agreed to a ninety day armistice, 
or even that “we were taken from active operations so as to witness the effect of the Presidents 
[Emancipation] procla[ma]tion.”243 Others quickly realized the groundlessness of most news that 
reached the ranks. The men “have had no reliable news from the North or the East since we left 
Helena,” one Iowan remarked. “Here rumor succeeds rumor and no man can believe anything he 
hears.” Even as he penned these words he overheard talk that a Rebel column was approaching 
Nashville and that the flotilla was almost certainly headed that direction to relieve the city. “I 
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expect our next move will be to Detroit or some other point to prevent an invasion from 
Canada,” he added with some sarcasm.244  
 For the most part, members of regiments had only each other to probe for news or 
anecdotal reports of recent events. Most requisitioned civilian steamers in the flotilla were only 
large enough to hold a single infantry regiment with its panoply of supplies, thus, individual 
units found themselves isolated from one another after re-embarkation. On the rare occasion that 
soldiers from different brigades found themselves in a position to swap stories and cross-
pollinate their internal regimental sensemaking processes, powerful transformations could result. 
Iowan friends and family in Thayer’s and Hovey’s brigades, occupying proximate positions 
along the line the evening following the bloody repulse at Chickasaw, wandered amongst one 
another through the frigid downpour searching for missing comrades and sharing stories as 
sporadic Rebel shells lit up the night sky. Survivors from nearby regiments "came around and 
told us how near they had come to being almost annihilated during the day and had barely 
escaped,” Farwell wrote. It was their understanding that the fortunate spared portions of Thayer’s 
brigade were to attempt another desperate assault in the morning, with Hovey’s regiments in 
support.245 This prospect was made all the more gut-wrenching when fugitives from other 
battered commands stumbled into the Iowan bivouac looking for their regiments, “telling how 
dreadfully they had been cut up in the fight & pronounced it impossible to take the heights in the 
way that had been tried,” Farwell recalled.246 Combined with the terrifying sights of that 
afternoon, these tales were altogether too much for the Hawkeyes. “We wondered why it was we 
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were given over to such destruction as this,” Farwell remembered, “Why it was that wisdom had 
departed from our counsels, that our Generals were only competent to lead single regiments into 
ambuscades and between cross fires of artillery thereby destroying the army and accomplishing 
nothing.” Though having been miraculously spared from certain destruction, the men of Hovey’s 
brigade were not insulated from the despondency of the rest of the army. The lessons they 
derived from their experience in the Yazoo bottoms were colored by those of less fortunate units 
whose traumatic accounts deeply influenced the way in which they made sense of the event. 
Chief among these lessons was that “our Generals” were tactically incompetent, and not to be 
trusted in the future.247 
 The effects of these lessons on the regiments of Hovey’s command first became evident 
just prior to the aborted New Year’s Eve assault on the heavily fortified Drumgould’s Bluffs. 
Silently withdrawn from the bottoms and stealthily reembarked upon transports without so much 
as an inkling as to their destination, Farwell remembered how “all felt a sense of relief when they 
found the point of attack was to be changed.” This solace was immediately reconverted into 
pangs of anxiety when regimental commanders returned from a conference with Hovey and 
relayed his instructions to their lieutenants. The flotilla, with gunboat escort, would proceed up 
the Yazoo until coming under fire by the heavy Rebel batteries atop the bluffs. At that point, 
Steele’s division would land and “with unloaded guns and fixed bayonets [we] were to form … 
into column of companies and as fast as formed, we were to charge at double quick upon the 
batteries,” Farwell remembered. “If any faltered or showed signs of running, those behind were 
to bayonet them on the spot.” Given the brigade’s total lack of trust in “our Generals” following 
the recent repulse, these orders were interpreted as veritable death sentences. “Many officers 
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quailed before such a prospect,” Farwell wrote, “men fainted away, pilots refused to guide the 
boats and were placed in the pilot house under guard and orders given that they be shot if they 
attempted to run from the post.” Privates were “instructed that the danger was as great in the rear 
as from the front, and that the heights must be taken if every man should fall.” One Iowan 
remembered how “every man whose bowels did not overcome his bravery, supposed that he had 
said his last prayer.” Even the veteran German officers of the 12th Missouri “brooded about what 
was going to become of us” while they “braced themselves up with whisky and steadied ‘file 
closers’ by the same means.” Another remembered only that the “prevalent feeling was that this 
was a ‘forlorn hope.’” While, fortunately, such a desperate affair was narrowly avoided due to 
prohibitively dense fog, the lack of efficacy in nearly every command of Steele's division had 
been put clearly on display. It was in large part the dispelling of such an insidious lack of 
confidence that motivated the army's bid to reverse its collective sense of success by 
overwhelming the threadbare Rebel garrison at Fort Hindman.248  
 Just as regiments which had experienced empirically distinctive versions of the battle 
crafted unique narratives of events and drew highly particular lessons from the same, Sherman 
and his staff came to their own conclusions, retrospectively evaluating the performance of the 
new corps and gauging the relative efficacy of ordering it to conduct similar maneuvers in the 
future. As far as Sherman was concerned the only “real fighting” had been the main assault, not 
the deadly "sharpshooting tournament" which had robbed the command of so many officers and 
men. Still, despite their valiant and bloody efforts, the amateurish performance of Blair's and 
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Thayer's brigades disappointed him. “I am satisfied,” he confided to Admiral Porter the day 
following the repulse, “had our troops been a little more experienced” the attack would have 
succeeded.249 Thus, even as most of those in the ranks of the flotilla independently determined 
that mismanagement in the upper echelons of the army, indeed by Sherman himself, was chiefly 
responsible for the painful defeat, he concluded that the amateur nature of his force was the real 
culprit. While eventually he appropriately accepted public blame for the disaster, privately 
"Cump" never ceased in his quest for scapegoats. 
 As the boats plowed northward toward Fort Hindman, orderly sergeants in each company 
took stock of their losses and obediently submitted casualty reports and strength returns up the 
chain of command. These eventually made their way to Sherman's headquarters aboard the 
Forest Queen in aggregated and much abbreviated form, providing him with a glance of the 
corps's strength and capabilities as it approached its next major challenge. Of the 1,776 casualties 
suffered by the army, half were sustained by Steele's and Stuart's divisions. Of these, 139 were 
killed, 569 wounded, and 183 captured. Losses were by no means distributed equally across the 
corps. More than three of every ten killed, wounded, and captured were from Blair's brigade. The 
four regiments accompanying him on the ill-fated assault each reembarked on the steamers 
having suffered the equivalent of two companies lost. At the same time, Blair's two remaining 
“new” regiments, both held out of the attack in reserve, suffered only two men wounded. The 
butcher's bill was even more inequitable within Thayer's brigade, where the traumatized 4th Iowa 
sustained a total of 112 casualties compared to the remaining total of 12 wounded across the rest 
of the brigade's four other infantry regiments. The disparity between Steele's and Stuart's 
divisions in terms of casualties was just as evident, with Steele's bloodied command accounting 
 
249 WTS to Porter, Dec. 30, 1862, OR, I:17, II, 879 
125 
for 85% of the corps's losses at Chickasaw. Still, despite the pall of depression that hung over 
those regiments which had suffered the worst, the corps had only sacrificed slightly more than a 
single full regiment in the bottoms. Though present for duty numbers plummeted by the day as 
tired, exhausted, and miserable men finally succumbed to colds and more serious illnesses 
contracted under the cold rain, aggregated reports suggested that Sherman still retained most of 
the flesh and blood he had brought with him to the banks of the Yazoo.250 
 Just as his own quantitative-centric analysis of the command's capabilities prior to 
debarking from Memphis and Helena had dangerously ignored the nuanced cultural 
characteristics of his regiments, the morning reports that reached his floating headquarters in the 
aftermath of the Chickasaw disaster likewise failed to represent the invisible changes that the 
traumatic experience had wrought within his corps. Chickasaw represented the first lesson in the 
new corps's practical military education, as well as the foundation of its operational heritage and 
tactical culture. Though most of Sherman's veteran regiments carried with them the impress of 
prior campaigns into the mud of the Yazoo bottoms, the battle represented the first time all the 
many subordinate units of the corps had operated together under his direction. Both divisions had 
behaved well in accordance with the tactical cultures their commanding officers and regiments 
had evolved across their relatively brief histories under arms. Steele's only recently cobbled 
together brigades suffered predictably from a grievous lack of coordination only exacerbated by 
the nightmarish terrain of the bottoms and a tendency of their mostly inexperienced officers to 
fight in accordance with the “popular pictorial idea” of war. The severely wounded Smith's 
division, on the other hand, avoided such destruction (even if it failed in its primary objectives) 
through its customary conservative skirmish-centric approach to warfighting. While neither 
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division could control what objectives it was assigned or what tactical situations it found itself 
confronting, their respective commanding officers and regiments applied their historically-
derived tactical philosophies and unit cultures to the problems at hand with, given their 
distinctive histories, mostly unsurprising results. In the end, as Sherman succinctly put it in his 
somber report to Halleck, the army had “landed, assaulted, and failed.” Though he remained 
mostly aloof of the fact, the majority of those in the ranks of his new corps remained convinced 
that the incompetence of himself and his highest ranking lieutenants was the root cause of that 
failure. This lack of confidence in “our Generals” carried grave implications for the future. 
Although both Sherman and McClernand intended what they considered to be the all but 
inevitable forthcoming capture of Fort Hindman to bolster the command's sagging morale and 
confidence, if the outnumbered Rebels chose to put up a fight instead of promptly capitulating, 
their regiments would have to earn their psychological redemption with sweat and blood. 
Moreover, just as past experiences and lessons learned in previous campaigns had informed the 
operational behavior of the veteran half of the corps at Chickasaw, so too would the command's 
nightmarish experiences in the bottomlands inevitably affect its behavior upon future fields.251 
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CHAPTER III: “NO TROOPS THAT CAN BE MADE TO ASSAULT”: ARKANSAS 
POST 
“I have yet seen no troops that can be made to assault.” 
 
~ Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, Jan. 16, 1863252 
 
 As each man of Steele's division blindly staggered forward at close intervals so as not to 
lose track of the shadowy form groping through the darkness in front of them, the eerie swamp 
was periodically lit up with flashes of light as the heavy guns of Porter's boats hammered away at 
the fort.253 Feeling through the chilly January darkness without direction in a “wet, low swamp, 
& thick timber” was a miserable undertaking. “Every two or three minutes” the column was 
forced to halt while the lead elements adjusted their trajectory, with only glimpses of the North 
Star through the canopy to guide them.254 “We were tired, our feet were wet, some of us hungry,” 
Sewall Farwell remembered. The 3rd Missouri, leading the division through the night, had to 
corduroy portions of the route in order for even infantry to pass. For some distance, the brigade's 
howitzers “had to be carried through on the shoulders of the men.” At one point, part of the 
column became detached from the rest of the division after mistakenly detouring to the right and 
had to backtrack.255 At another, the lead elements erroneously thought they had stumbled into 
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enemy pickets, more likely those from Second Division, countermarched back through the mud, 
and took a separate route further north. “So we went back & forth all night & no rest,” William 
Seaward, 9th Iowa, remarked. “Oh! Such roads, & such a night as we spent wandering about I 
hope I will never see again,” he added. “So tired & worn out, & many fell out & could not stand 
it.”256 For more than eight hours, Steele's division meandered through a “labyrinth of roads,” all 
of which Major Charles Miller, 76th Ohio, described as narrow and pockmarked with large pools 
of standing water. “The heavy artillery and transportation wagons made a perfect mortar bed of 
it,” he recalled, adding that the march “will ever be remembered by the weary supperless 
soldier.”257 The men exhausted from carrying the guns and the regimental and battery wagons 
mired in the muddy darkness, both Hovey and Thayer finally opted to abandon their trains and 
artillery, continuing through the night with footsore infantry only and leaving the battery 
commanders and wagoners to make their own inimitable way through the quagmire.258 
 Finally, at around two o'clock in the morning, the 3rd Missouri and 25th Iowa of Hovey's 
brigade emerged from the swampy woods onto comparatively dry ground filled with log cabins 
that marked the deserted winter quarters of Fort Hindman's Rebel garrison.259 The men were 
utterly drained. “My feet were wet and I was as near given out as I ever was,” Jacob Ritner, 25th 
Iowa, wrote home. “My back was so lame I could hardly walk.”260 Another Hawkeye considered 
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the march “one of the most tiresome, and disagreeable nights that I experienced in helping to put 
down the rebellion.”261 A swift search of the abandoned cabins suggested that their intended 
occupants had only recently fled. Fresh meat, cornbread, “cooking and camp utensils of every 
kind were left scattered in every direction,” one Iowan observed.262 Sewall Farwell, 31st Iowa, 
was struck by the “strange contrast” the comfortable Rebel cabins presented when compared to 
the living quarters his Hawkeyes had endured over the previous month aboard the crowded 
transports.263 
 Steele's aides dispersed and advised each regiment “to make ourselves as comfortable as 
we could without fires.”264 This prohibition of fires, as it had at Chickasaw, came hard to the 
exhausted freezing division, which had for the most part left their blankets and overcoats aboard 
the transports per Sherman's explicit orders. A few had learned from the misery at Chickasaw 
and ignored this order. Several Iowans of Farwell's company shared their contraband blankets 
with him, allowing for a little fitful sleep in the cold.265 Having no such luck, Ritner “got no 
sleep that night” as the bitter cold kept him awake despite his exhaustion. It did not help “not 
knowing but the rebels were in the brush close at hand,” he scribbled to his wife.266 There were 
only a few hours before daylight anyway “left the weary soldier to snatch a little sleep,” Miller of 
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the 76th Ohio recalled.267 Much of Thayer's brigade never made it to the Rebel cabins, halting 
instead to collapse in brush piles on the sides of the roadway.268  
 The Rebel garrison of Fort Hindman numbered less than 5,000 men to McClernand's 
nearly 32,000. Anticipating swift and easy victory, he had, upon the arrival of the flotilla at a 
landing some distance east of the bastion, ordered the army to disembark and move to surround 
the beleaguered fort by way of a circuitous route known to local slaves recruited as guides. 
Looking at his map, he envisioned in this sweeping envelopment the means by which “the enemy 
will be equally cut off from re-enforcements and escape, and must, together with his works and 
all his munitions of war, become a capture to our arms." If worse came to worse, however, the 
fort would be carried by the combined brute force of Porter's gunboats and an army-wide frontal 
assault.269 
 After disembarking on the morning of January 10, Sherman's two divisions had begun 
their approach march. With Steele in the lead, the corps stepped off from the landing area shortly 
before noon. At a crossroads just west of the landing, Steele's column turned northward on a 
country road presumed to meander through the swampy woods before debouching somewhere 
west of the enemy's first line of trenches. Stuart's division, on the other hand, maintained a 
northwestward bearing down the levee directly toward the impromptu Rebel works straddling the 
road, skirmishing with enemy pickets along the way. Giles Smith's Zouaves, leading the van as 
always though numbering only 290 effectives, swept forward in their customary manner “from 
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tree to tree,” driving Rebel pickets through the trees and beyond.270 “Steadily up the hill, 
sometimes crawling, again gliding behind trees and logs, went the Zouaves,” a correspondent 
observed.271 The capture of these trenches was uneventful. Their Rebel occupants had long since 
fallen back to reinforce the fort's garrison. It did, however, eliminate any need for Steele to 
continue on his roundabout course, which was especially convenient given that the slave guides 
proved not in fact to know where they were going. Upon discovery of this, and after 
countermarching back through a dense swamp to the landing, Steele's tired and annoyed troops 
had only just started to prepare their rations for the night when orders arrived once again from 
Sherman to "take a northwesterly course" through the swamp in order to reach jumping off 
positions for an assault on the fort in the morning. Thus, the torture had begun.272 
 By dawn, though many in Steele's exhausted division were barely upright, McClernand's 
two corps and four divisions was finally in position for a massed assault. While Steele's 
command had been groping through the dark, Stuart's regiments shivered in their positions along 
the line while the Rebels used sharpened fence boards to cut a long trench complete with head-
logs and a dense protective abatis extending westward from the fort to the woods that skirted a 
shallow creek, effectively preventing complete envelopment of the bastion. These new trenches 
would have to be taken from the Secessionists occupying them, along with the multiple batteries 
arrayed in support to their rear if the fort was to be surrounded as per McClernand's plan. As the 
sun began to rise on the horizon, the challenge confronted by both divisions was obvious at a 
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glance. Rebel flags studded the line, each representing one of eight regiments. Far from the 
bloodless coup he and McClernand had originally intended, Sherman's corps would once again 
have to launch a direct frontal assault in order to achieve its tactical objectives.273 
 The plan for overcoming this resistance was uninspiring to say the least. Relying on sheer 
mass and cold steel alone, McClernand intended to assault the fort and western pits 
simultaneously with the weight of no less than thirty-three infantry regiments and all the artillery 
he could bring to bear, supported from the river by the heavy guns of Porter's boats. After a 
punishing two-hour preliminary bombardment of the fort and outlying pits, the entire blue line 
would surge forward as one, striking the Rebel works at the same moment all along the line in 
order to neutralize the enemy's advantage of interior lines. While sound on paper, McClernand's 
plan dramatically underestimated the challenges of coordinating such a massive host and the 
inevitable deep contingency of battle, just as Sherman's at Chickasaw had before him. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, it produced much the same outcome.274 
 While Blair's and Thayer's brigades had confronted attritional defensive tactics at 
Chickasaw that leveraged the increased range and accuracy of modern rifled weaponry to erode 
their attacking columns long before they reached the Rebel positions, exhaustive surveys of 
extant field reports conducted by historians Paddy Griffith, Brent Nosworthy, and Earl Hess 
instead suggest that, in the vast majority of assaults made during the war, defending infantry 
usually held their fire until an attacking formation came within about a hundred yards. While 
opening an engagement at close range gave up any potential advantages provided by the 
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increased effective range of rifles, this tactic ensured both maximum accuracy and, most 
importantly, shock as a defender's volley slammed into a winded assault column. If well-timed, 
such a volley could so disorient and stun an attacker that his line might spontaneously reel and 
disintegrate, routing through supporting units to the rear and producing general pandemonium. 
Potentially decisive, a shock-reliant defense also entailed grave risk. Should the initial volley fail 
to produce sufficient shock to blunt an attacker's forward momentum, relatively little time 
remained to try again. Conversely, in order for any attack to succeed, an assaulting line had to 
absorb a defender's initial volley and continue forward at maximum speed, spilling over and into 
the enemy’s works like a tidal wave. The secret, Griffith explains, “was the deliberate acceptance 
of a higher risk in order to achieve a more decisive result.” It required “an unnatural response to 
fear.”275 
 Every layer of an infantry regiment was instrumental during a charge. Commanders 
provided inspiration and guided their formations, company officers strove to repeat commands to 
the men above the din, sergeants maintained discipline from behind the ranks, and privates relied 
upon confidence in their leaders, each other, and their perceived probabilities of survival. Above 
all else, a regiment's members collectively needed to believe that they could successfully make 
and survive an attack in order to maximize their likelihood of doing so. This degree of shared 
self-confidence in a regiment's ability to succeed represented the unit's collective efficacy, and it 
was of greatest importance once the terrifying effects of enemy fire began to challenge the 
supposition. If a regiment could maintain its sense of efficacy and forward momentum through 
the crucible of an initial shock volley, the odds of a defender abandoning his position were 
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relatively high. Attacking columns were almost never physically destroyed by a single ragged 
volley, no matter how short the range. Instead, it was the psychological effect of a shock volley 
that blunted forward momentum. In the same vein, rarely would hand-to-hand fighting ensue 
should an attacker successfully reach a defender's parapet. Bayonet charges functioned more as 
psychological weapons than as tools of physical coercion, frightening the enemy out of his 
position. Contrary to popular belief, they frequently proved effective.276 
 There came a time in every engagement, but most especially during frontal assaults, that 
historian Brent Nosworthy has termed the “penultimate moment,” when combatants on both 
sides experienced “the beginning of a thought or emotional process, such as panic or even more 
reasoned thoughts, such as the need to retire.” At this critical juncture, officers were well aware 
that “every incentive that can influence the actions of man” was necessary to sustain efficacy 
“even for a few moments longer [in order to] win the day.” The reception of a defender’s initial 
volley represented just such a moment for a winded charging regiment, and it was at this 
"penultimate moment" that a unit's collective efficacy, shaped in large part by its particular 
history, could make all the difference. 
 The members of each regiment collectively encountered and experienced an engagement 
and its attendant penultimate moment within the specific context of their unit’s unique 
operational heritage. For those in the ranks, every engagement was but an episode in a wartime 
narrative all their own, shared among all their comrades within the unit but distinct from those of 
even adjacent regiments. Every regimental banner on a Civil War battlefield represented a 
distinctive story, a cohort with an individual personality, character, and culture borne of all the 
distinctive trials that had led it to that particular place in time and space, and in that form. While 
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individual soldiers likewise inevitably forged their own personal narratives of service that 
allowed them to make sense of their experiences, the nature of contemporary tactics and 
communal military life led to high degrees of near consensus among members of a single 
regiment as they made sense of events. 
 As Federal regiments endured successive traumatic episodes, the survivors inscribed the 
names of engagements upon the stripes of the unit's national flag, borne into battle alongside its 
regimental and state colors. This commemorative tradition represented more than a mere bid to 
inspire esprit de corps. When the men glanced upward at the ragged and torn standard of their 
regiment, they reflected upon a history of beloved friends lost, terror and carnage overcome, and 
learned strategies for mental resilience, physical survival, and tactical success. The place names 
themselves, though often replicated upon many banners throughout the army, represented very 
different things and invoked very different memories for each command, their semiotic character 
and value contingent entirely upon each unit’s “personal angle of vision” and corresponding 
“face of battle” during each past engagement. Thus, as the regiments Sherman’s brigades 
prepared themselves to meet this, their forthcoming trial by fire, they did so within the context of 
their own respective regimental narratives — a phenomenon that would play a powerful role in 
shaping both the manner in which they behaved in the crucial penultimate moment, and the ways 
in which the survivors made sense of the experience in its aftermath.277 
 For this reason, the careful and thoughtful arrangement of regiments within assaulting 
formations by commanders was of enormous importance. Some showed far more attention to 
detail than others. While officers could not possibly anticipate what precisely would befall a 
regiment or brigade once it headed into the fray, they could “stack the deck” in their favor if they 
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played their cards right. Since success in all combat operations, most especially frontal assaults, 
was so heavily contingent upon psychological dynamics, it was of enormous importance that 
generals become aware of the diverse historical narratives that thrived within the regiments of 
their respective commands. 
 Still, even given exhaustive planning grounded in all but omniscient foresight, achieving 
the coordinated arrival of multiple attacking formations at their respective points of attack along 
a defensive line was far easier said than done. Sherman knew better than most that, “we cannot 
do as well on the ground as we can figure on paper.” While the terrain confronting the corps at 
Arkansas Post as it prepared for its assault appeared, at least in most cases, far more conducive to 
the maneuver than had the nightmarish amphitheater of carnage that was Chickasaw Bayou, the 
terrain and prospects arrayed before each of the three brigades chosen to spearhead the attack 
were markedly different, threatening to mercilessly dismantle the cohesion of the corps from the 
outset, just as it had along the Yazoo.278 
 At about noon on January 11, as a lengthy preliminary bombardment lifted and Sherman's 
batteries fell silent, Hovey's and Thayer's regiments of Steele's division came to their feet. “The 
enemy had ceased firing at us,” Farwell of the 31st Iowa later wrote, “but as soon as we raised, 
the shots were again sent whirring at us.” Although sporadic incoming Rebel artillery fire 
“created considerable excitement,” among the green levies, initially the Iowans had “no 
difficulty in keeping order in the ranks.”279 As the 500 veterans of the 76th Ohio rose up, Colonel 
Charles Woods and his staff  took one last glance at the obstacles ahead. “The Rebel line of 
works could plainly be seen,” Adjutant Charles Miller remembered. “The ground was 
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comparatively level and partly covered with timber to our right, but in our front there was little 
covering save some underbrush and deadened timber.”280 Though estimating that the regiment 
would have to pass over nearly 600 yards of open ground before reaching the enemy works, 
Woods finally decided it would be most prudent to dismount along with his staff, “and go into 
the charge on foot.”281 Accordingly, he ordered his Ohioans to fix bayonets, and to “make the 
charge without firing a shot.” Emphasis had to be placed on maintaining forward momentum, 
and any halt to aim and fire would necessarily slow the velocity of the attack. “The prospect 
looked anything but inspiring and all felt that of necessity there must be fearful slaughter in our 
lines,” Miller remembered. While the regiment, along with the remainder of Hovey's brigade, 
had been spared the bloodshed at Chickasaw, Woods's veterans of Donelson and Shiloh knew 
well what was likely forthcoming. “Captain Strong came to me and said, 'Charlie, our chances 
for life in this affair are slim and anything we have on our persons that we don't wish to fall into 
the hands of the Rebels we better leave back with the knapsacks,'” he added. The regiment had 
already stacked their knapsacks to the rear of the battle line.282 Strong also suggested the officers 
“leave our swords behind,” Miller recalled, “and, on first impulse, I was disposed to do so, but a 
second thought convinced me that it would be unsoldierly. So I told him that if we fell we ought 
to have our swords in our hands.”283 
 One of Steele's aides rode directly to Colonel Milo Smith's green 26th Iowa, at the front 
of Thayer's brigade, with orders to advance and “move upon the enemy's works,” William Oake 
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recalled. Smith “immediately placed himself at the head of the regiment, and gave the orders 
aloud.284 From where Smith's regiment formed “the enemy's line of rifle pits … were plainly 
visible,” Oake wrote. “The timber that had formerly covered the intervening space having been 
about all cut down by the enemy, thus giving them a good view of the column coming over that 
comparatively level stretch of ground.”285 Though level, the “thick underbrush” to the front of 
Thayer's brigade, as well as “the want of space for a front of the brigade,” necessitated that the 
brigadier advance his regiments initially in column. After the traumatic debacle at Chickasaw 
Bayou, such a necessity must have been difficult to swallow. Just as at Chickasaw, once through 
the worst of the nightmarish terrain, Thayer planned to deploy each of the regiments into line “as 
fast as we could get a front.”286 Having detached the bloodied veteran 4th and 9th Iowa to Blair's 
reserve out of mercy given their recent experience at Chickasaw (even though the latter had seen 
only light skirmishing), Thayer's brigade was led by two entirely green regiments: Smith's 26th 
and Lieutenant Colonel W. M. G. Torrence's 30th Iowa. “I gave direction [to the regiment] to 
follow up close by the right flank of the first battalion,” Torrence explained, “”to form line of 
battle on its left, at a designated point if practicable, and, if not, to form line of battle in its rear, 
and advance as it advanced and halt as it halted, and in every move to act in conjunction with 
it.”287 He knew his rank and file remained almost entirely green, having been spared total 
destruction by Steele's error two weeks prior. If the chaotic and terrifying experience through 
which they were about to pass could be broken into smaller, more manageable tasks, they were 
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more likely to retain their forward momentum. That is, of course, provided that Smith's Iowans – 
themselves just as green – stayed on course. 
 “At a given signal,” Col. Francis Hassendeubel's 17th Missouri leading Hovey's brigade, 
comprised principally of German gymnasts from Turnverein across the Northern states, were 
ordered to spearhead the assault on Steele's right by advancing further south “through the woods 
along the bayou.” The Turners prided themselves on athleticism and marksmanship, both of 
which Hovey and Steele had been quick to perceive during the “sharp-shooting tournament” 
along the bayou at Chickasaw. Accordingly, the regiment quickly became the division's dedicated 
light infantry force,  routinely used to screen its movements from the front and flanks and 
earning it the informal title of "Hassendeubel's sharpshooters." The Germans had likewise 
accumulated the most impressive record of achievement thus far during the war of any regiment 
in Hovey's new brigade. With their brother Germans of the 12th Missouri now detached to guard 
the brigade's supplies at the transports, the Turners were the only unit on the field in Hovey's 
command that had ever conducted a charge, having successfully assaulted the wavering 
Secessionist line on the second day at Pea Ridge. More recently, a brush by several companies 
with a contingent of Texas Rangers during the march to Helena had left several dead and the 
regiment fiercely embittered when word spread that most of the casualties had been slaughtered 
in cold blood after surrender and while begging for mercy.288 
 Behind the Turners, Hovey deployed Colonel Isaac Shepard's 3rd Missouri. Though also 
composed mostly of Germans, Shepard's command represented a much more ethnically diverse 
collection of men who did not always see eye to eye. The Irish and "American" contingent 
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occasionally poked fun at the abysmal English of the regiment's Teutonic officers, sometimes 
even to the point of insubordination on the parade ground. Shepard himself had never personally 
seen combat. A Harvard man, Massachusetts native, and radical Republican, he had acquired 
some limited experience in drill during his brief antebellum command of the Boston militia. The 
experience netted him a position as Nathaniel Lyon's aide-de-camp at the battle of Wilson's 
Creek, but a kick from the general's horse had incapacitated him just prior to the dramatic contest 
that took Lyon's life. Since then, while a handful of the regiment's older members had been 
around long enough to remember a bloodless advance of three companies against fleeing Rebel 
cavalry at the battle of Carthage, most had never experienced combat. To be sure, they had 
conducted their fair share of long marches and chased bushwhackers from countless hideouts in 
the brush, but the ultimate crucible of battle had thus far evaded them.289 
 Fortunately, the protection of the veteran Turners to their front would shield Shepard's 
unblooded command from the impending storm of Rebel fire. They, in turn, would shield the 
even greener "fresh levies" of William Smyth's 31st Iowa following behind in support. A portly 
Irish lawyer, Smyth and his cohort represented the fruits of Lincoln's most recent call for 
volunteers. Under arms for less than six months, with the exception of a handful of veterans from 
older commands -- many of whom had spontaneously reported as "ill" and remained in the rear -- 
the regiment was barely more than a crowd of civilians with elementary instruction in drill. Even 
Smyth himself still had trouble remembering the proper commands on the parade field, 
occasionally having to rely on a low-toned inquiry to his only slightly more experienced 
adjutant: "Lieutenant, what shall I say?" He and his Hawkeyes looked upon the band of long-
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service men formed to their front as hardened grognards by comparison, and focusing on 
following their lead would ease the terror of forthcoming events while providing opportunities to 
learn from observation. In the interest of everyone's safety, Hovey ordered Smyth's greenhorns 
not to fix bayonets or affix percussion caps to their loaded rifles, but rather to follow closely 
behind Shepard's line quietly until further orders. As the brigade moved forward, Smyth and his 
Iowans were not only participants in the drama, they were also carefully taking notes.290 
 Almost immediately after setting off through the woods on their approach, the foremost 
German skirmish teams “became hotly engaged.” Hassendeubel's command found itself 
“attacked on the flank” from the opposite bank of the bayou “much more violently than was 
anticipated,” prompting them to strengthen their skirmish line with the full weight of the whole 
German regiment. Spying a handful of Texan cavalry, their arch enemies, through the trees, the 
Turners quickly changed front to address the new threat and, in doing so, removed the protective 
coverage of their veteran experience from the brigade’s assault. Piling into a ravine for cover, the 
Turners began to ply their trade across the bayou. The remainder of the formation continued 
rushing forward through the trees. The adjustment to Hovey's front spontaneously made the 
inexperienced 3rd Missouri the lead element in his assault.291 
 All across the line, the men of Steele's division screamed at the top of their lungs – yells 
“which were to be the signal for the gunboats to cease firing,” Farwell explained.292 Shells 
slammed into the Arkansas mud as enemy batteries redoubled their efforts, but the Rebel infantry 
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occupying the trenches to the front ominously held their fire.293 In the comparative open on 
Hovey's left, “with alacrity and with wild yells,” Woods's 76th Ohio launched into a double 
quick toward the works, with Colonel George Stone’s 25th Iowa following closely behind. 
Almost from the beginning “a tempest of canister and grape from the rebel batteries” tore 
through the brush and into the line. Very quickly, the still unabated exhaustion from the previous 
night's forced march through the swamp told on the strength of both regiments – most especially 
so with those who had become ill during or immediately after the hardships of Chickasaw and 
were now desperately trying to keep up with their brothers in arms. Adrenaline alone proved 
insufficient. “I was very week [sic] and they double quicked it about half [a] mile & I could not 
Keep up,” Hawkeye Lieutenant Adoniram Withrow admitted.294 Another “started with the rest 
but the brush were [sic] so think and I was so weak that I was soon left behind.”295 Others who 
were not quite so physically ill also straggled. Oake, making the assault with the 26th Iowa, 
noticed “an old fashioned rail corncrib” that stood in the middle of the division's line of attack, 
behind which accumulated “skulkers from the different commands that had been ordered into 
battle.” The terrified men “could not be shamed out of their place of supposed safety,” he 
recalled.296 
 The major differences in terrain confronted by each of Steele's assault columns quickly 
dismantled the cohesion of his attack and carved the two brigades into three separate, if 
proximate, attacking pairs of regiments. As Thayer's column on the left moved through the heavy 
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brush to their front attempting to find an opening wide enough for more than a single regiment to 
deploy into line, the 3rd Missouri and 31st Iowa on Hovey's far right struggled through the 
timber skirting the bayou at a snail's pace. At the same time, Woods's Ohioans and Stone's 
Iowans in between them, constituting Hovey's left, outpaced both wings due to the comparatively 
open terrain to their front.297 Thus the division inevitably fell upon the Rebel works in piecemeal 
fashion with disastrous results.  
I. “So hot as to make it impossible” 
 Bolting unknowingly ahead of the remainder of the division, Woods's Ohioans suddenly 
became the tip of Steele's spear by default. It also meant that, as the foremost prong of the attack, 
they drew the concentrated fire of the enemy batteries and came into the range of Rebel infantry 
sooner than those on the division's wings.298 Though most of the 600 yards covered at the 
double-quick was over open fields, a thin belt of trees stood roughly 75 yards from the Rebel 
works.299 Just before and beyond the tree line, the enemy had constructed rude abatis out of 
“brush and fallen timber” in an effort to make the final approach to the only available cover 
exceptionally dangerous to any attacker.300 This combination of obstructions “considerably 
impeded the movements of the regiment,” Woods noted. As the winded and now disheveled 
Ohioan formation reached the abatis, at about 250 yards the Rebel works finally awoke with a 
shock volley of small arms, grapeshot, and canister.301 While not fired at sufficient range to 
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constitute part of an attritional defense, the volley was also fired too early to produce ample 
“shock,” most especially because most of the poorly aimed Rebel rounds whizzed over the 
attacker's heads. Opening at such distance, however, allowed for a second try. After the 
Secessionists reloaded quickly, the next “fell plump into our lines,” Adjutant Miller lamented, 
“and made considerable havoc.”302 More than a dozen Ohioans immediately fell dead and 
another 57 were wounded by the single fusillade – nearly 15% of the regiment's combat strength, 
“but the men kept straight on” Miller remembered.303 The veterans of many such ragged Rebel 
volleys at Donelson and Shiloh had learned that such an encounter was in fact survivable, and 
Woods's command safely endured its "penultimate moment."   
 Conversely, twenty paces behind, the Hawkeyes of the 25th immediately dropped to the 
ground when the shooting began. One Iowan noticed how the men instinctively sought the 
“slight protection afforded by the stumps and brush,” and several of them nervously 
“commenced firing” at targets of opportunity against all orders, threatening the Ohioans still to 
their front.304 Noticing immediately that their supports had gone to ground in terror, the veterans 
were outraged that Stone's levies had “left us exposed to the concentrated fire of the Rebel 
regiments.” As the 76th now represented the lone regiment of the division still standing and 
visible along the forward edge of Steele's advance, they immediately attracted all Rebel fire 
within range. “About three regiments strong,” Woods reported, “opened a destructive fire of 
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musketry upon us from the front and right and left, extending on the left to the full extent of the 
range of their muskets [rifles].”305 
 Although an attacking regiment's success against a shock-reliant defense was principally 
contingent upon its resilient response to the impact of a defender's initial volley, the arrival of but 
a single lone regiment to an enemy parapet was itself of little real tactical value. A defender's line 
had to be confronted with attackers along the entirety of its frontage simultaneously. If columns 
arrived piecemeal, their foremost regiments would face not only the shock of a volley from the 
enemy to their immediate front, but also from enemy troops on both flanks for a distance of 
potentially hundreds of yards in either direction, pouring in a devastating enfilade fire. It was 
through this enfilading fire that the increased range of rifled muskets could make the greatest 
difference. Defenders finding themselves unchallenged to the front could contribute their fire to 
an attacker far distant with much greater accuracy when armed with rifles than with muskets. 
Should this bloody contingency occur, an attacker would find himself, as did Woods's Ohioans, 
confronted with both a (short-range) shock-reliant and (long-range) attritional defense 
simultaneously.  
 While much of the fire concentrated on Woods's beleaguered regiment was still 
mercilessly “too high,” enough of it found its mark to finally stall the forward momentum of the 
veterans. Recognizing that he had outpaced both Thayer to the left and the Missourians on his 
right, Woods still did his best to drive his Ohioans through the tree line and across the final 75 
yards despite the heavy fire incoming from three sides. They would have none of it. As soon as 
the line reached the relative safety of the trees “the fire became so hot that the regiment faltered, 
but held its ground,” Woods recalled. Knowing full well they were unsupported, the men 
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instinctively “all dropped on their faces,” Miller recalled.306 Woods still did his best to urge them 
on, to keep them moving forward. “Finding it impossible to push the regiment over the open 
ground,” he tried ordering them to fire “to give them confidence,” he explained. He was 
immediately struck by the result. “After the regiment opened fire not a man flinched.” The 
Buckeyes each fired multiple rounds from the prone behind the scant cover of the broken 
treeline, when Woods again tried to drive them forward, “but as soon as the men raised to move 
forward the fire was so hot as to make it impossible,” he reported.307 
 Finally accepting that the regiment was immovable, Woods's shifted his priorities from 
carrying the trenches to providing suppressive fire from the trees that might keep Rebel heads 
down long enough to allow adjacent units to drive home their own assaults. Though the head 
logs running along the tops of the Rebel pits covered the forms of the enemy infantry and made 
them a difficult target for prone riflemen even at close range, the Rebel batteries and their horses 
were clearly visible just beyond the trenches. Here was an opportunity. Woods "ordered the men 
to clear and silence the guns of the enemy in our front,” he reported, and the Buckeyes made 
short work of it.308 “Not a single shot was fired from their two Parrott guns in our immediate 
front,” Woods remarked, the rifle fire making the guns too dangerous to man and the killing of 
their horses rendering the heavy pieces immovable.309 An additional enemy gun “some distance 
to our left” observed actively engaging Thayer's or even Second Division's lines also drew 
Woods's attention, and thus a hand-picked squad of the regiment's “best marksmen were ordered 
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a little in advance,” Miller remembered, “and, while protecting themselves as best they could 
behind trees, picked off the gunners of the battery which they completely silenced.”310 The 
remainder of the regiment continued “skimming the enemy's parapets with musket balls,” 
suppressing the Rebel infantry within and creating an opportunity for Stone's terrified Iowans to 
finally arise from their temporary cover at the abatis and rush forward to join their veteran 
comrades along the treeline where they laid down once more.311 From there, they joined in the 
target practice. “Some got where they could see something to Shoot at and Kept popping away,” 
one lieutenant remarked after the fight, “Others could not get a Sight & dident Shoot.”312 A few 
particularly zealous Hawkeyes “fired forty or fifty Shots,” expending almost all of their 
ammunition.313 All along the line junior officers were “yelling themselves hoarse, men Shouting” 
and “an incessant popping” added to the battle ambiance.314 
 Leaders in both regiments did far more than yell. Stone made a point to “at all times” be 
visible “at the head of his regiment,” one of the command wrote. The Colonel even “made 
several good shots with a rifle borrowed from one of the men, who was not so good a 
marksman,” he added. Stone's executive officer “was as cool and collected during the fight as if 
he had been at home,” and further strove to rally the more anxious and encourage them “by his 
example.”315 The Ohioan command team behaved similarly. Woods “exposed himself in the 
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thickest of the fight,” Miller recalled. “His large form was a conspicuous mark, but he was 
perfectly cool and walked about, twisting his mustache and breaking sticks as was his habit, with 
an eye on all that was transpiring.”316 Even Stone's Iowans later commented on Woods's coolness 
under fire.317 His brother, the regiment's executive officer, “would not lie down, but walked up 
and down the lines encouraging the men and exposing himself,” Miller noted. “A bullet struck 
his revolver with such force as to bend the barrel, but it saved his life as otherwise it must have 
shattered his thigh fatally.”318  
 Beyond the lack of further enemy artillery fire, however, the smoke and debris filling no 
man's land made it difficult for any shooter to judge the real effectiveness of his fire. “Quite a 
number of men were seen to drop as if killed or wounded, but to what extent the enemy suffered 
from our fire I cannot tell,” Woods later admitted. For many, the only viable targets were the 
arms and weapons of Rebels who “did not dare to show their heads,” but instead “just put their 
arms over and fired at random,” Miller wrote.319 Though un-aimed, such fire was still dangerous. 
“One man lying near me received a ball on the point of his chin which coursed down his neck,” 
Miller recalled. “He threw up his arms and called to me that he was badly wounded and moaned 
terribly.” The Adjutant “reached over and passed my finger down the bloody mark on his neck 
and found that the bullet had not entered.” He “tied up his neck with a handkerchief and assured 
him that there was no danger,” which calmed the grazed volunteer. Woods and Stone's regiments 
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remained “advanced as far as there was cover for our men” for the next several hours, laying 
down a heavy suppressive fire from cover and triaging their casualties.320 
II. “It was terrible” 
 The dense woods and thickets that hampered the advance of the 3rd Missouri and 31st 
Iowa  stopped abruptly before the enemy trench, where Rebel infantry had “felled all the big 
trees and thrown them helter skelter in front of their rifle pits,” John Buegel, the 3rd Missouri 
color bearer later observed.321  Sewall Farwell also remembered how, in this no man's land 
between the trees and the enemy trenches, though the ground was “tolerably level,” the Rebels 
“had cut the thick grass in such a way as to impede our march all that was possible.”322 Prior to 
the assault, one of Hovey’s aides instructed the column to “advance as close as it was practicable 
to be before the charge was made,” using the woods to shroud their movements while the 
skirmishers held the harassing Rebels on the opposite bank of the bayou at bay.323 
 As elsewhere along the line, the nasty terrain made it difficult for any regiment to 
maintain its formational cohesion. Following behind the Missourians, Iowan officers and 
sergeants worked at “preserving as good a line as was possible under the circumstances,” Farwell 
recalled. The column had not moved very far, however, when Rebel gunners sensed its approach 
and began blindly shelling the trees. As shells whirred and cracked through the limbs, the two 
regiments quickly halted and laid down. After the rounds detonated, the line arose again and 
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rushed forward until the guns again were heard.324 “We lay down on the ground and continued to 
advanced and drop down when they would shell us untill [sic] we got within a short distance of 
their works,” one of the Hawkeyes explained.325 Looking around during one of these tactical 
pauses, Farwell “noticed trees and stumps were much sought for and those who had been in 
service before and honored for their bravery were among the first to seek them.”326 The 
inexperienced were happy to follow the lead of the few scattered veterans among them. 
 When the Missourians finally debouched from the trees into the open, the column 
charged at the double quick “with loud cheers and the usual war cries,” Farwell wrote.327 As 
along Woods's front, the protected Rebels held their fire as they approached. Maneuvering the 
line through the rude abatis proved challenging, but a single “large open gap” beckoned to the 
Missourians.328 Carrying the regimental colors as a marker of the column's forward progress, 
Buegel entered this gap. Watching as the flag neared the parapet, Hovey “confidently expected 
they would enter the works,” he later admitted.329 At that moment, however, within about “one 
hundred paces,” Buegel recalled, the Rebels opened fire. “The blue beans [bullets] flew into our 
ranks, bringing death and destruction,” he wrote.330 The Missourians were cut down not only by 
fire from the Arkansans in the trenches to their front, but also from the right – “a quarter 
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unexpected and therefore not guarded,” Hovey lamented.331 As they struggled to climb over the 
obstacles and force themselves through the gap, the 3rd Missouri disintegrated under fire. “It was 
impossible to get over the barricade,” Buegel remembered. “We were all crowded into a trap, and 
our boys fell like flies. It was terrible.”332 Behind them, the neophyte Iowans watched in horror 
as the “old” soldiers they counted on to steel them fell apart. Farwell watched as the Missourians 
“staggered and fell to the ground … when someone in their line cried that the order was to 
retreat.” Accordingly, the regiment “sprang to their feet and with the rapidity of lightning dashed 
back upon us.”333 The result was chaos. “Whoever was still able to walk, ran back but most of 
them were killed or wounded,” Buegel observed.334 
 Their veteran anchor now in full rout, the Iowans acted instinctively. “Someone in the 
rear called out to retreat,” Farwell remembered, unsure as to the identity of the voice. “I saw that 
the right wing of the regiment was retreating and I also gave the order which the men were not 
slow to execute,” he shamefully added.335 In a desperate attempt to stem the flight of his new 
regiment, Smyth personally “dashed forward and called the men to rally.” Farwell, realizing at 
once that the order to retreat had not originated with the regiment's commander, set himself to 
aiding the Colonel in salvaging the shattered unit. As one Iowan color bearer had been struck 
down by canister, and another cowered behind a nearby tree, the regiment lacked an obvious 
rallying point amid the smoky chaos. To solve this, Smyth and his adjutant seized the colors 
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themselves. Farwell cried for his company to form on the standards and “almost alone, to her 
honor,” it began to do so.336 
 “As soon as we rallied we commenced firing,” Farwell wrote, “and it seemed to have 
excellent effect upon the spirits of the men.” As along Woods's front, the green Iowans quickly 
learned the psychological empowerment inherent in returning fire. “I felt afraid until I fired my 
gun the first time and after that I felt no fear at all,” E. Burke Wylie remembered.337 “All became 
cool and went to work in earnest,” Farwell explained. “The balls whirred by us but no one 
seemed to mind them very much.” Still, a few of the junior officers “were unable to hide their 
trepidation,” Farwell remarked in disgust, “and two had to be severely reproved for setting a bad 
example before their men, or rather behind them.” Pushed back toward the tree line but still in 
the open, the men used what scant cover they could find. Even Smyth and his adjutant “were 
posted behind a tree when a ball came and struck the tree about fifteen feet above their heads,” 
Farwell observed, “letting heavy chunks fall on and around them.” Such destruction of cover 
could have even more dangerous effects. Farwell watched one private be “seriously lamed from a 
limb which was cut off by a ball.” While a few of the Hawkeye casualties were helped from the 
field by their comrades against orders, many self-evacuated. “William Gardner received a ball 
shot through the arm,” Farwell noted, “but went from the field without taking anyone with him.” 
Another man “limped from the field with a buckshot in his leg.”338 
 As casualties mounted, with at least a fragment of the regiment now under relative 
control and the other half beginning to rally in the safety of a small ravine a short distance to the 
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rear, Smyth tried to reconsolidate his command. “An order finally came that we should retreat to 
[the ravine] and reform the regiment,” Farwell wrote. “This was done in good order, the 
stragglers from most of the companies falling into their places.”339 A short distance away the 
shattered 3rd Missouri also collected itself and caught its breath. Finding a bleeding and 
exhausted Buegel, the executive officer “congratulated me, [and] gave me a good sip from his 
canteen,” he remembered, “and I was again all right.”340 The 3rd Missouri had suffered a 
tremendous blow. Over the course of a single day, the Missourians had taken 75 casualties, 14 of 
whom were laying dead on the field. The rapid retreat of half of Smyth's Iowans preserved them 
from a similar fate. Only 14 Hawkeyes were wounded in the attack, none killed.341 
III. “We distinctly heard the word 'Fire'” 
 On Steele's left, trailing behind Woods's Ohioans as the column of regiments meandered 
through the dense underbrush and fallen trees at something approaching the double-quick, 
Smith's 26th and Torrence's 30th Iowa led the equally green 34th Iowa in the assault. Lacking the 
tree cover that sheltered the approach of Hovey's right wing, the men did their best to move 
swiftly while “shot and shell flew thick,” William Oake recalled. The Hawkeyes were also in the 
unique position of acting as the tip of Thayer's spear though neither unit had any prior combat 
experience whatsoever. Unlike Shepard's Missourians on Hovey's right, both had only been 
under arms for a little over three months time. While many of the junior officers in both 
regiments had previously served in other units, the vast proportion of the rank-and-file were 
entirely raw, lacking the critical collective efficacy to successfully endure a jarring shock volley. 
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Withholding the battered 4th and 9th Iowa from the fight was an act of humanity, yet Thayer's 
merciful decision came at great cost.342 
 The Rebels patiently held their fire as the Iowans approached, allowing the gunners to 
their rear to hammer away at the moving target. As shell and canister cut through the brush, 
Torrence, rushing forward in column alongside Smith's command, continued to hunt desperately 
for an opening wide enough to deploy into line beside them to prevent the entire Rebel front 
from concentrating its fire on the 26th Iowa alone. He had no luck. The cut-up terrain was 
frustratingly uncooperative. “I very soon found it impossible to form either on its left or rear,” he 
lamented, and accordingly “halted my command and allowed the first battalion [26th Iowa] to 
file by.” Thayer's already undermanned attack now became a mere file of regiments streaming 
through the brush piecemeal to attack one of the strongest portions of the enemy line.343 
 Approaching within a few hundred yards of the Rebel works, Iowans looking anxiously 
ahead could clearly make out “a glistening array of steel protruding over the breastwork [and] 
under the headlog, while through the embrasures of the work could be seen the double shotted 
guns awaiting our closer approach,” Oake remembered.344 Finally, within about 150 to 175 yards 
from the works, the brush dissipated into an open plain.345 As soon as practicable, Torrence 
“instantly formed line of battle” and began to shift into position to support Smith.346 At a 
distance of 75 yards from the works, though, the Iowans almost ceased to exist. “We distinctly 
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heard the word 'Fire' given,” Oake reflected. “To describe that moment requires an abler pen than 
mine.”347 As Rebel lead slammed into the line, the Iowan colors fell, rose, and then fell again.348 
Torrence's Hawkeyes were likewise stopped cold by the volley, and he instinctively screamed 
orders to “fire, lie down and load, and fire lying down” through the smoke and din.349 The few 
surviving officers of Smith's command also screamed: “Lay down and protect yourselves, and 
give it to them the best you can,” Oake vividly recalled.350 Both regiments fell to the mud so 
quickly that Rebel officers later remarked how the Federal “ranks seemed actually to wither 
under our fire.”351 The cost in life among the Hawkeyes of the 26th rapidly mounted. Smith 
himself was badly wounded and carried rearward along with his adjutant who had suffered “part 
of his jaw … carried away.”352 Those still alive did their best to return the heavy fire from the 
prone. 
 As elsewhere along the line, the most immediately inviting targets still visible while 
laying low were Rebel batteries to the rear of the pits. “The moment that an artillery man showed 
himself at the embrasures fifty shots would be fired at him,” Oake recalled. Meanwhile, one 
section of Missourian howitzers had been manhandled through the brush to within supporting 
range of the Iowans and “did splendid execution making the rebels think the Dutch had taken 
Holland,” Oake cheered. The suppressive fire of the German guns of Clement Landgraeber's 
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battery likely saved many Iowan lives over the course of the next several hours. Oake himself 
was fortunate enough to discover a slight depression where he and two non-commissioned 
officers huddled out of the enemy fire. “It seemed to us as though it were raining lead,” he later 
wrote, “but still we were untouched.”353 Perhaps fortunately, as the full attention of each and 
every Hawkeye was focused on remaining as close to the ground as possible and scanning for 
targets, there was little time to contemplate the utter human destruction in their midst. Almost a 
third of the regiment now lay either killed or wounded before the Rebel works.354 
 The stalemated firefight continued for nearly three hours. At one point, unhappy with his 
regiment's position, and under the covering fire of both Landgraber's guns and the survivors of 
Smith's command, Torrence was able to shift his 30th Iowa by the flank a short distance to the 
right in order to secure “a more strong hold of the enemy's left,” he later reported. Even so, he 
admitted that his neophyte command ultimately “did but little more than silence and keep silent 
some small artillery pieces … together with the musketry in the hands of the enemy in the rifle-
pits.”355  
IV. "A Series of Rushes" 
 Although Morgan L. Smith lay prostrate and expected to die as doctors evacuated him 
northward for surgery in Memphis, the legacy his Zouave-style tactical philosophy was on full 
display in his Second Division of Sherman's corps as it pursued its assault objectives. From his 
vantage point that morning, Stuart could see across what he described as a “large open field, 
where the enemy had their cavalry barracks” beyond which was a line of rude earthworks clearly 
 
353 W. R. Oake [26 IA], Skirmish Line, 70-71. 
354 W. R. Oake [26 IA], Skirmish Line, 71. 
355 Torrence [30 IA] OR Report, 770. 
157 
manned by Rebel infantry.356 Sherman ordered him to “advance one brigade and deploy it in line 
of battle across the field” in preparation for assault. Accordingly, Stuart ordered Giles Smith's 
brigade into line, flanked on the left and right by his Illinoisan light batteries.357 Kilby Smith and 
his brigade were “held at hand (out of sight of the enemy)” on the division's left in reserve.358 
 Gazing over the plain, Smith estimated the distance from the point at which he formed his 
brigade into line to the enemy works at about 1,000 yards.359 Unlike Steele's legions, Stuart's 
division enjoyed the benefit of being under the watchful eye of their corps commander who 
lingered a short distance to its rear. Always anxious for recognition in spite of his obscure 
surname, Kilby Smith reveled in the idea that “my command was under the immediate eye of the 
generals." To his front he saw nothing but “a beautiful level plain, a little ascending to the fort 
and spacious enough to admit of three regiments in line” stretching over a thousand yards before 
the Rebel works. “The day [was] as bright and beautiful as ever gladdened the heart of man,” he 
later recalled, and as the division maneuvered into line “with ten brave banners fluttering in the 
breeze and gilded by the sun,” his acute sense of martial grandeur was nearly overwhelming.360 
 After coming into line, the division laid down to rest while awaiting the lift of the 
softening barrage.361 Stuart's understanding of Sherman's orders was that the division was “to 
advance at the expiration of three minutes after the fire from the batteries had ceased.” While this 
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interpretation was not entirely incorrect, Stuart apparently assumed that this meant the gunboats 
too would fall silent for three minutes. Actually, the silence of only the army's batteries marked 
the agreed upon signal for the assault. Thus, when the army's guns ceased firing after about half 
an hour of bombardment, but the gunboats continued their barrage, Stuart evidently thought little 
of it.362 Suddenly though, he was startled to observe, through the lingering smoke of the guns, 
Thayer's brigade on his right beginning to surge forward at the double-quick. Immediately 
anxious, he urgently appealed to Sherman for advice, who was fortuitously nearby. “He 
commanded the advance at once,” Stuart reported, and thus Second Division began its attack.363 
 As bugles rang out, Smith's brigade immediately stepped off at the double-quick toward 
the enemy trenches across the plain, with Kilby Smith's following them up 150 yards to the rear 
in support.364 Just as along Steele's front, the Rebel infantry patiently held their fire. Not until 
Smith's front ranks had reached within 150 yards of the enemy works did the trenches finally 
erupt.365 With this, all forward momentum immediately stopped, but unlike with the nervous 
levies of Steele's brigades, Smith's seemed to drop as if on queue. The entire division promptly 
laid down and began to “seek the best shelter the place afforded.”366 Having arrived far ahead of 
Thayer's column on his right and even the elements of First Corps assigned to attack on his left, 
Smith, like Woods far off to his right, quickly realized the brigade was receiving the concentrated 
fire of every Rebel in the vicinity. Three Rebel cannon also contributed their might in grapeshot 
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and canister.367 The ground fronting the enemy works was almost entirely open with the 
exception of “logs, stumps and torn down chimneys” scattered about irregularly.368 
 Sending back a messenger to Stuart to report these developments, Smith decided, also 
like Woods, that the first order of business was to silence the enemy artillery. Most of his brigade 
having found limited cover either behind logs or nestled in slight depressions, and still hoping 
that either of the supporting columns would arrive on his left or right and allow for a coordinated 
final assault, he would spend the intervening time picking off  enemy gunners.369 He had just the 
command for the job. “I now deployed the Eighth Missouri on the right,” he later reported, 
pulling his brother's American Zouaves out of reserve. Together with the veteran 6th Missouri, 
the two broke into their customary four-man skirmish teams and scattered behind the scant cover 
ahead as they formed the division's trademark “cloud of skirmishers."370 To further facilitate this 
maneuver, Stuart ordered Kilby Smith to donate the veteran 57th Ohio from his brigade in 
reserve to plug the hole left by the deployment of the 6th Missouri as skirmishers, retaining a 
veteran presence on the brigade's right flank.371 While the “cloud of skirmishers” worked to 
silence the enemy batteries, Smith's green levies, now safely behind cover, could still fire on the 
works and guns to their immediate front from the prone.372 Altogether, though failing in the 
division's explicit orders, it was an impressive display of coordination under fire. 
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 Once the Rebel pits were sufficiently suppressed by the close-range rifle fire of the 
Zouaves, Stuart's command had the opportunity to fully apply its Zouave-style tactics. Smith 
promptly ordered “a series of rushes" intended to restore the division's forward momentum. It 
worked. “The ground gained from time to time under the hot fire was occupied by skirmishers, 
when the main line advanced accordingly and lay down,” an Illinoisan explained. The entire 
division moved forward “spasmodically," covered by a screen of skirmishers dispersed behind 
what cover they could find.373 As the Zouaves and skirmishers moved carefully from cover to 
cover, firing at opportunity, they eventually silenced all Rebel guns in range, “not only picking 
off every gunner who showed himself above the works, but killing every horse belonging to the 
battery,” Smith later proudly reported.374 Still, the Zouaves paid a heavy price. Four of the 
veteran riflemen were killed and 25 wounded. Their acting commander, Lt. Col. David Coleman, 
was himself struck slightly, a lieutenant shot through the face, and another company commander 
“wounded in [the] arm at an early moment, refused to retire, and fearlessly led his men through 
the action,” a correspondent reported.375 Meanwhile, Henry Bear of the green 116th Illinois in 
the brigade's center, experiencing his first direct enemy fire, “shot 32 rounds” at Rebel targets 
behind the headlog. “The Balls came close to my head but did not hit me,” he later wrote.376 
Exposing oneself for long enough to acquire a visible target and pull the trigger without 
receiving an enemy ball in return was no simple task given the circumstances. “Protected by their 
earth-works, and possessing a great advantage over us, they fully appreciated it,” one 
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correspondent observed from nearby, “and no portion of flesh belonging to the Confederacy was 
needlessly exposed.”377 All along the Rebel lines, only “rows of dodging heads” could be seen.378 
 Even given the effectiveness of the Zouave-style tactics, without proper coordination with 
the remainder of the corps and army, both Smith and Stuart knew well that no final assault could 
be successful. The firefight continued for hours with no visible support arriving on either 
flank.379 Finally, in the interest of adding extra firepower to the line, Stuart ordered Kilby Smith 
to deploy his brigade on Giles Smith's left, effectively making up for the lack of any adjacent 
command in that direction.380 Amidst what Kilby Smith described as “a perfect hurricane of shot 
and shell,” Second Brigade pushed into the dense smoke. “Remember your State, forward!” cried 
Colonel Benjamin Spooner at the head of his yet raw 83rd Indiana. Tying into the 113th Illinois 
on First Brigade's left flank, Kilby Smith's command promptly found cover and began to add to 
the din. “Had it not been for the protection of lying down and an occasional depression in the 
ground, the casualties would have been serious,” remarked one of the 55th Illinois.381 As it was, 
though the “fighting was quite severe & although the bullets flew around like bees swarming,” 
another of the 127th Illinois remarked, “not a man of our Co. was wounded.” After one enemy 
bullet “passed through Capt. Riley's hat and through a blanket that Newby carried,” however, it 
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was clear to all that the Rebels absolutely meant business.382 In all Second Division would suffer 
24 killed and 154 wounded during the assault.383 
 Though the corps had been stopped cold before the works, and thus had failed to achieve 
its orders to overwhelm the Rebel defenders and break through their line, the sheer weight and 
effectiveness of its fire had major effects on the ability of the enemy garrison to react. Colonel 
James Deshler, the Rebel officer commanding the mix of Texans and Arkansans to the corps's 
front later reported how, while his riflemen's shock volleys had easily stopped each and every 
blue column short of overtaking his works, “they kept up a very heavy and unremitting fire with 
long-range rifles upon us” which all but eliminated his ability to make tactical adjustments 
designed to shore up gaps in his line. At one point, in an attempt to fill a hole on his left flank 
with reinforcements from the right, the volume and effectiveness of the incoming fire from 
Stuart's division forced all of the Rebel reinforcements "to crawl on all fours in our shallow 
trench the whole distance.”384 Deshler also commented on the impact of Smith's skirmisher 
“cloud” and First Division's efforts to silence Rebel artillery. “The enemy concealed in the 
timber along the front of the line kept up such an unremitting and intensely hot skirmishing fire,” 
he reported, “that it was almost impossible for a man to show himself without being struck.” Of 
the battery horses attached to the four guns assigned to his support, “only one or two escaped 
being either killed or wounded." Along the adjacent Rebel commander's front, extending 
partially across Stuart's line of attack, “fire of artillery and small-arms was so intensely hot that 
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no one could have passed from the general's position to mine without being struck.”385 Thus, 
despite unquestionable failure to achieve their primary objective, by about 4 p.m., Sherman's 
corps had effectively brought all but local Rebel command and control to a halt, achieved total 
suppression of enemy artillery, and neutralized vast stretches of the Rebel trenches with “very 
heavy and unremitting” fire at medium and close range from behind cover. Of course, such 
accomplishments could not last indefinitely. The ammunition supplies available to each regiment 
would eventually be exhausted unless Sherman or McClernand could take swift advantage of the 
tactical situation produced by their subordinates. 
 As both generals gradually became aware of the stalemate along the front and 
accordingly began to plan one final collective surge to seize the fort and trench by force, a white 
flag of surrender suddenly arose over Fort Hindman. Rebel command and control having broken 
down completely, with communications between the outlying rifle pits and the fort all but 
severed by rifle and shellfire, the bastion’s commander, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill saw the 
writing on the wall. No reinforcements appeared immediately forthcoming, and despite the 
tactical success of his infantry guarding the flank against Sherman’s assault, the beleaguered 
Secessionists in the fort itself could not hope to hold out much longer. Wholly unaware of the 
flag, many of the Rebel regiments in the pits continued to fight on until panicked word finally 
made it to the incredulous powder-begrimed men in the trenches that the battle was over. Equally 
incredulous as to how the obviously blunted assault had somehow achieved victory, Steele's and 
Stuart's regiments were slow in getting to their feet and cautious to advance. Finally mustering 
up the courage to tread out into the open and through the abatis, the Second Corps claimed all the 
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surviving and still confused Arkansans and Texans as prisoners. The battle of Arkansas Post was 
over.386 
 That evening and the next day were taken up with the long process of counting and 
burying the dead, accounting for captured men and supplies, dismantling the captured fort and 
works, and finally stealing some much-needed rest. Across the past month, the unique character 
of long-term amphibious operations had proven both a blessing and a curse. The army's 
operations never extended far enough from the boats to require wagon trains, and both Sherman's 
and McClernand's emphases on maintaining a swift operational tempo ensured that all but 
absolute combat necessities had remained aboard while operating on land. Limited amounts of 
rations, ammunition, and medical supplies necessary to prolong the endurance of the divisions 
beyond what they carried in their stripped-down columns were off-loaded along the levees 
skirting landings, with one regiment from each brigade detached to guard them.  
 For those in the ranks, the absence of a supply train somewhere to the rear made little 
difference. Far more poignant was the continuation of Sherman's orders prohibiting knapsacks, 
overcoats, blankets, rubber ponchos, or any other supposedly expendable luxury defense against 
the elements, all of which were to be left on the transports so as to ensure maximum speed and 
mobility.387 Most went for long stretches “without any pretense of shelter,” and with clothes that 
“were completely wet and stayed that way on the boat.”388  Even the comparatively dry steamers 
had become “perfect pest houses” and miserable cesspools of all types of insidious pathogens 
that rapidly eroded numbers at roll call and on the battlefield. Companies quartered on the 
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unprotected hurricane decks "taking storm and sun" directly had it the worst. "It is worse than 
Prisson [sic]," one Iowan complained.389 Lower decks echoed with “the groans and coughs of 
our sick men all around,” an officer remarked.390 Even those who managed to remain in the ranks 
suffered terrible colds. After laying in the open with no cover under the frigid rain at Chickasaw 
Bayou, Private James Maxwell found he coughed so painfully at night “that it almost kills 
me.”391 The constant drain of effective manpower from every regiment severely depleted combat 
power, to include the vital mass necessary for each regiment to successfully carry out frontal 
assaults, while simultaneously overburdening outnumbered medical staffs. 
 The tactical lessons of Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post came at an extraordinary 
cost. Sherman's new corps paid a steep price for the myopic obsession of its commander with 
maximizing speed of maneuver. The consolidated morning reports filed by orderly sergeants 
across the two divisions showed an aggregate of about 18,000 men present for duty when the 
flotilla set off southward from Helena on December 15.392 In just over a week that number had 
plummeted by more than 30% to 12,500 effectives. Fewer than 1 of every 5 of these losses were 
attributable to the fighting at Chickasaw Bayou.393 By February, after suffering another 600 
combat casualties at Arkansas Post and enduring a brutal steamer passage through the snow back 
toward Vicksburg, only 11,750 would fall in for roll call. This amounted to a loss of nearly 200 
effectives from the ranks of the corps every day, or nearly one per regiment every three hours. 
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Hardship did not spare even Sherman's headquarters. By the time the expedition was reembarked 
following its victory at Arkansas Post, nearly every member of the corps staff was either 
suffering from illness or incapacitated and bedridden.394 
 The rapid deterioration of effective manpower over the course of the winter was most 
starkly evident at the regimental level. Whereas Steele's and Smith's regiments averaged about 
645 effectives when the flotilla departed Helena, by January 1 they averaged only 400 — a 
manpower loss that cost each regiment more than 80 yards from the average unit’s frontage. By 
the arrival of the fleet at Arkansas Post that number had dropped even further, with many 
regiments fielding only a few hundred effectives. Several newer regiments, disastrously 
undergoing their customary “seasoning” period while simultaneously enduring intense hardship, 
were devastated by illness. The 116th Illinois, for example, boarded the Steamer Planet on 
December 19 having reported more than 680 men present for duty just four days prior. By 
January 15, after suffering 5 killed and 13 wounded during the previous month’s fighting, the 
regiment’s effective strength had been halved. Only 280 privates answered roll call, whereas the 
staggering and still growing sick rolls showed an increase of nearly 300% from just a month 
before.395 Other new commands fared similarly. The 31st and 25th Iowa regiments, both 
undergoing their baptisms by fire that winter, suffered between 30 and 40% losses in present for 
duty strength between December 15 and January 15 despite relatively minimal combat 
casualties. In fact, although the 25th sustained 11 killed, 51 wounded, and 3 captured, mostly 
during its assault at Arkansas Post, the regiment suffered fewer total losses to its effective 
strength that winter than did the 31st, which reported only 14 wounded across both battles but a 
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nearly 40% reduction in turnout at roll call.396 Over just one month the length of the battle lines 
of all three regiments had shrunk by nearly a hundred yards. 
 Despite these dramatic losses, however, the most significant changes were invisible. The 
brutal repulses suffered by almost every regiment of the corps at one point or another between 
the winter's two major engagements inspired the beginnings of an aversion to frontal assaults that 
took the insidious form of a markedly lower degree of collective confidence, or efficacy, in each 
unit when the men contemplated an order to assault enemy works. As all experienced junior 
officers well knew, such widespread self-doubt represented the gravest of all possible threats in 
the penultimate moment of a bayonet charge. Worse yet, most of the rank and file still attributed 
the worst of their suffering aboard the transports and under fire that winter to “mismanagement” 
by “our Generals.” Few had yet completely lost their trust in and hope for the Republic's ultimate 
survival, but most agreed that unless the Army's highest ranking officers tried a different 
approach to subduing the rebellion, the best blood of the Western states would be poured out into 
Southern mud in vain.  
 As the corps re-boarded the transports underneath a deluge of frigid sleet that gradually 
transformed into a blinding snowstorm, the survivors of each regiment discussed their recent 
experiences together and the winter's second phase of sense-making unfolded. Just as in the 
aftermath of the Chickasaw repulse, the context in which sense-making took place played a 
major role in shaping the character of its byproducts. “The men have wet feet, wet blankets and 
overcoats and no place to dry them,” Sewall Farwell complained. “They are cold and though the 
cabin is open to them, not one in twenty can get around the fire.” Regiment by regiment 
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sidestepped carefully down the slippery levee through the freezing rain to climb back aboard the 
boats. Many slid down the embankment and “carried portions of the soil of Arkansas Post for 
months afterwards.”397 Officers confiscated any and all contraband loot from the fort that several 
soldiers attempted to smuggle on board. “There is strict orders about taking any secesh property,” 
Private William Seaward grumbled. “Some did not like to give up some things.”398 Seaward’s 9th 
Iowa became lost in the jumbled mass of men and animals after having spent the previous night 
laying on the riverbank in the rain without any protection whatsoever.399 The exhausted regiment 
“had our patience tried well, for we knew not which boat we were going on and moved around in 
the dark.” The Hawkeyes were drenched and freezing by the time they finally climbed aboard the 
Hiawatha. Once aboard, the sounds of coughing and wheezing filled the decks of every steamer 
as soaked, freezing men huddled together and shivered, or tried to get what little rest was 
possible “on our Wet Blankets.”400 Most had enjoyed no opportunity to bathe in weeks, and 
many were tormented by lice acquired aboard the transports.401 “You can imagine what a state of 
things we are in at present,” Farwell lamented.402 “The boys felt it was bad management,” 
another understated.403 Despite the victorious seizure of the fort, Capt. Jacob Ritner had “never 
felt so bad in my life” as he did the day his Iowans climbed back aboard their transport. “To see 
the men huddled on the boat, crouching and shivering without being able to get to the fire” 
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crushed his spirits. Not even the horrifying sight of the mangled dead strewn across the Arkansas 
Post battlefield had fallen with such force upon him. “When I saw the men today exposed to the 
storm and could do nothing for them I had to go to my room and ‘take a cry,’” he confided.404 
 Historians, who have been preoccupied with reconstructing the epic grand narrative of the 
Union Army's long campaign for Vicksburg, have traditionally identified the victory at Arkansas 
Post as a badly needed boost in the erstwhile debilitated state of morale in Sherman and 
McClernand's expeditionary force following its repulse at Chickasaw Bayou. Capt. Farwell, 
shivering aboard his transport, anticipated this somewhat disingenuous conclusion. “Generals 
will be applauded for things which should subject them to the severest censure,” he explained 
home. “The army will be represented to be in a condition and to possess a feeling entirely false 
from the real facts of the case.” To be sure, most were pleased at the fortuitous victory, and while 
conditions might have temporarily dampened their enthusiasm, the corps was most certainly in 
better spirits than it had been during the departure from the Yazoo. Even so, the experience of the 
battle left a much more complicated mark on the command.405 
 Given the marked similarities between the “faces of battle” all along Sherman's corps 
line, the experience of Arkansas Post imparted a set of widely shared lessons that became part of 
the practical military education and emergent tactical culture of the corps as a whole. Though for 
the veterans of the command the curriculum mostly consisted of review, the many greenhorns 
that filled Sherman's legions had been introduced to lessons that would remain with them for the 
remainder of the war. By far the most salient lesson learned by those in the ranks underscored 
one first taught amid the deadly “sharp-shooting tournament” at Chickasaw Bayou. When under 
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enemy fire, one was most likely to survive if fighting from the prone. Throughout Sherman's 
corps, men spoke and wrote about the salvation a low profile had provided. “If we had stood up 
nearly every Ball would have cut a road through our ranks,” one Iowan reflected.406 
 To be sure, the inclination to lie down immediately upon the receipt of hostile fire did not 
have to be trained. The human body naturally reacted to danger in this manner. Still, for all its 
practical common sense advantages, going prone under fire represented a blatant repudiation of 
the contemporary prevailing cultural discourse of battle. The lithographs adorning the covers of 
popular periodicals like Frank Leslie's Illustrated and Harper's Weekly, where the majority of the 
“fresh levies” comprising half of Sherman's corps had obtained most of their preconceived 
notions of combat, rarely if ever depicted men fighting from the prone. Instead, tightly dressed 
battle lines stood manfully under the heaviest of enemy fire, as if boldly daring the Rebels to cut 
them down. To reduce one's profile by cowering or sheepishly taking cover was evidence of 
indiscipline or even shameful cowardice.407 Almost to a man, the experience of real combat had 
shorn the neophyte volunteers of these early visions of upright fighting “man fashion.” 
Greenhorns took comfort in observing how veterans “that have been in service since the war 
commenced are just as afraid of balls as those who have never been under fire,” and were often 
just as quick – if not quicker – to lay down and seek cover. In this transformation they were 
helped along by the junior officers of both divisions, few of whom apparently saw any practical 
virtue in standing manfully, and suicidally, before almost certain destruction. Ever increasingly, 
the close-order formations of the parade field were interpreted by those in Sherman's corps as 
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being more tools of maneuver than of actual combat, serving to deliver more or less concentrated 
units to the point of enemy contact, but were rarely maintained under fire. The actual exchange 
of gunfire most frequently took place from either the prone, individually “firing at will,” or while 
behind cover, and usually dispersed in four-man skirmish teams.408 
 Skirmishing placed a premium on the leadership of non-commissioned officers. As only 
three commissioned officers served in each company (usually fewer actually present for duty), 
when companies dispersed into their four-man skirmish teams their control and coordination was 
principally the duty of non-coms.409 As the tactical culture of Sherman's corps drifted toward an 
emphasis on skirmishing, these enlisted leaders found themselves ever more central to the 
combat performance of their respective companies and regiments. In several cases, companies 
found themselves commanded by non-commissioned officers when the combined trials of 
steamer passage and campaigning robbed them of all their officers. As the hardship of 
amphibious life aboard the transports cut wide swaths of men from the “present for duty” 
formations, significantly reducing the mass of every command, the appeal of open order 
skirmishing tactics only increased. Lacking sufficient recruit replacements, most veteran long-
service regiments were fast transforming into what Sherman would soon refer to as “skeleton 
regiments,” lacking any appreciable mass to hurl at the enemy anyway. A preference for 
skirmishing over close-order, mass-based assault tactics was not merely convenient for these 
rapidly shrinking commands, it was obligatory.410 
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 While the combined traumatic experiences of Chickasaw and Arkansas Post purged the 
popular pictorial image of brazen bayonet charges by close-ordered masses from the minds of 
most in the ranks of Steele's and Stuart's divisions, the fortuitous, if brief, euphoria of 
unanticipated success inspired problematic conclusions. Although both divisions had failed 
miserably in their primary tactical objective to seize the Rebel pits by force, the surprising 
surrender of Rebel forces produced the illusion that it had been the close-range firefight itself 
that had prompted the garrison's capitulation. As one Hawkeye in the 31st Iowa put it, the Rebel 
garrison must have surrendered precisely because “their artillery horses were killed … and all 
their guns on the Fort silenced” by the combined fire of infantry, artillery, and Porter's boats. 
What other choice did they have but to capitulate? Under the circumstances, even regiments like 
Farwell's 31st Iowa, which had been temporarily routed after being broken by the fleeing 
survivors of the 3rd Missouri, could feel that “our regiment behaved very well all things 
considered.” After all, the Hawkeyes had eventually rallied, gone to ground, and returned fire 
until the surrender. As far as they were concerned, their honor remained intact. “Had we broke 
and run as that regiment [3rd Missouri] did, we would have been disgraced,” he observed, “but I 
find old regiments can do with impunity what would brand new ones with cowardice.”411 
 The beginnings of an altogether new tactical discourse or formula emerged within the 
ranks of most regiments within Sherman's corps. Certainly, they assumed, “our Generals” had 
learned, just as they had, that close-order frontal assaults were nothing but sheer suicidal 
madness. “I think experience has taught them that it is better to be a month taking it [Vicksburg], 
without loosing fifty men, than take it in an hour with a loss of five thousand,” one Iowan 
considered. Sewall Farwell hoped desperately that “what has been learned” over the past two 
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bloody contests would inspire “good management” among the high command, lest “the same 
fate” would await if the corps was again ordered to charge.  Still, should better minds not prevail, 
the experience of survival and fortuitous success at “the Post” taught most of Sherman's 
volunteers that, if ordered again to carry enemy works by frontal assault, the best way to survive 
with one's honor in tact was to manfully endure the storm of Rebel artillery during the deadly 
rush forward until reaching the artificial cover of the abatis, go swiftly to ground when the 
shooting started, and continue a close-range exchange of gunfire which eventually, if the lesson 
of “the Post” could be trusted, could result in Rebel capitulation. This formula for success was 
far more likely to ensure the survival of the rank and file than the bloody-minded tactical 
discourse enshrined within the popular pictorial idea of battle wherein a charging regiment would 
carry its assault to full fruition utilizing exclusively raw patriotism and cold steel. As this 
alternate discourse gradually emerged as one of the first widely shared artifacts of the corps's 
emergent tactical culture, and was summarily combined with the widespread distrust of the 
martial competence of “our Generals,” Sherman's command found itself organically evolving 
into a poorly designed tool for frontal assaults.412 
 From their limited perspective, Sherman's official “military family” likewise engaged in 
sense-making based upon the experience of the battle. They placed the battle within the context 
of their past experience as the old Fifth Division headquarters. “The result of this affair is no 
doubt quite important,” aide-de-camp Captain Lewis Dayton observed in a missive to his chief's 
wife after the battle, “[but] the fighting compared with Shiloh was not a good quail hunt.”413 The 
army had landed and “floundered around in the mud looking for roads,” before finally launching 
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its decisive assault the next morning. The Rebels proved “very stubborn, fighting well,” he 
admitted, but with Porter's heavy guns combining with those of the army, victory was inevitable. 
Dayton shared Sherman's favoritism of Second Division, as well as his tunnel vision, noting 
proudly that “our old Division did what fighting there was” and that “if there is any credit 
attached to it (and I am sure there is) it belongs wholly to Genl Sherman's council, planning and 
execution.”414 
 By Sherman's own estimation, the assault on the fort, despite the nearly 600 casualties in 
his corps, “was not a Battle but a clean little 'affaire' success perfect.” Like Dayton's, this 
judgment was based upon his past experience. Losses had been “comparatively light,” and he 
officially reported “far less straggling than I have noticed in former battles and engagements.” 
Privately, though, he had serious misgivings. “I have yet seen no troops that can be made to 
assault,” he complained to Ellen. “We did not do it at the Post. We merely went through the 
motions.”415 Professional U.S. officers like Sherman, having received their military education at 
the United States Military Academy, had long stubbornly embraced what historian Michael 
Bonura has termed the “French combat method,” which deeply informed the entirety of the West 
Point curriculum, Army regulations, and all officially prescribed drill manuals during the war.416 
This cultural framework emphasized the absolute centrality of offensive tactical operations 
ultimately resulting in the sine qua non of battle: the bayonet assault and “physical penetration of 
the enemy line.” Such a penetration represented “the culmination of all battlefield operations,” 
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and thus French tactical culture “encouraged the offensive in every conceivable operation, at 
every level of war, [and] in every decision on the battlefield,” Bonura explains. In fact, even 
when charged with fundamentally defensive objectives, French military thinkers urged officers to 
do so “only until they could launch another [counter]attack.”417 A culminating tactical stalemate 
like that experienced by his corps due apparently to its failure to continue advancing through the 
heavy Rebel fire represented the antithesis of military effectiveness by this measure. Due to the 
limitations of Sherman’s capacity to conceive of alternative offensive tactical paradigms that 
emphasized anything other than the bayonet, the event hardly even seemed a real “battle” by his 
estimation. 
 Sherman’s concerns were shared among other staffers, gradually emerging as a consensus 
at corps headquarters. Adjutant Hammond was particularly unimpressed by the behavior of 
Steele's division in the fight. The assault columns attacked far too gradually, “Men & Officers 
very backward,” he noted with frustration in his diary.418 He shared his chief's disappointment 
with the seeming unwillingness of either division to drive home their assault. Both proved amply 
courageous in advancing under heavy shellfire to the protection of an abatis, but then promptly 
went stubbornly to ground as soon as Rebel infantry opened upon them. Most of this he 
attributed to shoddy leadership by inexperienced junior officers. “I could easily have stormed the 
work if there had been good company officers,” he insisted.419 
 In truth, the failure of Sherman's corps to carry the Rebel pits, defended by a meager 
force not half their size, had far more to do with a lack of inter-brigade coordination resulting 
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from the particularities of the terrain fronting the Rebel works, than it did with the raw 
inexperience of half the command. Even the most combat experienced regiments of the corps 
conducted themselves under fire in much the same manner as the greenhorns once they realized 
they had no protection on their flanks. The veterans knew well that any breach in the enemy line 
unsupported from the rear could be just as disastrous for an attacker as it was for the attacked. 
Regardless of the cause, the combined repulses at Chickasaw and “the Post” left an indelible 
mark on the adolescent command as its commander and those in the ranks simultaneously came 
to divergent conclusions as to what had happened and why. Perhaps most importantly, the 
combined failures significantly lessened the confidence of Sherman and his staff in their new 
corps’s ability to carry Rebel positions head-on at the point of the bayonet. Sadly, it did not yet 
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CHAPTER IV: “EXPERIENCE WHICH WOULD SERVE US”: YOUNG'S POINT, 
STEELE'S BAYOU, AND DEER CREEK 
“I think with the policy now being carried [out] that we are crushing the rebellion 
and will continue to crush it though we be repulsed from every stronghold for months to come.” 
 
~ Capt. Sewall Farwell, 31st Iowa, April 22, 1863421 
 
 As the flotilla crawled southward from Fort Hindman toward Napoleon, Arkansas 
through a blinding snowstorm, Sherman's despondent regiments shivered aboard their cramped 
transports. One Hawkeye worried that the “cold and exposeyer” suffered by those riding aboard 
the open decks would “kill more than we lost in battle.” Another was convinced that if “we do 
much more steam boating we will all play out.”422 Overhearing alarming conversations among 
his coughing Missourians, Lt. Col. A. J. Seay, 32nd Missouri, began to smell “signs of mutiny” 
in his rapidly deteriorating regiment. The brief morale boost following victory at “the Post” was 
proving wholly insufficient to steel the men against the unrelenting hardship of prolonged life 
aboard the boats.423 
 Just after noon on January 15, 1863, from his perch upon the deck of the Forest Queen, 
Sherman noticed several steamers headed downstream toward the flotilla. He knew they did not 
belong to the fleet, but nevertheless hoped they might contain the most recent newspapers, and 
thus dispatched an aide to check. “You can imagine my surprise when he soon returned with 
Hugh [Ewing] looking as fine as possible as a Brigadier with his morning Report in hand and 
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orders to report to me,” he exclaimed in a letter home to Ellen.424 After months of politicking by 
Cump, the brigade of Brig. Gen. Hugh Ewing, Sherman's own foster brother, had finally been 
assigned by the War Department to his new corps. Joining Sherman's beloved “old Division” as 
Stuart's third brigade, both divisions now boasted their full complement of three brigades apiece. 
Containing the 30th, 37th, and 47th Ohio regiments alongside the 4th West Virginia, Ewing's 
brigade came directly from duty in the Eastern theater, and thus hailed from an altogether unique 
operational heritage from that enjoyed by the rest of the corps. Ewing's Buckeyes had not 
suffered through either of the brutal repulses at Chickasaw Bayou or “the Post.” For the most 
part, they had spent their time in uniform chasing guerrillas up and down the rugged mountains 
of western Virginia in operations not greatly dissimilar to those many of Sherman's “old” 
regiments had conducted in Missouri. The 30th Ohio, Ewing's own original command, came with 
one notable distinction in that it was now the only regiment in Grant's Army of the Tennessee to 
have also served in the somewhat notorious Army of the Potomac. After enduring especially 
bloody fighting at the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, the men of the 30th had proven 
themselves capable of standing up to severe punishment under Rebel fire. The Ohioans were 
unquestionably veterans, but it remained to be seen whether or not the specific content of their 
combat experience in the Eastern theater had prepared them for the novel challenges they would 
confront in the West. Either way, “Cump” was elated to have them and Ewing on board.425 
 Arriving at Napoleon long before the rest of the army and laying over on the evening of 
January 16, Sherman found the small nondescript and mostly abandoned river town “a hard-
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looking place,” and at first glance saw nowhere he might form even a brigade for drill, let alone 
lay out an encampment.426 Reporting the same back to McClernand, he prepared the flotilla to 
move further southward the next day but allowed the men off the boats and into town while 
awaiting further instructions. Regiments were ordered to “go on shore and make ourselves as 
comfortable as possible in the vacant houses around town,” leaving their supplies on the boats.427 
While most took the opportunity to get warm by a stove, cook their rations for the first time in 
weeks, or comb through abandoned pantries for food, the more disheartened members of the 
command instead took the chance to abscond from duty altogether. In Lt. Col. Seay's mutinous 
regiment twenty men deserted, only six of whom could be retrieved by squads dispatched to 
arrest them. These fugitives were summarily “stretched by their wrists on the deck till their hands 
went black” as a warning to others who might attempt a similar maneuver.428 
 As it turned out, desertion was the least of the mischief that most disenchanted members 
of the corps would commit at Napoleon. That afternoon an anxious courier bearing an urgent 
message from McClernand found Sherman aboard the Forest Queen, temporarily distracted by 
other pressing business. “Take measures immediately to extinguish the flames which are 
consuming Napoleon,” it read, “and find if possible the incendiaries and punish them.”429 
Leaping into action immediately upon recognizing the smoke issuing from the town center, 
Sherman went in person to staunch the blaze. Gathering any and all men nearby, he found it 
impossible to extinguish the fire. By destroying buildings to create a fire break they were able to 
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corral its spread.430 Relieved that total disaster had been evaded, Cump remained incensed. 
Identifying the guilty party quickly proved an impossible errand. Instead vowing to “assess the 
damages upon the whole army, officers included,” he proclaimed that “we all deserve to be killed 
unless we can produce a state of discipline when such disgraceful acts cannot be committed 
unpunished.”431 Though long an advocate of waging “hard war” against unrepentant 
Secessionists, even to the extent of ordering the destruction of entire towns that harbored Rebel 
guerrillas, Sherman insisted that such acts of destruction and arson be held on an extremely tight 
leash. Incidents like the burning of Napoleon caused him to worry intensely that the leash was 
gradually slipping from his grasp. 
 Over the course of the late winter and early spring of 1863, the regiments of Sherman's 
corps found themselves assigned a very different set of operational objectives from those they 
had pursued during the recent downriver amphibious campaign. As Grant's army labored to gain 
access to the Rebel “Gibraltar” at Vicksburg, the Lincoln administration sought to deliver its 
most direct blow yet to Southern slavery, having now unequivocally identified the “peculiar 
institution” as a critical Rebel center of gravity. Although most in Sherman's corps had long been 
aware of the President's preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, in January the edict officially 
took effect, ordering the emancipation of all slaves in those states still in open rebellion against 
the national government by U.S. armies in the field. Farther South than almost any other U.S. 
field army, the Army of the Tennessee became the natural spearhead for the government's new 
policy of “war in earnest.” Grant wedded the administration's new tactic of deliberate and 
proactive emancipation to his ongoing quest to pry open the “Father of Waters.” As he plotted a 
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series of ill-fated attempts to bypass Vicksburg entirely or reach the high ground to its north and 
east, his army also waged extractive warfare amid the bountiful plantations of the Deer Creek 
valley to its north which sustained the Rebel garrison. 
 Across the four-month period, Sherman's two divisions were assigned missions 
associated with all three of these operational objectives. Each of them required an adaptive 
response by the Fifteenth Corps as its officers and men strove to conduct ad-hoc engineering 
projects and aggressive resource extraction across wide swaths of difficult and dangerous terrain. 
The experiences the men of the corps had while engaged in these non-combat operations gave 
rise to an emergent “soldiers' culture” within the corps. Still reeling from the hardship and loss 
that defined Sherman's winter downriver expedition, bloodily repulsed from each and every 
Rebel position they had attempted to assault, those in the ranks of the corps were ripe for an 
altogether new “way of war” promising greater odds of both survival and success. While their 
Western cultural roots prevented most from ever fully embracing the revolutionary social 
implications of the government's new emancipation policy, the practical military qualities of both 
abolition and area denial quickly proved attractive. Sherman's volunteers were eager for the 
opportunity to punish the prodigiously wealthy Southern planters who inhabited the magnificent 
plantations of the southernmost portions of the Mississippi Valley. In the eyes of those in the 
ranks, these wealthy slave-owners were those they held most responsible for the war, and thus 
ultimately for the recent deaths of their comrades. Deeply frustrated with their inability to strike 
a powerful blow at the enemy on the battlefield, in their opinion due principally to the incapacity 
of “our Generals” to coordinate their attacks, the chance to do at least as much damage to the 
Secessionist rebellion without so much as firing a shot proved immensely cathartic.  
182 
I. “The Point” 
 Arriving along the levee at Young's Point, Louisiana in mid-January with the rest of his 
army to take command of the entire force, Grant wasted no time in getting to work. The bloody 
results of Sherman's direct assault on Vicksburg left little doubt as to the relative efficacy of 
repeating such an attack. Instead, Grant hoped to bypass the “Gibraltar of the Mississippi” 
altogether. Restarting an abandoned project begun the previous summer by black laborers 
overseen by troops under Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, Grant planned to cut a wide canal across 
De Soto Point directly across from Vicksburg which would redirect the path of the mighty river 
and render the city strategically insignificant. By allowing riverine traffic to pass freely beyond 
the range of Rebel artillery atop the Vicksburg bluffs, the plan would effectively convert the city 
into an inland town.432 
 Grant chose the new corps of his most trusted subordinate to lead the way in this 
endeavor. Disembarking from their transports onto the overcrowded levee, Sherman's miserable 
corps finally landed at Young's Point on January 23 and established camps along the trace of the 
abandoned canal ditch and upon the levee extending below it along the bend in the river. The 
canal, or rather its beginnings, ran a little over a mile across De Soto Point, with the spoil piled 
up on its eastern bank to protect laborers from the Rebel batteries at Vicksburg. The ditch itself, 
when Sherman initially surveyed it, measured roughly ten feet wide and six feet deep, still filled 
with innumerable stumps. His corps was initially charged with widening the ditch by nine feet. 
Additional detachments would labor to put the few roads to and from the canal into functional 
condition. Employed immediately after their disembarkation from the misery of the steamers, the 
men did not initially appreciate the opportunity for exercise. Sherman took note of the 
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resentment and considerable disaffection in the details. “I have never seen men work more 
grudgingly,” he frustratedly remarked.433 
 From the very beginning, the canal effort was beset with challenges. As water several feet 
deep already stood in the bottom of the ditch, widening the canal could only extend to a depth of 
about four feet before the standing water flooded the work area. A dredge was badly needed to 
drain the water prior to digging, but none was available. Moreover, the lax current flowing 
through the trench was never strong enough to erode the banks on its own. Instead, Grant and his 
chief engineer, Captain Frederick Prime, opted to cut a new entrance that could take advantage of 
the Mississippi's mighty current and, with a little coaxing, more or less dig itself. Plugging the 
entrance and exit of the ditch with sandbags and digging drainage ditches eventually removed 
most the water from the trench long enough to deepen the cut as the new entrance was dug. 
Heavy intermittent rains plagued the project, raising the river level until it threatened to 
surmount the levee in early February, but the new plan gradually showed promise. When word 
arrived that multiple dredges had been secured for the army at St. Louis later that month, Grant 
and Prime became increasingly optimistic.434 
 The technical exigencies of canal construction prompted Sherman's corps to make its first 
substantive adjustment to force structure. Desperately short of trained engineers, Grant issued a 
special field order in early December prompting all divisions of the army to organize a “Pioneer 
Corps” of mechanically-inclined men detailed from the ranks. As Sherman's two divisions were 
then absent from the army, it was not until Grant rejoined the command in late January that the 
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corps's pioneers were officially organized. While whole regiments detailed to fatigue duty, along 
with ever increasing numbers of freedmen, could provide raw muscle and sweat, most volunteers 
lacked the technical expertise to fashion trustworthy bridges, reliably repair levees, or dig viable 
canals. These tasks required men with “mechanical skill and fitness” who could “superintend 
Mechanical & Engineer work.” Brigade commanders were ordered to root out such soldiers from 
within the ranks of their regiments. Each brigadier was responsible for detailing fifty men as 
pioneers, further divided into two detachments, each under the command of an officer or 
sergeant. This armed each division with six such detachments, all under the command of a first 
lieutenant. As soon as the detachments had been formed, they were assigned supervisory duty at 
the canal.435 
 The Western regiments that comprised Sherman's corps were rarely hard pressed to find 
such “mechanical skill and fitness” within their ranks. Men who had worked as blacksmiths, 
carpenters, engineers, machinists, or mechanics comprised just under 10% of all enlistments into 
the average regiment in Stuart's division which led the way in the canal project. The Zouaves of 
the 8th Missouri boasted nearly a company and a half worth of men with a technical background. 
By late January, it is likely that the division's camps contained more than 1,000 men with 
relevant mechanical skills, and thus brigadiers could afford to be picky in their selection of fifty 
from their regiments while still leaving the majority in the ranks to assist in carrying out more 
technical assignments.436 To orchestrate the unskilled labor provided by the regiments 
themselves, Sherman divided the canal into 150 foot segments and assigned each to a separate 
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regiment. First and Second Divisions alternated daily in providing 500-man work details, 
reporting each morning to the corps Chief of Engineers, Captain W. L. B. Jenney.437 Twelve-hour 
work days were broken into two-hour shifts in the mud. Sherman strictly required officers to be 
present with each and every detail. “This rule is invariable,” he warned.438  
 Along with a steam pump and the promised dredges came 1,000 black laborers from 
Memphis in late February and early March to assist with the project. These men joined other 
freedmen from the immediate environs already toiling in the canal at the direction of the Pioneer 
Corps. There is unfortunately little evidence that the two races worked amicably together. For the 
most part, details remained separated with the exception of white Pioneer officers charged with 
overseeing the black laborers. “The darkies would be busily engaged in wheeling dirt from the 
canal singing their Negro melodies,” one Hawkeye observed. Occasionally, when Rebel gunners 
sent a shell screaming over the river, he and his comrades erupted in laughter at the sight of “the 
darkies, wheelbarrows and all[,] roll into the mud, and water[,] and after crawling out skin [run] 
for some of the large cypress stumps.” Chasing after them, white officers screamed “Come back 
you black curs and go to work!”439 Frustration brewed between the soldiers and laborers. David 
Holmes, 55th Illinois, thought he sensed that the “colored gents” were already “getting tired of 
working for Uncle Sam,” having overheard a few “say they would rather be with Massa.”440 
"The Negroes that are found on these plantations are unfit for free men and useless appendages 
to the Army," Major Abraham J. Seay, 32nd Missouri, remarked. "We have utterly failed in 
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almost every instant to render them useful to us."441 Most were not quite so pessimistic, but still 
had reservations. “They are good for such purposes as throwing up breastworks and digging 
canals,” one Illinoisan officer confided to his diary, “but I cannot think they are a class that 
should be armed.”442 
 The Rebels across the river ensured that canal details never became too complacent. 
River batteries frequently sent over “intermittent dashes of poetic spice in the shape of explosive 
shells.”443 On one day in March a total of fifteen rounds careened over the river.444 Though 
usually falling harmlessly nearby, occasionally they plunged dangerously into the canal. On a 
few occasions they were even greeted with cheers, when “not infrequently they would strike 
right at the base of a huge stump and raise it out by the roots and blow it bodily, or in fragments, 
completely out of the canal,” saving hours of grueling labor.445 Meanwhile, pickets along the 
levee put to use a lesson learned during the winter's battles. The flash of the guns on the far bank 
gave ample time to prepare for the arrival of Rebel shells. "All you have to do is lay flat down 
where you see them a coming and they will not be apt to hit a fellow," one observed. "You better 
believe they make a noise that is not very agreeable to hear, but I had rather hear them than the 
bullets of the Rebels," he added.446 Armed with his knowledge, one Hoosier veteran of Arkansas 
Post boasted in his diary about how the Rebels “try to shell us out of the trench but we don't shell 
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out worth a cent.”447 Another of his comrades was far less stoic when one "screaming monster" 
burst overhead and sprayed the levee with shrapnel. "They come as if Satans messengers from 
the other world," Private Hiram McClintock wrote in awe. "Pandemonium. No matter where they 
go they invariably seem to be coming right for you."448 
 By March 5, optimism for the imminent success of the canal was at its height at Grant's 
headquarters. The ebullient commander confidently wired Washington to report his anticipation 
that the ditch would be ready for steamer transit in only a few more days. The very next day, 
however, disaster struck. When the precarious sandbag closure of the canal's entrance suddenly 
gave way during the night, the closure blocking the exit failed to follow suit, flooding not only 
the canal but nearly all of the southern half of De Soto Point including much of the Fifteenth 
Corps's cantonment. Soaked engineers rushed to detonate explosives at the lower sandbag 
enclosure to drain the water, but Sherman's corps was forced to relocate further north away from 
the flooded peninsula. The only available ground high enough to avoid the surging floodwaters 
was the levee itself, and thus the entire corps found itself in cramped camps atop the narrow 
berm. Although Grant would attempt to continue the effort once the floodwaters had partially 
receded, for all practical purposes the disaster marked the unsuccessful termination of the ill-
fated operation. By mid-March, Rebel batteries had perfected the range from the Vicksburg 
bluffs to the canal (a little under half a mile from the most proximate positions), and rendered 
any additional labor efforts too precarious to contemplate. As the Secessionist gunners grew into 
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expert marksmen, any force detailed to work on the canal found the assignment “much like going 
into battle with nothing to shoot with but shovels loaded with mud.”449 
 While Grant and his staff had hoped against long odds, the enlisted men who labored on 
the canal understood the terrible odds working against them. Around the campfire, most 
“prophesied that the wayward current could not be coaxed to enter the channel being laboriously 
prepared for it," recalled one Illinoisan450 This discussion inevitably led to "not much heart 
[being] put into the work."451 Each and every setback to the effort came as little shock. "Every 
private soldier knew it was [a failure] from the beginning," Private Robert Henry, 26th Iowa, 
remarked.452 Even so, with the trauma of Chickasaw and “the Post” still lingering in their minds, 
many were content with the change of pace. “It is pret[t]y hard work but I would sooner dig than 
fight if it will accomplish any thing,” one still shaken Illinoisan remarked.453 The survivors of 
Shepard's roughly handled 3rd Missouri agreed. “Shoveling mud was, after all, only another way 
of taking Vicksburg, or at least a means of getting past it,” Sergeant-Major Edward Reichhelm 
remembered, “and preferable to another Chickasaw Bayou experiment.”454 
 While ultimately a failure, the canal project offered the Fifteenth Corps opportunities to 
develop important skills and prompted a series of adaptations that would prove valuable in the 
near future. By far the most significant of these was the creation of each division's permanent 
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Pioneer Corps. Whereas previously the brigades of Sherman's corps had lacked any formal 
mechanism by which to harness the expertise of their more mechanically-inclined members 
when tasked with constructing corduroy roads, erecting battery positions, or bridging streams 
and creeks, the command had now consolidated the most capable of these men into pioneer 
detachments that could supervise not only the labor of unskilled white volunteers, but also that of 
the growing numbers of freedmen attached to the army. In an army lacking many professional 
military engineers, the creation of these detachments represented a major step forward. 
 The project also accustomed the regiments of the corps to operating as collections of 
small detachments, each commanded by a junior officer or senior sergeant and assigned a small 
part of the larger effort. These smaller work details provided plentiful opportunities for junior 
leaders to gain experience in taking initiative while laboring alongside their subordinates in the 
dismal muck. There was nothing glamorous about the mission, and the willingness of leaders to 
assist their charges in the labor decreased the perceived power distance within most commands. 
Sergeant-Major Edward P. Reichhelm, 3rd Missouri, called his personal style of leadership “easy 
bossing.” By applying “a judicious mixture of persuasion and firm insistence” along with direct 
personal involvement in the unglamorous toil, Reichhelm discovered he could best maximize the 
productivity of his men not by driving them as a veritable slave master, but rather by consistently 
acting as an “easy boss.”455 Others who opted for a more domineering style found leadership an 
uphill battle. Given command of a thirty-man detail charged with laying a corduroy road to the 
canal under a driving rain, Lt. Henry Kircher, 12th Missouri, complained of his struggles in a 
letter home. Although Kircher finally “succeeded in keeping my men pretty much in the swing,” 
he had been forced to rely on “'God damns' and dirty looks'” in order to urge the work along. 
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“Such tasks are always very unpleasant because one can't teach the men that a soldier 
occasionally has to work,” he explained.456 
 Peacetime neighborhood projects had given white Westerners and their black 
“contraband” counterparts a significant advantage in this work. The vast majority of Western 
volunteers had considerable experience at working in similar capacities while participating in 
community logging bees, barn raising bees, and corn husking parties back home. Perhaps most 
similar were the time-sensitive exigencies of the wheat harvest. Laboring feverishly within a 
tight window to gather a crop prior to the loss of seeds, most Western farmers sought 
considerable help in expediting the process prior to the invention of time-saving machinery. As 
one group cut, another bundled the wheat, while a third followed behind stacking the shocks. 
Group labor was also routinely employed in ditching for drainage, a task remarkably similar to 
that engaged in by the corps while digging Grant's ill-fated canal.457 
 The abysmal conditions associated with laboring in the mud and mosquitoes of the canal, 
however, greatly deteriorated the already sunken morale of the corps. To make the experience 
slightly more tolerable, U.S. Army Regulations authorized the issuance of one gill of whiskey to 
soldiers working in conditions of “excessive fatigue and exposure,” which certainly described 
the work on De Soto Point.458 Suffering intensely in the miserable circumstances, regiments 
often became fiercely defensive over their authorized whiskey ration. When, on occasion, the 
vexing logistics of the camps at Young's Point delayed its issuance, formal complaints filed at 
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higher headquarters were not infrequent.459 Still, although some of those officers and orderly 
sergeants of Stuart's division were reported for covertly issuing excessive amounts to a few 
“Whiskey bloats” and “degraded sponges,” most officers and sergeants managed to keep their 
volunteers to a minimum sobriety.460 The same could not always be said for their commanders. 
Steele was known by those on Sherman's staff to occasionally "get tight on champagne" in 
private, but usually managed to maintain his stoic demeanor in front of the command.461 Blair 
likewise became "tight, very" on occasion.462 Frequently he shared his spirits and dinner with 
Sherman's chief of staff, Maj. John H. Hammond who occasionally remained at the brigadier's 
headquarters overnight after many a "jolly evening.”463 Accepting an invitation to play a game of 
whist on the evening of March 30, Lt. Col. Seay, 32nd Missouri discovered the regiment's 
commander “tight and asleep” instead.464 Upon discovery of Hugh Ewing's descent into the same 
behavior, Sherman, probably feeling a brotherly obligation, promptly “took Steps that have 
proven effectual” to nip it in the bud without ever recording just what such steps entailed.465 
 For those outside of high command there was little jollity in life at “the Point.” Many felt 
the corps cantonment represented “the most desolate Camp on earth.”466 The sodden ground 
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everywhere seemed on the imminent verge of sinking into a veritable sea of river water. In many 
places mud was ankle deep.467 George Browning, 54th Ohio, found he and his messmates “had to 
Build a Bridge in front of our tent to keep from drowning.”468 A shovel sunk a mere half foot into 
the campground of the 32nd Missouri uncovered an "abundance of water."469 One Illinoisan 
observed how, if a soldier was to "put his foot squarely down anywhere, it was questionable, 
when he raised it again, if the shoe would not stay behind."470 Water was omnipresent and 
inescapable. "Men stand in water[,] sleep and eat in water," Robert Henry, 26th Iowa observed. 
"It is hard for one that never had [such an] experience to imagine."471 
 By late January, nighttime temperatures plummeted far enough to freeze the water in 
regimental wash basins.472 Even sunny days were paired with a "cold piercing wind" that exacted 
a heavy toll from those already ill from the long steamer passage southward.473 Not until late 
February did daytime temperatures rise sufficiently to make bathing again possible.474 The 
deadly combination of harsh weather, flooding, “unseasoned” troops, hard labor, and in later 
months the hatching of malarial mosquito populations, quickly transformed “the Point” into a 
veritable hell on Earth.  
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 In his effort to cobble together an expeditionary force of sufficient size to take on the 
Rebels atop the Walnut Hills, Sherman had thought very little about the character of the troops 
and regiments assigned to his new command. Recent experience had illustrated the cost of such 
willful ignorance on the battlefield as the disparate histories of each unit played a powerful role 
in shaping their performance under fire. But the important qualitative differences between 
regiments extended beyond their various levels of tactical competency. In filling half of his new 
corps with freshly raised regiments, Sherman well knew that its impressive size was unlikely to 
last. Professional soldiers had long been accustomed to armies of fresh recruits requiring a 
customary “seasoning” period prior to full readiness for their first campaign. Ignorant of germ 
theory, officers and physicians presumed that the grievous losses newly raised regiments 
routinely suffered from “infantile diseases” like measles and mumps were inevitable. While we 
now know that the predominately rural volunteers comprising the bulk of Civil War armies 
suffered from a lack of critical antibodies, Sherman and his peers remained convinced that the 
staggering rates of disease in regiments of “fresh levies” was due to a critical lack of discipline 
and experience with military life. New regiments “dont know how to take care of themselves and 
suffer unnecessarily in health,” Cump explained to his brother. “They cant know how to make 
their camps, how to march, how to cook, how to shelter themselves so that in three months they 
fall away to mere skeletons.”475 
 Far more frustrating to Sherman than either of his recent repulses at Chickasaw or “the 
Post” were the repeated repulses he suffered as he personally rushed the ramparts of the Lincoln 
administration's flawed mobilization policy. The President remained staunchly in favor of raising 
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new regiments of volunteers instead of sending individual recruits to fill gaps in reduced veteran 
“skeleton regiments,” as Cump referred to them. This policy provided plentiful opportunities to 
award loyal Democrats with officer commissions which signaled bipartisanship to a still divided 
Northern public. Sherman bemoaned Lincoln's reasoning as “false economy.” He had watched 
firsthand as regiment after regiment of “fresh levies” shrunk from near 1000 men to fewer than 
300 for duty in a matter of a few months. “This same number of men, distributed to old 
organizations [would] learn quickly from association,” he argued, “ and escape in a measure the 
consequent sickness and death.”476 Older regiments had “by a process of elimination weeded out 
the worthless and inefficient officers & non commissioned officers,” thus rendering the 
remainder the best possible teachers for newcomers.477  
 With the Lincoln government apparently deaf to Sherman's entreaties, he and his 
lieutenants did their best to mitigate the anticipated losses associated with “new” regiments 
undergoing their “seasoning” periods while in such abysmal conditions. As soon as the corps 
started its disembarkation at Young's Point, regimental commanders of both “old” and “new” 
regiments labored to ensure their units took advantage of dry land to attend to the lagging 
sanitation endemic aboard the transports. Col. George Stone promptly ordered the officers of his 
25th Iowa to ensure the men washed and mended their remaining clothing, and that they bathed 
at least once a week.478 No member of the unit would be issued his daily rations “Unless he shall 
have washed his face and hands and combed his hair,” Stone asserted.479 His lieutenants shared 
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these concerns. “If the men will take care of themselves & Keep clean, half the sickness would 
be avoided,” one of Stone's junior officers remarked, “but as it is, there are some who do not 
wash once in a week, and no wonder they get sick and die.” Fortunately, many were “beginning 
to learn Some sense, & the officers & men are taking the matter in hands.”480 
 At the same time, suspicious that many complaining of illness might in fact be shirking, 
Stone also ordered that all reporting sick, presumably having lost their appetites, were to be 
issued only half rations. The remaining surplus was divided up between those still on duty. If the 
“sick” were in fact “’playing off’ or ‘shirking,’ the punishment will be a meritorious one,” he 
reasoned.481 Stone’s quest to purge his Iowans of “play-offs” was not limited to the enlisted 
ranks. Officers complaining of sickness who proved incapable of procuring a certificate of 
disability were expected to remain on duty. “It looks very suspicious to see officers reported sick 
who can play Whisky Poker all day and nearly all night,” Stone added sharply in his general 
orders.482 Two days later, when it came to his attention that many of his exhausted men were 
relieving their bowels in closer proximity to the regiment's cantonment area than the authorized 
latrines, he opted for an even more draconian measure. “Any soldier committing a nuisance any 
where else near camp [than the latrine] shall be liable to have his nose rubbed therein,” he boldly 
ordered.483 No record of whether or not the punishment was ever enacted survives. 
 Many correctly ascertained that the lack of much nutritional diversity contributed to the 
lengthy lines at sick call. Beyond the meager Army ration, extra protein was far easier to come 
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by at Young's Point than it had been aboard the transports. The murky water of the canal proved a 
likely venue for crawfish hunting, and work details frequently caught and ate the crustaceans as 
if they were a delicacy.484 After the levee broke and most the low ground flooded, “we can catch 
fish most any where,” one pleased Hawkeye remarked.485 Vegetables, on the other hand, were 
rare. The men of the 26th Iowa received but one onion apiece on February 17, "all we have had 
in the vegetable line this winter," one complained.486 The shortage contributed to widespread 
scurvy in the ranks. "The Gov has furnished us with but little of vegitables [sic] and the Scurvy 
prevails to a great extent," Hawkeye Private Robert Henry observed. One of Henry's comrades 
was "very sick with it [and] he is as large as two men it is horrible to look upon.487 Splurging 
limited personal funds on non-military food from sutlers amounted to a survival strategy for 
many. "I have spent the last available thing for such things as I considered necessary such as 
dried fruit cheese & light bread," Henry wrote, "for if there is any thing I detest or loathe it is 
[Army issued] 'hard bread.'" As civilian sutlers recognized the opportunity, prices skyrocketed, 
"but I am certain I owe my good health to the use of them," he explained.488  
 For great numbers of the still “new” recruits that filled Sherman's army however, regular 
bathing and dietary supplementation would never be sufficient. From the moment the corps 
landed at Young's Point, its newest units began to show alarming signs of “every conceivable 
variety of lice and small-pox, measles and mumps, and other diseases incident to women and 
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children,” Kilby Smith reported.489 “It appears like one could not get well when once sick in the 
army,” one Illinoisan observed.490 His regiment, the 116th Illinois, was by no means unique 
among the “new” regiments of the corps in its loss of nearly 200 men from resignation, 
desertion, discharge, and death during its four month stay at Young's Point. Hasty funerals for the 
dead were marked by the somber drone of the “Dead March” and rifles fired in salute over the 
grave. By February, these sounds became nearly omnipresent. In March, when extensive 
flooding confined the corps's camps to the narrow levee itself, the men were forced to share their 
cantonment with the dead, and the levee was lined with shallow graves no further than a stone's 
throw from the shelters of the living. Those few who were still well found themselves picking up 
the slack by undertaking additional duties. “The men reported fit for duty rarely had a day of 
rest,” Sergeant Major Reichhelm remembered, but were constantly hard at work, generally knee-
deep in mud and water.”491 The combination of exhaustion and abysmal conditions eventually 
disabled many of even the most physically robust specimens in every regiment. 
 Between January and April 1863, the Fifteenth Corps lost a staggering 3,500 men from its 
rolls. When its regiments finally stepped off southward on the famed Vicksburg campaign, they 
left behind more than 1,600 of their own in shallow graves along the levee or in crude coffins 
headed northward to grieving families across the West. At least another thousand had been 
discharged for disability, many of whom would perish at home in a matter of weeks or months 
from the same ailments which had mercilessly taken the lives of their comrades. More than 500 
men deserted from Fifteenth Corps regiments during the late winter and spring, some for 
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political reasons as the perceived meaning of the war gradually shifted, but many undoubtedly in 
a bid to save themselves from the omnipresent disease and death that defined life at “the Point.” 
The frequent departure of steamers northward from the camps offered easy opportunities for 
those so inclined to anonymously slip away from their comrades with few to no questions asked. 
Finally, at least 160 officers of all grades within the corps resigned their commissions between 
the day Sherman's transports landed along the banks of the levee and the day the blue columns 
departed southward for Grand Gulf.492 
 Losses were by no means evenly distributed across the 41 infantry regiments and six 
batteries that now comprised the corps. The starkest difference was between “old” and “new” 
previously “unseasoned” regiments. On average, “old” longer service regiments each suffered a 
loss of 25 dead, 34 discharged for disability, 17 desertions, and 4 officer resignations over the 
four-month period. By dramatic contrast, the “new” fresh levies of Sherman's corps, comprising 
almost half the command, lost on average more than 100 to death, issued at least 50 discharges 
for disability, lost nearly 20 men to desertion, and reported an average of nine resignations. Thus, 
while on average “old” regiments suffered a loss of 80 men to all causes, “new” regiments lost 
nearly 200 – more than two full-strength companies. This disparity had the effect of converting 
all of Sherman's large “new” units of fresh levies into the same “skeleton regiments” that 
comprised his command prior to their arrival.  
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 All told, the total loss to the corps between January and April amounted to more than 
twice the number lost to all causes during the recent intense fighting in the Yazoo bottoms and at 
Arkansas Post. More than seven times those who had fallen to Rebel lead and steel that winter 
now lay silently along the levee as victims of disease, abysmal sanitation, and appalling 
conditions. The sheer scale of human tragedy entailed by such loss is difficult to comprehend, 
but the cost to the corps's operational capabilities (and, by extension, to those of Grant's army) 
are easier to calculate. At a point in the corps's history when most of its regiments averaged 
about 350 men for duty on a daily basis, the loss of almost 3,500 men was the equivalent of 
nearly 10 regiments, or an entire division. In fact, when the corps set off on its long march to 
Vicksburg, neither of its two divisions could muster anywhere close to 3,500 men present for 
duty. These young volunteers had not been lost to enemy action. Their patriotism, youthful vigor, 
and potential operational contributions had been lost. Sherman, his lieutenants, and all those in 
the ranks of the corps would now have to do more with far less. 
II. “Experience which would serve us” 
 Once it had become painfully evident that the canal was almost certainly a failure, Grant 
turned his attention elsewhere. By cutting a levee a considerable distance upriver to the north, the 
Army flooded backwaters leading into the Yazoo hinterland east of the Mississippi. This 
increased flow, Grant hoped, would allow for a modest expeditionary force, along with an escort 
of Navy gunboats, to meander through the Yazoo watershed until it could reach the high ground 
north of Vicksburg and establish a lodgment to exploit with follow-on deployments. While the 
tortuous course of the vegetation-choked waterways proved challenging enough to the hard luck 
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combined arms force, the expedition was stopped cold in its tracks by a meager but stalwart 
Rebel defense of a sand and dirt bastion dubbed “Fort Pemberton.”493 
 In part to distract Rebel attention from the logjam at Fort Pemberton, as well as to try one 
final roundabout approach to the heights north of Vicksburg, Grant ordered Sherman to 
accompany Admiral David D. Porter in launching a second foray into the dark swamps of the 
Yazoo on March 14. This time, a joint force of five of Porter’s City-class ironclads, four tugs 
towing mortar rafts, and one division of Sherman’s corps riding aboard steamers and in towed 
coal barges would ascend the Yazoo and make a left turn northward into Steele’s Bayou just prior 
to coming into view of the Rebel batteries atop Haynes’s Bluff. Porter’s smoke-belching flotilla 
would plow the brown waters of Steele’s Bayou before turning into the vine-choked gauntlet of 
Black Bayou to gain the slightly wider channel of Deer Creek. From there, the boats would 
resume their northward trajectory until making a right turn into Rolling Fork, then south again 
after entering the Sunflower River. Finally, at the conclusion of this labyrinthine journey, the 
expedition would re-enter the Yazoo north of both Haynes’s and Drumgould’s Bluffs, 
disembarking Sherman’s one division upon dry ground after having flanked all Rebel defenses 
along the Yazoo River. Provided the route could be both secured and maintained, additional 
troops would then be dispatched through the winding bayous to the newly secured landing. At 
the very least Rebel forces would be drawn off from either Fort Pemberton or Vicksburg itself to 
confront the new Yankee threat, growing the menu of strategic options available to Grant.494 
 It was a desperate plan, but the importance of bagging Vicksburg amid a flagging 
Northern war effort seemed to warrant pulling out all the stops. It was also extremely risky. 
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Grant, Porter, and Sherman all recognized the terrifying possibility that, even barring any enemy 
resistance, the gambit could cost the Navy many or even all of its gunboats, and thus its only 
hope of ever seizing the city at all. Should a single vessel hit a snag, puncture its hull on any of 
the many submerged hazards, or suffer a debilitating attack by Rebel partisans, all the craft north 
of it would immediately be trapped. If it sunk in a narrow portion of any of the winding bayou 
channels it could spell disaster for the entire campaign. 
 Sherman selected his beloved “old division” for the perilous undertaking, its primary 
mission at the canal having been nullified by the recent flooding. The multifaceted Zouaves 
would once again spearhead Sherman's effort. Understanding that many of the 8th Missouri had 
been recruited from the St. Louis waterfront, Grant presumed that several had considerable 
experience with river work. Thus, when casting about for a command to “clean out the channel” 
of Steele's Bayou and clear a route for the expedition by cutting away overhanging trees and 
vines, the Zouaves seemed a perfect fit. Along with two detachments from the Second Division's 
new Pioneer Corps, the regiment embarked aboard the Diligent on March 15 and set out on their 
clearance mission.495 With them they brought more than 300 axes “and a keg of spikes, so as to 
make rafts on which the men are to stand whilst cutting away the tree tops” along with a coil of 
rope, with which “to heave away the chopped trees and limbs.” Once the mission was complete, 
the Zouaves were to make their way northward to Black Bayou were they would rendezvous 
with Sherman.496 
 In an effort to shorten the distance that the rest of Stuart's regiments had to be hauled 
through the most challenging southern portions of Steele's Bayou, Grant thought it best to 
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disembark the division at Eagle Bend along the eastern bank of the Mississippi and march it 
down a levee hugging the northern bank of Muddy Bayou until reaching transports waiting in 
Steele's Bayou. Accordingly, early on the morning of March 16, Stuart's twelve regiments 
boarded steamers at Milliken's Bend with five days rations, all available ammunition on hand, 
and every axe that could be found.497 After landing at Eagle Bend, Stuart took one look at the 
levee running along Muddy Bayou and determined that it was utterly “impassable for the troops 
without the construction of rafts and bridges.”498 First, a lengthy “floating bridge” was necessary 
to even reach the high ground of the levee, the fields between the river and levee having been 
utterly inundated with floodwaters.499 Moreover, two massive crevasses had been rent in the 
levee by floodwaters which would likewise require bridging before the division could safely 
reach its objective. The bayou itself was so densely overgrown with trees and vines that 
considerable effort was also necessary to clear it of obstructions before it could be used as a 
supply viaduct. Conscious of the need for speed, he immediately ordered the men to disassemble 
the slave cabins and cotton gin of a nearby plantation and use the lumber to bridge the two 
crevasses.500 With this, he returned to report to Grant at Young's Point, leaving the details to the 
newly arrived Brig. Gen. Hugh Ewing.501 
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 Ewing broke apart the regiments of his brigade and assigned each of them a separate task. 
It would prove the beginning of a pattern for the Fifteenth Corps while operating in the bayous. 
As the expedition gradually progressed toward its objective, its component brigades were 
routinely fragmented into individually-tasked regiments, which often subsequently fragmented 
into separately tasked companies and even smaller detachments. Each of these subsequent 
divisions created an opportunity for junior officers and even sergeants to take initiative within 
some small part of the larger plan, growing their skills as leaders in the process. When security 
became a concern, these fragments would quickly re-consolidate in order to repel Rebel attacks. 
 The division of labor in Ewing's brigade as it approached its mission began with his 
assignment of Col. Augustus Parry's 47th Ohio to erect two viable bridges over the gaping 
crevasses. As Parry's Buckeyes tore apart the nearby slave cabins for wood, just as Stuart had 
prescribed, Ewing set Col. Joseph Lightburn's 4th West Virginia to clearing obstructions from 
Muddy Bayou. Filing into the frigid brown water of the narrow channel with axes in hand, the 
men started in to the dirty work. Meanwhile, the division's Pioneer Corps applied its expertise in 
supervising the construction of Parry's bridges. Freedmen assigned to the Pioneers assisted in the 
heavy labor of cutting additional lumber and hauling it into place. By noon of March 19 both 
bridges were in place, allowing for Giles and Kilby Smith's brigades to march east to the 
transports awaiting them in Steele's Bayou. As the other two brigades embarked, Ewing received 
orders to remain with his regiments at Muddy Bayou, continuing to clear the channel and 
finishing an artillery wagon road that would facilitate the movement of supplies and ammunition 
forward from Young's Point should it become necessary.502 
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 After chugging northward through the winding bends of Steele's Bayou to the mouth of 
Black Bayou, the lead regiments of Giles Smith's brigade transferred to flatboats and coal barges 
which ferried them through the vine-choked stream to the relatively dry ground of “Reality 
Plantation.” Discovering the property nearly abandoned, and its outhouses veritable “chicken-
abounding oases,” the tired infantrymen took in their new temporary home “with amazing 
equanimity,” one embedded journalist noted.503 A slave on the plantation explained how the 
overseer, who had long referred to the Deer Creek valley as “the Confederate snuff-box, that the 
Yankees could not open,” had ingloriously fled.504 To protect against attack, the men hauled 
cotton bales from the gins and stacked them up into impromptu breastworks.505 The steamers 
meanwhile returned to Muddy Bayou to ferry the rest of the division northward in three trips 
spread across the next three days. By the morning of March 23, all of Stuart's division would be 
encamped at “Reality.”.506 
 Set on reconnoitering the expedition's objectives well ahead of his corps, Sherman had 
long before ascended Steele's Bayou to “Reality” alone in a private tug and was waiting with the 
Zouaves when Giles Smith arrived with the 6th Missouri and 116th Illinois. Upon his arrival 
days before, one look at the condition of Black Bayou and Deer Creek had been enough to 
convince Sherman that, as was so often the case, what looked good on a map and what was 
actually operationally feasible were two very different things. The route painstakingly plowed by 
Porter's ironclads, then slashing away at trees and vines and smashing “the wooden boats all to 
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pieces” as they attempted to ram half-submerged obstructions somewhere north of “Reality” on 
narrow Deer Creek, was not practicable for any sizable assault force. “I don't think we can make 
a lodgment on high land by this route,” he reported back to Grant.507 While the optimistic Porter 
remained confident in his ability to continue on course to Rolling Fork, he advised Sherman to 
stay with his landsmen at “Reality” and await developments. Cump was more than happy to 
comply, given that it seemed a fool's errand to try and follow up the admiral on land with any 
more than a token force given the flooded terrain.508 
 The first signs of trouble appeared in a brief dispatch from Porter up Deer Creek back to 
Sherman at “Reality” the day after Smith's brigade had arrived. The admiral and his ironclads 
were still in Deer Creek, but his forward momentum was being stalled by felled trees tossed into 
and across the creek by slaves apparently driven by Rebels. “Hurry up to co-operate,” he urged 
Sherman, who was incapable of doing so given that most of Stuart's regiments would still require 
at least another day to arrive at “Reality.” Not wanting to cut off all contact with the units which 
had not yet arrived, he opted instead to send Smith's demi-brigade alone in advance. Before first 
light on the 21st, Sherman dispatched Smith with his 800 men up the east bank of Deer Creek on 
foot with orders to proceed twenty miles in search of Porter's boats and provide whatever help he 
needed.509 Sherman did not anticipate much fighting, and took it “for granted [that] the five iron-
clad gunboats can fight anything that can be brought against them, and land forces are only 
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needed to cover the ground, to enable them to clean out obstructions” without being hampered by 
harassing Rebel marksmen on the banks.510 
 As soon as the sun rose, Smith's detachment was in motion behind a “negro guide” 
provided by Sherman, who allegedly knew the way to Porter's most recent position.511 Only a 
short distance up the creek it became clear that “the enemy had been very busy felling trees to 
obstruct the creek,” Smith later reported. Slaves encountered along the route explained to him 
how all “had been notified to be ready at nightfall to continue the work.” Though lacking any 
formal authority to seize “property” on his mission, Smith recognized that all the slaves he 
encountered had been made free by the President's recent proclamation. Thus, he took the 
obvious step, and “ordered all able-bodied negroes to be taken along,” warning their aggrieved 
masters “that they would be held responsible for any more obstructions being placed across the 
creek.”512 Falling in behind the speeding column, the freedmen joined in the van, and in the 
process partially converted the character of the mission from that exclusively of tactical 
reinforcement and relief to one also of emancipation. 
 As the sounds of Porter's guns grew louder, the column sped forward. By late afternoon, 
the southernmost embattled boats were in sight and the lead elements of Smith's force took 
sporadic fire from across the river. Deploying his men in the usual Second Division fashion, 
dispersed in four-man skirmish teams, the Missourians and their Illinoisan supports entered the 
fray. “Every tree and stump covered a sharpshooter,” Smith reported. Rushing toward the 
outhouses of a nearby plantation for cover, the advance guard was ambushed and one Missourian 
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cut down before the rest of the company could storm the buildings.513 Meanwhile, Smith worked 
to make contact with Porter, who was overcome with emotion upon seeing blue uniforms. At the 
Admiral's behest, Smith took command of all the marines on hand along with his infantry. As his 
three regiments were actually only the size of a single full strength regiment, he broke their small 
companies up into independent tactical units and gave them each separate tactical objectives, just 
as Ewing had done with his command at Muddy Bayou. This breaking up of his concentrated 
command, though outnumbered by the Rebel enemy, actually had the effect of making the small 
force more difficult to drive from the field. Most companies were charged with skirmishing to 
gain a tactical edge over the Rebels hidden in the woods to their front. Others were ordered to 
disperse for several miles down the creek to the south “to prevent any more obstructions being 
placed in it.”514 Each detachment, after departing, effectively left Smith's control, and relied on 
itself and its junior leaders in the sharp fight along the creek. Several of these detachments 
lacked a single officer. As the sun went down, they operated completely “on their own hook.” 
 The next day, as Smith's adept skirmishers fought from behind dispersed cover, slowly 
gaining an edge in the exchange with the remaining Rebel sharpshooters, Porter's boats began the 
painstaking process of backing down the river in retreat. As they did so, the detachments charged 
with guarding their withdrawal worked to pull obstructing trees from the water. It is likely that 
the many freedmen now accompanying the column assisted. It was a laboriously time-consuming 
process, and even more so under sporadic enemy sniper fire. Suddenly, along a wood line in the 
distance, Smith noticed “a long line of the enemy filing along the edge of the woods and taking 
position on the creek.” Accompanying slaves had warned him of these reinforcements. The 
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oncoming Rebels opened a heavy fire on Porter's retreating boats, which responded in kind but 
with little effect, their guns incapable of firing over the  
tall levees. Whether or not Smith could repel this new foe with just his outnumbered and 
dispersed skirmishing detachments was questionable. To make matters worse, sounds of heavy 
musketry filtered up from the south. Concerned that two of his most distant detachments might 
be cut off by another Rebel force in the rear, Smith speedily organized a relief party of 
skirmishers to rescue the beleaguered contingents. After the rescuers climbed aboard one of the 
ironclads, the craft plowed its way through obstructions southward toward the endangered 
outpost. As soon as it arrived, however, it came upon a welcome surprise: Maj. Gen. William T. 
Sherman and the rest of Second Division. 
 Just prior to Smith's arrival the previous day, Porter's optimism had run out. Blocked to 
the rear by obstructions and surrounded on all sides by Rebel snipers and light artillery, the 
ability of the flotilla to extricate itself from the hopeless situation was proving impossible barring 
relief from land. He had asked Sherman for support, but none seemed immediately forthcoming. 
Had his pleading dispatches made it through? Barring a miracle arrival of blue-coated help, he 
prepared himself for the unspeakable possibility of having to scuttle all his vessels so as to 
prevent their capture by the Rebels. With this in mind, he made one last effort to reach Cump, 
scribbling an urgent message on tissue paper, wrapping it in a piece of tobacco, and handing it to 
“a darky who called himself a telegraph” with instructions to make haste to “Reality” plantation 
in exchange for fifty cents.515 
 Upon receipt of the desperate message of his close friend, Cump sprung immediately into 
action. With his chief of staff, assistant adjutant-general, and multiple aides then on leave, 
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Sherman had to take the coordinative helm himself.516 Unlike at any time during the previous six 
months, he transformed under the immense stress of the campaign's first existential crisis into the 
leader the moment required. “I was almost alone at Hill's,” he later remembered, awaiting the 
arrival of the rest of Stuart's command. With no time to waste, he found a canoe and paddled 
down the still heavily obstructed Black Bayou alone until he found a steamer loaded with the rest 
of Smith's brigade. There was no way for the large craft to make the passage through the still 
tree-choked bayou, so the men were quickly transferred to an empty coal barge and towed with a 
smaller tug up the meandering channel. Crashing through debris with abandon, with fallen limbs 
“carrying away the pilot-house, smoke-stack, and everything above-deck,” nothing was spared in 
Cump's fever for rescuing the ironclads. 
 By the time the tug made it to the landing nearest “Reality” the night was “absolutely 
black.” Disembarking the barge and leading its occupants on foot, Sherman piloted the column 
through the pitch black swamps to “Reality.” For illumination, the men lit candles and stuck 
them in the sockets of their bayonets. After just a few hours' rest and the arrival of Kilby Smith's 
brigade (absent Smith himself), the command was up and moving forward at first light. The 
distant thunder of Porter's guns and growing crackle of musketry hastened the march.517 Sherman 
remained at the front and on foot, wading hip-deep through swamp water in places where the 
road dipped. “Being on foot myself, no man could complain,” he later remembered. “The 
soldiers generally were glad to have their general and field officers afoot,” he laughed, “but we 
gave them a fair specimen of marching.” The speeding column made twenty-one miles in five 
hours, or about four miles an hour – breakneck pace for an infantry column over such difficult 
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terrain. Nearing the sounds of the guns, Sherman spotted Smith's southernmost detachments 
fighting as skirmishers from atop an Indian mound in the bend of the creek. Having successfully 
delivered the column to its objective, the winded general “sat down on the doorsill of a [nearby] 
cabin to rest” for a moment while his subordinates took over.518 
 Although both Stuart and Kilby Smith were absent orchestrating other facets of the 
operation at Muddy and Black Bayous, Giles Smith was cut off with his demi-brigade to the 
north, and his brother Morgan still lay at Memphis convalescing from his Chickasaw wound, 
Second Division applied itself to the immediate tactical problem just as its evolved operational 
heritage and culture would have suggested. Deploying a line of skirmish teams directly from the 
column and well to the front to push the scattered Rebel forces back, the engagement before the 
Indian mounds quickly became exclusively a battle of skirmishers. Led independently by junior 
officers and senior sergeants, the “cloud of skirmishers” from a total of only seven companies 
from three regiments swept from tree to tree and cover to cover in a loosely coordinated wave, 
fighting skillfully as they advanced. Meanwhile, the massed body of remaining regiments 
followed safely in column a considerable distance to the rear, contributing additional companies 
to the skirmish line as needed. Just as at Corinth, Chickasaw, and Arkansas Post, the division's 
tactical approach capitalized on the individual skills of its riflemen and junior leaders while 
taking maximum advantage of terrain and vegetation. Its massed main body functioned primarily 
as a reserve for the forward deployed skirmish teams and a potential defensive bulwark should 
the skirmishers have to withdraw. This tactic also maximized economy of force and minimized 
casualties. While no wave of skirmishers could successfully assault Rebel works, against an 
enemy caught in the open these methods were far more efficient than any massed line of battle or 
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frontal assault could ever hope to be. For the first time in the campaign, Second Division's 
operational culture was ideally calibrated for the tactical problem at hand. Thus, very quickly, the 
division's skirmishers gained the upper hand. Once the remaining Rebel sharpshooters had been 
driven from the field, Sherman re-consolidated the scattered elements of his relief column to 
ensure the continued safety of Porter's ironclads as they continued to limp southward “at a snail's 
pace” back toward “Reality.”519 Jubilant over the their swift and relatively easy victory, the 
cocky soldiers jibed the sailors: “Better let bushwhacking out to 'Old Tecump's' boys!” they 
shouted.520 
 The next day, rain fell in torrents, turning the Deer Creek road to “mud, at times almost 
up to our knees.”521 Hoping to make something of the erstwhile fruitless venture, and struck by 
the obvious wealth of the valley Porter called the “granary of the world,” Sherman chose to make 
the most of the slow withdrawal. Supposed to be inaccessible to the Yankee invader, most of the 
Deer Creek properties had been planted with corn, and “their gardens well stocked with 
vegetables, which were growing most temptingly,” one observer noted.522 The slaves 
encountered by Smith on his initial trip northward had confirmed that most, if not all, of the 
plantations abutting the creek had provided “hands” to assist in obstructing the creek and 
capturing Porter's flotilla. All were thus deemed culpable for retaliation, and now they would 
pay. First, all properties were searched for serviceable horses to mount the officers of the 
command. Entire spans of mules were seized and led by the halter while other hungry 
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infantrymen combed through corn cribs, chicken coops, and smokehouses in search of eatables. 
Having brought only two days' rations along on the trip, Smith's brigade was famished. The 
painstakingly slow pace of the withdrawal provided ample opportunities for practice at foraging 
liberally off the countryside. Famished volunteers pried open smokehouses across the valley and 
seized tens of thousands of pounds of cured bacon. “Chickens, eggs, mutton, veal and other 
delicacies … turkeys, geese, calves, and sheep without number” were piled into confiscated 
wagons and hauled along for the journey back to “Reality.” Hundreds of mules, horses, and cattle 
were confiscated. Cotton bales, many of them stamped “C.S.A.” in preparation for sale to the 
Confederacy, were tumbled into the creek to float downstream for others to retrieve. Others were 
burned in place, frequently along with the outhouses in which they were discovered.523 
Customarily restrained in his approach to private property, Sherman now freely vented his anger 
and frustration as his beloved “old Division” tried its hand for the first time at authorized and 
deliberate “war in earnest.” In total, one correspondent estimated, Stuart's division destroyed “at 
least 2,000 bales of cotton, 50,000 bushels of corn, and the gins and houses of the plantations 
whose owners had obstructed our progress and joined in the warfare.” In so doing, he confidently 
assumed, “we crippled the enemy so far.”524 
 By far the most valuable “property” seized from the “granary of the world” were a large 
number of enslaved men and women who fell in behind the column and followed along.525 
Nearly 8,000 slaves  were held within the county in 1860, and while many of the able-bodied 
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men had been removed by nervous planters prior to the arrival of the Federal army, large 
numbers still remained.526 “Reality” alone was home to 127 men and women.527 Even a 
staunchly conservative journalist embedded with the division had to admit that in “every 
instance, everywhere, they were our friends … doing everything and anything in their power to 
assist us.” Black men had carried all the crucial dispatches, guided all the critical movements, 
labored alongside white regiments constructing bridges and roads, alerted Federal forces to 
approaching Rebels, and even assisted in hastening fellow slaves toward the withdrawing 
“Linkum army.”528 Though undertaken exclusively in the interest of securing their freedom and 
that of their families, their operational contributions to the corps's efforts had proven utterly 
indispensable. 
 While sharp skirmishing had been necessary to drive the Rebel host from the field, the 
mere arrival of the reinforcing blue columns, at a place and time the onrushing Rebels had 
assumed to be all but impossible, secured the closest approximation to success the expedition 
would enjoy. While falling well short of the expedition's original objectives, through the careful 
coordination of pioneering efforts, hard work, inspiring leadership, brutally hard marching, and 
the vital assistance of slaves, Stuart's division saved Porter's flotilla. The entire expedition had 
been “used in labor – constant and severe.” Embedded reporters admired how the “officers and 
men worked with equal alacrity, whether in building bridges or making forced marches, both by 
day and in the night.”529 Sherman's own observation that the timing of his relief column's arrival 
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had been “very opportune” was a profound understatement. Had the division hit any snag in its 
forward momentum, had any relatively minute part of the division's larger system failed to fulfill 
its assigned duties, and the relief column reached Porter's beleaguered craft even an hour later, it 
is quite possible that the boats would have already been abandoned and scuttled, and with them 
the campaign for Vicksburg.530 Though the strategic significance of the near disaster was mostly 
lost on the men in the ranks, their success marked perhaps their most significant contribution yet 
to the preservation of the Union. 
 Crafting intelligible narratives that made sense of their unit's participation in the 
expedition proved exasperating for every officer charged with filing a formal report afterward. 
The night after returning to Young's Point, Maj. Dudley Chase, commanding the Regulars who 
spearheaded the relief column, came to chief engineer Jenney's cabin, quietly shut the door, and 
“looked around to see that we were alone,” Jenney remembered. “I command a battalion of 
regulars,” Chase whispered, “I have been on an expedition, – I must write a report, – I want you 
to tell me where I have been, how I went there, what I did, and if I came back the same way I 
went, or if not, how I did get back.” Still laughing about Chase's confusion years hence, Jenney 
observed that the incident “serves to illustrate how little even battalion commanders knew of 
what was being done at this time.”531 Even so, if the larger strategic picture remained obscure to 
most of those in Sherman's corps, the expedition instilled a number of valuable skills and lessons 
to the soldiers in each regiment involved. Even Porter acknowledged that the mission had 
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provided “a lot of experience which would serve us in the future.” Although in reference to his 
sailors, the remark was just as applicable to Sherman's footsore landsmen.532 
 Nothing about the expedition had neatly fallen into the lap of the corps. It had been 
forced to fashion its own luck out of whole cloth from beginning to end. As its component units 
worked their way through nearly impassable terrain, each and every regiment contributed in 
some material fashion to the completion of the corps's ultimate objectives. Fragmenting into 
smaller units, re-consolidating when needed, and then fragmenting again to address unforeseen 
challenges became almost second nature as junior leaders took on more responsibility more 
frequently than at any prior time. Even during the heaviest of the fighting at the Indian mounds, 
all combat operations were controlled by junior officers and sergeants moving among their 
dispersed skirmish teams, guiding their advance and withdrawal, and taking care to keep in touch 
with friendly skirmish teams on their flanks. 
 The unique problems of engineering, swift maneuver, and resource extraction had also 
proved fundamentally easier to solve than those of the battlefield. Grit, firm resolve, and sweat 
proved capable of accomplishing meaningful results in ways that valor and trust in fate and God 
had proven incapable of winning under fire. Moreover, the quite visible personal leadership of 
every senior officer from regimental commanders to Sherman himself, sweating alongside their 
commands and often half submerged in the same muddy water as the privates, forged a bond of 
familiarity that had been palpably lacking in the command before. In all, the expedition taught 
Second Division, and Sherman, that they had more in the way of tactical capabilities up their 
sleeves than they had previously imagined. 
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III. “I want to take every thing away from the Damned Secesh” 
 Stymied first at Yazoo Pass and now at Steele's Bayou, Grant began to explore an even 
more daring strategy to reach the high ground east of Vicksburg. On the evening of April 16, 
Grant and Porter sent seven gunboats and three empty transports through the dark of night down 
the river and directly past the Rebel batteries guarding Vicksburg's bluffs in a desperate attempt 
to “run the batteries.” Suddenly alerted to the opportunity, the Secessionist gunners fired upon 
the barely visible flotilla with incredible ferocity, but most of the vessels still miraculously 
managed to make it through the maelstrom. Grant planned to use these vessels to ferry his army 
across the Mississippi some distance to the south, marching it northeastward toward the high 
ground east of Vicksburg in a bid to cut off the enemy garrison from any and all supply.533 
 In preparation for the forthcoming campaign, he sought both to secure his lengthy 
riverine supply line and strike a blow at the breadbasket of the city's garrison which lay to the 
north along the Deer Creek valley. The town of Greenville, Mississippi, several miles north of 
Vicksburg, had long been a source of harassing gunfire for passing supply steamers headed to 
and from Grant's army. Amid one of the richest portions of the lower Mississippi Valley, the 
plantations south and east of Greenville produced prodigious amounts of cotton and, of greater 
military value, foodstuffs that the Vicksburg garrison regularly tapped as they awaited Grant's 
next move. The region also contained the greatest density of able-bodied male slaves within easy 
reach of the army. Grant well knew that their labor had greatly benefited Pemberton's garrison, 
and he meant to convert those efforts to his own aims instead, offering freedom in exchange. 
Once again, he turned to his most trusted subordinate for the job.534 
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 After meeting with Grant and learning his expectations, Sherman promptly turned to 
Steele's fresh division to conduct the operation. As the command would be wholly unsupported, 
speed was of the utmost necessity. The column was to take only rations that could be carried by 
the men on their persons or upon pack mules. Barring any unforeseen contingency in the form of 
Rebel resistance, Steele was to march his division southward from Greenville down the Deer 
Creek valley for two or three days, “clearing the country as you go of guerrillas and Confederate 
soldiers.” If the inhabitants of the region remained at home “and behave themselves,” the column 
was to “molest them as little as possible.” On the other hand, should the division discover 
abandoned properties, “you may infer they [their owners] are hostile, and can take their cattle, 
hogs, corn, or anything you need.” 
 These instructions left a great deal of latitude to both Steele and his lieutenants in 
determining the extent and character of extraction and destruction to be levied. Few clear red 
lines existed. Cotton “which is clearly private property” was not to be touched, but all marked 
“C.S.A.” was to be promptly “brought away or burned.” Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
any and “all provisions which are needed by us or might be used by the [Rebel] army in 
Vicksburg, unless needed by the peaceful inhabitants” were to be consumed, seized, or 
destroyed. Above all else, Steele was to ensure that the wealthy inhabitants of the valley “see and 
feel that they will be held accountable for the acts of guerrillas and Confederate soldiers who 
sojourn in their country.” Beyond the denial of the nutritional and financial bounty of the valley 
to the rebellion, Steele was to execute a psychological operation. “Let all the people understand 
that we claim the unmolested navigation of the Mississippi, and will have it,” Sherman ordered, 
“if all the country within reach has to be laid waste.”535 Embarking his command on April 2, 
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Steele's flotilla steamed northward in search of a viable landing.  After several false starts at 
landings that eventually proved inaccessible to the rest of the region, the column was finally on 
its way south into the Deer Creek valley from Greenville on April 5.536 
 In many ways, Steele was perhaps the least likely choice for waging such a “war in 
earnest.” His attractiveness to both Grant and Sherman had always been in part due to his 
apparent lack of radicalism. The same could not be said of his division. Unlike Stuart's command 
operating along the southernmost reaches of Deer Creek during the Steele's Bayou expedition, 
many “old” regiments in Steele's division had considerable experience at employing 
emancipation as a deliberate tactic. Long before almost any other Western commander, Maj. 
Gen. Samuel Curtis had adopted the practice of issuing “free papers” to slaves along the route of 
his army's long march across Arkansas to Helena in the summer of 1862. Similar to Giles Smith's 
recent experience, Curtis had noticed that Rebel cavalry were pressing local slaves into hard 
labor, forcing them to cut trees to obstruct the Federal route. Offers of “free papers” issued to any 
and all slaves encountered along the road quickly eliminated the problem. “They are now 
throwing down their axes and rushing in,” Curtis observed, and by the time his column reached 
Helena it contained several thousand freedmen and women trailing in the van.537 Continuing his 
abolition strategy after establishing the garrison at Helena, ironically the liberal policy was 
quickly halted after the arrival of the far more conservative Steele. But time had changed the old 
man, and Steele, ever mindful of his duty, had his orders. 
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 The march was hard, occasionally pushing nearly twenty miles a day. While Steele's 
“old” regiments stood it relatively well, for many of the “new” units the expedition represented 
the first hard marching they had done since enlistment. "The men stumble slowly towards night," 
Seay observed of his “fresh levy” Missourians, "and complain of sore feet."538 Captain Jacob 
Ritner, 25th Iowa, though a long-service veteran now in command of “fresh levy” Hawkeyes, 
completely “gave out” on the first and second day's marches. By the third, he found he “stood it 
first-rate” and “believe[d] I could march a month now.”539 A full third of his regiment, the largest 
in the division, failed to keep up, “gave out and lagged behind.”540 In short time the pain of the 
march was eliminated for many, and in several regiments at least half the privates found 
themselves mounted upon “jayhawked mules.”541 By the time the column returned to Greenville, 
nearly every officer of every grade was mounted.542 Those in the ranks were stunned at the sheer 
beauty and bounty of the valley. “It is the real 'South' just as we have all read about,” one 
Hawkeye officer wrote in awe.543  
 Although formal reports like those required after combat engagements were never filed 
by the regiments of the division in the aftermath of the expedition, a reconstruction of the 
“primary” tactics of area denial and emancipation as conducted by Steele's division is possible 
through the triangulation of a variety of sources. Among the many plantations nestled along the 
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usually quiet banks of Deer Creek lay the picturesque “Mount Pleasant” of the late Rhode 
Islander Henry Tillinghast Ireys. After Henry died in 1846, leaving his properties in a trust for his 
young sons, the surviving Ireys family remained absentee planters like many of those who 
owned the palatial properties near Greenville. Finding Rhode Island still all too proximate to the 
war, the family had long since decamped even further away from Mississippi, instead riding the 
war out in Scotland.544 In order to maintain what meager profits were still possible despite the 
blockade, and also to watch over the many acres and at least 50 slaves they owned, the Ireyses 
employed Anderson Copeland and his wife to live on the property as their overseer.545 Well 
aware that Yankees were lurking in the area that warm April afternoon, Copeland was already on 
edge. He had taken precautions with the property he was employed to protect. Earlier that 
morning he ordered several slaves away from the grounds with eight mules, two full wagon loads 
of fresh meat, and orders to remain hidden deep in the woods until sent for.  Later that afternoon, 
as he dutifully watched from the shade of the porch and the slaves hoed and drove mule teams 
plowing the dark Mississippi mud in preparation for spring planting, he noticed a group of riders 
in blue approaching from the Deer Creek road and his heart began to pound. “I was so frightened 
that I kept at a distance and yet in full view,” he later sheepishly recounted to a claims 
commission agent.546 
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 If they too noticed Copeland, the soldiers initially showed no interest in him. Instead, 
they rode directly into the fields and approached the slaves themselves. Their foreman, slave 
John Lewis, looked up from his work as they approached. “Boys, put down your hoes & stop 
plowing,” one of the riders called out. “You are all free.” As Lewis and the others allowed the 
bluntly delivered pronouncement to set in, the mounted officer wasted no time in giving further 
orders to the soldiers with him. “I want to take every thing away from the Damned Secesh,” 
another slave, Alexander Colbert, heard him say. The officer then promptly ordered the mules 
immediately unhitched from their plows. Turning to Lewis, he explained that he and the other 
slaves were “to go with us,” and again insisted that they hurriedly “take out your mules!” As the 
slaves complied, the officer, Colonel Isaac Shepard, 3rd Missouri, and his entourage spurred 
their mounts toward the Copeland home. Having apparently fled the premises upon the 
realization of what in fact was happening, the overseer had left his wife alone at the house to 
meet the Federals. Announcing their intentions, Shepard received what by then the Missourians 
had grown accustomed to hearing from Southern women: spite. Afterward, she proudly repored 
to her shy husband how she had defiantly “asked them If they knew they were taking the 
property of Northern Men,” referencing the New England Ireyses. “So much the worse for 
Northern Men owning property in the South,” Shepard bluntly replied, and departed.547 
 The Missourians had proven to be merely the advanced guard of Steele's division, and a 
long column of blue now completely filled the roadway in either direction as Lewis and the 
others mounted the unhitched mules bareback and fell into line. For at least two hours the road 
was filled with dusty Yankees as others rifled through the property looking for anything that 
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might be deemed of greater use to Uncle Sam than the Rebel garrison at Vicksburg. They “were 
just passing through the country gathering up things – mules & negroes,” Colbert observed. The 
Ireyses later reported 35 mules, 100 head of cattle, and a valuable mare seized without any 
receipt or voucher provided. In all, they estimated the value of property lost at nearly $10,000, 
not including an unknown number of their most valuable “possessions” – human beings like 
John Lewis and Alexander Colbert.548 
 Not all of the Ireys's slaves chose to join the column. Watching from across the vast 
fields, slave Isaac McLean observed the dramatic proceedings from start to finish, but ultimately 
“did not follow them.” When freedom suddenly appeared, a very personal calculus had to be 
made by each bondsman and woman, and swiftly. Lewis and Colbert decided that immediate 
departure was their best strategy. McLean apparently felt otherwise. On the other hand, as soon 
as word reached the slaves charged with guarding the hidden wagon loads of meat that the 
Yankees had arrived, the bondsmen blithely ignored Copeland's instructions and made directly 
for Steele's column with eight more mules and two wagon loads full of fresh provisions.549 
 As the division wound its way down the valley, similar scenes played out all along the 
banks of Deer Creek. At another plantation, the Missourians spotted a gang of slaves likewise 
preparing for planting under the much closer supervision of an overseer who sat on horseback 
nearby with whip in hand. At first sight of the column, the toiling slaves froze, “gazing at us as if 
paralyzed,” Sergeant-Major Reichhelm remembered. In an instant, “they all dropped their tools 
and with a great shout flinging their arms into the air they came bounding over the fields towards 
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the roadside.” Their “joyful cries” were so exultant that their exact words were hard to discern. 
Even so, the German Reichhelm had no trouble making out “Oh, Lord,” “Yankees,” and 
“freedom.” Halting the regiment for a moment while the officers took stock of the available 
forage on the property, the liberated men and women shouted and danced in the roadway “like a 
lot of children greeting a Santa Claus.” One elderly man walked straight to the national colors at 
the head of the column, knelt down, and between sobs thanked God “that Thou has pleased to let 
us see the glory of this day.” Unlike many of the more conservative Western regiments in Steele's 
division, the Germans who filled Shepard's regiment felt it “was an indescribable scene and we 
felt its tremendous significance.” Still acting as the principal interlocutor between the Army and 
the local white population, their colonel beckoned to the white overseer “who had stood there 
scowling and undecided what to do,” Reichhelm observed. “His occupation was gone,” Shepard 
called out to him. For now, he should “consider himself a prisoner for the present” while the men 
searched the grounds.550 
 Approaching the main house, Reichhelm and a few others noticed a tall flagpole bearing 
the French national colors by which stood a middle-aged “genteel looking man.” Seeing the 
soldiers approaching, he excitedly pointed to the flag. “I claim the protection of that flag; I am a 
Frenchman, and this is French property and you must not interfere with this property,” he cried 
out in a thick accent. Shepard approached and spoke with the man, doubting the validity of his 
claims but placing a guard over the house until he could ascertain the truth. The home and its 
denizens would be safe, he promised, but any provisions and willing slaves would be seized. 
Hearing this, those slaves nearby rushed to their quarters, rapidly gathered their few earthly 
belongings, and fell into line behind the regiment. As the division column swept by the indignant 
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Frenchman's home, subsequent details from other regiments searched for anything the 
Missourians may have missed. Upon discovery of several chickens, a few of the 9th Iowa were 
chased around the grounds by the outraged Frenchman, now with flag in hand, as they grabbed 
them up for supper. “It looked like mockery to me,” the Hawkeye officer in charge of the detail 
remarked. “Let him hoist the Stars and Stripes if he wants protection.”551 
 While Steele's “old” regiments led the way in liberating the valley's human “chattel,” the 
more recently raised half of his division remained far more interested in the emancipation of 
livestock and poultry than of human beings. By contrast with Shepard's proactive abolition 
efforts, officers in the 25th Iowa made sure that there “was no effort made to bring them along” 
even though inevitably “they would come.” Even so, by the end of the expedition one Hawkeye 
company commander counted a ratio of two “contraband” to every man in his company.552 After 
watching men and women along the eastern bank fashioning rafts out of rails to cross the waters 
to freedom, the Hawkeyes were not about to turn them away.553 That said, they were not always 
inclined to assist in their bid for liberty either. The sight of a lone slave woman attempting to 
pilot a flimsy handmade raft up the creek toward the column only to drift further and further 
away downstream elicited no pity but considerable laughter from the ranks. For all but the most 
radical of Steele's command, emancipation was still merely a pragmatic tactic. 
 Shepard's direct personal involvement in his regiment's search and seizure operations 
during the expedition were somewhat unique. For the most part, the vast majority of the 
division's extractive efforts were conducted by small detachments of men commanded by junior 
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officers or senior non-commissioned officers. These detachments were usually ordered to set off 
on foot or on captured mounts to scour distant properties known only to maps or slave 
informants. While away from the main column, these detachments operated “on their own hook,” 
with almost all their actions determined by their assigned leader or even the men themselves. 
 Private William Royal Oake was assigned to just such a six-man detail from the 26th 
Iowa commanded by a lieutenant, ordered to cross Deer Creek and search a plantation assumed 
to be about a mile distant on the eastern bank. As most planters in the valley owned property on 
both sides of the creek, many had intentionally moved all their most valuable property (including 
slaves) to the eastern side of the creek and summarily destroyed or burned all the bridges.554 This 
did not stop the Hawkeyes. Procuring a modest craft nearby, the squad paddled across the creek 
and walked about a mile to their objective. The estate proved a goldmine. Turkeys, chickens, 
hams, and plenty of apple-jack whiskey were uncovered while rifling through the abandoned 
plantation, all of which was packed onto confiscated mules and horses found on the property. 
Much of the whiskey was consumed by the men on the spot, after which they each rode a 
captured mule heavily laden with forage back to the creek. Precisely how to get such volume of 
provender back across the water on such a meager craft took some thinking. Eventually, the 
squad hatched a plan whereby one would stand in the rear of the boat while the others coaxed 
their mounts and livestock into the water.  
 Once across, the Iowans calculated that, given the duration of their errand and the 
probable speed of the division column, the regiment would be about three hours down the road. 
Steele’s path was easy to trace, clearly marked by the still smoldering cotton, gins, corn, and 
forage on both sides of the dirt route leading southward. Sure enough, later that afternoon the 
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men straggled back into their regiment's bivouac. Their colonel remained suspicious of the 
detail’s prolonged absence until "we took over to him a fine young turkey,” Oake recalled. The 
bribe worked, and “a smile lit up his face as he kindly thanked us.”555 
 Much of the intelligence upon which such distant forays were based came from 
bondspeople who were eager to assist in the army's mission. Slaves were not always immediately 
forthcoming with information, fearful of the wrath of their masters or the roving gangs of Rebel 
partisans that shadowed the Federal column. “A negro generally keeps dark,” one Illinoisan 
noted. More often than not, though, they eventually “shed much light as to where we were to 
look to find wagons ready loaded with supplies, and hid in the woods to be hauled away in 
emergency, and many other things too good to be left.”556 Foraging detachments discovered 
provisions hidden in the woods, in canebrakes, in locked buildings, and even “nicely boxed up & 
hid under the rails by the roadside.”557 Each discovery marked a lesson learned that could be 
applied by the men in the search for provisions at the next plantation. 
 In many cases, detachments from Steele's “old” regiments directly encouraged slaves to 
join the column. Foragers derived great satisfaction from breaking into smokehouses and corn 
cribs, and “throwing out … a lot of meat to the begging and half starved darkies.”558 At almost 
every property, slaves lining the roadway “seemed to think that we were their friends and 
appeared to think they must tell us all they knew and do every thing they were told to do.”559 In 
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other instances, their intelligence proved somewhat fantastical. Slaves who were interrogated by 
the 25th Iowa alleged Rebel cavalry to be between 12 and 24 miles away, numbering anywhere 
“from twelve hundred to twelve hundred thousand.”560 
 The path to freedom was not always a one-way street. Colonel A. J. Seay's "body 
servant," Allen, was retrieved by his local master during the expedition. Seay had no trouble 
finding two others to take his place.561 Seizing freedom by assisting the Yankees could also entail 
grave dangers. One particularly unfortunate man approached a group of soldiers one night he 
assumed to be of Steele's band to share intelligence on the location of a nearby Rebel camp. 
Sadly, the pickets were Rebels themselves. As the blue column swept by a plantation the next 
day nearly every man noted his body, hanging from a tree in the yard as a warning to all other 
slaves in the neighborhood to keep quiet.562 Such scenes enraged the more liberal portions of 
Steele's command, and seemed to increase the amount of wanton destruction meted out on the 
rest of the valley. By the time the column counter-marched back to Greenville, every cotton gin 
within sight of the creek was a smoldering ruin and enormous piles of cotton and corn still 
belched flames and smoke into the sky. While there is no record of a single private residence 
being harmed in any way, in the case of almost every other useful structure, “the work of burning 
[went] magnificently on,” one Hawkeye proudly observed.563 
 Two brief brushes with a small Rebel cavalry contingent amounted to all the direct enemy 
contact during the expedition. In both cases, although the infantry immediately on hand formed 
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in battle line and rushed forward supported by the division's artillery, the Secessionists dispersed 
under the punishment of the heavy guns long before Steele's infantry could make contact. This 
manner of confronting the minimal Rebel threat contrasted sharply with the economical 
skirmishing preferences of Stuart's division, but it seemed to work all the same.564 “They always 
run before we got close enough to hurt anyone,” Captain Jacob Ritner observed.565 
 After returning from the fiery foray back to his base at Greenville on April 10, Steele 
continued to send occasional patrols from Greenville into the Deer Creek environs for the next 
several weeks. One, a joint effort by the 27th and 32nd Missouri, walked several miles and 
waded through deep water to "pillage a house, taking everything they wanted." In the process, 
several imbibed a considerable amount of the alcohol discovered in the house and were 
summarily punished by their commander, Lt. Col. Seay as a result.566 Seay was sent on yet 
another patrol on April 19, this time requiring the portage of 120 men of the 3rd and 32nd 
Missouri by steamers a full twenty five miles north. The detail deliberately hunted the landing 
area for slaves, chickens, and "property useful to us" as it crawled through dense canebrake while 
keeping an eye open for Rebel partisans. When it became clear that the owner of one property 
had "his slaves 'hid out,'" the men scoured a half mile radius before finding them "hid in a 
canebrake, guarded by a white man with a double barreled shot-gun." The sentinel was no match 
for the patrol, which accordingly "took all" and moved on to the next property in search of more 
of the same.567  
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 Try as he might, Steele struggled to contain the libertine spirit that his extractive mission 
naturally inspired. "Steele cannot control the men as he wishes," Seay observed during the 
march, even as the division commander occasionally "use[d] his sword and revolver" to curb the 
worst excesses and acts of indiscipline.568 Upon the column's return to Greenville, Steele was 
appalled to learn that so many private carriages, buggies, and farming implements had been 
arbitrarily seized by various regiments against his orders. He promptly returned the items to 
aggrieved families upon their pleas for mercy, reporting this decision back to Sherman. Always 
the conservative, Cump shared Steele's disgust. “Our men will become absolutely lawless unless 
this can be checked,” he warned. “War is at best barbarism, but to involve all – children, women, 
old and helpless – is more than can be justified.” While the seizure or destruction of provender 
represented “a well-established law of war,” the Federal government had no right to destroy “the 
stores necessary for a family.” Worst of all, such unbridled destruction “injures our men to allow 
them to plunder indiscriminately.” Even so, the brief reports issuing from Greenville were 
sufficient to convince both he and Grant that “Deer Creek has been sufficiently chastised never 
again to desire a Yankee visitation,” and thus the expedition had succeeded in its primary 
mission.569 On April 22, Steele and First Division were ordered back to Young's Point to “prepare 
for a new move.”570 
 The Deer Creek expedition had been both an illustration of preexisting skills and 
predispositions that remained a major component of the division's deep operational heritage and 
culture, as well as an indoctrination for Steele's “new” regiments into the tactical practice of “war 
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in earnest.” Even for veterans of Curtis's long trek through Arkansas, the expedition had 
imparted valuable lessons. At the most basic level, the men gained considerable experience in the 
rudiments of extractive warfare. They encountered a variety of schemes hatched by crafty 
overseers, planters, and even slaves bent on securing or hiding foodstuffs and valuables. They 
learned to anticipate where various items of use were usually stored on Mississippi plantations, 
and developed methods by which they could swiftly be procured and transported. They now also 
better understood the intrinsic operational value of human intelligence provided by slaves and 
“contraband,” who had assisted materially in the success of the expedition, just as they had 
further south with Sherman's column. Perhaps most importantly, they recognized the anxiety, 
fury, and anguish on the faces of the erstwhile proud and unrepentant planters and overseers from 
whom they confiscated. While their actual political stances were often far more complex than 
Steele's volunteers were apt to recognize, the men tended to categorize them all as the rankest of 
“Secesh,” and making them pay for rebellion felt quite good. The Schadenfreude felt even better 
when those in the ranks reflected upon how glad they were that “the ravages of war are not 
visited upon Iowa.”571 In all, the men of First Division returned to Greenville “in good spirits and 
believe they are now in a fair way to put down the rebellion,” for the first time since leaving 
Helena months earlier.572 
IV. “A white mans war” 
 While Steele's command awaited orders at Greenville, Colonel Shepard, always at the 
forefront of emancipation, took the opportunity to begin drilling seventy of the black men 
liberated during the recent expedition. Observers fashioned Shepard's impromptu cohort the 
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“Black Brigade.”573 Members of the 25th Iowa watching the proceedings thought the freedmen 
promised to “make good soldiers,” especially because they seemed “willing to learn and [were] 
prompt in obeying orders.”574 By April 17, the Federal camp at Greenville had accumulated 
nearly six hundred previously enslaved men and women, “and more coming in every day.”575 
Less than a week later, the number had risen to nearly 2,000. “It is not necessary to march 
through the country to get Negroes,” one Iowan realized, “they come in by scores, as fast as we 
can provide for them.”576 Steele quartered the refugees in the quarters of abandoned plantations, 
issued them rations from the bounty of seized provisions, and awaited orders advising him of the 
next proper step to take.577 In the meantime, two steam mills were put to work grinding captured 
corn “and providing for all that come.”578 
 The dramatic influx of African American refugees into the corps's camps coincided with 
an auspicious visit from the U.S. Army's Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas. Sent on a special 
mission directly from Washington by Secretary of State Edwin Stanton, Thomas had orders to 
make a circuit throughout Army camps across the country, making speeches emphasizing the 
vital importance of all U.S. officers and soldiers embracing the Lincoln Administration's decision 
to enlist and arm black regiments. “It was a full-scale public relations campaign,” historian 
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Kristopher Teters observes, but among predominately conservative Westerners it promised to be 
an up-hill battle from the start.579 
 Sherman was unenthusiastic about Thomas's visit. Shortly after receiving word that the 
Adjutant General would be addressing his corps “about nigger Regiments,” he privately shared 
his true thoughts with Ellen. Such an obviously political mission seemed beyond the proper 
purview of Thomas's responsibilities, he thought. “I'll hold my tongue,” he promised, but “if he 
says nigger to me, Ill show him my morning Reports, ask him to inspect my Brigades or 
Batteries, or ask him to Sing the Star Spangled Banner and go back whence he comes.” Despite 
recent experience, Cump continued to “prefer to have this a white mans war, & provide for the 
negro after the Storm had passed.” Given his “experience, yea prejudice I cannot trust them yet,” 
especially not with arms. Even so, he admitted that “Time may change this,” and understood well 
that “we are in a Revolution and I must not pretend to judge.”580 Accordingly, he bit his lip while 
Thomas spoke to the men of Second Division. “I followed & Know the men look to me, more 
than anybody on Earth,” he later wrote. Mounting the cracker box podium, he explained to his 
beloved “old Division” precisely what he had told them several times before. They knew well his 
ambivalence to abolition, but “we are likened to a Sheriff,” he dutifully explained, and thus 
“must execute the Writ of the Court & not go into an inquiry into the merits of the case.” He 
admitted his earnest hope that armed blacks would never “be brigaded with our white men,” but 
rather assigned “some side purpose” in the rear. After all, his experience with even the many 
black cooks and teamsters attached to his regiments had soured his opinion of their military 
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potential. “They desert the moment danger threatens,” he confided to John after the speech. In 
the end, however, though he “wont trust niggers to fight yet,” like most of those in the ranks, he 
did not “object to the Government taking them from the Enemy, & making such use of them as 
experience may suggest.”581 
 As Steele's division was absent at Greenville during Thomas's visit, the consummate 
professional and dutiful conservative had to relay the news to his command personally. On the 
morning of April 23, he ordered the division arrayed in hollow square in the center of which he 
stood alongside his senior lieutenants. First Division listened intently to what he had to say. 
Much to their surprise, the erstwhile ardent conservative “came out heartily and boldly in favor 
of the policy of the administration in freeing and arming the Negroes.” Steele argued that “all 
slaves should be encouraged to come within our lines and be well treated and provided for.” He 
also warned that “every soldier or officer who refused to obey the orders of the president in this 
matter would be promptly punished.” He knew well that many in the ranks, perhaps even most, 
had long been of the opinion that he was “rather too pro slavery, and too much disposed to 
protect rebel property,” but he meant to dispel such rumors once and for all. “We [have] treated 
them [Rebels] as erring brethren long enough,” he proclaimed, and “the time had come to throw 
away the gloves and use every means in our power to crush the 'infernal rebellion.'” While 
Steele, like Sherman, remained fiercely opposed to any indiscriminate plundering of Southern 
property, he was strictly a man of duty, and his orders made crystal clear that the slaves were to 
be freed. Just as he had always done before, Steele did not allow any of his personal political 
convictions to color his interpretation of these orders. He was a soldier's soldier to the last. Those 
officers who followed him in sharing their comments, including nearly every brigade and 
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regimental commander in the division, echoed his sentiments exactly. While many expressed 
having long felt that emancipation was the correct strategy, others flatly admitted that “a year or 
more ago they would have opposed it, but now supported it heartily.” Listening closely as their 
commanders and leaders made a bid to shape the cultural outlook of the division, the men issued 
“not the least murmur of disapprobation,” and instead greeted the “most radical sentiments … 
[with] the loudest cheers.”582 
 The one of a kind presentation had an electrifying effect on Steele's command.583 “The 
army is now all right,” Jacob Ritner wrote, “there is no mistake about that.” Listening closely to 
the conversations about camp after the gathering had been dismissed, he heard none express 
opposition.584 That was not because no opposition existed. One Buckeye of the 76th Ohio “didn't 
like quite all they said.” Most especially grating to him were expressions by several officers that 
“they would as leave stand by the side of a negro to fight as by a white man.” This he assumed to 
be a lie.585 Hearing Colonel Charles Woods, his own regimental commander, and “no nigger 
man,” express such beliefs seemed spurious and even duplicitous.586 While few if any were now 
willing to express such sentiments aloud, Steele's entreaties had by no means purged them from 
the ranks. 
 On April 18, Sherman's order to begin accepting applications for commissions in new 
“colored” regiments reached Steele's camps at Greenville. Accordingly, a board of three 
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examining officers was formed to consider applications, chaired by Colonel Woods, 76th Ohio, 
arguably the most well versed regimental officer in the division on military matters.587 Steele 
encouraged all men who had interest in positions as orderly sergeants in black regiments to apply 
as well. The response was explosive. Nearly a full company applied from the 25th Iowa alone. 
Woods was not about to let things get out of hand, however, and maintained a reputation for 
being “very strict” in his selections. “They will have none but the best of officers,” Ritner 
understood. Still, the opportunity for the most motivated of his volunteers to depart his command 
concerned him. “If they all get their places I will lose some of my best men,” he worried.588 The 
initial enthusiasm for appointments into the new black regiments arose most often from motives 
separate from political enthusiasm for emancipation and social revolution. Several noted how the 
most eager volunteers were frequently “the strongest democrats in the army.”589 Many of the 
same political stripe still could not bring themselves to apply regardless of promises of higher 
pay and authority. “I have a prejudice against the color which I cannot overcome,” one Buckeye 
admitted.590 A few officers who had not applied for positions were offered them anyway, most of 
whom turned them down. “I did not accept because I knew there would be a great trouble 
connected with them [black troops],” Robert Stitt, an officer in the 4th Iowa explained to his 
wife.591 Regardless of their motivations, however, the departure of many of Sherman's highest 
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performing enlisted men to serve in black regiments did reduce the number of experienced senior 
non-commissioned officers in the corps. At the same time, it also cleared the way for junior 
enlisted men to receive promotions into the higher echelons of their companies and regiments, 
thus refreshing the leadership of many units, most especially “new” regiments, with volunteers 
who enjoyed considerable experience serving in the ranks as privates. 
 For most of the still shaken survivors of Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post in both 
divisions, the tack toward a strategy of emancipation and “war in earnest” was well received. Not 
only were expeditions like Steele's Bayou and Deer Creek comparatively enjoyable affairs, but 
they also seemed a viable alternative for defeating the Secessionist rebellion that did not entail 
desperate, costly, and often futile frontal assaults against entrenched Rebels. While many still 
balked at the notion of arming black men, many others came to the conclusion that “the sooner 
the slaves are taken away from the rebels, the sooner the war will be over and the sooner they 
will get to go home.”592 The volunteers knew that Secessionists could not possibly defend the 
entirety of their vast domain, try as they might. Their plantations and highly prized human chattel 
were extremely vulnerable assets. Now that the Lincoln administration proved willing to 
embrace the direct targeting of this erstwhile carefully avoided Rebel center of gravity, many in 
the ranks rejoiced. “The taking of the negroes[,] arming the men and putting women and the old 
and young at work on the plantations will surely have a good effect,” Capt. Sewall Farwell, 31st 
Iowa, wrote. His regiment having suffered among the worst of those roughly handled over the 
past winter's operations, Farwell and his comrades thought the recent expedition was promising 
for the future. “I think with the policy now being carried [out] that we are crushing the rebellion 
and will continue to crush it though we be repulsed from every stronghold for months to come,” 
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he prophesied.593 Jacob Ritner noticed how the “soldiers have all got to be in favor of setting the 
Negroes free, and arming them too.” This change was not due to any particular moral 
enlightenment. “There is just as much prejudice against them as there ever was,” he cautioned, 
adding that there was nearly always “someone trying to abuse, insult, and impose upon them.” 
Instead, the shift in what he called “the universal sentiment” concerning the liberation and 
arming of slaves occurred because his comrades could now clearly see how “this is the quickest 
way to end the war, and that is what they all want.”594 
 The experiences of the late winter and early spring imparted new lessons, skills, and 
beliefs to the men of Sherman's corps. Novel non-combat tasks had required adaptation in 
everything from force structure and tactical doctrine to political ideologies and even cultural 
outlooks. As the strength of every unit in the command shrunk dramatically, the corps's “skeleton 
regiments” became increasingly tight-knit cohorts. Those still on duty found themselves with a 
much greater share of work assigned to them. This meant a disproportionate amount of fatigue 
and hardship, but also greater opportunities to grow with experience. There were far fewer 
chances to “shirk” hard work than had existed in the past, even after the infusion of hundreds of 
freedmen to assist in the backbreaking labor that defined the corps's pursuit of its objectives. This 
infusion increased the amount of interaction and cooperation many in the corps engaged in with 
blacks, and gradually converted the command into an increasingly bi-racial organization. To be 
sure, still only white men bore weapons, stood guard, and faced the immediate prospect of 
combat, but freedmen increasingly took over many of the critical if unglamorous tasks that 
allowed the corps to operate in and maneuver through the bayous. In a corps that had proven 
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itself, on two still painfully recent occasions, to be less than maximally effective in an offensive 
capacity, the ability to navigate and maneuver effectively, thereby positioning itself on ground 
that abrogated any need for an assault, such labor as that conducted by the freedmen increasingly 
proved of far greater operational value than anything they may have been doing toting rifles in 
the ranks. 
 Sherman's new corps continued to evolve into a tool not of attack, but of swift maneuver 
and area denial. Its rapid movement and mere presence within valuable enemy breadbaskets was 
proving of far greater potency than the physical damage it could do directly to enemy military 
forces on the battlefield. While the corps was by no means combat ineffective, its recent 
experience had vividly illustrated a crippling lack of coordination in combat which threatened to 
hobble any future assault on Rebel defenses. The failures resulting from this lack of coordination 
had bred a debilitating lack of confidence within nearly every regiment of the corps when 
ordered to launch an attack against works. The experiences of the bayou expeditions suggested a 
possible workaround to the men for their corps's tactical shortcomings. The now proven capacity 
of its divisions to move great distances through almost impenetrable terrain, convert their 
regiments and companies into collections of widespread detachments led by junior officers and 
sergeants, and quickly complete ad-hoc engineering tasks while providing for their own security 
began to suggest the emergence of a different corps-level “way of war.” Their sense of mostly 
bloodless success suggested to those in the ranks an alternative recipe for victory, giving rise to 
an emergent “soldier's culture.” 
 In his typology of the many varieties of “military culture,” Wayne Lee describes 
“soldiers' culture” as shared beliefs, patterns of behavior, and assumptions that organically arise 
“from the shared experience of a non-elite soldiery, which often is in defiance of their elite 
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masters but which they [see] as essential to their survival.”595 The prevailing interpretation of 
“war in earnest” in the ranks of Sherman's corps not merely as another tactic in their arsenal, but 
as a viable alternative to direct action against entrenched Rebels, was a key by-product of the 
emergent Fifteenth Corps “soldiers' culture,” promising the men increased odds of survival. In 
this way it closely resembled the formula many had adopted under fire at Arkansas Post when 
going to ground near the enemy works and sharpshooting from cover. The men in the ranks of 
Sherman's corps made it ever increasingly clear through their actions that they sought first and 
foremost to survive the war. Their patriotic motivations to preserve the Union and defend 
republican government had not waned, but they could not achieve either if dead.  
 As this emergent soldiers' culture did not yet extend to Sherman's headquarters, it can not 
be said to have represented a coherent “corps culture.” The process of frustrating trial and error 
by which Grant had attempted to avoid a costly frontal assault on Vicksburg seemed little more 
than tedious to Cump. He did not blame his friend, but such forays were “bordering on the 
impossible, and to take Vicksburg without the deadly & costly assault is impossible,” he 
remarked to his brother. In his opinion, “we should fight on all occasions even if we do get 
worsted.” After all, with its bounty of available manpower, the United States could “stand it 
longest.” His incomplete grasp of the culture in the ranks of his corps was still on clear display as 
late as early April. Writing to his brother John, Cump assured him that “all my soldiers are 
attached to me,” and that every “officer of whatever Rank who arrives applies for my Corps, 
because they know I am truthful and will not slaughter them to build up a little personal fame.” 
While it was true that Sherman remained uninterested in bolstering his ego or reputation with the 
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Northern public, plenty of those in the ranks of his corps had every good reason to presume that 
he would take no especial pains to avoid ordering them to slaughter. It was for that very reason 
that many would continue to refer to him with names like “the Stormer” or “bloodhound,” 
presumably when well out of earshot.596  
 Even so, Sherman was not so intransigent in his thinking as to escape the late winter 
unaffected by experience. “We are doing good,” he admitted, even considering the repeated 
failures of the bayou expeditions. Insubordinate pyromania and unauthorized foraging by 
“skulkers” aside, the performance of his command in conducting deliberate area denial and 
resource extraction operations was promising. “We have Consumed much, and destroyed more,” 
he wrote proudly, but remained awestruck by the sheer volume of provender his two divisions 
had discovered hidden in the isolated Deer Creek valley. “I tell you tis all nonsense about the 
South being exhausted,” he observed. “Northern papers talk about Starvation in Vicksburg,” but 
his columns “saw every where cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry and vast cribs of corn.” If the rebellion 
was ever to be brought to its knees, it would take much more of these kinds of operations on a 
much grander scale. “The war in Earnest,” he decided, “has yet to be fought.”597 
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CHAPTER V: “THE MEN CANNOT BE MADE TO DO IT”: THE VICKSBURG 
CAMPAIGN, APRIL – MAY 1863 
“It was Sherman's order and that bloodhound and madman is responsible 
for a thousand more lives vainly and foolishly sacrificed.” 
 
~ Sgt. Maj. Edward P. Reichhelm, 3rd Missouri598 
 
 The operational assignments and therefore experiences of the Fifteenth Corps throughout 
the fabled campaign for Vicksburg were heavily influenced by the close personal relationship 
maintained between Sherman and Grant. Their steadfast, mutual trust meant that Sherman's corps 
was more often than not hand-picked to operate independently of the others of Grant's army. 
Frequently, this resulted in assignment to less glamorous missions, but usually also to 
considerably less fighting than was the case for McPherson's and McClernand's embattled 
commands. The corps did not take substantive part in any of the bloody contests that marked the 
route to Vicksburg: Port Gibson, Raymond, or Champion Hill. Even so, Grant trusted “Cump” 
more than the somewhat less experienced McPherson, and maintained very little faith in 
McClernand's leadership, prompting him to remain nearby whenever they might run into trouble. 
He also felt the need to remain with the main body of his army, nearest to its fighting edge, 
which meant that he required a reliable lieutenant to take care of things elsewhere. Sherman, and 
his corps, fit the bill perfectly. 
 While there is little direct evidence that Grant carefully considered such nuanced factors, 
nearly all of the assignments he handed to Sherman's corps during the long circuitous march to 
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Jackson and eventual investiture of the “Gibraltar of the Mississippi” seemed almost perfectly 
tailored to the unique strengths and evolved tactical culture of its regiments. This happy marriage 
of the right corps with the right objectives dramatically ended upon the army's arrival at the gates 
of Vicksburg, when both Grant and Sherman once again behaved as if wholly unaware, or at 
least willfully ignorant, of the prevailing tactical culture that thrived amongst those in the ranks 
of the corps's regiments, including their deep aversion to and lack of confidence in the assault of 
entrenched Rebels, and the corps's interminable coordination struggles while under fire. 
 Prior to the onset of the campaign, the corps experienced its first major command shake-
up. Following his promotion to Major General in mid-March, in no small part due to his 
courageous performance at Chickasaw Bayou (and a bit of back-room political dealing), Frank 
Blair needed a position more prestigious than that of a Brigadier. For better or for worse, just 
such a position opened up when news reached the Young's Point camps that Congress had denied 
David Stuart's own promotion. The target of considerable ire and lingering ill-repute regarding 
involvement in a famous antebellum divorce case, Second Division's commander had hoped that 
an illustrious military career as a volunteer officer would somehow convert his reputation in the 
public eye. Unfortunately, though having performed admirably on every field from Shiloh to 
Arkansas Post, this was apparently not to be the case. Promptly resigning upon reception of the 
bad news, Stuart left his beloved Second Division with a note of thanks for its loyal service since 
his impromptu taking of command in the swamps of Chickasaw Bayou. “I cannot refrain from 
expressing in orders the strong sentiment of interest & attachment which I cherish for you,” he 
wrote, “& the sincere regret with which I part from you.” Ultimately, however, it did not 
“become you, nor me, to debate or discuss [the] wisdom, or [the] justice” of Congress's decision. 
Moreover, his great pride at having had the opportunity to lead the division helped in some small 
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degree to make up for the “indignity of my official retirement.” Nevertheless, he pledged, his 
“sympathy, & concernment [sic] for you, my absence will not abate.” Grant promptly handed the 
empty slot to Blair, by far the highest ranking brigadier in Sherman's corps.599 
 In addition to the change of command in Second Division, the Fifteenth Corps 
temporarily gained a Third Division under the command of Brigadier General James Tuttle, 
attached by Grant in order to equalize the corps's combat power with those of McPherson and 
McClernand. Tuttle's three brigades were not destined to spend more than a single campaign with 
the command, and struggled to integrate themselves fully with the other two divisions which had 
already endured significant trials alongside one another. Nevertheless, the operational 
contributions of the division to the corps's pursuit of its assigned objectives during the 
forthcoming campaign were significant if somewhat subsidiary.600 
 Although initially planning to move his entire army southward as one toward Grand Gulf 
on April 20, the abysmal condition of the roads through the Louisiana swamps forced Grant to 
hold Sherman back until the route could be improved by the pioneers of McClernand's and 
McPherson's corps. Eagerly awaiting orders to follow, Cump received a note from Grant on April 
28 informing him of the plan to assault Grand Gulf directly with a combined force of infantry 
and gunboats in order to secure a landing for the army on the east bank of the river. Grant 
requested that one division of Sherman's corps make a diversionary movement toward Haynes's 
Bluffs to distract the Rebel garrison. Cump was to take special care to ensure that those in the 
ranks understood that the maneuver was no more than a feint, as Grant wanted to avoid the 
damaging presumption that the corps was once again headed into the meat grinder of the Yazoo 
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bottoms. While trusting that “the army could distinguish a feint from a real attack,” Sherman still 
prudently opted to assign his more confident “old Division” to the mission, embarking it upon 
ten steamboats on the morning of April 29 and proceeding directly to the mouth of the Yazoo.601 
 Crawling northward toward the Rebel batteries atop the fortified bluffs, the boats passed 
the hallowed battlefield of Chickasaw Bayou and continued northward until in “easy range” of 
the enemy batteries a short distance north. Accompanying gunboats opened on all enemy 
batteries within reach as Blair's division disembarked “in full view of the enemy,” taking care to 
“seemingly prepare to assault.” In truth, the foray had more than a tinge of absurdity. Both 
Sherman and the Rebel defenders “knew full well that there was no road across the submerged 
field that lay between the river and the bluff,” rendering any such assault impossible. Even so, 
ever faithful to Grant's wishes, the division kept up appearances until dark, when it re-embarked 
and started back across the river to Young's Point. Shortly after his return, a courier reached 
Sherman with another note from Grant. “Hurry forward,” it urged. Having failed to secure Rebel-
fortified Grand Gulf, Grant had instead moved the army further south and crossed at Bruinsburg, 
where the army found the eastern banks of the river all but uncontested. Accordingly, Cump 
immediately started Steele's and Tuttle's divisions, then idling in camp, southward. On the 
morning of May 2, the Fifteenth Corps was finally on the road to Vicksburg. Blair's division 
remained behind to rest after the diversionary foray alongside another of the 17th Corps guarding 
the camps at Young's Point until called for by Sherman.602 
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 After four days of hard marching, Steele's and Tuttle's commands made the 63 miles to 
Hard Times, Louisiana, four miles north of the recently secured crossing at Grand Gulf.603 
Steamers ferried the two divisions across to the east bank at Grand Gulf on May 7, and the next 
day they marched 18 additional miles northeast to Hankinson's Ferry on the Big Black River. By 
May 10, they had rendezvoused with the main body of Grant's army, then tarrying east of Port 
Gibson as its chief determined the most prudent next step. After much careful deliberation, he 
chose to head northeastward, aiming for Edward's Station and an opportunity to cut the vital 
Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad, isolating the Rebel garrison from outside support. The whole 
army would sweep northeast with all three corps utilizing more or less separate routes, spread 
across a nearly twenty-mile front and using the Big Black River to protect their vulnerable left 
flank. McClernand's 13th Corps would take the left, McPherson's 17th the right, and Sherman's 
15th the center, slightly behind the others. In two days’ time, the three disparate elements would 
converge upon Fourteen Mile Creek, a short distance south of their objective at Edward's Station. 
 Keeping his titanic host fed and supplied was Grant's greatest concern. After making the 
long journey by boat from the depots at Memphis to Milliken's Bend and Young's Point, the 
army's supplies had to be hauled down the same long winding route by which Sherman's corps 
had just made its way to the main body. While the tactical pause outside Port Gibson had allowed 
time for the army's quartermasters to replenish supplies thus far expended, in the future such an 
extended lifeline would be challenging, if not impossible, to maintain. Supplies would continue 
to flow from Memphis and Grand Gulf throughout the campaign, but it was already clear to 
Grant that in the future it would be necessary to “make the country furnish the balance.” While 
this bold decision to cut from his base of supply has traditionally been celebrated as a feat of 
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military genius, it came at a great cost in hardship for those of Sherman's corps habitually in the 
extreme rear of the army, left only scraps for forage after the passage of McClernand's and 
McPherson's corps. Those in the columns of Sherman's divisions fully recognized the 
precariousness of their logistical situation. In fact, Sherman had made sure they did, announcing 
in his general orders how “the officers and men of the whole army should be impressed with the 
real difficulty of supplying so large an army of men and horses by such a road.” “Rations are 
hard to get and should disaster occur we will be in a bad fix,” Iowan Sewall Farwell worried. “It 
seems to me we must be successful or be destroyed as an army we are so far from a base of 
supply.” Most regiments found themselves restricted to two hardtack crackers per day, “with a 
fair prospect of less quantity soon,” another Hawkeye fretted.604 
 Arriving at the banks of Fourteen Mile Creek on May 12, Steele's division quickly 
secured a bridgehead. Taking personal tactical command of the head of his corps column, 
Sherman ordered a battery of Steele's howitzers to shell the bushes on the opposite bank with 
canister while Col. Charles Woods's (originally Hovey's) brigade forded the creek and the 
vaunted Turner skirmish teams of the 17th Missouri – Steele's premiere light infantry unit – 
traded sporadic shots with Rebel cavalry. Once the enemy had abandoned the east bank, Steele's 
pioneers set to work fashioning a crossing “in lieu of the burned bridge.” Though requiring only 
three hours labor, the delay was long enough for the remaining Secessionist cavalry to escape 
Sherman's grasp.605 
 
604 G.O. 29, 15 AC, May 2, 1863, OR, I:24, III, 264; S. S. Farwell [31 IA] to Brother, May 6, 1863, S. S. Farwell 
Letters, SHSI Iowa City; John Bell [25 IA] Diary, May 15, 1863, 203. 
605 WTS Report, May 24, 1863, OR, I:24, I, 753; Charles Woods Report, May 25, 1863, OR, I:24, II, 250. 
247 
 Meanwhile, McPherson's corps on the right stumbled into a fierce and bloody fight at 
Raymond, convincing Grant that at least two Rebel contingents were operating against him, but 
had yet to combine. While McClernand's divisions on the left discovered the advanced elements 
of what had originally been the Vicksburg garrison south of Edward's Station, McPherson's 
encounter to the east suggested that another Rebel contingent was probably guarding the state 
capital at Jackson. Sensing an opportunity, Grant now took action to attempt the piecemeal 
destruction of both. While McPherson's and McClernand's corps moved north in a feint to 
distract the westernmost of the two Rebel elements prior to driving east to Jackson, Grant 
ordered Sherman's corps northeast to approach the state capital directly from the south, this time 
with Tuttle's comparatively fresh division in the lead.606 
 The road to Jackson passed through “a continual succession of hills and valleys” formed 
of yellow clay. Dust in the roadbed was at least four inches deep in many places. “Innumerable 
buffalo gnats” mercilessly tormented man and beast alike. “They fly in your face and bite,” one 
Missourian recorded in his diary while shewing them away. Fresh water was scarce, and the 
perpetual delays caused by balking teams and gun crews stalled in the ascent of each hill became 
“irksome” in the extreme. Yellow dust filled lungs and the dry heat made breathing a chore and 
sweat omnipresent. Finally, on the 13th, the dry spell was dramatically broken when the heavens 
opened and “it rained harder than I ever saw in my life,” one wrote in awe, adding, with some 
exaggeration, that “the men almost drowned in the rain, mud, and water.” The route deteriorated 
under the downpour, delays became even more frequent, and the men often found themselves 
standing in the rain for long stints. In some places road cuts transformed into veritable sloughs, 
and the column was forced to wade through water nearly up to their waists. After making little 
 
606 WTS Report, May 24, 1863, OR, I:24, I, 753. 
248 
progress due to the weather, the miserable men “lay on the soaked ground drenched to the skin, 
hungry and exhausted.”607 
II. “A perfect rabble” 
 Arriving within about 3 miles of Jackson at 10 o'clock on May 14, Tuttle's advance guard 
could clearly make out the thunder of McPherson's guns operating further north. Leading the 
van, it fell to the newly attached Third Division to spearhead Sherman's attack on the capital. 
After using his artillery to brush away a few lingering Rebel batteries watching over the Lynch 
Creek bridge southwest of the city, Tuttle advanced the division into a field on the east bank and 
maneuvered his brigades into line of battle, immediately charging Rebel skirmishers visible in a 
tree line beyond. The enemy having no works from which to repel Tuttle's assault, little blood 
was shed, and the Secessionists promptly scurried back into their carefully prepared trenches 
outside Jackson. This changed the game. Tuttle now confronted a tactical problem all but 
identical to that faced by the other two divisions of Sherman's corps at Chickasaw Bayou and 
Arkansas Post. “As far to the left as we could see, appeared a line of intrenchments,” Sherman 
noted. For the first time during the long campaign, he showed signs of pause. Not wanting a 
repeat of the stalemate at “the Post,” he ordered a staffer to take one of Tuttle's regiments “and 
make a detour to the right to see what was there,” hoping to find an undefended flank. Steele's 
brigades would follow. In ordering this reconnaissance, Sherman repeated the same tactic he had 
ordered at Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post, feeling for the Rebel flank prior to reluctantly 
accepting the necessity of a frontal assault. A short time later, the aide returned with wonderful 
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news. The rebel works on the far right were completely abandoned, and the city was Grant's for 
the taking.608 
 Although as many as 6,000 Rebels had only recently garrisoned the capital, their 
commander Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had hastily evacuated the city in anticipation of Grant's 
arrival. While the foremost elements of McPherson's corps and Tuttle's division had run into the 
Secessionist rear guard, Steele's flanking division found only a wary band of state militia 
disinclined to put up a fight. Soon, even those to Tuttle's front had withdrawn. By nightfall, the 
Fifteenth Corps indisputably held Jackson, and its arrival marked a major turning point in the 
morale of the rank and file, significantly boosting their trust in the army's leadership. “For once 
the rebels had been out generaled,” one Iowan officer crowed. “We marched in with wet clothes, 
tired limbs blistered feet and empty stomachs but no one heeded these things.” After hard 
marching, considerable fatigue and hardship, but fortunately very little fighting, the corps now 
found itself unopposed in the streets of the Mississippi capital. Much in the same spirit as in the 
aftermath of the successful bayou expeditions, the men again took note of what could be 
accomplished without any bloodshed when “our Generals” put their minds to it. Indeed, many in 
the ranks quietly “thanked our stars that our exhausted vitality had not been put to a severer test.” 
As the haggard looking regiments of Steele's and Tuttle's divisions re-consolidated themselves 
after the long march and companies stacked arms, “a race to town took place and a wild hunt for 
something to eat” became impossible to prevent. For the fleetest of foot, nourishment was more 
or less readily available, and “immediate starvation, at least, was staved off.”609 
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 Hoping to catch the westernmost of the dual Rebel forces off balance, including most of 
the Vicksburg garrison sallied forth from its defenses, Grant eagerly pushed McClernand's and 
McPherson's corps westward the following morning. Once again, he charged Sherman's corps 
with another independent assignment. Cump's command was to remain in Jackson and “destroy 
effectually the railroad tracks … and all the property belonging to the enemy” with an eye 
toward preventing the capital's reoccupation by the Rebel forces under Johnston still lingering 
nearby. Yet again, Grant leaned on his trusted lieutenant's command to carry out fiery area denial 
operations while the remainder of his army pursued direct action with the enemy. Ever obedient, 
Sherman wasted no time in assigning the regiments of Steele's division, the most experienced 
command in his corps when it came to practicing “war in earnest,” to the thorough destruction of 
the railroad, the bridge over the Pearl River, and all Rebel government “property to the south and 
east” of the city. Meanwhile, Tuttle's division would seize or destroy all Rebel property of 
military value to the north and west. Destruction of the tracks was to “be extended out as far as 
possible, and must be complete,” but above all else, “dispatch [was] of the utmost importance,” 
Sherman emphasized. The sooner the corps could complete its work, the sooner it could rejoin 
the rest of the army and maximize Grant's strategic options. By destroying the vital strategic rail 
junction east of Vicksburg, Sherman's corps would prevent any Rebel relief army from 
threatening Grant's rear as he moved west to bag the prize.610 
 Employing the same tactics as during the recent bayou expeditions, the two divisions 
fragmented into smaller fatigue details and work parties, each assigned a separate mission under 
the command of a junior or non-commissioned officer. Details pried up rails and ties, stacked 
them, set the ties ablaze, and warmed the rails over the fire before warping them around trees “so 
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[as to] render them unfit for use.” Starting five miles out and working their way back toward the 
main depot in the center of town, the corps worked with determination. Sweaty details had 
effectively dismantled the railroad in all directions by the following morning, with some laboring 
all night long to meet the deadline. Their work was exceedingly thorough, and the tracks would 
not be operational again for months. Other groups spread out to search and destroy “everything 
public not needed by us.” The Pearl River bridge was doused with twenty barrels of tar and set 
ablaze. Afterward, even the abutments “were battered down” with artillery. Several other minor 
bridges were destroyed in similar fashion. Ammunition beyond that which could be carried along 
with the army was summarily thrown into the Pearl River. Other targets included the city's 
arsenal buildings, a cannon and ammunition foundry, printing presses, sundry manufacturing 
facilities, storehouses, flouring mills, cotton sheds, warehouses, the railroad depot, rope factory, 
saltpeter works, and even part of the Mississippi state penitentiary which had been converted into 
a cotton and munitions factory. Rebel tents were collected, stacked behind the State House, and 
set afire. “The quantity destroyed is beyond calculation,” one Hawkeye put bluntly.611  
 There were in fact significant limits on the destruction. The Governor's mansion and State 
House were preserved. Even so, as seemed to occur so often, the destruction far exceeded 
Sherman's wishes. When it came to his knowledge that both a Catholic church and the local 
“Confederate Hotel,” along with several other unauthorized structures and even a few private 
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homes were in flames, he became enraged. While the church and homes were likely an accident, 
the others were clearly acts of malice “not justified by the rules of war,” he complained. As at 
Napoleon, he and his lieutenants found it impossible to either staunch the flames or discover the 
“mischievous soldiers” responsible. Mischief was by no means restricted to arson, either. Despite 
the appointment of Brig. Gen. Mower's brigade to serve as temporary provost of the city, rumor 
inevitably made it to corps headquarters that several guards were freely “giving license to 
soldiers to take the contents of stores, taking things not necessary or useful.” If true, Sherman 
warned, this was absolutely indefensible. “Only such articles should be taken as are necessary to 
the subsistence of troops, and the private rights of citizens should be respected,” he insisted. 
Even so, what specifically was “necessary to the subsistence of the troops” proved a profoundly 
subjective question.612 
 In a few cases, the necessity of articles seized was obvious on its face. Food, boots, and 
shoes were among the most highly prized commodities. In other cases, the definition of military 
necessity blurred. The 25th Iowa scored “fine clothes of every kind, tobacco, sugar, cigars, 
horses, buggies, fine coaches, in fact everything imaginable,” Captain John Bell exclaimed. As 
the city's businesses were turned upside down by looting foragers, “the niggers and workers had 
a rich harvest and booty” as they joined in the chaos. The offices of the local paper were “broken 
open, the type thrown in the street and the presses and furniture broken up,” and the post office 
“rifled of its contents.” The Governor's palatial estate, while spared the torch, was likewise 
“broken open and pianos and furniture destroyed.” Many private residences “were entered … 
trunks broken open, fine dresses torn to pieces, and the jewelry, silver ware and provisions 
taken,” according to one stunned Mississippian. Medical instruments were taken from the local 
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dentist, books and bindery seized from the local bookseller, medicine stolen from the pharmacy, 
and of course no shortage of tobacco and provisions liberated from the local grocery, which 
assessed its losses at no less than $200,000. “Intelligent gentlemen” assessed the total loss of 
property in the city and environs, all incurred in less than 36 hours' time, at $5,000,000. 
Mississippi Governor John Pettus doubled that figure in his own retrospective assessment.613 
 Disgust at the behavior of many in the command was not restricted to those at Sherman's 
headquarters. Lt. Henry Kircher, 12th Missouri, thought that even “war in earnest” ought to be 
“carried on in a deacent [sic] way, and not any one allowed to destroy as suits his notion. We are 
not rob[b]ers.” Lt. Col. A. J. Seay, 32nd Missouri, was likewise disgusted at the behavior of 
many in the corps. They had behaved like “a perfect rabble for 4 or 5 hours,” he complained. No 
doubt fueled by confiscated alcohol, the fugitives had destroyed many unauthorized buildings, 
“but I am proud to say no private houses have been burned,” at least not deliberately. The seizure 
of goods apparently bothered him far less than the pyromania. His Missourians managed to 
procure “an immense quantity of tobacco, some rum, whiskey, wines, etc., some clothing and 
some provisions,” all of which Seay deemed a welcome treat. Most disappointing of all to the 
starving and exhausted men in the ranks, there seemed to be “more shrubbery than vegetables” 
about the town. Many still lingering on the very verge of starvation, they mourned the sight of 
“the sugar warehouses with their tiers upon tiers of sugar hogsheads, going up in fire and 
smoke.”614 
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 The next morning, Sherman received a message from Grant ordering the ash-covered 
corps in motion westward once again, this time with Steele in the lead. The command was on the 
road by 10 o'clock. Both sides of the route quickly became strewn with illicitly captured goods 
and commodities too cumbersome to carry along. As the column rushed westward away from the 
now much disheveled capital, Seay glanced over his shoulder as Rebel cavalrymen shadowing 
the army returned to its streets. “I saw them shoot and bayonet several drunk, straggling Yankees 
and Negroes,” he coldly reported to his diary that night without remorse. “Good for the 
stragglers.”615 
 The corps column made twenty miles to Bolton Station on the 16th and reached 
Bridgeport on the Big Black River the following day. Waiting there for Cump was Frank Blair 
with Second Division, having been left behind to await relief by forces enroute from Memphis 
while the rest of the corps marched south from Young's Point. Blair's division had marked time 
establishing and improving the infrastructure of Grant's tenuous supply route west of the river 
before receiving orders from Sherman on May 7 to rejoin the main body. After a long and 
difficult march south, Blair managed to procure transportation independently and cross two 
brigades to Grand Gulf in the evening of May 11, setting out for Jackson in the morning. Ewing's 
Third Brigade remained on the west side of the river completing a road from Young's Point to 
Warrenton until being relieved and marching to Grand Gulf on May 15. The brigade would 
rejoin Blair's division at Vicksburg on the 18th.616  
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 Blair's primary assignment was the security of Grant's lengthy 200-wagon train on its 
way to link up with the main army. The painstaking movement of this train greatly slowed the 
division's forward rate of speed, requiring three days to reach Raymond. Arriving in the midst of 
the rapid movement to bag Pemberton's force at Champion Hill, the command was temporarily 
attached to McClernand's corps with orders to support its attack. With the exception of a few 
Rebel shells which fell too close for comfort, and a little light skirmishing, the division was 
mostly a spectator to the main event. Even so, when called upon to advance to the support of 
other troops in contact to their front, the men conducted themselves in close accordance with 
their division's evolved tactical culture, despite the recent change of division command. Leading 
the column, Giles Smith's brigade deployed one company from each of its regiments ahead as 
skirmishers “with orders to advance and push the enemy vigorously.” Meanwhile, the main body 
remained in the rear at its customary “close supporting distance,” collecting no fewer than 300 
prisoners as it swept across the shattered forests of the battlefield. As usual, Second Division 
burnt its powder almost exclusively on the skirmish line.617 
 Ordered north by Grant to rejoin its parent corps, the “old Division” was finally reunited 
with Sherman as the corps prepared to cross the Big Black River at Bridgeport. After brushing a 
few lingering enemy sharpshooters from a rifle pit on the western bank with artillery, the way 
was clear for the now re-consolidated corps to continue its march on Vicksburg. That night, the 
already once again famished regiments crawled over a flimsy pontoon bridge illuminated by 
bonfires on both banks. The passage made for “a weird and impressive scene,” one observed. 
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While far too dark for photography, struck by the dramatic image an accompanying journalist 
sketched what he saw.618 
 After defeating and nearly routing Pemberton's force at the battle of Champion Hill with 
McPherson's and McClernand's corps, Grant swiftly pursued his weary prey to the west as it 
limped back toward Vicksburg. By 10 o'clock on May 18, the lead elements of Blair's division at 
the head of the Fifteenth Corps had interposed themselves between Vicksburg and the long 
sought after Rebel forts atop Haynes's and Drumgould's Bluffs. After nearly six months and 
immeasurable hardship, Grant's army was finally on the high ground in Vicksburg's rear. Pausing 
at a fork in the road to deploy Smith's Zouaves and Regulars as skirmishers to scout in both 
directions, Sherman awaited Grant's instructions on how to proceed. Upon his arrival shortly 
thereafter, the army commander ordered Cump to continue westward toward the northern 
defenses, while McPherson and McClernand headed south to approach the center and southern 
defenses respectively. Accordingly, Sherman moved Blair's division immediately forward 
directly toward the works, left Tuttle's in support, and ordered Steele to extend further west down 
the road in search of the banks of the Mississippi and, even more importantly, the corps's elusive 
primary objective from that December: the only road running north out of the city.619 
 By then, the hunger pangs were almost insufferable. Exhausted men routinely stumbled 
out of line into the woods flanking the road in search of almost anything to satiate their 
stomachs. “Hungry near to the starvation point, we ate weeds, roots, leaves or anything we could 
get a hold of,” one Missourian recalled. An officer in the 113th Illinois overheard someone in his 
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company joking about how he planned to subsist “by chewing newspaper advertisements of 
provisions” cut from Rebel papers he had found in Jackson. Another in the 76th Ohio offered one 
of his privates a half dollar for a piece of hardtack. Abandoned Rebel rifle pits discovered along 
the way offered a handful of the most advanced skirmishers a highly coveted prize. “The rebels 
retreating in great haste had left us their breakfast in camp kettles filled with corn meal mush, 
and also bacon and corn bread and other delicacies,” Reichhelm remembered. These were 
“ravenously devoured.” Even bags of raw corn intended for horse feed were slashed open and 
their contents pocketed by famished men, meant to “stave off starvation until relief should come 
from the fleet.” For most in the column, though, only “filling up with water” could provide 
enough respite for sleep at night.620 
 By dawn on the 19th, the army had finally reached its objective. Despite tremendous 
hardship, risk, and no shortage of painful blisters, the Army of the Tennessee had successfully 
outmaneuvered, and in multiple cases outfought, two Rebel armies converging to prevent it from 
reaching the gates of Vicksburg. “We had compassed the enemy to the north of Vicksburg, our 
right resting on the Mississippi River, with a plain view of our fleets at the mouth of the Yazoo 
and Young's Point,” Sherman proclaimed in his report, “Vicksburg in plain sight, and nothing 
separated us from the enemy but a space of about 400 yards of very difficult ground.” It was to 
prove “very difficult” indeed.621 
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III. “Unsupported on the left or right” 
 Little in the way of substantive attempts to address the corps's coordinative shortcomings 
or lack of confidence in frontal assaults had been attempted by Sherman or his lieutenants since 
the corps's spectacular failures at Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post. This was mostly due to a 
lingering divergence of explanations for these failures prevailing at headquarters and in the 
ranks. Sherman and his chief lieutenants remained convinced that failure had been principally 
due to a lack of experience, discipline, and spirit within attacking regiments, most especially 
among their junior officers. Little to no consideration was apparently given to their own 
coordinative failures as a command team. The men, on the other hand, most especially those of 
Steele's hard luck division, were of the opinion that orders for frontal assaults against works were 
themselves evidence of a grave incompetency in the higher echelons of command. “Our 
Generals” seemed to suffer from a severe lack of creativity, and for that reason repeatedly 
ordered what amounted to suicide missions. Lacking confidence in their ability to succeed, most 
of those in the ranks had instead devised practical strategies to survive such futile assignments 
without sacrificing their personal or regimental honor, by obediently advancing to an enemy's 
abatis or into his initial shock volley, and subsequently going to ground to “sharpshoot.” 
 The long campaign of rapid maneuver to Jackson and now Vicksburg gave hope to many 
that “our Generals” might have perhaps finally learned their lesson, and a germ of renewed 
confidence began to spread as the army again found itself in view of the mighty Mississippi. 
That confidence was perhaps highest in the ranks of Sherman's corps, having been spared much 
fighting during the long circuitous march, unlike the other corps of Grant's army.  Even so, on the 
morning of May 19, it was once again the Fifteenth Corps's turn to bleed. Grant was confident 
that Pemberton's army was still reeling from its defeat at Champion Hill, and thus would crumble 
under minimal pressure. Accordingly, he planned to use the entire army to assault the Rebel 
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works in hopes of collapsing what little fighting spirit the garrison still retained and seizing the 
city without having to resort to a lengthy siege. After all, with Johnston's force still hovering near 
Jackson, there was no telling how long he had to bag the “Gibraltar” before having to fight in 
both front and rear. 
 The mostly slave-prepared Rebel defenses of Vicksburg extended for a distance of more 
than eight miles, encompassing the northern, eastern, and southern portions of the city 
completely. Scarring a succession of hills that ringed Vicksburg, the somewhat irregular and 
jagged line of works appeared “exceedingly tortuous” to the casual observer, but this gave it 
additional strength, allowing for a crossfire of rifle, musket, and artillery fire at almost every 
point. To the immediate front of Blair's division on the northeastern shoulder of these defenses, 
blocking the route of what locals called the “old grave yard road,” were the looming ramparts of 
“Fort Beauregard,” known today as “Stockade Redan.” As the slopes of the region's hills were so 
steep, and the intervening valleys so filled with tangled thickets and dense underbrush, relatively 
few viable avenues of approach existed for attacking the imposing salient. In fact, along 
Sherman's front only one immediately presented itself: the “Graveyard Road.” Visible from 
Rebel defenses for several hundred yards in either direction, assaulting columns would almost 
certainly remain under a deadly fire for their entire journey down the road toward their objective. 
Whether or not any body of troops could endure such a fusillade while still maintaining ample 
force to penetrate the fort's parapet upon arrival was an open question. Hoping to avoid a lengthy 
siege given the potential for Rebel attacks to his rear, Grant meant to find out.622  
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 Although Grant issued orders on the evening of the 18th for all three corps to “push 
forward rapidly, and gain as close positions as possible to the enemy's works” in preparation for 
an army-wide assault at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, by that time Sherman's was still the only of 
Grant's corps in position to push the long march to its victorious fruition. Moreover, of his three 
divisions, Blair's was the only command naturally positioned to assault the Stockade Redan 
complex, and thus Cump charged the freshly-minted division commander with the mission. All 
three of Blair's brigades would participate in the division's assault arrayed in line of battle, 
forming behind a hill to shroud their preparations from prying Rebel eyes. On the left, Blair 
ordered Kilby Smith's regiments to aim directly for the Stockade Redan, attacking along the 
Graveyard Road but split into two wings by its raised embankment. The right wing of the 
brigade, including the 83rd Indiana and 127th Illinois, Smith placed in the independent command 
of Col. Benjamin Spooner, “in whose ability and dauntless courage I repose[d] fullest 
confidence.” Spooner was to drive his pair of regiments “forward as rapidly as possible” in the 
customary Second Division fashion – not worrying so much about well-dressed formations, but 
rather surging forward “in such order as he could best get over the ground.”623  
 In Blair's center, Giles Smith's brigade would assault down a steep slope and directly 
through the Mint Spring ravine, aiming at the Rebel line running between a prominent lunette to 
the east and Stockade Redan. On his right, Ewing's brigade, having yet to participate in an 
assault with the corps, would likewise attack through the ravine, doing its best to cut through the 
entangling abatis while aiming directly for the lunette. Having never before experienced a frontal 
assault against Rebel works, but assuming that the army's recent victories at Raymond and 
Champion Hill indicated that it was truly “irresistible,” Ewing's Buckeyes “expected another 
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complete victory.” The advance would constitute “a short job,” Ewing proclaimed to the 
assembled command. “We would be inside of the works, in less than ten minutes after receiving 
the order to move,” he promised. Finally, in cooperation with Blair's brigades, Sherman ordered 
Steele to advance Thayer's Iowa brigade in an attack on the Rebel works to the west of Second 
Division to prevent enfilading enemy fire on Ewing's regiments from that sector.624 
 In hopes of keeping Rebel heads down behind the parapet during the assault, Blair 
ordered the division's Zouave skirmishers advanced as far forward as possible “with a view of 
obtaining a closer position and of reconnoitering the ground” prior to the attack. In this, he 
displayed a basic grasp of the division's habitual skirmisher-centric approach to frontal assaults, 
despite having only recently taken command. The guns of Battery A, 1st Illinois Light Artillery 
registered five rounds on the parapet to find their range, shouting their findings aloud to the gun 
teams in a manner that nearby skirmish teams must have heard, adjusting their own sights 
accordingly.625 At 9 o'clock, Sherman ordered the customary general preliminary bombardment 
in hopes of easing the job of the assaulting force, and thus all available guns along Blair's line 
opened on their assigned targets. The bombardment continued unabated for five full hours, 
extending throughout the morning hours and into the early afternoon. Almost no return fire was 
received from Rebel batteries behind the works. 
 At precisely two o'clock, the Illinoisan batteries fired three salvos in quick succession to 
signal the assault, and Blair's division “dashed forward” into the deadly valley. The dispersed 
Zouave skirmish teams poured a heavy fire from behind cover onto the top of the Rebel parapet 
in an attempt to suppress the enemy. While the effectiveness of their fire was, as always, difficult 
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to judge, the small numbers of effectives still in the regiment, as well as the necessity of firing 
upward toward the crest of the steep slope from the ravine bottom, likely limited their ability to 
suppress the enemy. The defense of Stockade Redan proved far more akin to that confronted by 
Blair's brigade at Chickasaw Bayou than it did the shock-reliant tactics confronted at Arkansas 
Post. As at Chickasaw, near impenetrable terrain, dense abatis, and enemy fire dismantled the 
assault long before it reached the base of the parapet. As the mass of each brigade “dashed over 
stumps and tangled limbs of fallen trees, struggled through deep gullies bristling with brush and 
cane, and climbed the steep slopes,” one Illinoisan observed how “men dropped by tens [from 
enemy fire], stopped behind some sheltering log or bank, [or] slackened speed for sheer want of 
breath” until finally “all the momentum of the start had worn itself out; and a thin line of panting, 
staggering humanity pressed on.”626 
 Trees felled with their tops toward the attacker, their branches sharpened and entangled 
with telegraph wire, presented a formidable abatis. Rebel slaves had dug deep pits covered with 
dry grass designed to swallow whole portions of assaulting lines unaware of their presence or 
danger. In several spots, these obstructions proved “an almost impenetrable mass,” forcing men 
to cut narrow pathways through the trees and wire that quickly drew “a murderous cross fire” as 
they tried to surge through the tight defiles. In other places, most notably along the right flank of 
Ewing's brigade, whole regiments discovered that passage through the abatis was utterly 
impossible, and they were forced to halt, go to cover, and add their fire to the suppression of the 
works with the Zouaves instead.627 
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 Even for those who managed to cut their way through the obstructions, maintaining 
alignment proved impossible, shattering the concentrated mass needed for the assault to succeed. 
“A line of battle could no longer be preserved,” one lieutenant with the Regulars remembered, 
“but the flag steadily advanced, and each man earnestly strove to keep within its shadow.” 
Recognizing this, the captain of the color company called to the ensign to keep the banner well 
ahead of the battalion, as “we shall not be able to preserve much of a line.” Col. Hamilton 
Eldridge, leading his 127th Illinois alongside Spooner's Hoosiers, also noted the tendency of 
terrain and Rebel fire to scatter the men “to a considerable extent,” with only the regimental and 
national colors serving as rallying points for those making their way forward independently. 
Even Kilby Smith was forced to admit that it “was almost vain to essay a line.” As at Chickasaw 
Bayou, the visibility of bright regimental colors through the smoke proved crucial to maintaining 
any vestige of unit cohesion in the chaos of a charge.628 
 After making upwards of four hundred yards across the ravine, the surviving members of 
both brigades paused under the defiladed cover of the southern slope “where they were 
comparatively sheltered from the small-arms of the enemy,” Kilby Smith reported. An additional 
deadly 75 yards of almost vertical embankment still separated the command from its objective, 
but Smith quickly recognized that the men around him “were thoroughly exhausted” and his 
brigade was “alone, [and] unsupported on the left or right, save by a portion of the Thirteenth 
Regulars.” Even most of Giles Smith's adjacent command was impossible to see from the 
southern side of the road. Rising from his prone position along the slope to gaze southward, he 
was disheartened to find “not a soldier to be seen” and absolutely no evidence “that we had 
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friends near us outside of our division.” Something must have gone awry, he assumed, and sent a 
runner to find Blair and ascertain the facts. While they waited, many scrambled to find cover 
from which to ply their skills as marksmen – just as they had from the abatis at Arkansas Post. 
Quickly spotting a group of Rebel skirmishers “picking off our officers with devilish skill,” 
several crack shots worked to silence the enemy riflemen as they awaited further orders.629 
 Though invisible to Kilby Smith, First Brigade was in fact making some progress, none 
of its regiments more so than the small indomitable band of Regulars. Their national standard 
was by then “yards in advance of anyone,” making it a natural target for every Rebel in the 
immediate vicinity. A special kind of madness fired the enthusiasm of the men to keep the flag 
aloft. Despite a withering fire that cut officers and five successive color bearers down as they 
ran, much of the yelling blue swarm nearly made it to the foot of the parapet, but at a tremendous 
cost in blood.630 The survivors huddled behind cover only 25 yards from the redan, doing their 
best to return fire and praying for the darkness of night so they might retire. By the time it finally 
came, more than half of the Regular officers were dead or wounded, their commander Captain 
Edward Washington, grand-nephew of the nation's first president, mortally. A comparable 
proportion of those in the ranks had also fallen before the redan. Morning roll call at first light on 
May 20 showed a loss of more than 43% in the battalion. For all practical purposes, after only 
three major engagements, it ceased to be a combat force, and would spend the rest of its service 
guarding Sherman's headquarters. The shaken survivors inscribed the regiment's colors, riddled 
with more than 55 bullet holes but somehow successfully evacuated from the field, with the 
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phrase: “First at Vicksburg” – a motto still enshrined in the modern 13th U.S. Infantry's battalion 
crest today.631. 
 When his exhausted aide completed the perilous journey from the rear back to Kilby 
Smith, between breaths he parroted instructions not from Blair, but directly from Sherman. Smith 
was “to get my men as close to the parapet as possible and be ready to jump in when they began 
to yield.” The rest of the army would soon attack in support, Cump assured him. Accordingly, 
Smith cried out for the men to cease firing, fix bayonets, and await the command to charge. Even 
so, every time he glanced up at the steep slope, ever deepening doubts stirred within him as to 
whether or not the command could even make it up the embankment at all without ladders. It 
might be possible to fashion an impromptu ladder by driving bayonets into the parapet, he 
considered, but any isolated individual or small group that hazarded such an ascent would have 
been immediately captured or cut down at the summit. 
 Now beginning to dread Sherman's order to drive his brigade's assault to its bloody 
fruition, Smith instead chose mostly to ignore it, and instead continue employing his brigade's 
firepower as effectually as he could from its current position. After all, perhaps his current 
position already represented “as close to the parapet as possible.” Having failed to reach the 
enemy parapet in an assault unique in its operational heritage, Smith's brigade quickly shifted to 
what it knew it could do well. After dispatching runners to the rear for ammunition, “the most 
accurate marksmen were thrown forward, with carte-blanche to select the best cover.” Individual 
companies from each regiment pushed a short distance forward to skirmish at closer range until 
their ammunition was exhausted or guns fouled beyond their ability to reload, when they were 
summarily replaced by others. Once again, just as at Arkansas Post, the brigade managed to 
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achieve almost complete fire superiority at close range, “and none of the enemy ventured his 
head above the wall who failed to pay the penalty.”632 
 Just how long the two brigades could hold on to their hard won forward positions 
remained an open question. As during prior assaults, while success in gaining fire superiority at 
close range was no small feat, it remained mostly tactically insignificant unless it could be 
exploited by a coordinating maneuver element. With no such force available, there could be no 
breakthrough. Communicating via aides with Spooner across Graveyard Road, Smith started to 
receive troubling reports from all along his brigade frontage. “Their loss had been fearful, falling 
upon their best line and non-commissioned officers,” he reported. “Captain after captain had 
been shot dead; field officers were falling,”633 
 As the fearful hours dragged on and daylight began to fade, it gradually became evident 
to those still hugging the southern wall of the Mint Spring ravine that neither reinforcements nor 
assault orders were likely forthcoming. The wholly unsupported division's attack had failed, and 
it was time to begin thinking about how to escape the potential total destruction or capture that 
might accompany a Rebel counterattack. Although Kilby Smith had already started to consider 
how best to fortify his newly won ground, even going so far as to begin sighting potential battery 
positions under the slope, an aide from Sherman arrived at his position near nightfall with orders 
to fall back whenever he thought he could. After confirming the order with Blair, Smith 
somewhat reluctantly began the retrograde movement as soon as darkness blanketed the 
battlefield, in many cases one company at a time. By 3 o'clock the next morning, nothing but a 
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few skirmish teams still resided in no man's land, and Blair's battered division was once again 
behind the crest from which the bloody assault had begun.634 
 In contrast to the Rebels guarding Stockade Redan, the Secessionists responsible for 
repelling Thayer's and Ewing's assaults on Blair's right at the 27th Louisiana Lunette opted for a 
more conventional shock-reliant defense. Ewing's Buckeyes, arrayed in line of battle, advanced 
into the ravine with a screen of skirmish teams deployed well to the front, instead of ensconced 
upon the north ridge to their rear as the rest of the division had done. Ensnared by felled trees 
and telegraph wire and incapable of further forward movement, the stalled half of the brigade 
“retired to the first cover, laid down,” and peppered the parapet with “a heavy fire” to help keep 
Rebel heads down as the rest of the brigade approached. The left wing continued forward. As 
Col. James Dayton's 4th West Virginia neared the parapet, the Louisianans opened with a 
fearsome shock volley that felled every member of the color guard. Urging the men on from the 
front, the regiment's major was likewise cut down. Only a portion of the men reached the ditch at 
the foot of the parapet, but the enemy fire they encountered even there proved “too strong to be 
resisted” anyway, prompting them to sprint back to a bluff about 75 yards from the parapet to 
await orders. Attempts to coordinate a renewal of suppressive fire from the batteries in support of 
a final push broke down. Unaware of the plan, those of Ewing's command still lodged for safety 
in the ditch at the base of the scarp took the fire of the Federal guns as a signal not for assault, 
but as cover for their withdrawal to salvation. Those who made it back to the cover of the 
brigade's jumping off position left fifty of their dead behind. Nearly 200 of Ewing's command 
were wounded, and six wholly unaccounted for. “The history of the charge of the Kanawha 
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Brigade … is similar to that of every Brigade engaged,” one Buckeye later wrote. “In short, we 
were repulsed everywhere.”635 
 Indeed, the story in Thayer's brigade, assaulting the redan from a position 400 yards west 
of Ewing, was little different. With the still decimated 4th Iowa in reserve, the Hawkeyes of 
Thayer's 26th, 9th, and 30th Iowa charged down the northern slope of the ravine with a cheer at 
the sound of the artillery signal. Their brigade frontage mangled by the intervening smaller 
ridges, draws, and fingers of higher ground that filled the ravine, the Iowans received a 
Louisianan shock volley while still attempting to make their way across the bayou itself. Only 
the veteran 9th, which had yet to face such a volley in its history, withstood the fire without 
halting behind cover in the ravine bottom. Lacking any obvious support visible to the right or 
left, and facing a dauntingly steep rise to their front, the Iowans opted to employ the time-tested 
strategy of survival with honor. Taking cover under the protection of the defiladed southern 
slope, the Hawkeyes did not budge until dark allowed for cautious withdrawal northward. 
Sherman's assault had failed.636 
 In his formal report, Blair attributed the failure of his division to a combination of the 
“insuperable” terrain in many places along his command's frontage and the enemy's ability to 
reinforce the main point of attack due to his not being engaged simultaneously at any other 
location.637 In reality, the terrain itself had not been “insuperable” for any but Ewing's right-wing 
regiments. Instead, it was the capacity of the dense abatis, intervening bald ridge lines, and sharp 
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Rebel fire to cause total breakdowns of command and control that had utterly dismantled Blair's 
assault, just as the same factors that had disrupted the corps's maneuvers in every previous 
assault it had attempted during the war. 
 To these exogenous factors were added Blair's perennial personal coordinative failings 
and those of his staff. After spending most of the previous day and early morning deployed as 
skirmish teams who were charged with maintaining contact with their Rebel counterparts to the 
front, Lt. Col. Cyrus Fisher's 54th Ohio was nearly out of ammunition by the time an aide 
reached it with orders to prepare for the assault. An effort to replenish the regiment's cartridge 
boxes was botched when crates marked “.69 caliber” were pried open only to reveal the wrong 
ammunition for their muskets. While Fisher and his lieutenants urgently sought to remedy the 
debacle, Blair arrived in person with orders for the regiment to connect with the left flank of the 
neighboring 55th Illinois, and conform his regiment's movements to theirs. Before Fisher could 
even ascertain what exactly was expected of his command, the brigade was in motion toward the 
redan. “I had no previous notice of the forward movement, or an idea that the regiment was the 
front of an assaulting column,” Fisher confessed afterward. Lodging itself along the same ridge 
as the rest of the brigade and keeping up “a brisk fire on the parapet,” the Ohioans exhausted 
their little remaining ammunition in short time and thus became useless to the division once 
forward movement ceased. Ordering his men to cease firing, “reserve one round in the piece, fix 
bayonet, and lie down until ammunition could be sent,” Fisher dispatched a runner to Smith to 
report his situation. Fortunately, the 57th Ohio was nearby and able to relieve Fisher promptly, 
but his Buckeyes were unable to reach the ammunition wagons and rearm in time to return to the 
fight. Insufficient preparation and poor communications had all but eliminated an entire 
270 
regiment's contributions from a critical flank of Blair's attack, and the Rebels along Fisher's front 
were able to shift and concentrate their defensive fire elsewhere.638 
 While Blair's division and Thayer's brigade futilely flung themselves at the Rebel works, 
the remainder of Steele's division hunted the Mississippi and the long sought after northern road 
out of Vicksburg. Though ordered to participate in the general assault at 2 o'clock, this contrasted 
with Sherman's previous orders to close with the river and secure the army's new vital supply 
line back to the Yazoo. Accordingly, while dispatching Thayer to participate in the assault, Steele 
sent Manter's (originally Blair's) and Woods's brigades westward through a dense forest and 
canebrake to complete Grant's northern encirclement of the city. Proceeding the furthest west of 
any command in the army, Woods's lead regiments found the road, and were within 150 yards of 
the river when they debouched from the timber upon a bald ridge line and immediately drew the 
fire of Rebel batteries to the south. Deploying to counter this threat, Landgraeber's howitzer 
teams sprinted into the open at a full gallop under fire, unlimbered, and began to respond to the 
Rebel battery, mostly without effect. Meanwhile, Woods's infantry cleared a house on a nearby 
prominent vista, and recognized that they could silence the battery themselves.639 
 Lt. Col. Seay led his Missourians into the house and ordered the riflemen to the windows 
to keep up a steady fire on the Rebel works and all batteries within range. “We are fighting at 
long range, losing but few men,” he proudly reported, as the regiment “kept the Rebs so 
completely driven from their guns they could not use them.” Though his 32nd Missouri had been 
spared the worst at both Chickasaw and Arkansas Post, they were now proving that they were 
“hard to beat as sharp shooters.” Seay himself grabbed a rifle to join in the fun. “I shot till my 
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shoulder was sore from the kicking muskets,” he laughed. All along the line, Steele's regiments 
found cover and practiced their sharpshooting on Rebel works and gun teams. Accurately 
estimating the distance between himself and the Rebel guns to be about 300 yards, Pvt. Calvin 
Ainsworth, 25th Iowa, elevated the rear sight on his rifle before he and his Hawkeye comrades 
each fired twenty carefully aimed rounds into the Rebel positions. Lt. Alonzo Abernathy's 
company of the 9th Iowa fired sixty per man during the day. While usually remaining silent 
behind cover, the Rebel guns did respond at opportunity. One enemy Parrott, thought to be 
silenced, suddenly let loose a fury of grapeshot that killed and wounded several Hawkeyes in the 
25th Iowa. Despite these losses, the regiment remained sheltered under the brow of the hill, 
firing at targets of opportunity until its ammunition was completely exhausted.640 
 That night, having secured their assigned western objectives, Steele's division dug in “to 
protect ourselves somewhat,” one young Missourian remembered. “As soon as the batteries 
began to shell us, each one slipped into his hole like mice.” The shallow rifle pits were anything 
but well established. Early the next morning, as one Irishman of the 3rd Missouri calmly read a 
newspaper from his foxhole, he was suddenly decapitated by a Rebel shell. “We were not safe 
for a minute,” one private realized. The men would have to dig deeper, and fast.641 
IV. “Forlorn Hope” 
 As the sore and half-disillusioned corps awoke on the morning of May 20, word passed 
through the ranks of Blair's bloodied division “that an assault would be again made upon our left; 
and that we would make a demonstration in favor of the attack.” That afternoon, Sherman's 
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batteries again thundered their deep notes, and most of the division crowded into protected 
positions along the crest of the northernmost ridge in the ravine, peppering the Rebel parapet 
with rifle fire. “The ruse” continued for four hours, without any actual assault ever taking place. 
Even so, all had plentiful opportunities to find the range to the Rebel works. The men of the 30th 
Ohio fired no fewer than 30,000 cartridges during the day – more than a hundred per man – “and 
would have fired more, had they been furnished in time.” Moving rearward from the firing line 
that evening, the Buckeyes were covered in powder, with “blackened lips … and blackened 
hands.” Orderly sergeants discovered that only a mere three men had been wounded during the 
day's operations, prompting several to grow “loud in expressing their preference for always 
fighting just such kind of battles.” In sharp contrast to the previous day's maneuvers, “they were 
so safe, and pleasant … had all the excitement of a real battle, without any of its dangers.” They 
also produced much the same in the way of results: very little.642 
 During the day, Grant met with his three corps commanders, and after comparing notes 
the officers came to a consensus that the previous day's assault had failed “by reason of the 
natural strength of the position, and because we were forced by the nature of the ground to limit 
our attacks to the strongest parts of the enemy's line.” Along the Fifteenth Corps front, that meant 
the deadly Graveyard Road, which still remained the only viable route left open to reach 
Stockade Redan. Beyond this, the greater problem had been the failure of any but Sherman's 
corps to attack as ordered, the others not yet having reached their jumping off positions when 
Blair surged forward. After much deliberation, and no little reluctance, Grant determined they 
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would try again. This time, though, the enemy would be attacked simultaneously all along the 
line, preventing another Rebel concentration against any single assaulting force.643  
 Always bent on formulating his plans based on the most complete assessment of the 
situation possible, Sherman personally reconnoitered the area to his corps's front after the 
meeting with Grant. He knew that the narrow Graveyard Road was still the only clear route from 
Federal lines to the redan, but this time he also noticed “another point in the curtain about a 
hundred yards to its [the redan's] right (our left)” that might prove viable if an attacker could cut 
his way through the abatis. He ordered his staff to prepare general orders announcing Grant's 
intentions to the corps. Blair's division, with all its officers on foot, would again assault down the 
Graveyard Road, but this time not in line of battle, but rather in a narrow column “preceded by a 
selected, or volunteer, storming party of about 150 men.” Simultaneously, Steele's division 
would “in like manner attack, by any route he may select.” While Sherman suggested “the front 
of Thayer” as the most promising route, as usual he left the details entirely up to Steele, 
remaining fixated on the operations of his beloved “old Division.” So as to avoid the confusion 
of Arkansas Post and the 19th, he ordered all division assaults to be coordinated “by the watch, 
and not depend on [artillery] signals.” Commanders were not to sacrifice momentum when 
fearful of lacking support on their flanks. “All must presume that others are doing their best,” he 
instructed, “and do their full share.”644 
 Prior to any of this, skirmish teams along the entire corps front would “during the night, 
advance within 100 yards of the enemy's works,” and use shovels or axes to “prepare pits, or 
fallen trees, so as to give them cover from which to kill artillerists who attempt to load the guns, 
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[and] also to keep down the fire of the enemy's infantry in the rifle-pits during the assault.” 
Experience at Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post had taught “Cump” the vitality of 
establishing fire superiority with skirmishers prior to and during any major assault. It had also 
impressed upon him the importance of pummeling Rebel positions with artillery before any 
attack. Starting at daylight, all the corps's batteries were to open “with great care and precision” 
on the portions of the Rebel works that were to be principally targeted by the assault columns. 
Only 100 rounds of canister and shrapnel “for service after passing the parapet” were to be 
retained as a reserve in battery caissons.645 
 The volunteer detail charged with leading the attack down Graveyard Road, referred to by 
the contemporary military term “forlorn hope,” consisted of two officers and fifty men from each 
of the three brigades of Blair's division placed temporarily under the command of Captain John 
Groce, 30th Ohio. Together, they would carry their guns, axes, boards, and hand-fashioned 
ladders to enable the main body to scale the steep scarp of the redan. Both Grant and Sherman 
visited the detachment personally and promised a sixty-day furlough upon completion of their 
deadly mission.646 
 The rest of the division would follow close on the heels of the “forlorn hope,” directly 
down the Graveyard Road in a tightly-packed column. Ewing's brigade, “by right of rank” and 
having suffered the fewest losses on May 19, would lead the way, followed up closely by Giles 
Smith's and then Kilby Smith's. If all went according to plan, the forward deployed skirmishers 
would keep Rebel heads down while the “forlorn hope” rushed across no man's land to the redan 
and established a secure breach. Ewing's brigade would subsequently mount the parapet and 
 
645 G.O. #38, May 21, 1863, OR, I:24, III, 334-335. 
646 Blair's OR Report, May 24, 1863, OR, I:24, II, 257.; Story of the Fifty-fifth, 245. 
275 
drive a wedge into the Rebel line that could be exploited by the combined weight of the other 
two brigades.647 
 Although this time the corps's assault would fall on the Rebel works simultaneously with 
Grant's other two corps, thus preventing the enemy from sending reinforcements to bolster their 
line to his front, Sherman's own tactical-level plans failed to replicate this logic. The inability of 
half of Ewing's brigade to surmount the obstacles in Mint Spring ravine during the last assault 
had convinced him that the only realistic approach was the narrow Graveyard Road itself. At the 
same time, the moment any attacking column was spotted by any Rebels who were not 
adequately suppressed by the skirmishers deployed in the ravine, it would immediately draw a 
debilitating fire from the front and both uncontested flanks. While Grant's plans ensured that 
Sherman would face no more Secessionists than currently held the works to the immediate front, 
Sherman's plans ensured that nearly all of those in the area would be able to concentrate their fire 
on the head of his single attacking column. 
 At “precisely two o'clock” on May 22, the dauntless volunteers of the “Forlorn Hope” 
debouched from the cover of a berm along the northern slope of Mint Spring ravine and took off 
down Graveyard Road toward the redan. It took the party three minutes to sprint for their lives 
the full distance down the road and into the ditch before the rampart of Stockade Redan. Under a 
heavy Rebel fire for the entire distance, many fell – all posthumously awarded the brand new 
“Medal of Honor.” Others simply lost their nerve. Overcome with fear only 20 yards from the 
base of the redan, one lieutenant of the 127th Illinois dove off the roadway and behind its 
embankment for cover along with ten others. The squad refused to budge for the remainder of the 
fight. A surprising number of the party successfully reached their objective in one piece. Sadly, 
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just after leaping into the trench and starting to catch their breath, two shots rang out from afar, 
and two officers of the 6th Missouri, both survivors of the hell at the Chickasaw sandbar, fell 
severely wounded. One Zouave lodged the detachment colors into the loose dirt of the parapet. 
Looking up the ten-foot high rampart “for a head to shoot at,” and then back toward Federal 
lines, the survivors anxiously awaited support. Fortunately, although the preliminary 
bombardment had failed to erode the slope of the parapet, it had “pretty well pulverized” the 
scarp so as to ease the process of digging with bayonets for cover. From above came frequent 
Rebel cries to “Surrender, Yanks!” which elicited the reply: “Come and get us.”648 
 Ewing chose his own original command, the veteran 30th Ohio, having been in reserve 
during the previous assault, to spearhead his attack. Behind them would follow Lt. Col. Louis 
von Blessignh's German 37th Ohio minus three companies detached to duties elsewhere. In a 
customary display of his considerable personal courage, Blair stood near the head of the column, 
head uncovered, awaiting the moment to assault. Ewing, in shirt sleeves, was at his side, 
anxiously watching the desperate charge of the “Forlorn Hope.” Behind him, the German Lt. 
Col. Hildt stood at the head of his regiment, silently observing the party's sprint to destiny. 
Finally, after what seemed an eternity, Blair ordered the division to attack, Ewing screamed 
“Forward!” and Hildt, through a thick accent, echoed the call, starting the Buckeyes forward at 
the double-quick.649 
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 Immediately upon the column's coming into sight, the Rebels then focused on executing 
the surviving members of the Forlorn Hope shifted their fire to the Ohioan column hurdling 
down Graveyard Road with a cheer. Once again, Blair found himself confronting an attrition-
based defense, attempting to erode his division from 400 yards before it could even approach its 
objective. “To the right of us, to the left of us, and to the front, a perfect sheet of flame issued 
from the enemy's fortifications,” one Buckeye recalled. Confronted by no other proximate 
advancing column – as Grant's original plans had contemplated – the Secessionists manning the 
works for a considerable distance on both flanks were free to concentrate their fire against the 
head of Hildt's lone vulnerable regiment. Veterans of brutal handling at the battle of South 
Mountain the previous year, the Buckeyes had “stood up against a front fire … for forty-five 
minutes,” only to spend the following night crowded around campfires wondering “how could a 
single man escape?” This, though, was different. “It is difficult to describe the horrors of a cross 
and concentrated fire,” one Ohioan wrote. “Forward, forward!” Hildt and Ewing cried through 
the din, and the regiment continued to surge ahead through the storm of lead. The sight of the 
“Stars and Stripes” of the Forlorn Hope through the smoke, waving from the scarp of the parapet, 
was encouraging. The sight to the rear was not. Although the entirety of Ewing's Kanawha 
Brigade had been ordered down the road, Lt. Col. Von Blessingh's German 37th Ohio, formed in 
column behind the 30th, had not followed Hildt's Buckeyes in the charge. In fact, watching the 
Rebel fire seemingly converge from all points of the compass onto the lone embattled regiment, 
the lead German companies stubbornly, and disastrously, refused to budge.650 
 Blair was confounded. Most of the Rebel fire still seemed to be focused on the surviving 
lead elements of the 30th, yet the Germans positively would not advance. Fewer than ten had 
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been killed, and just over thirty would receive wounds over the entire course of the day, yet “the 
men lay down in the road and behind every inequality of ground which afforded them shelter,” 
he later angrily reported. “Every effort” of Blair, Ewing, von Blessingh, the regiment's junior 
officers, and even its sergeant major proved ineffectual to budge them. In any assault, even if the 
majority of a regiment maintained its confidence, the nerves of a few inevitably gave out. At 
Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post, as most brigades had attacked in line of battle, these men 
were those observed dropping from the ranks and taking cover as their comrades continued on. 
This time, as Ewing's column attempted to wedge itself through a tight gap, the psychological 
breakdown of even a handful of Germans at the front of the formation had brought the entire 
division to a sudden halt. While plenty of those in the ranks remained willing to do their duty, 
none were about to step out of line and continue into the open individually when it was clear that 
the rest might not follow suit. Thus, despite the best wishes of its commander, the 37th Ohio 
stubbornly stayed put.651 
 Suddenly finding themselves in a position not at all dissimilar to that confronted by 
Williamson's bloodied 4th Iowa at Chickasaw Bayou, the 30th promptly halted and took cover 
itself on the southern slope of the ravine, still more than 150 yards from the parapet before 
attempting one final surge toward the works. Struggling alone through a narrow defile near the 
salient, the thick Rebel fire from front and both flanks quickly dismantled the unit. Casualties 
literally piled up within the defile, blocking the way for the rest following behind. “The second 
company forced its way over the remains of the first, and a third over those of the preceding,” 
Ewing watched in horror, “but their perseverance served only further to encumber the impassable 
way.” While a small number of the 30th made their way all the way into the ditch at the foot of 
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the scarp, the ranking officer present determined that their numbers were hardly “sufficient to 
warrant my thrusting them over the ramparts, to be either slaughtered or taken prisoners.” Barely 
underway, Blair's attack had already stalled.652 
 Showing far more flexibility than at Chickasaw, while his terrified Germans balked, Blair 
quickly adapted by ordering the rest of Ewing's command, the 47th Ohio and 4th West Virginia, 
to bypass their traumatized comrades, forego the Graveyard Road completely, and continue 
directly into the tortuous ravine. Giles and Kilby Smith's brigades followed closely behind. 
Enraged by the sight of the insubordinate Germans, Colonel Augustus Parry instructed the 
privates of his 47th Ohio to shoot any officer they saw halting to take cover behind a tree or 
stump, then told the officers to do the same with balking privates. While offering far more 
protection than the road, the new route through the ravine quickly proved “almost impassable 
with abatis of felled timber,” and would not “admit of anything like a charge,” Blair later 
reported with frustration. The best he could now hope for was to use the protection of the ravine 
itself to gradually move his division close enough to the parapet to organize a final lunge at the 
redan. The stall of his brigade in the captured trenches at Chickasaw Bayou and the intractable 
tarry of the corps at Arkansas Post had shown how effecting such a lunge after the men had 
found good cover would be exceedingly challenging, but Blair had little choice. Once again, a 
combination of nightmarish terrain and Rebel fire had eradicated Sherman's best laid plans and 
broken up the cohesion and momentum of his corps's assault.653 
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 With the division's cohesion rapidly deteriorating in the chaos, Blair again adapted by 
handing control of the finer details over to his subordinates. Ewing's two remaining regiments 
took up positions along a ridge of higher ground halfway through the ravine and began adding 
their fire to suppress the Rebels behind the redan, still about seventy yards distant. Feverishly 
pouring lead into the enemy position “as fast as we could load and fire,” some Ohioans 
discharged as many as 240 rounds during the attack. One Buckeye's musket became so hot “he 
could hardly hold it in his hands.” Sadly, though well intentioned and at close range, much of this 
fire fell short and into the backs of comrades ensconced in the ditch or sheltering against the 
parapet. On at least one occasion, this prompted a few of those now under fire from both 
directions, to tragically fire back toward the rear in anger.654  
 Making his way to Giles Smith, Blair ordered the veteran brigadier “to go forward as 
rapidly as the nature of the ground would admit, and to assault whenever he found it practicable 
to do so” under the cover of Ewing's fire. Kilby Smith was to follow on his heels, in preparation 
to “support any movement.”655 Struggling through the vine-choked ravine at the head of his 
column, Smith was pleased to find Ransom's brigade of McPherson's neighboring corps, likewise 
mired in the morass of vegetation and telegraph wire enroute to the works. Quickly explaining 
his debacle, Smith and Ransom agreed to work together in their approach to the redan and 
coordinate their combined assaults upon arrival. The two brigades used the terrain to scale the 
cluttered slope of the hill until within striking distance of the Rebel works. As the rounds zipped 
by and cut into the dirt, Smith boldly rose and shouted over the din to the Zouaves. “Boys, they'll 
give us one volley,” he screamed, “before they can reload, we'll be inside their works!” Along 
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with the command to charge – an uncharacteristic assignment for the Zouaves – he added the 
additional directive to “Hurrah like hell!” The men of both brigades obediently cheered wildly 
and rushed from cover up the slope toward the redan with abandon. Immediately visible all along 
the line, the attack prompted a redoubling of fire from Blair's batteries and Ewing's riflemen still 
peppering the crest of the parapet as fast as possible.656 
 Those few of Smith's brigade who were able to reach and mount the parapet quickly 
found themselves engaged from both front, flank, and even rear, as the Rebels holding the salient 
of Stockade Redan, then unchallenged to their front, turned to assist in repelling the assault on 
their flank and rear. The brigade “met so severe a fire from my front and left by both musketry 
and artillery that I found it absolutely necessary to order the brigade to fall back,” Smith later 
reported. Yet again, as at Chickasaw, Arkansas Post, and two days prior, terrain had nullified 
Sherman's numerical advantage, and funneled his brigades into piecemeal assaults that 
confronted an overwhelming volume of Rebel fire from almost every direction. “It was found 
impossible to advance,” Blair somberly admitted.657 
 As the survivors took shelter behind whatever cover they could find and continued to take 
shots of opportunity at hats and heads peeking over the parapet, Grant found Sherman watching 
the disaster from the rear, and the two concurred that their assault had failed yet again. Just then, 
an orderly from McClernand's corps arrived and handed Grant a hastily scrawled message. 
McClernand's assault to the south had been successful, broken through the enemy line, and “the 
flag of the Union waved over the stronghold of Vicksburg.” He urgently requested a renewal of 
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the attack all along the line so as to prevent a Rebel concentration or counterattack against him. 
Both Grant and Sherman were skeptical, but if there was any truth to the amateur general's 
claims at all, it would have been criminal to withhold support. Grant departed to learn what he 
could in person, telling Sherman that “if I did not receive orders to the contrary, by 3 o'clock 
P.M. … try it again.” No follow on orders ever arrived from Grant, but the sounds of continued 
heavy fighting to the south did. Assuming these echoes to be those of McClernand's supposed 
breakthrough, Sherman reluctantly opted to order a renewal of the assault.658 
 Tuttle's Third Division would repeat exactly the same plan which had just gone bloodily 
awry. This time, however, the Graveyard Road column would hopefully benefit from the 
suppressive fire of the first assault's survivors, still dispersed behind cover all along the Mint 
Spring ravine. Alas, just as with that of Blair's skirmishers ahead of the first assault, such fire 
was fated to be mostly ineffectual given the steep slope of the ravine and parapet and the all but 
complete exhaustion of both the men and their ammunition. Ordered out of the road to make way 
for the assaulting column of Mower's brigade, Ewing's surviving Buckeyes were told “they had 
made several charges in different battles, and never been repulsed.” At exactly 3 o'clock, 
Mower's brigade surged forward down the road, with its commander trodding brazenly at the 
head of the column. The brigade advanced “closed up beautifully,” with “no running, [and] no 
excitement.”659 All of the pomp and circumstance of the ostentatious approach, however, to 
include the Bald Eagle, “Old Abe,” perched next to the regimental standard of Mower's lead 
regiment, came to a screeching halt a short distance from the works under the weight of a sudden 
Rebel shock volley. More than one hundred and fifty casualties resulted from the single blast, 
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prompting Sherman to immediately call off the attack. “This is murder,” he exclaimed to a 
staffer, “order those troops back.”660 
 Sherman had always intended for the attack on Stockade Redan to represent the corps's 
main effort. But, in the spirit of Grant's intent, he also ordered Steele's division to launch “a 
strong demonstration” against the 27th Louisiana Lunette to the west in an attempt to prevent the 
Rebel reinforcement of Stockade Redan from that direction. This time, Steele was to employ the 
entirety of his division against the lunette. Thayer's Hawkeyes would again spearhead the attack, 
followed closely by Woods's brigade, with Manter's regiments in reserve. The brigade had 
advanced through the ravine at night, using the darkness to screen its movement, and expected to 
attack at 10 a.m., yet nothing happened. It took the arrival of Steele himself and Woods's brigade 
from the right to commence the attack up the steep southern slope toward the lunette.661  
 The lengthy delay of Steele's “strong demonstration” was principally caused by the 
extraordinarily difficult and deadly challenge of getting Woods's brigade from the far right to a 
jumping off position alongside Thayer's brigade – a problem that Sherman apparently had given 
no consideration to whatsoever. Much of this maneuver necessarily took place across an all but 
bald ridge in full view, and minimal range, of the Rebel works, “through gullies, single file, over 
hills, fallen trees, etc.” The unforgiving terrain and lack of cover made it necessary for each 
regiment to sprint through enemy rifle and artillery fire in single-file lines on multiple occasions, 
“running the blockade,” as many sardonically called it, referencing the army commander's 
already legendary maneuver to bypass the Vicksburg batteries.662 
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 Once the two divisions had finally reached their combined jumping off positions, one 
Hawkeye predicted grave results should they be ordered to advance further. “They can fire at us 
from their fort, from their front and from their right and left,” he worried as he scribbled in his 
diary under fire, “it is folly in my opinion to make this charge.”663 Moreover, with Blair's 
division already repulsed, it was highly questionable what, if anything, such a charge could even 
achieve. Steele could never hope to realistically carry the lunette, at the very top of such an all 
but vertical slope, and indeed his orders never contemplated as much. His orders instructed him 
to launch a diversionary attack in support of another assault elsewhere – an assault which, by the 
time his command was in position to make it, had already failed. Tragically, this did not stop 
him. 
 “We found ourselves on a very steep hillside, slanting, as it seemed to me, at an angle of 
45 degrees,” Sgt. Maj. Reichhelm later observed. “Some distance back of it stood the rebel fort, 
so that we were directly under and in front of it, but sheltered from its fire until we should reach 
the crest.” The brow of the ridge was too narrow to support even an entire regiment in line of 
battle, the brigade would have to charge in column, and even then only in groups of two or three 
companies at a time.664 Half of the 25th Iowa were deployed along the crest of the ridge as 
sharpshooters, charged with suppressing the Rebel works at long range until the rest of the 
brigade column had rushed past. They were then to fall back in with their regiment, adding their 
weight to the assault.665  
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 At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, just as Steele was beginning to scan the foreboding 
terrain to his front from the foot of the hill behind his division, an artillery salvo thundered across 
the Mint Spring ravine. Mistakenly taking this to be the signal for Tuttle's renewed assault on 
Stockade Redan – one that, by that time, had already been launched and repulsed, Steele hurried 
his brigades into position.666 After what seemed like hours of waiting, his shrill voice cried out: 
“Forward! Charge!” Beside him, Thayer echoed the command, screaming “Forward, forward!” 
 The Hawkeye skirmishers attempted to provide some vestige of suppressive fire from 
behind the brow of the northern hill, but found “the rebs behind their rifle pits could seldom be 
touched.” Because of this, as soon as the division's foremost companies crested the southern hill, 
they were butchered mercilessly. “As the men rose to a level with the crest a terrific fire seemed 
to sweep the front rank away as the wheat falls before a mower blade, and the colors went down 
almost instantly,” one mourned. “Whoever poked his head over the hill was a dead man,” another 
observed. “Forward, forward! Follow me, boys!” officers screamed, often moments before being 
cut down alongside their men. “We struggled forward against the weight of dead and wounded 
who fell backward into our ranks, and the ground on the steep incline gave way under our feet,” 
Sgt. Maj. Reichhelm remembered. From the rear, Steele watched as his division was fed 
piecemeal into a veritable gauntlet of death. Finally, those regiments not yet to the crest decided 
that “to mount the crest of the hillside was certain death … and it seemed impossible to pass 
beyond it alive.” Steele's and Thayer's ceaseless cries of “Forward! Forward!” gradually lost their 
effect. “Rank had lost its power,” Reichhelm remembered. “The column refused to move and our 
repulse was accomplished.”667  
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 In fact, a handful of Thayer's brigade had managed to rush through “the terrible hail,” 
steeled by the confidence of the veteran 9th Iowa in its center, a few making it all the way to the 
cover of the Rebel parapet. “Terribly thinned out,” the Hawkeyes anxiously gazed back through 
dense smoke for Woods's supporting regiments, but in vain. Only the Germans of the 12th 
Missouri had rushed ahead “hard on their heels.” “To our disappointment & chagrin none [other] 
came,” Lt. Alonzo Abernathy observed with disgust. Still balking behind the brow of the hill, 
Steele's lieutenants urged, cursed, and shoved men over the crest and into the fire “only to meet 
death.” The remainder of Woods's brigade, still traumatized from their still all too palpable 
repulse at Arkansas Post, simply refused to advance. The brigade's cultural aversion to frontal 
assaults, forged under fire only a few months prior, held it in place. Only the German 12th 
Missouri, having avoided the debacle at “the Post,” moved forward.668 
 With the colors less than ten paces from the crest of the parapet, Thayer's Hawkeyes 
naturally grew concerned over their capture. Given that those huddling against the scarp frankly 
assumed “that we would all be shot dead or taken prisoner,” they took pains to remove the flag 
from the front, and “passed it down from one to the other until it reached below safely.”669 The 
rest awaited their fate until dark, long after Steele had accepted defeat and called off the “strong 
demonstration.” Once the sun was down, the survivors slipped off the slope and through the 
ravine back to their original positions. Thayer's and Woods's brigades had sustained a combined 
345 casualties during the charge – almost double the total number of effectives in several of their 
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regiments. Seventy-two of the division's officers and men were dead on the field, and nothing 
was gained. Yet again, the Fifteenth Corps had been brutally repulsed. 
 Spared the worst of the engagement due to the breakdown of its lead regiment, Ewing's 
brigade lost only about half the men it had during the May 19 assault, reporting a total of 25 dead 
and 116 wounded. Giles and Kilby Smith's brigades also suffered fewer casualties the second 
time around, though combined the two still sacrificed 158 men in the futile assault, 31 of whom 
were killed. Four of Blair's regimental commanders were seriously wounded, and two of Steele's 
killed. Mower's brigade of Tuttle's division also paid a heavy price for their brief contribution. 
Nearly 200 of the command fell. Altogether, Sherman's corps suffered 1,570 total casualties, 
including 283 dead, across the two fruitless charges. Since most regiments in the corps had 
reported fewer than 200 men for duty that bloody week in May, the losses in aggregate 
represented the temporary loss of nearly eight regiments worth of effective manpower, and the 
permanent loss of more than one.670 
 McClernand had not in fact made any breakthrough. The heavy losses suffered by 
McPherson's and Sherman's corps in attempting to support his imaginary success “caused great 
feeling with us, and severe criticisms on General McClernand,” Sherman later remembered. The 
error would eventually lead to Grant's removal of McClernand from corps command after the 
latter published statements blaming the assault's failure on “the fact that McPherson and 
Sherman did not fulfill their parts.”671  
 Precisely what had possessed the men to allow them to so much as even attempt both 
deadly charges was a topic of considerable discussion and not a little astonishment in its 
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aftermath. In many cases blind faith and resignation to one's ultimate fate had carried men 
considerable distances toward the Rebel works. “I have been left constantly to think how entirely 
we are dependent upon God for our preservation,” one Hawkeye reflected. During the assault “it 
seemed as though human thought[,] reason[,] and intelligence was of no avail.” There seemed no 
good reason to consciously govern one's speed in an effort to cross the expanse in greater haste, 
as “by so doing perhaps the fatal bullet would penetrate the body that otherwise might fall 
harmlessly at the feet,” he reasoned. The same mortal consequence might attend a lunge to the 
left or right. “There was but one way to do and that was to go forward,” he concluded, “and trust 
in God.” While a sound strategy for coping with the likely prospect of imminent death, the 
Iowan's statement was simultaneously an admission of his lack of confidence in the likelihood of 
success. The corps had obediently advanced at the order, but few were the men who thought it 
even possible that the Rebel works could be carried.672  
 Indeed, in the aftermath, the widespread consensus in the ranks of both divisions had it 
that the assault could never have succeeded. This was most especially the case among those in 
Blair's division who, on May 19, “had been favored with a very near view of the exterior slope of 
the bastions … knowing these works to be manned by veteran soldiers of similar blood to our 
own.” Watching the whole nightmare unfold from the relative protection of his battery's fortified 
position, one Illinoisan gunner thought it “almost if not entirely impossible to have ever taken 
those Bluffs from the front.”. Others found it hard to even refer to the action as an assault. One 
Hawkeye officer preferred the word “slaughter … for I can call it nothing else.” Another chose 
“destruction, [for] I don't call it a battle.” One of Steele's Missourians thought it “a wonder that 
the whole division was not destroyed on the spot.” Just as in the aftermath of the Chickasaw 
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repulse, the survivors were left regretting “that so many lives were thrown away and so much 
danger incurred when it was not necessary and no good accomplished.” The only bright lining 
seemed to be that the men were now, yet again, “richer in experience.” All now had 
unquestionably gained “satisfactory proof that Vicksburg cannot be taken by storming it,” one 
reasoned.673 
 Those in the ranks were well aware of the grave lack of coordination which had 
hamstrung both assaults from the beginning. In Steele's division, many of Thayer's survivors 
blamed Woods's brigade for failing to provide support to their lodgment under the parapet. Those 
few elements of Woods's brigade which had upheld their part of the plan, the 12th Missouri and 
parts of the 3rd, blamed the others for refusing to go “forward properly.” The rest blamed Steele 
for his failure to coordinate the timing of his assault with that of Blair or even Tuttle. “The 
common soldier does not ascertain who was responsible for this murder,” Private Buegel, 3rd 
Missouri, admitted. Beyond rumors of “jealousy and betrayal,” his comrades sensed “that a 
general attack was supposed to take place on the whole line, but was not carried out.” Thus, as 
usual, “the enemy could throw his troops against this division.” “The troops have only a portion 
of them been engaged at a time,” another Hawkeye complained. Yet another merely noted 
somberly in his diary: “Bad management somewhere. Don't want to see another one.”674 
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 Many found themselves consumed with the same outrage that had dominated campfire 
discussions after Chickasaw Bayou. “Today the most deplorable event in this campaign occurred 
– the vain assault of the enemies [sic] works,” Sgt. Maj. Reichhelm recorded ruefully in his 
diary. “It was Sherman's order and that bloodhound and madman is responsible for a thousand 
more lives vainly and foolishly sacrificed.”675 This, Reichhelm later asserted, was the “sentiment 
of every man with whom I came in contact that day and the day following.” It was certainly the 
sentiment of Lt. Henry Kircher, 12th Missouri. As far as he could tell, a third of his regiment had 
been “murdered, only because Sherman thinks that everything can be forced by the stormers 
without knowing the terrain or testing it out.”676 The notion that these tactics were the best “our 
Generals” could devise seemed impossible to believe. “Why did not the great charger S[herman] 
come and lead it himself,” Kircher wondered. “But no, only orders are given to charge up the hill 
and take the pits,” and his intrepid German comrades were always, and remained, “willing to 
obey orders from our superior officers.” That said, he hoped and prayed that “this be the last fit 
of insanity that our commanders will ever have.”677 
 Liquor, of course, was an oft discussed culprit. Multiple officers were “said to have been 
under the influence of liquor while in the fight and their behavior is the talk of all who talk of it,” 
one Illinoisan overheard. Yet another rumor made the rounds that Grant himself was chiefly 
responsible for the slaughter. “All the generals were supposedly greatly opposed to this last 
storm, but Grant wouldn't let himself be stopped and still gave the order for the entire line to 
charge,” Kircher reported home to his mother. Inevitably, the experience of the bloody repulses 
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were compared in conversation and contemplation to past experiences. “I thought we had to 
work at the 'Post,'” Captain Jacob Ritner, 25th Iowa admitted, “but that was a mere nothing to 
this.” The “terrible hail of bullets” had been like nothing “I nor anybody had ever heard before,” 
Kircher, a veteran of hard fighting at Pea Ridge, observed. One thing was beyond any doubt – 
Sherman's corps had reached a new low in its deterioration of confidence in assaulting Rebels 
behind works. Many officers, in fact, were convinced that the loss of efficacy was now total. “I 
do not think there will be any more charges made,” Ritner predicted. “The men cannot be made 
to do it.”678 
 While opinions vary as to the efficacy and necessity of Grant's second assault on 
Vicksburg, historians have rightfully been uniformly critical of Sherman's handling of his corps's 
operations. In his magisterial three-volume history of the campaign, Ed Bearss attributed 
Sherman's failure on May 22 to his having completely “lost control of his corps.” Contrary to the 
logic of Grant's larger assault plan, “he had launched three separate and disjointed attacks,” 
allowing the Rebels to swiftly reinforce any embattled portion of the works without worrying 
about weakening another still under attack. “It is clear,” Warren Grabau, another historian of the 
battle, observed, “that Sherman did not fully understand the reasoning behind Grant's decision.” 
Overawed by the vexing abatis that had ensnared Ewing's brigade on May 19, and the lack of 
effective artillery support during that attack, he opted to mass all his artillery and attempt a 
second storm “by ramming an assault column right down the road.”679 
 
678 Charles Affeld [1 IL LA B] Diary, May 22, 1863; Kircher [12 MO] to Mother, May 26, 1863, 102.; Ritner [25 IA] 
to Emeline, May 23, 1863, 169-170.; Kircher [12 MO] to Mother, May 26, 1863, 102. 
679 Edwin Cole Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, Vol. III (Dayton: Morningside, 1986), 844; Grabau, Ninety-
Eight Days, 369-370.  
292 
 Even so, although given the benefit of years worth of retrospective reflection, Sherman 
himself always remained of the opinion that the failure of both assaults was due exclusively to 
the unique strength of the Vicksburg defenses. The attacks had failed “by reason of the great 
strength of the position and the determined fighting of its garrison,” he asserted. No mention of 
his failure to coordinate the attacks even of his own corps, let alone Grant's struggles to 
accomplish the same across the army, were ever acknowledged by either officer. Both attacks 
had been necessary, they maintained, because without them the army never could have known if 
such an assault was possible. In fact, Grant later spuriously asserted in his memoirs that the May 
22 assault had been necessary in large part because “the troops believed they could carry the 
works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches [afterward] if they 
had not been allowed to try.”680 
 Benefiting from the vantage point of a more objective observer, members of the press 
who had witnessed the prosecution of both attacks were more honest in their assessment of the 
failure to take Vicksburg by assault. One embedded journalist of the Chicago Tribune thought 
both operations had broken down chiefly because of either “bad management or disobedience of 
orders on the part of those to whom high commands were entrusted, or from the dreadful 
character of the work to be performed, I will not attempt to decide.” One way or another, it was 
undeniable that there had been “a want of co-operation between subordinate and superior officers 
and commands.” Assault columns “went gallantly forward, but were left to perish for want of 
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support.” Individual units charged valiantly, “only to be disappointed in their expectations of 
receiving success and help.”681 
 Another from the New York Times did not even bother narrating the second assault in 
detail. “It is needless to give particulars,” he explained, as “it was in the main like the other, only 
on a larger scale.” In fact, given the recent experience of the army over the course of the winter, 
it seemed decidedly unremarkable, even given the excessive loss of life and limb. “The usual 
character of assaults prevailed,” he observed. “Some gallant heroes went up the hill into the very 
ditches, others failed when half way up, others never started.” These types of things never 
seemed to succeed, he suggested. All along the line the story had been more or less the same: 
“down a broken hill under showers of grape, canister, fragments of shells and musket-balls; up a 
long ascent covered with almost impenetrable abatis, broken into hallows [sic], nearly 
inaccessible to a pedestrian in the most peaceful times,” he wrote. Indeed, it seemed unlikely that 
any force could have surmounted the parapet even had no Rebels been defending it. Assaulting 
works began to seem, in the parlance of the men, utterly “played out.”682 
 Despite their repeated failures to seize the bastion by storm, or perhaps even because of 
them, most of the officers and men in Sherman's corps were confident of the efficacy of the 
inevitable forthcoming siege. “We are sure to take Vicksburgh,” Capt. Farwell wrote confidently. 
“We have them surrounded with an army that cant be whipped in a fair fight and victory is sure 
to come sooner or later.” Now that “our Generals” had finally come to the same conclusion as 
those in the ranks, “all that is necessary is to wait patiently … instead of charging upon works 
that have been built upon the best military knowledge and principles,” and victory was all but 
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inevitable. “This is the only way in which the place can be reduced without immense loss of 
life,” another Hawkeye remarked. “If we cant storm them we can starve them out,” Private 
Henry Bear, 116th Illinois, wounded in the side during the May 19 assault, proclaimed. On the 
far opposite flank, Lt. Col. Seay agreed. “I have no doubt that we will have a long, bloody 
siege,” he prophesied. “Those of us who survive will be able to stand anything.”683 
 The men of the corps were well aware that the only reason a siege was even possible was 
because of the arduous feats of endurance they had performed during the long campaign of 
maneuver from Young's Point to the gates of Vicksburg. They rightfully prided themselves on 
their proven capacity for swift long-distance movement on an exceedingly tight logistical budget, 
just as they had after the risky bayou expeditions of the previous months. By an indirect 
campaign of maneuver, the army had positioned itself there was no need for bloody assaults. 
Those that had been ordered anyway, in their eyes, represented grievous errors of judgment – just 
as they had at Chickasaw and Arkansas Post. The experience dramatically reified the enormous 
confidence the men in Sherman's regiments had developed in their capacity to make even the 
most daunting maneuvers on foot with great speed and agility. Their quick and efficient 
dismantling of Jackson's capacity to allow safe haven for Rebel forces likewise bolstered 
confidence in their ability to thoroughly prosecute “war in earnest.” At the same time, brutal 
repulses during the subsequent dual assaults had likewise solidified their sense of the corps's 
coordinative failings and firmly solidified their aversion to assaults. After witnessing once again   
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the defensive advantages naturally accruing to well-planned and soundly constructed earthworks, 
both the Fifteenth Corps and its commander took to the spade themselves as they underwent their 
most complete evolutionary adaptation yet. 
296 
CHAPTER VI: “ONE OF THE BEST TRAINING SCHOOLS”: THE SIEGES OF 
VICKSBURG AND JACKSON, MAY - JULY 1863 
“It is astonishing how soon we become accustomed to things.” 
 
~ Cpt. Jacob Ritner, 25th Iowa684 
 
 With characteristic understatement, Sherman began his report to Grant on the evening of 
May 22 with an admission that his corps “had a hard day's work, and all are exhausted.” Two 
brigades of Blair's division, Giles Smith's and Ewing's, still remained ensconced along the ridge 
half-way between their jumping off positions and Stockade Redan. These he ordered to dig in 
and fortify their positions, ordering a thousand picks and shovels delivered to assist them in the 
labor. Certainly, it would be possible to cut a mine underneath the Rebel redan, he considered, 
and blow the position sky high. But this would have to wait. “My men are too exhausted to do all 
this to-night,” he confessed.685 
 General orders composed at Sherman's headquarters that evening set the stage for the 
next phase of operations against the “Gibraltar of the Mississippi.” The Fifteenth Corps would 
hold what little ground it had won during the second assault. Smith's and Ewing's commands 
were to “construct in their front a rifle-pit or breast-height of logs, and lay out a covered road to 
their rear.” All batteries were to replenish the ammunition expended in support of the assault.686 
More instructions followed the next day, finally acknowledging the Rebel works as “too strong 
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to be carried by assault,” requiring reduction “by a system of regular approaches.” Just like the 
enemy works themselves, these “approaches,” zig-zagging across the rugged terrain in no man's 
land, would be hand-fashioned by the corps “according to the well-established principles of the 
military art.” On May 25, Grant confirmed Sherman's assessment by ordering the entire army to 
“the work of reducing the enemy by regular approaches,” to begin immediately under the 
supervision of the army's Chief Engineer, Captain Frederick E. Prime.687 
 Lacking more than a handful of officers with professional training in military 
engineering, Grant's siege would represent both the “last traditional Vaubanian siege in the 
history of the Western world,” and a departure from established doctrine in siegecraft. As 
historian Justin Solonick has observed within his masterful treatment of the Vicksburg siege, the 
Army of the Tennessee “embraced conventional engineering maxims and adapted them” based 
upon what they considered Western common sense and the many lessons they had derived from 
the experience of past campaigns. While Solonick and others have comprehensively examined 
the operations of the forty-two day siege in great detail, few have considered how the manner in 
which the army set about its novel assignment were influenced by past experience, as well as 
how the experience and lessons of the siege itself left an indelible mark on the beliefs, habits, 
and indeed culture of the commands that prosecuted it.688  
 The eagerness of those in the ranks to turn toward siegecraft was in large part derived 
from the realization that there would be no more suicidal assaults. Just as historian Steven 
Sodergren has  observed of an Army of the Potomac emerging from its fierce bloodletting during 
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the 1864 Overland Campaign into the comparative safety of the Petersburg trenches, siegecraft 
“was welcomed by those in the ranks for the escape that it offered from the frontal assaults and 
charges” which characterized high-intensity combat. “The boys now seem perfectly willing to 
siege the place,” one Illinoisan artillerist sensed, “being confident that storming will not do it.” 
Hawkeye Private Thomas Coffman captured the logic of the siege succinctly in a brief note home 
to his sweetheart. The army had gone “to work and built forts as well as the rebs and we are 
going to let them come out and fight us when they get hungry enough.” It seemed to all that 
“Gen. Grant deems the game caged and he does not want to sacrifice life” in any more fruitless 
assaults.689 
I. “Shot until my shoulder is beat very sore” 
 In order to “secure a fair share of labor, and to keep the good soldier at his post,” 
Sherman laid out a series of “rules” meant to govern the corps's siege operations. First of all, 
each of the three division commanders would set his pioneer detachments to constructing a 
“good covered road from his base toward some salient of the work in his front,” taking 
advantage of any and all natural cover along the way. In places where such cover was wholly 
unavailing, zigzag approach trenches with a “regular 'sap'” were necessary. “Sap rollers,” 
Captain W. L. B. Jenney, the only staff officer of Sherman's headquarters who enjoyed any 
professional training in military engineering, would rove between divisions providing “general 
supervision of this work” in light of his understanding of Captain Prime's intent, and appointing 
various officers to oversee the most important portions of each brigade's effort. While the lion's 
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share of the labor was to be conducted by fatigue details drawn from each regiment, Sherman 
made clear that “negro labor, when organized” would also be employed to save the sweat of his 
bloodied veterans.690 
 The corps quartermaster department ensured that the supply routes to the landings along 
the Yazoo were kept constantly in the best possible condition. This would prevent any shortage 
of ammunition or provisions, temporary stores of which were maintained in the immediate rear 
of each division, from slowing the progress of the siege, as well as allow for regular transfer of 
casualties and mail to the rear. While Steele would retain the black laborers of First Division's 
pioneer corps, Blair's “negro force” was assigned duty maintaining the crucial supply route back 
to Chickasaw Bayou and the Yazoo. Those relatively few white pioneers serving alongside these 
black men noted, with some racist derision, how “some are very easy to learn, [but] others are 
slow.” While unfortunately no record of how the black pioneers felt about their white 
counterparts survives, the ceaseless and efficient flow of supplies across the nightmarish terrain 
of the old Chickasaw Bayou battlefield throughout the siege is indisputable evidence of the 
indispensable contributions of these ex-slaves to the command.691 
 Engineer Captain W. L. B. Jenney sited and ordered the establishment of covered 
approaches along the fronts of each brigade in Blair's division immediately after the receipt of 
Sherman's orders. From left to right, or west to east, these were Smith's, Ewing's, and Lightburn's 
approaches, along with another cut by Captain Young, commanding Tuttle's pioneers. On the 
right, Captain Herman Klostermann, commanding Steele's pioneers, superintended two 
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additional approaches along Woods's and Thayer's fronts. Only the latter would be pushed to 
fruition. Second Division's white pioneers were responsible for maintaining the roads between 
the works of the corps's nine brigades. The remaining pioneers took charge of the construction of 
siege materials and supervised the erection of fortified battery positions all along the line. 
Gabions and fascines, neither of which most in the ranks were familiar with, were hand-
fashioned from vines, cane, and saplings growing along the crest and rearward slope of the 
Walnut Hills. In at least one case, Sherman himself had to instruct junior officers in the novel art 
of manufacturing such siege materials.692 
 Although many of the “old” regiments of Blair's division had accrued considerable 
experience with constructing modest field fortifications during Halleck's campaign for Corinth, 
the complicated works and “regular approaches” at Vicksburg were “more elaborate than any we 
had yet seen,” one Illinoisan later noted.693 On the far right of the corps line, Thayer's Iowans 
first cut into the Mississippi loess soil on the night of May 30 to begin down the long meandering 
path toward the Rebel works approximately 300 yards distant. Surveying the route, Klostermann 
marked out the pathway for the approach trench so as to reduce the task of the unschooled 
volunteers to mere digging – much as had been done along the De Soto canal. As the approach 
ran by necessity down the steep northern slope of the ravine before climbing the southern 
embankment toward the Rebel works, daily Hawkeye details from Thayer's regiments and the 
division's pioneers found themselves inevitable targets of Rebel sharpshooters. To solve this 
deadly problem, the men fashioned fascines out of cane, and placed them over the six-foot deep 
 
692 Jenney Report, Sept. 22, 1863, OR, I:24, II, 188; Frederick Prime and Cyrus Comstock Report, OR, I:24, II, 171.; 
Story of the Fifty-fifth, 249; Solonick, Engineering Victory, 63-64. 
693 Story of the Fifty-fifth, 248. 
301 
and six-foot wide trench, forming “a roof which hid the movements of our men, and [which], 
where well constructed, [was] impenetrable to musket balls.” Rebel shells would have obliterated 
the cane roof, but the inability to sufficiently depress the guns and the perpetual volume and 
accuracy of covering fire from Steele's riflemen and artillery usually kept the enemy batteries 
silent.694  
 Off to Thayer's left, the approach of Ewing's brigade just north of Graveyard Road was to 
become the corps's primary focus. Still convinced that Stockade Redan, blocking access to 
Graveyard Road's path into the city from the north, remained the primary tactical objective of his 
corps, Sherman focused maximum attention on this approach. The Buckeyes of Ewing's 
regiments had begun cutting what would become the sap the day after the failed assault, two 
days before even receiving Grant's orders to begin the siege. Having established an impromptu 
forward rifle pit only a hundred yards from Stockade Redan as cover for the survivors of the 
attack, Ewing's approach was initially started as a mere shallow “covered road” by which to 
provide ammunition to skirmishers rotating in and out of the advanced position. Once Grant and 
Prime ordered them on May 25 to commence siege work, the men began converting the covered 
road into a proper zig-zag approach. Mechanically-skilled men from the 35th Missouri, erstwhile 
assigned to the pontoon train and not members of the corps, were charged with the technical 
aspects of the work while the regiments of Ewing's brigade provided rotating 50 man daily 
details to move earth. 
 Just south of Graveyard Road, Giles Smith's battered brigade began its own approach 
toward the right flank of the redan, more or less concurrently with that of Ewing's to the north. 
Beginning in the ravine bottom secured during the assault, Smith's Zouaves alongside the 6th 
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Missouri and 116th Illinois cut multiple approach trenches which converged when nearing the 
redan. Smith's approaches measured eight-feet wide, intended to allow for a column four-men 
abreast to debouch from their confines and spring violently onto the redan parapet.695 
 Despite cane fascine roofs and sap rollers, labor on the works and approaches during 
daylight hours quickly proved more dangerous than it was worth all along the line. Instead, most 
brigades alternated between sharpshooting and heavy artillery barrage during the day and 
siegecraft during the night. The necessity of laboring on approaches under the cover of darkness 
forced the men to accustom themselves to working, communicating, and coordinating operations 
at night. This was a novel experience for most regiments. While a handful of Sherman's 
expeditionary force had found themselves digging battery positions in the rain through the night 
following the repulse at Chickasaw Bayou, and Steele's division had made its miserable tramp 
westward in the darkness of night at Arkansas Post, corps operations had usually come to a halt 
following “Taps” and the extinguishing of lights in camp each evening. Work now continued in 
one capacity or another at all hours of the day and night.696 
 On June 9, Sherman ordered a permanent and unbroken “continuous chain of sentinels” 
to be established across the entire corps front, to “act as sharpshooters or pickets” after being 
instructed to allow “no human being [to] pass into or out of Vicksburg, unless on strictly military 
duty, or as prisoners.” Individual sentinels on duty were to connect with those to their left and 
right and remain in close contact with others massed in reserve to the rear. In effect, this 
“continuous chain” was to function as a permanent “cloud of skirmishers” meant to harass the 
Rebel works continually and provide covering fire for those working in or on the approach 
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trenches during the dangerous daylight hours.697 Regiments often divided companies into five 
reliefs, each spending two hours in forward sharpshooting pits cut perpendicularly off the 
approaches during each day, providing all effective manpower in the corps a daily opportunity to 
practice their marksmanship.698 
 Sharpshooting details quickly found they could “see the town from where we are ... but 
the rebel sharpshooters can see us also so we have to keep close [down].”699 Duty in the forward 
pits was exceedingly hot in both senses of the term: air temperature and enemy fire.700 Regiments 
converted empty grain sacks into sandbags, just as they had done to dam the entrances and exits 
of Grant's ill-fated canal, and stacked them along the forward edge of trenches in a manner that 
produced “port holes” out of which to aim and shoot “at the unlucky head that hap[p]ens to 
appear above the other works.” At night, details covered the pits with roofs of rails and brush, 
both to hide the riflemen during the day and protect them from the merciless rays of the summer 
sun.701 Although some regiments erected “head-logs” to protect their shooters, for others, “it had 
not yet occurred to us to use logs on top to protect our heads when firing, as became the custom 
later on.”702 
 Riflemen had to take extra care when scanning for targets and exposing themselves 
behind the portholes, as many of the Secessionists proved crack shots themselves. “The enemy 
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have Squir[r]el rifles' which are very accurate,” one Iowan observed, “[and] they watch these 
'port holes' and when they see the flash from our gun [they] put a bullet general[l]y right 
through.” Very quickly, the men adapted accordingly, and “learned to get down as soon as we 
fire.” Unfortunately, this tactic also reduced their ability to judge the accuracy of their fire. “If 
we stand to see what effect our shot has had we are all most sure to share the fate of one of our 
boys of Co. D,” Private Robert Henry, 26th Iowa observed of a comrade recently shot through 
the head. Another Hawkeye explained to his wife how he and his comrades had to learn how “to 
dodge and where to stand up, and so keep pretty well concealed.”703 At night, officers worked to 
identify “the best and most concealed places” in which to place detachments so as to maximize 
coverage and the potential effectiveness of their fire the next day. Although judging the accuracy 
of sharpshooting fire was difficult for the men in the pits, in retrospect it is clear that the riflemen 
of the corps exacted a fearsome toll on the Rebel regiments to their front. The 27th Louisiana, 
charged with holding the works to the immediate front of Ewing's brigade during the siege, lost 
every field officer it had, either killed or wounded, to the fire of sharpshooters. In fact, on June 
27, Brig. Gen. Martin E. Green became the highest ranking casualty of the corps's “chain of 
sentinels” when he boldly shouted to his men that “a bullet has not been moulded that will kill 
me” just prior to rising up to check the progress of Smith's sap only to be cut down immediately 
by a bullet fired from the 116th Illinois.704  
 At first, Henry and his comrades found themselves “a little timid” on sharpshooting duty, 
exposed to the snap and buzz of incoming Rebel balls overhead in a continual stream throughout 
the day. The young Hawkeye “involuntarily dodged at every Whiz but they were so frequent that 
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it became tiresome and I soon got so I could stand the racket,” he proudly reported. By the time 
his company's daytime rotation was complete, “I was as mindless of them [Rebel bullets] as of 
the hum of flies.”705 Most men assigned to the task armed themselves to the teeth with 
ammunition, in almost giddy anticipation of expending all of it over the course of a day. Private 
John Mains, 6th Missouri, routinely took at least a hundred rounds along with him on duty in the 
pits. Private Arch Brinkerhoff, 4th Iowa, regularly fired until his “shoulder is very much bruised, 
where my gun kicks me,” frequently expending between thirty and sixty-five rounds per day.706 
By mid-June, at the height of the siege, Brinkerhoff estimated that his company fired 
approximately 1,000 cartridges per day when assigned to the forward pits.707 One Buckeye 
estimated that he alone fired “at least one thousand rounds” over the entire course of the siege.708 
While unfortunately reliable numbers are all but non-existent, if Brinkerhoff's estimates are even 
remotely correct, Sherman's corps likely fired tens of thousands of cartridges per day. 
 The rate of this fire was contingent upon each shooter's ability to identify potential 
targets, find the range, and take careful aim. Each day his company made its way forward to 
sharpshoot, Brinkerhoff would set himself to carefully “looking for Rebs.” “Every time I would 
see a rebel [I] would shoot at him,” he dutifully recorded in his diary. The availability of such 
targets was often dependent upon the weather. On intensely hot days, the men rarely spotted 
Rebel heads to shoot at. On cooler days, however, “our game stirs about more and we have some 
pretty fair shots.” The range to targets likewise varied significantly dependent upon how far 
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advanced each brigade's forward pits were at the time of assignment to them – most 
progressively advancing week by week and day by day until shooters were within a hundred 
yards or less of the enemy works. Some riflemen even established their own personal positions 
from which to partake in their routine sharpshooting assignment. Private Charles Willison, 76th 
Ohio, happened upon a particular piece of terrain that allowed him visibility into a highly 
vulnerable portion of the Rebel line at almost a thousand yards distance. “My rifle was sighted 
for one thousand yards and practice enabled me to get accurate range of the spot so I could see 
the dust fly just where I wanted to hit,” Willison explained. The Buckeye became so good at such 
extreme long-range firing that it was at this very spot “I hit the only man I was sure of during the 
war,” watching as the Rebel threw his hands into the air before being evacuated by stretcher.709 
 On the occasion of general artillery bombardments, entire companies blazed away “pretty 
fast to keep the rebels down, so the Battery men can work the cannons,” sometimes even firing 
by volley. On other days, the enemy did his best to contest the corps's fire supremacy. 
“Sometimes the Johnnies shoot pretty close,” Brinkerhoff observed. “We have to take good care 
of our heads.” A few of the 30th Iowa took to holding their hats up on ramrods to draw Rebel fire 
and “see how quickly some Johnnie would fire at them; and they would nearly always hit it if 
above the log.” The Hawkeyes learned, just as their enemy counterparts did, to look carefully for 
targets immediately after the shot, and “if they saw a rebel put his head up above their works to 
see if he had hit some Yank … they would pull on him.” Others less interested in taking such 
risks to get a clear shot merely watched for the darkening of Rebel artillery embrasures – an 
occasion which would inevitably draw “five to ten ready to shoot into it.” One day in late June, a 
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company of the 25th Iowa was amazed to spot “50 naked rebs” within range attempting to reach 
the river to bathe. Immediately, “ten crack shots” opened upon them, “forcing them to leave 
suddenly, leaving their clothes on shore.”710 
 Although individual companies and even whole regiments regularly rotated to and from 
the forward pits, many also selected rearward positions at the crest of the southern lip of the Mint 
Spring ravine where men could practice their marksmanship on the Rebel works at more or less 
personal whim. This surprising liberality in ammunition expenditure represented the 
extraordinarily bountiful supply that Grant's army enjoyed atop the Walnut Hills. It also 
effectively converted the enemy works into a kind of “free-fire zone” where even junior enlisted 
men needed little to no authorization from superiors to engage at will. On days when 
Brinkerhoff's Hawkeye company was not assigned to sharpshooting duty, the young private 
found he enjoyed shooting so much that he frequently climbed the ridge to the embrasures of the 
1st Iowa Battery and shot “till I get tired.” Firing from more than 400 yards distance, it was 
difficult to tell if he “hit any one body,” but he nevertheless continued “until my shoulder is beat 
very sore.” The safety of long-range sharpshooting even allowed for photography, and 
Brinkerhoff and his comrades “got our pictures taken in a group standing skirmishing … Some 
loading some firing in all positions.” Sadly, these images do not survive.711 
 Unlike the dismal swamps of Young's Point or the Yazoo bottoms, the Walnut Hills were 
“high, healthy, and good … in direct and easy communication with our supplies,” offering 
substantial cover for those in the rear from the intermittent fire emanating from the Rebel works. 
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Most regiments established cantonments on the reverse slope of the ridge from which both major 
assaults had been launched. If not assigned to sharpshooting duty, most did their best to stay out 
of the sun and “lie by in the middle of the day as much as we can.”712 Still, the static monotony 
of siege life inevitably eroded discipline and cleanliness, just as it had in the camps at Young's 
Point. Regimental commanders found themselves frequently issuing and re-issuing sharp-toned 
general orders threatening punishment if companies failed to maintain well-policed spartan 
encampments. In the 26th Iowa, many junior enlisted men who failed to painstakingly care for 
their quarters and clothing drew the ire of their commander, Colonel Milo Smith. Inspecting his 
regiment behind the works, Smith was astounded to find several “exceedingly filthy,” a few of 
whom were so infested with lice “that these vermin can be seen 'even at a distance' crawling 
upon their persons at all hours of the day.” Smith warned his junior officers that failure to 
address such a sad state of affairs would soon result in “details … made for the purpose of 
washing such men.” The Hawkeyes of the neighboring 30th Iowa were ordered to concern 
themselves with an altogether different sort of cleanliness. Lt. Col. W. M. G. Torrence, after 
observing how “the Great God” had bestowed upon the regiment “blessings” of “good health and 
cheerfulness” throughout the campaign, did not want to risk alienating His benevolence. 
Accordingly, Torrence ordered “everything which might prove offensive” to God be immediately 
removed from camp.713 
 Sherman required commanders of every company and battery in the corps to conduct 
three daily roll calls, ensuring that familiarity with orderly sergeants would not produce spurious 
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reports that erroneously inflated the army's perception of available manpower. The unusually 
honest reports that reached corps headquarters daily were rarely uplifting.714 Hard work each 
night and stifling heat each day took a heavy toll on the health of the corps.715 Constant details to 
picket duty or fatigue parties left little free time remaining to bathe or wash clothes.716 Watching 
his men bake in their camps to Steele's rear, one Hawkeye noted how “the sun pores its rays of 
heat down upon them,” producing widespread “fever and ague” in the ranks. By the first of July, 
the men present for duty in his regiment, the 25th Iowa, had decreased by more than 23% since 
the opening of the campaign in May. Still a “new” regiment, the 25th suffered considerably 
greater losses to its effective strength during the siege than did the “old” veteran 4th and 9th 
Iowa regiments of Steele's division. On a whole, First Division suffered a decrease of 8% in 
available effective on duty strength between May and July. Blair's Second Division, in no small 
part due to the grievous losses sustained during its two ill-fated charges, suffered far worse, 
losing 21% of its effective strength across the three months of the campaign. Including Tuttle's 
Third Division, Sherman's corps experienced a decrease of more than 14% of its already heavily 
depleted effective manpower during the campaign, leaving it with only 14,644 of the 27,116 men 
borne on its rolls (54%) in the works atop the Walnut Hills with their companies on July 1.717 
 The 410 infantry companies and 9 artillery batteries assigned to Fifteenth Corps 
headquarters averaged about 35 effectives each by July, though many rarely mustered even half 
that number. Company I, 26th Iowa reported 14 privates, 5 corporals, 3 sergeants, and a first 
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lieutenant for duty on July 1. Their brother Hawkeyes in Co. E, 31st Iowa counted only 8 
privates, 3 corporals, 2 sergeants, 1 lieutenant, and their captain for duty on the same day – only 
one less leader than the total number of privates still able for duty. While these represented some 
of the more extreme cases of company-level attrition within the corps, they were by no means 
singular. Very few companies could boast more than 30 aggregate men of all ranks for duty by 
the beginning of July. This shrinkage naturally transformed most companies into increasingly 
tight-knit groups, as the survivors bonded ever more closely over the course of the siege. By the 
summer of 1863, even within the ranks of the newer regiments, those who remained understood 
that “the weak members [had] been left behind or winnowed out” of their companies.718 After the 
combined blood-lettings of Chickasaw Bayou and “the Post,” the protracted nightmare of 
Young's Point, the long slog to invest Vicksburg, and the two desperate assaults, all that was left 
of Sherman's “skeleton regiments” were the lean sinews and connective tissue that constituted 
each unit's true combat power. Indeed, while all the regiments of the corps would continue to 
leach men from their rolls throughout the rest of the war, the rugged and wiry cohorts that filled 
the Walnut Hills works that summer would represent the veteran core of each command for the 
duration. 
 By mid-June, many began to tire of the monotony of siege life. “Just the same old 
programme,” John Gay, 25th Iowa jotted in his diary. “Some firing but not much[,] can't see why 
they dont pitch in and I think twentyfour [sic] hours firing would be more than the reb's can 
stand as it would be a fire from every quarter.”719 Unsubstantiated and erroneous rumors that 
“our army corps is to make another assault upon the rebel works” rustled the feathers of many in 
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Steele's division. Capt. John Bell, 25th Iowa, was aghast at the news. “I hardly believe it,” he 
scribbled in his diary. “It is fool-hardy and useless in my opinion.” While most agreed that 
assaulting the works again would be suicidal, some thought that if the parapet itself could be 
breached by heavy artillery, it might be possible to exploit the gap. “All say the third time is to 
prove the charm,” one Illinoisan in Blair's division asserted, somewhat singularly.720 While still 
confident that such rumors of a forthcoming assault were untrue, Bell's brother officer Capt. 
Jacob Ritner began to worry considerably about the growing rates of sickness sapping his 
company's effective strength. “If we have to lie in these rifle pits another month,” he fretted, “we 
will lose as many men by sickness as we would by a charge.” While the Rebels remained all but 
silent during the day, it was the “continual excitement and strain on the nerves” that Ritner feared 
the most. It would “wear out any set of men” eventually.721 
 On clear evenings, moonlight usually offered ample illumination for digging approaches 
and gun positions and gradually inching the saps ever nearer the Rebel works. “Strong covering 
parties” of skirmishers maneuvered through no man's land in the darkness to provide protection 
and early warning for fatigue details toiling in the trenches.722 While both sides occasionally 
attempted nighttime raids between trenches to capture pickets and gain intelligence, far more 
frequently an informal “common understanding” existed between Federal and Rebel pickets that 
“musket firing ceases at dark,” leaving work details comparatively safe to push forward the saps 
and improve the works.723 The cover of night also frequently brought Rebel deserters into 
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Federal lines, bearing tales of woe from within the beleaguered city that significantly boosted 
morale and confidence in eventual success. “They all told the same tale of being worn out with 
sleeplessness and fatigue,” one Illinoisan of the 55th Illinois recalled, “of hospitals crowded with 
sick and wounded; of women and children slain in the city by fragments of shells.” The 
emaciated Secessionists “bitterly complained that their daily ration of meat was but a mouthful 
of bacon, and half spoiled at that; that beef and flour and even corn meal had long been 
exhausted … [and] that raw pork and musty pea-meal bread formed a monotonous diet.”724 
 Despite the apparent dejection of Vicksburg's inhabitants, Grant grew increasingly 
concerned about a Rebel relief force under General Joseph E. Johnston supposedly coalescing in 
the Federal rear. On June 11, he ordered Sherman to detach Tuttle's Third Division from behind 
the corps lines for duty along the Big Black River to the east. Its departure left the entirety of the 
siege work along the corps's front to Steele's and Blair's divisions alone. Moreover, when Grant 
assigned Sherman to command of all detached divisions forming along the Big Black on June 22, 
in preparation for a potential enemy onslaught, Steele – as the senior division commander – 
assumed temporary command of the corps.725 
 Shortly before Sherman's departure, Capt. William Kossak took charge of the trenches 
and saps of Ewing's approach, then extending to within 20 feet of the Stockade Redan parapet. 
To the right, Colonel Oskar Malmborg, 55th Illinois, superintended a new approach by 
Lightburn's brigade, picking up where Buckland's had abandoned their sap, and aiming at the 
stockade itself. Malmborg, a product of some formal education as a military engineer in Sweden 
prior to immigrating to America, cut an eight-foot wide trench to allow for a column four abreast 
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to assault the works from its head.726 Employing a combination of pioneers, a company of miners 
drawn from a Missouri regiment, and regularly rotating 50-man details from various others, 
Kossak was charged with advancing the approaches close enough to the enemy works to allow 
for a point-blank plunging fire to be poured directly into the Rebel trenches. While constructing 
“trench cavaliers” to achieve this, some of Kossak's pioneers thought they heard sounds of 
tamping, a tell-tale sign that “the enemy was mining to blow up the head of my sap,” Kossak 
reported. Frantically digging counter-ditches in multiple directions, Kossak hoped to strike the 
Rebel mine chamber, but to no avail. Early in the morning of the 26th, explosives in two of these 
enemy mines were detonated, throwing gabions into the air and collapsing several of Kossak's 
counter-ditches. Undeterred, the details continued to shovel Mississippi dirt by both day and 
night, even as Rebels threw shells with lit fuses over the parapet amid the fatigue parties. 
Fortunately, none were killed by these bombs, nor even by the detonation of the Rebel mines. “A 
few men were covered by earth and gabions falling on them from the parapets,” Kossak 
observed, “but they extricated themselves without material injury.” To return the favor, his 
details flung their own grenades over the redan parapet, and the Illinoisan heavy guns “shelled 
the enemy handsomely.”727 
II. “One of the best training schools” 
 By late-June, the saps had reached such a near proximity to the outlying Rebel works that 
many again began to wonder if yet another bloody assault was likely to be ordered. Fatigue 
details working at the saps were “within Ten steps of the rebs if not Closer,” Private John Mains, 
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6th Missouri observed. “They will soon bee [sic] close enough to eat off the same dish.”728 Many 
of the foremost pickets had ceased exchanging fire even during the day.729 Given the short 
distance now necessary to cross under fire, even some of the most recently pessimistic members 
of the corps wondered if such a maneuver might now meet with success. Even still, “it would be 
attended with losses very great and I think Gen Grant desires that the place be taken without 
further loss of life,” Sewall Farwell explained.730 While many found relief in this assumption, 
they were also wrong.731 
 All of the corps's saps were now well within 100 yards of the Rebel works. Ewing's was 
within twenty feet of Stockade Redan and Lightburn's twenty-five. All realizing that further 
forward progress was both unlikely and probably imprudent, on the evening of July 3 Captain 
Prime instructed all to turn to mining operations in preparation to explode mines underneath the 
enemy works prior to a direct assault from the approaches on the morning of July 6.732 “Little 
farther progress could be made by digging alone,” Prime considered. “We could put the heads of 
regiments under cover within from 5 to 100 yards of his line,” thus avoiding what most of 
Grant's headquarters believed to be the primary cause of failure in May. “Long-continued 
exposure” to enemy fire, most felt, had resulted in the army's repulse. Now, with assault columns 
debouching simultaneously from the ten approach trenches no more than 20 feet from the enemy 
parapet, Rebel defenders would struggle to get even a single volley off as the men crested the 
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works and fell directly upon them with the bayonet. Instead of a Rebel shock volley, each 
attacking regiment's crucial “penultimate moment” would come either as stunned (and starved) 
Secessionists fled in terror, or in the throes of hand-to-hand combat.733 Not knowing much of 
anything about mining, Malmborg, Ewing, and Smith were at a loss until Kossak recalled that 
many in Lightburn's 4th West Virginia were “old coal miners.” A detail of 16 Appalachian miners 
were drawn from its ranks and distributed to each brigade's approach to superintend the process, 
but they were never put to work. The very next day, the Rebel garrison of Vicksburg 
surrendered.734 
 Many found the euphoria of victory ineffable. After suffering through every traumatic 
step of the campaign from the Yazoo bottoms to the surrender, Private Burke Wylie, 31st Iowa 
was filled “with feeling almoste [sic] too full for utterance.” Robert Henry could only exclaim, 
“What relief! What pleasure! No pen can ink or painter paint … the thrilling pleasure.”735 Even 
so, much of the ineffability of the moment arose from the sadness of loss that mitigated the 
otherwise unbridled joy. “How I wish that all of Company B was here to enjoy the victory,” 
Captain Ritner lamented, reflecting on the many losses sustained over the campaign within his 
company of the 25th Iowa. “I don't feel much like rejoicing. It takes off a great deal of pleasure 
to me to think what it cost to win.” Pledging never to forget the fallen, he hoped their names 
would be “remembered with honor and pride by a grateful people.”736 Many others likewise 
found “little that was boisterous in the glad acclamation.” Instead of cheers, most merely turned 
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to their filthy comrades to offer “hand shakes of mutual congratulation, [with] moist eyes and 
silent prayers of thankfulness.”737 
 The long awaited fall of the city also revived the army's trust and confidence in Grant's 
generalship. “Every body likes Genl Grant & well they may, for he has done well,” one Hawkeye 
pronounced on the day of the surrender.738 “He has gained a greate [sic] victory here,” another 
wrote home, “and consequently is the greatest General of the time.”739 One of the 55th Illinois 
thought that Grant had “shown himself to be one of the very best planning and maneuvering 
generals that we have in the service.”740 In fact, he was certain that in coordinating the circuitous 
campaign to invest Vicksburg, the army commander had “displayed the best generalship yet 
shown since the beginning of the war,” and hurrahed for “Grant and W. T. Sherman, long may 
they live to lead our armies.” In truth, such celebrations of Sherman were comparatively few and 
far between within the corps. Even so, while the command had by no means yet developed the 
passion and love for “Uncle Billy” that they would later exhibit, by the conclusion of the siege 
little of the disgust and hatred that had accompanied his name in late May still lingered on the 
lips or pens of the men.741 
 Looking back with the benefit of hindsight, it was clear to all who had endured and 
survived the protracted siege that the experience had imparted many lessons and skills which 
would later prove invaluable. Foremost among these was the sheer volume of marksmanship 
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practice the siege provided. “While we lay there fighting our men were given a better 
opportunity for becoming good marksmen than they would have had without such practice,” one 
Iowan later recalled, “and it helped our army ever afterwards.”742 Adjutant Charles Miller, 76th 
Ohio, likewise observed how the companies daily rotating in and out of the sharpshooting pits 
eventually “became almost perfect in [finding] their range.”743 Overall, he thought the siege 
“presented one of the best training schools for engineering and gunnery known to modern 
times.”744 
 The riflemen taking their turn in the foremost sharpshooting pits were not the only 
members of the corps provided unprecedented opportunities for marksmanship practice during 
the siege. Each gun crew in every one of Sherman's batteries likewise capitalized on the 
opportunity to hone their skills on live captive Rebel targets and “became almost perfect in range 
and center shots,” Adjutant Miller observed.745 In fact, according to most accounts and historical 
analyses, the accuracy and precision of Federal artillery fire far exceeded that of the 
“sharpshooting” riflemen of Grant's army.746 Sending individual shells from the corps's Parrott 
and James rifles sailing directly through narrow embrasures to silence Rebel guns from a 
distance of often more than 700 yards was no small feat, but after weeks of opportunities for trial 
and error, the volunteer artillerymen had mastered their craft and learned much about their 
weapons in the process. While howitzer crews were usually incapable of matching the accuracy 
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of the rifled guns, they found a separate niche in battering down earthen Rebel parapets and 
habitually setting fire to cotton bales used to bolster the enemy works. Once the approaches had 
been advanced adequately to maneuver howitzer crews to within 300 yards of the enemy works, 
they too began to take aim at the embrasures.747 Over the course of the siege, the 4th Ohio 
Independent Battery of Steele's division fired a total of 1,865 rounds from its two 12 lb. 
Howitzers and four James rifles while supporting the advance of Thayer's approach.748 Artillery 
practice was far more plentiful along Blair's front, where the gunners of Battery A, 1st Illinois 
Light Artillery expended an astounding 9,690 rounds from their two Parrott rifles and five 12 lb. 
Napoleons over the course of the siege.749  
 The amount of firing a given battery might accomplish each day often had to be gauged 
by the volume of incoming rifle fire that filled the air, and thus the opportunity for such 
extensive artillery practice was almost entirely contingent upon the ability of the corps's 
sharpshooters in the trenches to suppress their Rebel counterparts. Crews learned the hard way to 
stay low to the earth while sponging their barrels and loading the guns. As Charles Affeld was 
sponging the bore of his crew's piece while supporting the May 22 assault, a fellow crew 
member was shot through the heart and killed instantly while thumbing the vent and “standing 
erect.” Had he “been more careful he would probably [have] been living yet,” Affeld observed.750 
Another member of Battery A was killed well behind his gun's embrasure while washing his 
hands during the siege. “Getting some soap in his eyes, he called for a towel and holding out his 
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hands, he raised himself a little too high and a rebel bullet went through his heart,” a comrade 
lamented.751 
 Occasionally, riflemen waiting their turn in the saps or the forward pits were detailed to 
man the heavier guns so as to give their crews a rest. In doing so, they “became expert 
artillerists,” Adjutant Charles Miller, 76th Ohio noted, and “after getting their range, planted 
some remarkable shots into the works.” Those fortunate enough to earn a chance to work the 
guns found the detail “a great deal better than … [the] infantry.” One Hawkeye earnestly hoped 
“to try and stay in the artillery till the war is over and I dont think that will be very long if 
General Grant keeps on as he has.”752 Although infantry details were routinely assigned to 
establish or improve the gun emplacements of each battery, many artillerists found their work 
insufficient, unimpressive, or worse. When Battery B, 1st Illinois Light Artillery was moved at 
night to a new position dug by infantry details in preparation to support the May 22 assault, 
gunner Charles Affeld and his team were aghast at what they found. “The infantry had done a 
poor job, either on account of poor management or not enough tools,” he griped. In an attempt to 
manhandle their piece into the shoddy earthwork before the sun arose along with the Rebel 
sharpshooters, they found there was barely enough room for the gun alone, let alone its crew. 
After feverishly scraping away at the dirt “so the gun would at least stand straight,” they 
hurriedly “cut brush to screen us from observation … so as to be protected from 
sharpshooters.”753 
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 While all in the corps maintained a subjective sense of fire superiority throughout the 
siege, the true extent to which the command had succeeded in winning and defending its fire 
supremacy was not apparent until the Rebel surrender. After the capitulation of the city, Grant's 
chief engineer, Captain Prime, was astounded at the discovery of more than 40,000 rounds of yet 
unused Rebel artillery ammunition. “If at almost any point they had put ten or fifteen guns in 
position, instead of one or two to invite concentration of our fire, they might have seriously 
delayed our approaches,” he observed. During the course of the siege, he and others had 
remained of the apparently erroneous opinion that the comparative silence of the Rebel guns had 
been due “to the lack of ammunition.” Even a “small portion of this [ammunition], judiciously 
used, would have rendered our app[roach much slower,” he thought.754 Those who had enjoyed 
an opportunity to grasp the tactical realities of the daily situation from the forward rifle pits well 
understood why the enemy's guns had been so comparatively silent. “We have so many batteries 
that can be brought to bear on one point that they dare not fire,” one observed.755 More 
accurately, the tactical symbiosis of suppressive sharpshooting fire from the forward pits and 
surgical precision fire from the corps's batteries marked a major advance in the command's 
tactical capabilities on the battlefield – one that the corps would apply with deadly effectiveness 
on future fields.  
 The experience of near ceaseless shell and rifle fire had inured those in the trenches to the 
sounds and sensations of battle. “It is surprising how soon one will become indifferent to the roar 
of artillery and the whistling of bullets,” one Hawkeye noted.756 “There is not five minutes at a 
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time here but you can hear a cannon,” Private Joseph Orr, 76th Ohio wrote his father. “I have got 
so use[d] to them that they don't sound louder than a rifle shot to me.” By June, not even the 
constant firing of the heavy Illinoisan Parrotts at all hours of the day and night could keep Orr 
awake. Another Hawkeye was awed at the “continual roar of cannons and muskets all the time.” 
One Iowan thought the perpetual daily “crack, crack, & pop, pop” from the foremost rifle pits 
began to sound little more threatening than popping corn.757 The ability to think clearly while 
under fire was a vital capability for all in the ranks of the corps, and the experience of the siege 
provided plentiful opportunities to hone their confidence and focus under exceedingly dangerous 
conditions. Even as Rebel balls and shells whizzed over their encampment during breakfast, one 
noted of his comrades that “all got so we do not notice it.”758 
 The success of the siege had, to a truly unique extent, been the product of the adaptive 
“native good sense and ingenuity” of the men. “Whether a battery was to be constructed by men 
who had never built one before, a sap-roller made by those who had never heard the name, or a 
ship's gun-carriage to be built, it was done,” Prime observed in his report, “and, after a few trials, 
was well done.” It astounded him how quickly the veteran regiments of citizen-volunteers had 
accustomed themselves to the novel labor despite having received no specialized training. 
“Officers and men had to learn to be engineers while the siege was going on,” he wrote.759 This 
proved no problem at all for Sherman's corps. “It is astonishing how soon we become 
accustomed to things,” Captain Ritner reflected.760  
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III. “A miniature Vicksburg” 
 The Fifteenth Corps was not to immediately enjoy the fruits of its momentous victory. 
The evening after the city fell orders from Sherman reached both Steele and Blair instructing 
them to prepare to move at short notice.761 By five o'clock the next morning, the corps was 
already out of its works, in column, and headed east toward the Big Black River with orders to 
join Sherman's Expeditionary Force and pursue Joseph Johnston's ragged Rebel band all the way 
to Jackson if necessary.762 On July 6, both divisions crossed the river at Messenger's Ford and 
continued eastward through the oppressive heat and dust. Armed with their recent experience of 
success in siege craft, most expected to employ much the same tactics against Johnston. “The 
intention is to surround his Army and 'bag' them all as was done in Vicksburg,” Robert Henry 
wrote.763 
 Despite a “terrific thunder storm” on the evening of July 7, the insufferable heat and dust 
of the road east made the remainder of the journey trying in the extreme. “The dust rose in 
suffocating clouds about the sweltering columns,” one Illinoisan recalled, “and the men suffered 
wo[e]fully.” Very quickly the “men and horses were of the same color as the ground.” Many fell 
dangerously ill with heat exhaustion and sunstroke, “and others were constantly seen dropping 
out of the ranks and lagging behind from exhaustion.” Potable water proved all but non-existent 
as groups of parched volunteers wandered listlessly away from the column in desperate attempts 
to parch their thirst. “We were obliged to use w[h]at water to drink that in peaceable time would 
not make good answer for washwater for your feet,” one Hawkeye admitted, and even that “was 
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very scarce.” Most that could be found nearby was “covered with a green scum and warm.” In 
other places, Johnston's retreating army had intentionally poisoned springs and wells with the 
carcasses of livestock so as to prevent their use by Sherman's onrushing force. On frequent 
occasions details were forced to haul water to camp from miles away just to boil for cooking. 
Those who managed to find it often sold full canteens for as much as fifty cents apiece, with 
great success. After the minimal rations brought along from Vicksburg were expended, most 
regiments sustained themselves exclusively on blackberries and green corn, stripping whole 
acres near encampments. Corn still in its husk was laid atop rails over a fire, and once “the husks 
were burned off the corn would be cooked by the steam and be in a delicious state to be 
eaten.”764 
 By the ninth, the foremost elements of Steele's column were within sight of Jackson's 
outskirts. The next day, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, a Rebel battery caught sight of the 
advanced guard and sent a fusillade as a warning.765 Remarkably level by comparison with the 
nightmarish terrain of the Walnut Hills, the ground sweeping ahead of Steele to the impressive 
Rebel works had been mostly clear-cut by enemy pioneers in an effort to establish a clear field of 
fire. Most of Sherman's force, including Tuttle's division, was already in place and investing the 
city by the time of Steele's and Blair's arrival. Shuffling the two newly arrived commands into 
the center of his lines of investiture, it was quickly obvious to all that “Sherman had evidently no 
intention of ordering any hasty or unnecessary assaults,” which came as a great relief to the 
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entire corps.766 Indeed, it relieved all observers who took one quick look at the impressive Rebel 
works. “The batteries and long lines of rifle-pits could have enfiladed and swept the wide, open 
space in front with a murderous fire,” an embedded journalist with the New York Times observed. 
“It is well that an assault was not ordered.”767 
 Although frequently brushed over by historians of the Vicksburg campaign, the 
subsequent siege of Jackson, while brief, provided powerful evidence of a profound evolutionary 
shift in Sherman's tactical philosophy. While Johnston, with every good reason, seems to have 
assumed that his opponent would squander his numerical advantage once again by hurling it 
against the well-prepared Rebel works ringing the city, for perhaps the first time in his brief 
tactical career, Sherman thought twice. This time, as he later explained to Admiral Porter, “the 
forts and lines were too respectable to venture the assault,” and instead, he opted to employ what 
he termed – in language that made clear how the strategy was a direct product of learning from 
experience – “a miniature Vicksburg.” In fact, he not only “made no assault – indeed – I never 
meditated one,” but instead progressively enveloped the city by maneuver while the men 
engaged chiefly in sharpshooting from rifle pits, or what he somewhat quaintly called “picket 
work.”768 
 Just as at Vicksburg, many regiments almost automatically set to digging in “to protect 
ourselves.”769 Once again, most work on the fortifications took place “in the shades of night,” 
whereas skirmishers and batteries dueled with their Rebel counterparts at considerable range 
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during the day.770 The gunners of Battery A, 1st Illinois Light Artillery immediately put to work 
the hard won experience of preparing gun positions at Vicksburg, and quickly established “the 
safest works we ever occupied.” “Sinking our guns into a pit,” the crews threw the dirt ahead of 
the breastwork while others fashioned an embrasure of cotton bales. With such defilade, enemy 
fire “invariably shot over us.” Moreover, the distance to the Jackson works being much greater 
than that at Vicksburg, the battery was able to post a spotter well ahead of the guns while still 
within audible shouting distance. Whenever smoke billowed out of one of the Rebel embrasures, 
before the sound of the shot could even reach the position, the spotter would scream “Down!” 
and Illinoisan crews instinctively hit the ground until the shot struck or passed. After several 
close calls, the men responded in the same fashion even if in the middle of loading their guns. 
Fortunately, such dangerous encounters were relatively rare given that the teams had mastered 
their aim so well at Vicksburg that enemy crews were almost always silenced by the long-range 
rifled guns long before they could do much damage.771 Other batteries were assigned far less 
precise targets. The four James Rifle crews of the 4th Ohio Independent Battery found 
themselves ordered to “throw all the projectiles in the direction of the State House, so that the[y] 
may be destructive in the town.” Initially conservative in their ammunition expenditure prior to 
re-supply from Vicksburg, the battery eventually increased its rate of fire until July 14, when it 
was “ordered to fire one shot every five minutes day or night in the direction of the State House 
or … into the enemy Rifle Pits” at a distance of about 850 yards. At no point were the battery's 
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howitzers engaged, both the town and enemy being beyond the effective range of the smoothbore 
guns. 772 
 Once again, nearly all the powder the corps's infantry expended during the siege was 
burnt by sharpshooting details. Because the volume of fire called for was significantly lower than 
at Vicksburg, and because targets were generally at much greater range, frequently such details 
were more impromptu affairs conducted by a handful of “picked marksmen.” Just such a squad 
was thrown together by the First Sergeant of Company A, 55th Illinois on July 11 in the interest 
of silencing a frequent harassing fire from nearby Rebel skirmishers. Selecting six men to join 
him, the team maneuvered into a dry creek bed and “crept on within shorter range of the rebel 
lines” to positions behind cover. Employing a single Colt Revolving Rifle – the only one of its 
kind in the regiment – the First Sergeant “cleaned out a whole picket post,” cutting down several 
unsuspecting Rebels and scattering the remainder.773 Such small unit actions, though they usually 
went unrecorded, illustrated many of the particular strengths of the corps's tactical culture: high 
degrees of initiative by non-commissioned officers, the capacity to operate in impromptu groups, 
considerable marksmanship experience, and small unit maneuver through difficult terrain.  
 After a last-ditch effort to raid Sherman's supply lines with Rebel cavalry, Johnston came 
to the same conclusion Pemberton had in Vicksburg. There was no escaping the grip of such a 
leviathan, and now veteran, Federal force. Accordingly, on July 16, he opted to evacuate Jackson 
and escape northward with his “Army of Relief” in hopes of employing it more fruitfully 
elsewhere within the embattled Confederacy. Vicksburg and Jackson, and with them the 
Mississippi River, following the near contemporaneous fall of Port Hudson to the south, were 
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now firmly in Federal hands. Well aware that his army was utterly exhausted, Sherman prudently 
not to pursue the fleeing Secessionists, instead ordering his victorious legions back into Jackson 
for a second time that summer.774 
 Unlike during the corps's brief visit to the capital in May, when it bore orders from Grant 
concerning the specific extent and character of destruction he wished meted out on the city, this 
time the army commander simply instructed Sherman's command to “do the enemy all the harm 
possible” and “inflict on the enemy all the punishment you can.” In fact, he added that he had 
“no suggestions or orders to give” and that Cump was to deal with Johnston “in your own 
way.”775 On July 13, just before the fall of the city, he sent follow-on orders for Sherman to 
“destroy … everything valuable for carrying on war” he found in the city. This lack of specificity 
in orders for targeted destruction has been identified by historian Mark Grimsley as altogether 
“something new” in the war and “unmistakably different” from prior Federal policies even of 
“war in earnest.” In the wake of Vicksburg's capitulation and Johnston's flight, the strategic 
dynamic of the campaign changed dramatically. Grant was no longer in fear of a Rebel relief 
army falling upon the rear of his siege lines, and thus there was “little need for such destruction 
[of Jackson] if the objective were the 'pragmatic' one of preventing an enemy force from 
operating … in the area,” as it had been along Deer Creek, Grimsley notes. Instead, the corps's 
second visit to the Mississippi capital was intended to “destroy the region's economic value to 
the Confederacy,” plain and simple.776 
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 The corps most certainly went about its mission in its “own way,” perhaps to an extent 
well beyond what Grant had originally contemplated. The lack of clear boundaries delimiting 
Grant's definition of what constituted “everything valuable for carrying on war,” Sherman's 
habitual incapacity to control the destructive tendencies of libertine volunteers, and the lessons 
derived by the rank and file of the Fifteenth Corps's recent experiences of “hard war” in the Deer 
Creek valley all combined to produce the swift, complete, and unequivocal erasure of Jackson, 
Mississippi as a strategic point on any military map. In truth, however, much of Jackson was 
already either in flames or ashes by the time Sherman's force entered the environs. Fires started 
by Johnston's retreating army in an attempt to keep valuable stores out of Sherman's hands 
quickly spread to adjacent blocks of homes and shops and proved resistant to efforts to put them 
out. As usual, the corps's brigades fragmented into smaller fatigue details and went to work 
dismantling the capital with a vengeance. What railroads had been crudely repaired during the 
Federal absence were once again demolished for a distance of ten miles in every direction. All 
rolling stock discovered in the city was fired, and along with 4,000 cotton bales utilized in the 
Rebel earthworks, the sky over Jackson turned black with smoke.777 While junior officers and 
non-coms attempted to corral their work details and prevent straggling, some excesses were all 
but inevitable. “Our men in spite of guards have widened the Circle of fire” begun by the 
evacuating Rebels, Cump lamented.778 As working parties continued their punitive work in the 
capital, Sherman dispatched Steele with three brigades of the corps eastward 13 miles to 
Brandon, Mississippi, where he was to continue the destruction of the railroad in that direction. 
When combined with the prior efforts of Woods's detached brigade at Canton, by July 18, the 
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Fifteenth Corps had effectively “ruined the main arteries of travel and communication in the 
heart of Mississippi,” and thus its work was done.779 Looking on as “the skies are illuminated by 
a fire in the northern portion of the city,” one journalist had trouble feeling much sympathy for 
the Rebel city. “Nothing is safe or respected here, but everything destructible seems doomed to 
destruction,” he wrote. “Such is war.”780 
 “The place is ruined,” Sherman reported bluntly. His command had “desolated this land 
for 30 miles round about.”781 Far more impressive to him, however, was the apparent reaction of 
its dejected inhabitants as the Fifteenth Corps quartermaster began distributing rations to the 
destitute citizens of the city in an effort to “relieve the immediate wants of suffering 
humanity.”782 “The people are subdued,” he wrote, “and ask for reconstruction.” All across the 
city he encountered Mississippians admitting “the loss of the Southern cause.” While, as usual, 
abhorring the fiery excesses of “stragglers” in his ranks, Cump simply could not ignore the clear 
psychological, and thus strategic, impact their heavy-handed tactics appeared to have on 
erstwhile rebellious Southerners.783 
 Finally granted a well-deserved respite, Sherman's expeditionary force departed Jackson 
enroute westward to the banks of the Big Black River in late July to establish long-term 
cantonments. Once occupied, “Camp Sherman” would allow the corps to catch its breath, re-
organize its shrunken battalions, allow for those most deserving to depart home on leave, and 
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begin the long process of preparing for the next campaign. When Grant suggested deploying 
Sherman's corps south to Natchez to conduct a similar operation to that which the command had 
just conducted at Jackson, Cump showed a keen awareness of the habitual tendencies of his 
command, as well as his inability to control them. “As he left it to my option I preferred to stay 
here for good reasons,” he explained in a letter home. Unlike the agriculturally rich hinterlands 
of Natchez to the south, “This land is stripped of niggers, and Every thing” by virtue of the 
recent campaign. Indeed, all the area between Vicksburg and Jackson had been effectively 
“cleared out and all the mischief done.” “Were we to go to Natchez it would be one endless strife 
about run away Negros, plundering and pillaging soldiers and I am sick and tired of it,” he 
asserted. The still quite conservative Cump had “had my share of this trouble and am willing 
others should try it.” In truth, while he would always remain ashamed that so many in the ranks 
of his corps had become “Expert thieves, sparing nothing not even the clothes of women, 
children & Negros,” he began to understand how the sheer destructive capacity of the volunteers, 
even when bridled to the minimal extent he and his lieutenants could achieve, could itself prove 
a powerful strategic weapon.784 In fact, if the experience of the long campaign for Vicksburg had 
been any indication, such a weapon might even have a greater potential to put down the rebellion 
than did direct confrontation with Rebel armies on the battlefield. Commanding a corps which 
had yet to find success in the attack, but which had frequently shown a profound capacity for 
swift long-range maneuver and frighteningly efficient destruction of enemy assets, Sherman's 
“slow evolution,” as B. H. Liddell Hart called it, only slightly trailed that of his corps's tactical 
culture.785 
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 The long Vicksburg and Jackson campaigns nearly disintegrated many companies in 
Sherman's corps. Captain Sewall Farwell found only 19 men in his company of the 31st Iowa 
well enough for the march to Jackson after the surrender, and he left the remainder in the 
trenches before Vicksburg. After the tough march to the state capital and the pursuit of Johnston 
to Canton, the company could muster only five men, including Farwell himself, for daily duty. 
By late July, it was a company only in name. Another Hawkeye company “had no one able to 
march, except a Sergeant and Corporal — no privates,” Farwell remarked.786 The experience had 
likewise disintegrated the clothing of most in the corps. Private Charles Willison, 76th Ohio, 
“was down to hardpan in the way of clothing.” By the time Vicksburg capitulated the one shirt he 
had left “was gone all but the front and one sleeve,” and before the regiment went into camp 
after the fall of Jackson, he had no shirt at all, and “my pants were in an indescribable condition, 
my blouse all rags, and my only fairly respectable covering a forage cap.” The uniforms of 
several were in such poor condition that they had even taken to donning captured Rebel 
uniforms, likely seized at Jackson. Understandably alarmed at this practice, regimental 
commanders promptly condemned it by general orders after their arrival at “Camp Sherman.”787 
 Once the corps's new camps were comfortably established, Sherman charged Hugh 
Ewing with compiling brief historical reports from each regiment in the corps with an eye toward 
awarding authorizations for the adornment of each unit's national colors with the names of 
battles in which it had honorably taken part. Not all requests were authorized. The 37th Ohio was 
disallowed the honor of bearing “May 22 Assault” on its banner due to its ignoble refusal to 
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advance that day. Regardless of the honors bestowed or withheld, the duty required the staff of 
each regiment and battery in the corps to reflect upon their experiences in service, and forge a 
coherent narrative that emphasized the most salient episodes in the brief military careers of their 
units. For the most part, reports consisted of little more than a brief paragraph highlighting each 
major battle in which the unit had taken part. Details were limited to when the unit arrived on the 
field, the most basic elements of what had been expected of it, its most signal tactical successes, 
and the casualties it sustained. The embattled 76th Ohio's trials at Arkansas Post were reduced to 
a single sentence: “Charged Rebel works on the Right to within 75 yards silencing 2 Parrott 
Guns and musketry fire untill [sic] the surrender.” Its entire participation in the long and bloody 
Vicksburg campaign was likewise summarized: “Were under fire and in the front and sharp 
shooting with the enemy during the entire Siege.” Because neither the Steele's Bayou nor 
Greenville expeditions, to say nothing of the ill-fated canal project, had constituted major battles, 
regimental reports ignored these experiences completely despite their being among the most 
salient influences on the development of an emerging corps-level tactical culture.788 
 The Fifteenth Corps and its commander emerged from the lengthy struggles for 
Vicksburg and Jackson molded by experience in specific and indelible ways. The beliefs, 
assumptions, predispositions, and habits of thought and behavior concerning operations that 
predominated throughout the command and guided its tactical behavior, performance, and 
decision-making were all direct byproducts of the particular experiences through which it had 
passed over the previous eight months since its founding. As would always be the case, each 
individual regiment and battery within the command had developed its own distinctive unit-level 
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tactical “micro-culture” due to the limitations of its “personal angle of vision” and lessons 
learned from its unique experiences across each campaign. Even so, the many cultural 
differences between the regiments of the corps, which had been so striking upon the formation of 
Sherman's expeditionary flotilla, were ever increasingly subtle. The component units of the corps 
were becoming ever more culturally like each other and less like those of the other corps across 
the U.S. Army. As the corps's units accrued ever more experience alongside one another, 
enduring the same campaigns in pursuit of the same corps-level objectives, their members 
naturally arrived at similar conclusions as to the key lessons of their experiences, developed 
consistent levels of confidence in their relative capacity to successfully achieve certain missions, 
and gained varying levels of skill in conducting certain tasks due to disproportionate 
opportunities for practice. In this fashion, a coherent and easily discernible corps-level tactical 
culture finally took shape. 
 Perhaps the single most signature element of this tactical culture was the corps's deeply 
ingrained aversion, widespread lack of confidence, and proven incapacity to charge Rebel 
breastworks. Crucially, this aversion to assaulting works did not extend to a lack of confidence in 
all attacks. Many within the ranks yearned for what they called a “fair fight” against Rebels in 
the open – a fight they both were certain they could win and, at the same time, had almost never 
experienced. Instead, the men had developed a greatly inflated respect for the defensive 
advantages accruing to infantry fighting from behind works, and thus for earthworks and field 
fortifications themselves. It was in large part this profound respect for entrenchments, borne of 
the corps's recent painful experiences charging them, that inspired Sherman's corps to dig so 
ardently over the course of the campaign and fight so brazenly from the protection of works. 
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 While Blair's division, still bearing the influence of Morgan Smith, remained far and 
away the most effective light infantry force in the corps, the ongoing sharpshooter's war that 
unfolded across the siege gradually converted even Steele's division into expert skirmishers. The 
extensive marksmanship practice that Sherman's regiments had enjoyed set them, and the rest of 
Grant's army, apart from all other field armies who's regiments rarely fired their weapons outside 
of major engagements. Moreover, the considerable experience the corps accrued when 
components operated as fragmented details and detachments that were led by junior leaders and 
charged with a variety of tasks and missions transformed the corps, making it extraordinarily 
flexible in approaching novel tactical challenges both on and off the battlefield. From digging 
earthworks in the dark, coordinating the fire of sharpshooters and artillery against Rebel 
embrasures, swiftly tearing up railroad tracks, or hunting water and sustenance to sustain the 
punishing daily march, almost everything that the corps did at the tactical level it conducted in 
small groups guided by junior leaders. This competence, confidence, and experience in 
independent and detached small-unit operations represented a defining element of the corps's 
tactical culture that would prove absolutely vital in future campaigns. 
 Finally, though often much to its commander's chagrin, the corps continued to show an 
especial skill in the efficient, widespread, and even occasionally excessive destruction of Rebel 
property. When such violence to Secessionist military articles was ordered and critical to 
operational success, the corps had proven itself to be among the most effective and swift 
commands in the U.S. Army for destroying valuable enemy resources and infrastructure. Due to 
Grant's habitual reliance on Sherman to conduct his “dirty work” distant from the remainder of 
the army, the corps developed a cultural affinity for raiding operations due in large part to its past 
experiences of success. As in the Deer Creek valley, the reactions of Mississippians, whom the 
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men all but uniformly presumed to be the rankest Secessionists, to the torching of their property 
signaled a special kind of victory to those in the ranks. If the Rebels chose to hide in their 
impenetrable rifle pits, then the enlisted men and an increasing number of their officers 
determined that they would instead effectively “smoke them out” by dismantling the rest of the 
so-called “Southern Confederacy” that was left unguarded. 
 Despite what several historians have claimed, neither Sherman nor Grant were wholly 
responsible for imparting this panoply of cultural elements. Neither officer had molded the 
command by hand, nor imparted their unique personalities to the subordinate units serving under 
their headquarters. In fact, in many ways the exact opposite had occurred, and continued to do 
so. The real process of first genesis and then evolution of the corps's tactical culture was one of 
constant interaction between the command, its commanders, and the experiences through which 
they passed together. 
 Grant's exerted his primary influence on the evolution of the Fifteenth Corps through his 
assignment of particular missions and objectives to it as a subordinate component of his army. 
Thinking of Sherman as an avatar of the corps (rather than the specific component units it 
contained) when contemplating these assignments, Grant rarely showed evidence of any special 
contemplation of the organization's proven tendencies, strengths, weaknesses, or even recent 
history when determining which tasks to assign to it. Instead, he almost instinctively reached for 
Sherman to conduct those operations furthest away from his immediate supervision, feeling a 
constant need to shepherd the other two inexperienced corps commanders through the trials of 
the campaign. 
 The manner in which Sherman chose to prosecute the missions that Grant handed down 
to his corps was always a byproduct of an ongoing feedback loop of experiential learning. 
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Sherman's unique personality and tactical philosophy mixed with empirical evidence of what his 
still young command either could or was not likely to accomplish. As the disasters of Chickasaw 
Bayou and Arkansas Post had suggested, and the bloody repulses before Stockade Redan and the 
Louisiana Lunette only dramatically reified, he still commanded “no troops which can be made 
to assault.” Although he and his senior lieutenants still disagreed with most of the rank and file as 
to why the corps seemed to be habitually hobbled in offensive operations, its chronic inability to 
carry Rebel works from the front was indisputable. 
 Though commanding more than just his own corps at Jackson, Sherman's striking 
departure from his habitual reliance on bloody assaults was powerful evidence of his learning 
from experience. It also hinted at the somewhat singular personality trait that would eventually 
propel Sherman into the ranks of American military history's truly great commanders. While 
plenty of bayonet assaults launched by both sides during the war did in fact successfully carry 
entrenched positions, Sherman had never personally witnessed nor commanded such tactical 
successes, and thus could reflect only upon, and learn only from, his personal uniform 
experience of failure. That he eventually did reflect upon it allowed him to learn vicariously from 
(and about) those in the ranks of his command, thus gradually imbibing the culture that saturated 
the force he commanded due to its particular history. By way of their particular successes and 
failures when assigned particular objectives, due in no small part to their relative levels of 
confidence and skill associated with each task or mission, the men of the corps transmitted their 
culture from the bottom-up to their chief. Slowly, Cump was becoming one of them. 
 For all its unfortunate shortcomings in the assault, the corps's phenomenal successes off 
the battlefield throughout the campaign imparted a new confidence in Sherman's perception of 
the organization's true operational capabilities. The command proved time and again that it could 
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sweep across unforgiving terrain at impressive speed, endure lengthy marches on extraordinarily 
tight logistical budgets, swiftly and efficiently dismantle Rebel infrastructure, construct 
fieldworks worthy of admiration by the most professional military minds of the era, and fight in 
small teams as skilled marksmen with both small arms and artillery to deadly effect. As 
Sherman's own thinking about the root causes of the rebellion and the ideal strategy to put it 
down started to transform, he realized, like so many in the ranks of his corps had done months 
prior, that the inability to coordinate desperate massed frontal assaults against entrenched Rebels 
across vast frontages of nightmarish terrain might not be so debilitating a liability after all. 
Perhaps the tactical culture that emerged from experience within the ranks of his corps was 
something he could work with. 
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CHAPTER VII: “JUST IN FROM THE MISSISSIPPI”: CHATTANOOGA 
“The effect was the same as we had seen at Arkansas Post and Vicksburg.” 
 
~ John Buegel, 3rd Missouri789 
 
 By the fall of 1863, Col. Adin Underwood was a hard-bitten veteran of the fiercest 
fighting the Army of the Potomac had seen in the eastern theater of the Rebellion. After fighting 
in the Valley, Second Bull Run, and Chancellorsville, and being wounded at Gettysburg, he and 
his veteran 33rd Massachusetts, along with 15,000 men of the hard-luck 11th and 12th Army 
Corps, Army of the Potomac, were transferred west across the Appalachians to Lookout Valley 
just outside Chattanooga, Tennessee as the War Department hurriedly consolidated a force to 
raise the Rebel siege. After pushing the enemy out of Chattanooga, the three dispersed columns 
of Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland had been caught off guard that 
September by retreating Secessionists at the especially bloody battle of Chickamauga in northern 
Georgia. Only narrowly averting total disaster, Rosecrans managed to fall back to the relative 
safety of Chattanooga to await reinforcement. Gen. Braxton Bragg, commanding the Rebel 
forces hot on Rosecrans's tail, subsequently laid siege to the town that fall from the heights of 
Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge frowning down upon it from the south. Judging any 
frontal assault of Rosecrans’s defensive works too risky, Bragg settled in to starve the Federals 
out that fall instead.790 
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 Despite their lengthy journey, Underwood’s Bay Staters, along with their Eastern 
comrades in other Potomac regiments, took pride in the tidiness of their new camps, the sharp 
appearance of their fresh uniforms, and all the “general marks of Eastern trimness and setting 
up,” as Underwood put it. These traditional hallmarks of martial professionalism had long been 
an important part of the Army of the Potomac’s culture, first instilled by Maj. Gen. George B. 
McClellan in the aftermath of the Bull Run disaster and scrupulously maintained by each and 
every one of his successors.791 On November 20, however, what appeared to the Potomac men to 
be the very “slouchy” antithesis of military bearing came trudging into the valley from off the 
mountains to the west. “Just in from the Mississippi,” Underwood observed, the advanced 
elements of Sherman’s Fifteenth Army Corps tramped down the muddy road and past the Eastern 
encampments, “dusty and dirty, ragged and shoeless.” While having never met the Westerners in 
person, the Bay Staters were well apprised of the exploits of Grant’s “Vicksburg rats,” which had 
only recently “won him his victories.”792 Crowding the sides of the roadway to catch a glimpse, 
the spit-and-polished Massachusetts men quickly drew ridicule. “What elegant corpses they’ll 
make in those good clothes!” one of the ragged Westerners shouted. “We prided ourselves upon 
not having a superfluity about us,” an officer in the 55th Illinois explained, “not an ounce of 
weight that did not mean business – the business of the campaign.” After all, “clothes were of 
minor consequence.” The only possession of real importance was one’s weapon, “always in 
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perfect order and readiness, and the powder kept dry.”793 Though donning the same uniform and 
enrolled in the same U.S. Army, the Eastern and Western veterans seemed culturally worlds 
apart. “Each one thinks their army is best,” Captain Jacob Ritner observed of the interactions. 
“For my part I don’t see what the Army of the East has to be proud of. If I belonged to it, I 
should be ashamed to own it,” he added.794 
 “What’s your badge?” one of the Potomac men shouted out, frustrated at being unable to 
identify the column by the characteristic corps badges worn by all soldiers in the Army of the 
Potomac. “Badge is it?” an Irish Westerner replied. Thinking quickly, he patted his cartridge box. 
“Why fourty rounds to be shure, besides twinty in me pocket,” he crowed with arrogant 
confidence. Rugged Westerners had no time for foppery like corps badges, the response implied. 
There was a war to fight, and while the Eastern armies had certainly endured a rough time, 
Grant’s “Vicksburg rats” had been too busy winning to spend time designing corps badges with 
which to adorn their hats. Though probably apocryphal, the story eventually made its way to 
corps headquarters, where it was so heartily appreciated that it inspired the corps’s only official 
badge. Although adopted at nearly the end of the war, all of those still serving in the Fifteenth 
Corps in the spring of 1865 would adorn their chests with a cloth or metal badge marked by 
nothing more than a symbolic cartridge box inscribed with the words: “40 Rounds” – the 
individual rifleman’s standard load of ammunition.795 
  Much has been made since the war of the supposedly major cultural differences between 
Eastern and Western volunteers serving in the U.S. Army during the war. For the most part, 
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Eastern troops thought of their Western counterparts as “crude, undisciplined and slovenly” – all 
characteristics frequently attributed by those still huddled along the Atlantic to the inhabitants of 
the antebellum Western states. Likewise, Westerners assumed that the grand Potomac army was 
filled with exactly the same kinds of “effete, liquor-soaked, money-mad” dandy frippery and 
extravagant display that they attributed to life “back East.” Too much attention to appearances 
distracted attention from simply winning the war, they thought, and led to the production of 
“’bandbox’ troops, fit only for parade and garrison.”796 Many historians have been quick to 
accept this sociocultural explanation for the supposedly distinguishing characteristics of Eastern 
and Western Federal volunteers. The Army of the Tennessee frequently maintained a somewhat 
shoddy appearance and prosecuted its campaigns in the manner it did in no small part “because it 
was the way their own fathers had approached the challenges of carving farms out of the 
wilderness,” Steven Woodworth posits.797 
 In truth, little of the Fifteenth Corps’s appearance that crisp fall day had anything to do 
with the Western sociocultural origins of its men. Had Underwood instead first encountered 
Sherman’s legions while they were ensconced in their snug camps along the Big Black River a 
few months prior, he would have had difficulty telling them apart from his Massachusetts 
comrades. Wearing fresh uniforms (in some cases even white parade gloves), under orders to 
appear “neat and clean” at all times, and toting brightly polished weapons with their shoes 
“properly cleaned and blackened,” the “Vicksburg rats” had regained much of their proper 
military bearing and appearance after only a brief respite from the prolonged trials of the 
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Vicksburg campaign.798 Much had transpired since then to dramatically deteriorate their outward 
appearance once again. 
 After receiving urgent instructions from Halleck to send reinforcements to Rosecrans, 
Grant turned to his most trusted subordinate before heading northward to assume command of all 
Federal forces in Chattanooga. Sherman was to take the three divisions of his and one of 
McPherson's corps upriver from Vicksburg to Tennessee. Disembarking at Memphis in early 
October, the command immediately set out eastward toward Chattanooga, repairing the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad along the way so as to alleviate Rosecrans's supply problems while 
sparring with Rebel cavalry intent on preventing such repairs from taking place. On October 27, 
an exhausted courier arrived at Sherman’s headquarters with a note from Grant, ordering him to 
“hurry eastward with all possible dispatch” and abandon repairs to the railroad. He needed his 
dependable Army of the Tennessee to break the siege in Chattanooga, and he needed it fast.799 
 Stripping down the army’s trains dramatically and determining to live off the land to 
furnish the balance of rations he lacked the transportation to haul, Sherman rushed his four 
divisions over more than two hundred miles, often averaging more than fifteen miles a day.800 
Forced to take a meandering route due to a combination of abysmal roads, burned bridges, and 
impassable fords, the columns frequently found themselves headed almost every direction but 
east toward their objective. While the weather largely proved amenable to the march, at other 
times it did its very best to slow or even halt the advance entirely. Foraging liberally off the 
countryside, the corps illustrated its penchant for extensive resource extraction all along the way. 
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While most of the humble inhabitants of south-central Tennessee clearly “could spare little” of 
their meager foodstuffs, Sewell Farwell still watched as the ravenous columns “took every thing 
and made the country desolate” as they marched.801 One elderly man Farwell noticed standing by 
the side of the road as his Hawkeyes marched passed could only muster the cry, “What will 
become of us[?] What will become of us[?] … as every thing was swept from him.”802 Having 
fine-tuned their extractive capacity throughout the Vicksburg campaign, Sherman’s men had few 
compunctions when hungry. Only after nearly a full month of marching and counter-marching 
did the much bedraggled Army of the Tennessee finally stumble off the eastern slope of the 
Cumberland Plateau and into Lookout Valley.803 
 The corps had withstood the more than 200-mile march remarkably well. Surveying his 
exhausted but hardy 6th Missouri, Maj. Delos Van Deusen noted how although there was “not a 
sick man in our regiment,” those in the ranks were “nearly all out of shoes,” many traipsing 
barefoot past the Eastern camps.804 Capt. Jacob Ritner, whose company was also barefoot by the 
end of the march, was similarly impressed at the forbearance with which his Hawkeyes stood the 
march. “It does my heart good and I feel proud of my company when I see with what fortitude 
and good will they bear hardship and fatigue,” he commented. “They don’t talk now like they did 
in the ‘dark days’ at Young’s Point.”805 His veteran Iowans had matured markedly over the 
course of a year. While their rough appearance had much more to do with the circumstances of 
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the long, grinding march than their regional origins, Underwood’s observation that Sherman’s 
columns were “just in from the Mississippi” was more heavily freighted with significance than 
he knew. Unlike the two corps of the Potomac army, the Fifteenth Corps and its tactical culture 
were direct byproducts of the war in the lower Mississippi Valley. The command’s distinctive 
“way of war,” its tactical strengths, weaknesses, assumptions, and predispositions, had all been 
forged in the particular assignments it had pursued there as a component element of Grant’s 
Army of the Tennessee. The degree of success which its regiments would enjoy while pursuing 
the many diverse missions and objectives Grant assigned them during the forthcoming campaign 
was in no small part contingent upon this distinctive tactical culture. 
 Due to the nature of the campaign, the men enjoyed relatively few opportunities to write. 
What little does survive, mostly in the form of formal reports, memoirs, and hurried but 
illuminating entries in pocket diaries, still offers a vivid glimpse at the degree to which the men 
and officers of the Fifteenth Corps had become powerfully aware of their distinctive tactical 
strengths and weaknesses as a military organization by the conclusion of the command’s first 
year. By the winter of 1863, this self-awareness extended well beyond those in the ranks, all the 
way up the chain of command to Sherman’s headquarters. Over the long course of the Vicksburg 
campaign, Cump and his corps had mutually molded one another into powerful but limited 
instruments of warfare: nearly unmatched masters of certain operational tasks while all but 
completely incapable of others. In requesting his most trusted subordinate and the corps he still 
nominally commanded to assist in breaking the Chattanooga siege, Grant thought almost entirely 
in terms of aggregate numbers. Just as Sherman had given little thought to the nuanced 
qualitative and cultural differences between the various subordinate units comprising his 
downriver flotilla a year prior, Grant likewise paid little attention to the major differences in past 
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experience and thus tactical culture within each of the field armies and corps. Just as Sherman 
had learned the hard way, Grant ignored such nuance at his own peril. 
I. “Camp Sherman” 
 For three months, the shady billets at “Camp Sherman” along the banks of the Big Black 
River in Mississippi had provided Sherman's exhausted corps with an invaluable opportunity to 
recuperate, refit, and re-organize after the hard trials of the Vicksburg and Jackson sieges. 
Fatigued officers and many enlisted men received brief furloughs home to recruit their health and 
spirits. A few used the opportunity to try and recruit fresh blood to replenish their “skeleton 
regiments,” though usually with little success.806 While present for duty strengths would 
fluctuate some over the course of the coming Chattanooga campaign, most of the corps’s 
regiments rarely fielded more than 250 officers and men on any given day, nearly all of them 
veterans. Even so, of those men regularly present with their units, an average of 83% would be 
reported as “for duty” that fall – the highest rate the corps would ever achieve during the war.807 
Those veterans still in the ranks after the hard trials of the lengthy Vicksburg campaign 
represented the resilient core of each unit, and short of debilitating illness, injury, or death, little 
would manage to shear them away from their formations until discharge.  
 The officer corps at the regimental-level had matured along with the corps’s units. Of the 
twenty-eight infantry regiments serving in First and Second Divisions, only five had been 
commanded by the same officer since enlistment. All those currently at the helm of the corps’s 
regiments had learned their trade, and in most cases gained the entirety of their military 
experience, as junior officers within the martial bodies they now led. The U.S. volunteer Army’s 
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policy of internal promotion of field officers maintained the integrity of regimental culture by 
avoiding contamination by outsiders. A regiment’s commander had typically experienced the 
same events from the same particular limited “angle of vision” as all those in his charge, and thus 
the tactical choices he made and the manner in which he comprehended his orders were both 
products of his regiment’s particular combat experiences. This naturally led in most cases to 
leaders at the regimental-level who were well aware of what they could realistically expect their 
respective commands to accomplish, and what they could not. While not every commander 
would (or could) always take such factors into careful consideration, none were ignorant of their 
regiment’s true capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. 
 The same could not necessarily be said of Sherman’s highest ranking lieutenants. Shortly 
after the establishment of “Camp Sherman,” First Division’s chief was called westward to 
command Federal forces culminating at Helena, Arkansas for a new campaign. Having loyally 
served alongside his friends Sherman and Grant throughout the struggle for Vicksburg, “Fred” 
Steele was off to punish a different corner of the Rebellion. In his place, Brig. Gen. Elias Smith 
Dennis, an outsider from McPherson’s corps, stepped temporarily into the void to administer 
First Division’s operations at “Camp Sherman” until the first of September. On that day, a stern 
looking redheaded officer strode into division headquarters and took the command he would hold 
for the next thirteen months before taking over the entire corps.808 
 Maj. Gen. Peter Joseph Osterhaus came to First Division with a distinguished military 
history. A native of Prussia and an infantry veteran of the 1848 revolutionary conflict, he had 
come to America shortly thereafter to evade arrest. After raising the 12th Missouri in St. Louis 
after the outbreak of the war, Osterhaus had risen rapidly through the ranks as a result of his 
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proven tactical acumen on every field from Wilson’s Creek to Pea Ridge to Vicksburg. After the 
fall of the latter bastion, he had explicitly requested a new command encompassing the veterans 
of his old regiment, the 12th Missouri. Heartily recommended by multiple of Grant’s highest-
ranking lieutenants, Sherman accepted the request and assigned the Prussian command of the 
First Division in Dennis’s place.809 
 To hear the veteran Germans speak of him around the campfires of “Camp Sherman,” one 
could reasonably form the impression that Osterhaus was anything but a nuanced tactician. 
“Späne Peter”810 they called him –  “Chips Peter” – in reference to orders he had shouted over 
the din at Pea Ridge just prior to launching them into a frontal bayonet assault: “Strike them so 
as to make the chips fly!”811 They had done so with great success, making the 12th Missouri one 
of the only regiments in the Fifteenth Corps to have ever successfully conducted a frontal assault. 
Needless to say, the Germans were elated at Osterhaus’s appointment. “Wherever the Red One 
can go, we can go too,” Henry Kircher wrote confidently home. “The assurance that General 
Osterhaus will lead us wherever we are going satisfies me.”812 He had other nicknames, too. 
“Red Peter,” in reference to his flaming red hair, or occasionally even just “the Red One.” The 
latter moniker took on even greater meaning due to First Division’s bright red guidon marking 
the command’s headquarters in the field.  
 While anti-German nativism continued to thrive in mid-nineteenth century America, even 
within the Army, Osterhaus managed to quickly overcome any reservations the command may 
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have had about his ethnic background by consciously exhibiting the highest possible standards in 
his personal military bearing and perpetually earnest appearance. “Everyone in the division loved 
the General,” one native-born Hawkeye remembered, “and would cheer when he rode by.” The 
Prussian, he estimated, “was a fighter to the finish.”813 Osterhaus’s natural capacity for 
charismatic leadership contrasted sharply with the reserved professionalism of Steele, who at no 
point during his lengthy tenure of division command had ever earned even a fraction of the same 
esteem and trust from the men. 
 Specific experiences in division command in Arkansas and during the long campaign for 
Vicksburg had led Osterhaus to embrace a very similar tactical philosophy to that of Morgan 
Smith. Like Smith, “the Red One” had come to appreciate the capacity of relying heavily on 
skirmishing tactics to conserve lives in the main body of an attacking force. This tactical 
conservatism was mirrored in the Prussian’s passion for artillery – the heavier the better.  
Whenever a tactical problem could possibly be solved exclusively with accurate artillery fire and 
an open order skirmisher “cloud,” Osterhaus had continually shown an inclination to avoid 
risking any more lives than necessary. He understood well that effective artillery could spare his 
veteran infantrymen, and joked about wishing he could “put bayonets on the guns and make 
charges with them.”814 Even during the occasional frontal assault, as conducted by his division 
on the second day at Pea Ridge, “Späne Peter” frequently ordered the same Zouave-style rushes 
that Morgan Smith cherished to preserve the integrity and ensure the survival of his command.815 
While some historians have occasionally criticized this tendency as excessively cautious, the 
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men in the ranks unsurprisingly did not share this opinion. In all of these tactical tendencies, 
Osterhaus could not have differed more dramatically from the hard-charging direct-approach of 
Steele. Instead, Osterhaus’s tactical philosophy paired perfectly with the evolved tactical culture 
of First Division in the wake of the Vicksburg campaign, most especially its aversion to frontal 
assaults and recent extensive experience with both rifle and artillery marksmanship practice. For 
the first time in its service, the division stood to benefit from the leadership of a commander 
who, though an outsider, was perhaps the perfect officer to command it. 
 Steele took Brig. Gen. John Thayer along with him to Arkansas, prompting Osterhaus to 
consolidate the division’s three “skeleton” brigades into two, each commanded by the division's 
two most accomplished Colonels: the indomitable Buckeye Charles Woods and veteran Iowan 
James Williamson. This represented the first shuffling of regiments the division had yet 
undergone. Moreover, for the first time, these brigades were organized almost exclusively along 
state-lines. Woods’s new command, with the exception of his own original 76th Ohio and the 
hard-luck 13th Illinois, included every Missouri volunteer infantry regiment in the division. 
Williamson’s, unsurprisingly, retained its exclusively Hawkeye character. The command’s 
artillery, just as it had been across the Vicksburg campaign and siege, remained consolidated and 
independent of the two infantry brigades.816 
 Immediately recognizing the “depleted condition of our ranks,” Osterhaus took steps to 
maximize the available combat strength in each unit. Noticing several able-bodied white 
volunteers employed by regiments as teamsters shortly after taking command, he promptly 
ordered them “replaced by good Negroes.”817 He also ordered the smaller units in each brigade to 
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pair up “for all tactical purposes” with another regiment from the same state to form what he 
called “tactical battalions.” Woods’s brigade would contain six of these battalions, and 
Williamson’s five. Seven of the division’s largest regiments were to operate as independent 
tactical battalions. Regardless of the regimental identities of their members, the battalions were 
subdivided into four equal “divisions” and eight equal “companies,” commanded by the senior 
officer in the battalion. When in camp or on the march, each regiment would retain its 
independence under the leadership of its original commander, but under fire it would become 
half of its respective “tactical battalion.” 
 This innovation, apparently of Osterhaus’s own invention, allowed veteran regiments to 
maintain their esprit de corps and distinctive identities while simultaneously maximizing their 
combat potential by increasing the modularity of the division as a whole. Though his heavily 
depleted veteran commands obviously could not muster the raw firepower of a full-strength 800-
man regiment, Osterhaus understood the maneuverability advantages of smaller units. In his 
native Prussia, infantry companies with strengths of no more than 250 men were routinely given 
independent tasks in combat, consolidating with the three others in their battalion as necessary. 
The “tactical battalion” concept mirrored this logic. When needed, individual “skeleton 
regiments,” usually of fewer than 250 men, could be maneuvered quickly and tasked 
independently to perform a particular mission, only to later be paired with another in a tactical 
battalion to maximize defensive firepower. First Division’s officers had long struggled with the 
command and control dynamics of moving large regiments and lengthy columns through 
nightmarish terrain (most dramatically at Chickasaw Bayou). The “tactical battalion” concept 
promised to help avoid these challenges in the future. Whereas Second Division’s shrunken 
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“skeleton regiments” maintained about the same available manpower strengths as Osterhaus’s, 
the “tactical battalion” idea appears to have only been instituted in Osterhaus’s division.818 
 In late July, Frank Blair departed on a lengthy leave, prompting the shuffling of Second 
Division’s command structure as well. Through most of the summer and early fall, Brig. Gen. 
Joseph Lightburn took the helm and coordinated the administration of the division. Lightburn 
was subsequently replaced by Brig. Gen. Giles Smith in early September. On October 6, 
however, while the tired blue column trudged eastward across Tennessee enroute to Chattanooga, 
electrifying news spread through the ranks. “The Zouave” had finally mended sufficiently from 
his gory Chickasaw wound to return to command, and Morgan Lewis Smith once again took 
over his beloved Second Division.819 
 Although long separated from their chief, Smith’s impress on the evolution of the 
division’s tactical culture had always been on display. Despite orders to launch desperate frontal 
assaults, the division’s leadership and junior officers had routinely leaned heavily upon the 
skirmisher-centric Zouave-style tactics that had long been Smith’s trademark. Added to this 
foundation was a panoply of skills and increased confidence in light infantry combat embodied 
in regiments now barely half the size since the last time Morgan Smith had led them. He 
announced his return with characteristic humility. “Having been debarred the privilege of being 
with you in your last and most brilliant campaign, I feel very much like a recruit upon joining an 
old Regiment,” he admitted in his first general order read aloud to each company. He earnestly 
hoped for “the disposition of every officer and man to look upon my mistakes as errors of the 
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head and not the heart,” remaining confident that “we shall have no difficulty in resuming our 
former pleasant relations.” Indeed, they would not. With the return of Morgan Smith and the 
appointment of Osterhaus to command of First Division, both of the corps’s original divisions 
were now led by officers whose tactical philosophies were perfectly calibrated to the tactical 
cultures that had organically arisen within their commands.820 
 Following Smith’s return, his brother Giles returned to command of First Brigade, while 
Lightburn retained the Second. Like those of First Division, both brigades consolidated their 
“skeleton” regiments, though not along state lines like in Osterhaus’s command. Tuttle’s Third 
Division, briefly attached to Sherman’s corps during the Vicksburg campaign, would remain at 
Vicksburg and never again rejoin the command after it headed northward to Memphis.  Instead, 
three brigades of the old Sixteenth Corps division of Brig. Gen. William Sooy Smith, veterans of 
the Jackson siege but not the bloody battles for Vicksburg, were transferred into the corps to 
operate as a new Fourth Division in Tennessee. Sherman assigned this division, comprised of the 
brigades of Col. John Loomis, Brig. Gen. John Corse, and Col. Joseph Cockerill, to his foster 
brother Brig. Gen. Hugh Ewing, representing the 37-year old’s first division command. The 
brigades were by no means a tabula rasa of tactical culture. Just as Steele's and Smith's divisions 
had before them, the brigades of Loomis, Corse, and Cockerill all joined the corps bearing the 
cultural impress of their own unique historical experiences. Most strikingly, they lacked the 
deeply ingrained aversion to frontal assaults shared by the remainder of the corps, having 
avoided the same experiences of bloody repulses suffered by First and Second divisions across 
the past year.821 
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 Ironically the least significant command change occurred at the very top. Having been 
called east to Chattanooga to take the reins of all beleaguered Federal forces in the area, Grant 
could not simultaneously command his beloved Army of the Tennessee. On October 24, that task 
passed to Sherman, leaving formal command of the Fifteenth Corps to Frank Blair upon his 
return to the army en-route to Chattanooga on October 29. A changing of the guard at 
headquarters immediately prior to a major campaign typically carries major implications, but 
Blair was not fated to play much of an active role in forthcoming operations. In fact, he would 
ultimately take so little ownership over the command that he never even filed a formal report in 
the aftermath of the campaign. Instead, Sherman and his spartan entourage of staffers, along with 
the same headquarters culture they had developed over the years, would remain nominally at the 
helm of the corps throughout the battles for Chattanooga. For at least a few more months, the 
command remained, for all intents and purposes, Sherman’s corps.822 
II. “You will attack the enemy” 
 On November 15, Sherman personally arrived at Chattanooga ahead of his army and 
participated in a hurried conference wherein Grant explained his plans to break the siege. Having 
successfully re-opened his supply line to the west via a series of daring maneuvers in Lookout 
Valley, the hero of Vicksburg now turned to the much more daunting problem of removing Bragg 
from Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge to the south. Aware that Bragg had recently 
detached one corps of his army to threaten Federal forces under Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside at 
Knoxville, Grant knew he needed to quickly finish up with Chattanooga and respond to the new 
threat. Frantic dispatches from Washington constantly underscored that fact. Things needed to 
move expeditiously, but given that nearly all of the Army of the Cumberland’s horses were dead 
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of starvation after the prolonged siege, it was unlikely that it would be doing anything 
expeditious anytime soon. Despite the recent arrival of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the 
Army of the Potomac into Lookout Valley, Grant still hoped, as usual, to rely on his most trusted 
subordinate to achieve the most critical portion of his plan. 
 Sherman’s divisions would cross the Tennessee River at Brown’s Ferry, west of 
Chattanooga, and then march into the hills behind the city to screen their movements and give 
the impression to Rebel onlookers atop the heights that they were in fact headed northward to 
reinforce Burnside in Knoxville. Instead, the columns would slip eastward, away from the city, 
again using the hills as a screen, until arriving at a creek feeding into the northern bank of the 
river where they would find pontoon boats waiting for them. Under the cover of darkness one 
brigade of the army would utilize these boats to cross the river, silently secure a bridgehead on 
the opposite bank, and allow for the rest of the command to be ferried across until a pontoon 
bridge could be laid down. Once Sherman had the entirety of his force on the south bank of the 
river, he would proceed southward, skirting the banks of North Chickamauga Creek until 
reaching the “northern extremity” of Missionary Ridge and, presumably, Bragg’s extreme right 
flank.823 
 “The general plan,” Grant explained in a note to Thomas on November 18, was merely 
for Sherman to “secure the heights on the northern extremity [of Missionary Ridge] to about the 
railroad tunnel” (see map) and threaten Bragg’s sole supply line before he could shift forces 
northward in response. Beyond that, the plan would evolve fluidly based on the behavior of the 
Rebel foe.824 A month after the battle, Sherman also confirmed this interpretation in a letter to his 
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Senator brother. “The whole philosophy of the battle was that I should get by a dash a position 
on the Extremity of Missionary Ridge from which the enemy would be forced to drive me,” he 
explained. Once ensconced upon “the extremity” of the ridge, he fully “expected Bragg to attack 
me at daylight,” when he could repel him from works in the same bloody fashion he himself had 
been repelled so many times before.825 
 In his own subsequent orders to division commanders Sherman made clear that the 
corps’s objective was merely to secure “possession of the end of Missionary Ridge,” which it 
was to “hold, and fortify.” No mention was ever made by him of any “assault,” “sweep,” or even 
“attack” of Bragg’s lines, nor of any movement against Rebel positions further south than the 
“northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel.”826 The Fifteenth Corps’s officer corps must 
have breathed a sigh of relief given the command’s habitual incapacity for such maneuvers. 
Grant’s orders seemed perfectly calibrated for the corps’s tactical culture. Making “a dash” over 
difficult terrain after a risky amphibious landing, followed by the rapid fortification of key terrain 
were all tasks the corps had mastered over the course of its year in service, and thus the men and 
officers of the command had every reason to be confident about this their most recent 
assignment. 
 As usual, things quickly became more complicated. Under a deluge of cold rain on 
November 20 and 21, Cump’s ragged-looking legions crossed the Tennessee at Brown’s Ferry. 
Morgan Smith’s brigades along with John Smith’s Seventeenth Corps division, followed shortly 
thereafter by Hugh Ewing’s new division. In truth, the crossings themselves had proven a bit 
perilous, given the proclivity of the river’s rushing current to dismantle the rickety pontoon 
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bridge. Before Osterhaus could push First Division across, the bridge fell apart yet again – this 
time in a much more complete fashion, leaving “the Red One” and his brigades stranded on the 
west bank. Anxious of any further delay, Grant promptly ordered Sherman to do without. The 
First Division would be detached from the rest of the corps, remaining in Lookout Valley for the 
time being and reporting to Hooker instead. Sherman, the two Smith’s, and Ewing trudged 
northeast, away from Brown’s Ferry and into the hills to shroud their movements from prying 
Rebel eyes atop Lookout Mountain. Halting at a hidden camp, the three divisions bedded down 
in preparation for the next move.827 
 On November 23, Sherman ordered Giles Smith’s brigade to the waiting pontoon boats in 
preparation for the nighttime crossing. After dark, the brigade would board the boats and “drop 
down silently to a point above the mouth of South Chickamauga [Creek], then land two 
regiments” which would “move along the river quietly and capture the enemy’s river pickets.” It 
was an exceedingly perilous endeavor fraught with potential for miscalculation or even failures 
of navigation. Moreover, should the south bank of the river contain more than just a few 
scattered Rebel outposts, the two “skeleton regiments” could easily prove more a sacrifice than 
an advanced guard.828 
 That night, cloud cover reduced visibility to nearly zero, and a steady light drizzle made 
for an unpleasant evening. All of Smith’s regiments carried a hundred rounds of ammunition per 
man – a signal that a desperate fight for the opposite bank might be in the offing. Each of the 
craft was loaded with twenty-five men and manned by four oarsmen who self-identified as 
having past experience on the water. Having chosen his own Zouaves of the 8th Missouri to 
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spearhead the landing, followed close-up by the veteran 55th Illinois, Smith boarded a boat 
himself for the journey. “All guns were loaded but not capped,” one Illinoisan remembered, “and 
no one was to fire on any pretence [sic] whatever, unless by orders.” Talking above a whisper 
was strictly prohibited, and even the oars were “carefully muffled.”829 
 Silently drifting down the swollen river, oarsmen hunted a roaring bonfire on the northern 
bank which marked a point opposite the area designated by Sherman as the landing site. Those 
along for the ride nervously eyed a string of fires on the southern bank that “glimmered through 
the mist,” accompanied by the shadows of Rebel pickets “throwing wood upon them” and 
talking among themselves. Finally, after the lead batteau came abreast of the signal fire, it turned 
hard to the left against the current, and deposited its load of anxious Zouaves onto the south 
shore.830 
 Although the regiment never filed a surviving formal report on the action, enough 
anecdotal evidence is extant to suggest that the twenty-five Zouaves on each boat likely operated 
more or less independently under the direction of their junior officers once ashore. After all, the 
vast majority of the 8th Missouri’s operational experience had been conducted in just such a 
fashion, scattered across a wide front in small skirmish teams led by junior officers or senior 
non-coms. The command also enjoyed considerable amphibious experience, having served with 
distinction during the Steele’s Bayou expedition. With their vast experience and training moving 
stealthily and carefully from tree to tree in combat from Fort Donelson to Arkansas Post to 
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Vicksburg, the Zouaves were the ideal candidates for the mission, and they did not let Smith 
down. 
 Creeping silently through the dark along the riverbank toward the nearby outpost fires, a 
captain and his contingent of Zouaves managed to get close enough to overhear the idle 
conversation of one Rebel group. “It would be a good joke if the Yanks floated down the river 
some night and took us in,” he later remembered hearing one of them say. “Boys, that’s just what 
Uncle Billie has done,” the Zouave captain allegedly shouted out, springing from the darkness 
upon them. “Guess you’ll surrender, won’t you?” All along the riverbank, desperate looking 
Zouaves startled unprepared Secessionists without the need for any bloodshed. Only one shot 
was fired over the entire course of the operation, and that by a startled Rebel picket “who in his 
nervous surprise, fired in the air.” Another frantic mounted Rebel “came up at full speed, 
shouting, ‘The Yanks are coming!’ only to be “promptly dismounted and invited to join his 
comrades just captured.”831 
 Elated by the news of the safe and secure landing, Sherman quickly ordered the shuttling 
of the rest of his force to the south bank. After consolidating their prisoners and ensuring that no 
greater enemy force was in the immediate area, those on the south bank began, in typical 
“Vicksburg rat” fashion, digging in and securing their newly won position. “At this point we 
expected to have a desperate struggle,” Major Thomas Taylor, 47th Ohio, wrote, “and it took 
strong nerves to bear up under the contemplation of this prospect.” If the stray shot from the 
startled Rebel’s musket had drawn the attention of those atop Missionary Ridge to the south, only 
a handful of boats remained on the bank with which to escape. “We had no artillery,” he worried, 
“and only the ground we stood upon.” Accordingly, he and his fellow officers “put a spade in the 
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hands of each man … with instruction to ‘bury himself’ in the shortest possible space of time.”832 
The gravity of the situation was not lost on any present. “Every man worked with a will,” an 
Illinoisan recalled.833 
 The extensive experience of Smith’s brigade with digging and preparing earthworks from 
Corinth to Vicksburg to Jackson paid off. Within less than five hours, the command had 
established “a line of pits over a mile and a half long, almost four feet deep and the same wide, 
with good parapet capable of resisting shell and shot from ordinary sized guns.” As the rest of the 
corps focused on the laborious process of moving across the river, partly by pontoon boat, then 
by steamer ferry, and finally by pontoon bridge, Second Division turned the south shore of the 
Tennessee into a “miniature Vicksburg,” just as it had the outskirts of Jackson, Mississippi five 
months earlier. Even Sherman, an especially stern critic of field fortifications, pronounced the 
fruits of their labor “very respectable.”834 
 It took the rest of the morning to get the remainder of Sherman’s army across the river. 
Most historians of the campaign still remain sharply critical of this delay, arguing that Cump 
ought to have sent Smith’s division southward toward Missionary Ridge immediately after 
landing, alone if necessary. “Had the Federals pushed forward instead of stopping to entrench, 
they could have occupied [Missionary Ridge] without firing a shot or losing a man,” Albert 
Castel argues.835 Another historian has recently condemned Sherman’s “excessive caution” and 
insists he “wasted time by ordering the construction of entrenchments before moving toward 
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Tunnel Hill.”836 While there is no way of knowing for sure just how much blood and toil may 
have been spared by such a maneuver, historians continue to ignore the full weight of past 
experience and thus ingrained tactical culture that informed Sherman and his command at dawn 
on November 24, when the decision to entrench along the bank was made. 
 Both the 8th Missouri and 55th Illinois were filled with veterans of the near total disaster 
at Shiloh in the spring of 1862. With their backs to the very same river, the entire army had been 
surprised by a sudden Rebel onslaught without the benefit of any earthworks from which to repel 
the attack. Grant’s army, along with his and Sherman’s military careers, had only barely escaped 
total destruction. Cump, ever the consummate paranoiac, was not about to commit the same 
blunder again. Neither were his men. Over the long course of the Vicksburg campaign they had 
routinely witnessed the powerful advantages accruing to even vastly outnumbered defenders 
when fighting from behind the most rudimentary of field fortifications. All of those veterans in 
the regiments ensconced along the south bank of the river that morning still maintained vivid 
memories of having been brutally repulsed by a force less than half their number at Arkansas 
Post from behind a rifle pit prepared in a manner of a few hours using only blunt fence boards. If 
an enemy counterattack was forthcoming, and there was every reason to believe it might be, they 
meant to be prepared. Their behavior, and Sherman’s decision, were the direct byproducts of 
painfully won experience. 
 While Smith’s veterans cut away at the Tennessee mud, Sherman rallied his division 
commanders and explained the details of his plan to seize the “northern extremity of Missionary 
Ridge.” The three divisions across the river would array themselves en echelon from left to right 
facing south toward the ridge. Morgan Smith’s command would form the left wing, sweeping 
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south with its own left flank skirting the steep western bank of South Chickamauga Creek. In the 
center, John Smith’s Seventeenth Corps division would advance alongside, with Ewing’s division 
in column on the right flank, “prepared to deploy to the right on the supposition that we would 
meet an enemy in that direction.” The 20-lb. rifled Parrotts of Lt. Francis De Gress’s Illinoisan 
battery, already installed in positions prepared for them by Second Division, would send a salvo 
southward to signal the coordinated advance of the command.837 
 Before the conference had concluded, the dense fog of the early morning was already 
converting into a light rain. Sounds of heavy fighting echoed across the valley from the west, 
apparently from the far slope of Lookout Mountain. Finally, at about noon, De Gress’s guns 
thundered, and the Fifteenth Corps stepped off with its customary heavy “cloud” of skirmishers 
screening its front. From the beginning, the fog and rain paid enormous dividends. While the 
base of Missionary Ridge to the south was unmistakable, its crest was shrouded in clouds and 
thus the corps’s advance was invisible to the Rebels snug within their defenses atop the height. 
Although meeting with no resistance, the command still moved with caution, edging its way 
forward behind the skirmisher cloud until pausing briefly around 3 o’clock at a railroad track “to 
correct our lines.” Nearing what appeared to be the steep rise of the “northern extremity” of 
Missionary Ridge, Morgan Smith ordered Lightburn’s brigade to move swiftly up the hill and 
“carry the ridge.” Captain E. W. Muenscher, a captain in the 30th Ohio then creeping south on 
the skirmish line, received orders to “go ahead with my company” and seize the heights. 
Obediently, Muenscher “gave the order, and up we went on the run.”838 
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 Just as the Zouaves had been a perfect fit for the daring nocturnal crossing, Muenscher’s 
Buckeyes, and in fact the entirety of Lightburn’s brigade, were ideal candidates to spearhead the 
corps’s ascent up the ridge. As the only group of regiments within the corps with extensive 
experience maneuvering and fighting within the mountainous terrain of western Virginia, the 
veterans of the “Kanawha Brigade” had every reason to be comfortable coordinating disparate 
skirmish teams across the broken terrain and steep slopes of densely wooded hills. Even so, the 
Buckeyes later admitted that as “we gradually ascended and possessed ourselves of the hill … 
our confidence increased. We thought when we gained the summit that if the enemy then 
advanced we could receive him on more equal footing.” The Ohioans reached the crest 
unopposed and caught their breath briefly before continuing southward to clear the rest of the 
hill. After cresting himself, Lightburn recognized immediately that the summit was “not … the 
[crest of the] hill designated” in his orders, perceiving that another point to the south was in fact 
the real objective. Accordingly, he dispatched the 47th Ohio, also veteran mountain fighters from 
the Virginian campaigns, to seize the wooded eminence.839 
 The Buckeye skirmishers, still maneuvering individually from tree to tree, moved 
carefully through the fog and mist until reaching their objective atop the southern hill. Shortly 
after their arrival, however, the woods erupted with fire. A single Rebel regiment, also 
maneuvering as dispersed skirmishers, had rushed to the hill after receiving word from an 
anxious scout that a massive Federal host was en-route to Missionary Ridge. As surprised to find 
Federals already atop the height as the Ohioans were to meet them, the Rebels quickly gave way 
under the full weight of Lightburn’s brigade, falling back off the hill to the west. As the fog still 
hanging atop the crest of the hills severely hindered visibility, the precise location of the brigade 
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remained somewhat of a mystery to all present. What topography could be made out in the 
fading light did not seem to match anyone’s expectations.840 
 While the lingering clouds and the angle from which both Sherman and Grant had 
originally observed the “northern extremity of Missionary Ridge” from afar had suggested that 
the furthest hilltops east were in fact an organic and unbroken extension of the ridge, Lightburn’s 
brigade had actually crested a free-standing height known locally as Billy Goat Hill. Between 
Billy Goat and the real Missionary Ridge was a deep saddle nearly 300 yards across and at least 
150 feet deep. Frustrated at learning this, Sherman also recognized that Billy Goat “was so 
important that I could leave nothing to chance.” With night coming on quickly, and still 
concerned about the same imminent counterattack the corps had worried about since the 
beginning of the operation, Cump “ordered it to be fortified during the night.” After all, the 
command had successfully reached “the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge,” even if it was 
not technically on the ridge itself. Grant’s original plans had made clear that Sherman was to 
“hold, and fortify” just such a position. Given the surprise saddle to his front, Sherman must 
have wagered that it was tactically better to have the saddle between himself and the Rebels 
likely atop Tunnel Hill than to have it at his back. Moreover, as the men hauled Second and 
Fourth division’s heavy guns up Billy Goat with ropes by hand, the corps’s batteries would soon 
have a perfect elevated position from which to pummel Tunnel Hill. Despite these advantages, 
historians since the end of the war have been unmerciful in their criticism of Sherman’s 
“uncharacteristic caution” in choosing to consolidate his gains by again digging in. “Normally 
more aggressive,” Larry Peterson suggests, “Sherman had erred on the side of caution,” and in so 
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doing, “significantly alter[ed] the battle’s future course” and even “undermined Grant’s entire 
plan of action.”841  
 A few historians do cut Cump some slack, given a brief and oft overlooked episode that 
occurred that evening on the corps’s left flank, then resting along the steep banks of South 
Chickamauga Creek. While Lightburn’s skirmishers fought off the unsuspecting Rebels atop the 
crest, the rest of Morgan Smith’s division continued its sweep southward along the creek bank, 
moving around the back side of Billy Goat with its skirmisher “cloud” advanced well to the 
front. At about four o’clock, the lead elements of Giles Smith’s brigade suddenly took both 
sporadic musket and artillery fire from across the creek to the east. Rushing a battery into 
position to counter the unanticipated Rebel threat, Smith hurried forward on foot to ascertain the 
true nature of the situation. Suddenly, “the peculiar whir of a charge of canister shot coming 
straight for us filled the air,” wrote one officer standing nearby, who also heard one of the iron 
balls “strike the General as plainly as one would hear a ball of putty thrown against a wall, and it 
sounded much as that would, too.” The wounded Smith “was staggered, but did not fall, and was 
supported by his companions and led from the field.” 
 The ambushing Rebel force proved meager and uninterested in pressing any significant 
attack, withdrawing shortly thereafter out of range of the brigade’s guns. Frantic shouts filled the 
air. “Where is Col. Tupper? Where is Col. Tupper? Where in hell is Col. Tupper? He is in 
command of this whole thing and does not know it!” Following Smith’s removal from command, 
the ranking officer on the field, Col. Nathan Tupper, 116th Illinois, suddenly found himself at the 
helm of First Brigade. Crippled in one arm, Tupper had ignored his disability and quit his law 
 
841 Sherman’s Report, Dec. 19, 1863, OR, I:31, II, 573; Steven Woodworth, The Chattanooga Campaign 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012), 59; Peterson, Decisions at Chattanooga, 62. 
365 
practice to raise a regiment the moment he heard of his brother’s death at Shiloh. Having 
commanded the regiment since Chickasaw Bayou, Tupper had accrued considerable experience 
with leading the Sucker cohort, but none at the brigade level. Moreover, First Brigade had 
enjoyed the most stable leadership of any brigade in the corps, having served under Giles Smith 
since Chickasaw Bayou. Now, as dusk faded to night, First Brigade struggled to regain its 
balance and adapt to the change while attempting to find itself on the map.842 
 Despite the temporary discomfiture rendered by Smith’s wounding, the corps as a whole 
had performed admirably in achieving the limited objectives Grant had assigned to it. Its success 
was in no small part a product of the mission’s near perfect compatibility with the evolved 
tactical culture of the command. The vital skills necessary to complete the corps’s assigned 
objectives just happened to be those with which it had experience. The brazen amphibious 
mission across the Tennessee was tailor-made for Smith's Zouaves. Once across the river, and 
then later atop Billy Goat, the corps tapped into its extensive expertise derived at Vicksburg to 
quickly erect field fortifications and prepare an impressive defense. About midnight, however, a 
courier arrived at Sherman’s headquarters with a directive from Grant that shifted the operational 
paradigm in a dramatically disadvantageous direction for the Fifteenth Corps. “You will attack 
the enemy at the point most advantageous from your position at early dawn to-morrow 
morning,” it read. Thomas and his “Cumberlanders” would likewise assault “early tomorrow 
morning,” aiming either to seize the Rebel rifle pits at the foot of the ridge or “move to the left to 
your support, as circumstances may determine best.” As before, Grant’s instructions left 
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considerable room for flexibility, leaving even the precise hour for Sherman’s forthcoming 
assault up to his own judgment.843 
 Grant's initial orders had contemplated a mission that Cump knew was ideally suited to 
the capabilities and tactical strengths of the divisions he had on hand. Probing ahead to secure 
what Sherman and his lieutenants all presumed to be the “northernmost extremity” of Missionary 
Ridge, with an eye to fortifying the same and bringing on an imminent and presumably futile 
Rebel attack, the tables seemed to have finally been turned. For once, the corps would have the 
chance to repel hopeless charges from behind the protection of works instead of being repelled 
itself. The intervening valley that ran between Billy Goat and Tunnel Hill was just one more 
obstruction to a Rebel counter-attack Sherman fully expected would come. Alas, it was not to be. 
Grant's follow-on orders to assault the Secessionists atop Tunnel Hill effectively converted a 
mission erstwhile perfectly calibrated for the Fifteenth Corps to one monstrously out of step with 
its operational heritage and culture. 
 As Grant had no way of seeing the tortuous and confusing tangle of thickets, marshland, 
ridges, saddles, hills, and spurs to Sherman’s front, he also could not have known how 
dramatically out of step his orders were with the terrain. To be sure, the deep saddle between 
Billy Goat Hill and the real Missionary Ridge, somewhat counter-intuitively, would have little 
bearing on the course of the fight. Instead, it was the combination of Missionary Ridge’s 
exceedingly narrow crest along with an additional Rebel-held eastward projecting spur that made 
Sherman’s attack all but impossible from the very beginning. Assaulting the narrow rise from the 
north end would dramatically reduce the available frontage for any attacking force. Little more 
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than a “skeleton regiment” or two could ever manage to pack themselves into the limited ground 
before those on the wings were no longer able to engage Rebels atop the crest. Moreover, though 
Sherman did not yet know it, attacking the ridge from its rear or eastern slope would also prove 
impossible due to a combination of nightmarish terrain and enfilading Rebel fire from the 
eastward-projecting spur. As Steven Woodworth suggests, the hesitation and delay to carry out 
his orders for which so many historians have castigated Sherman was more likely evidence that 
he fully grasped the impracticality of Grant’s expectations – most especially given his perceived 
lack of “troops that can be made to assault.” Cump’s hesitance was less a blunder and more a 
powerful expression of his growing awareness and understanding of both his own weaknesses 
and those of his corps combined with a veteran’s eye for truly impossible terrain.844 
 At dawn, Sherman and his staff surveyed the entire front prior to issuing his orders, 
“catching as accurate an idea of the ground as possible by the dim light of morning.” Across the 
deep saddle, he could see Rebels preparing “a breastwork of logs and fresh earth, filled with men 
and two guns” atop the crest of Tunnel Hill.845 Even more Secessionists appeared to be forming 
beyond. The likelihood of pushing them off must have seemed exceedingly small, but with 
positive orders from his close friend and superior Sherman had little choice but to commit to 
disaster. He evinced anything but confidence when he delivered the attack orders to his adoptive 
brother. “I guess, Ewing, if you’re ready, you might as well go ahead,” a nearby journalist 
overheard him say without even so much as a shred of conviction. Ever the consummate theater 
connoisseur, Sherman had seen this show too many times.  Two of Ewing’s brigades, those of 
Corse and Loomis, would attack the ridge from opposite directions: one from the northern end 
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and one from the western face of Tunnel Hill. They would be supported to the limited degree 
possible on the eastern slope by elements of Lightburn’s brigade, which had not been engaged 
the previous day. Almost as an after thought, Sherman added that Ewing ought to try and 
maintain his formational cohesion “till you get to the foot of the hill.” Whatever awaited the men 
at the crest, he knew it would require cohesive mass to punch through – cohesive mass that 
terrain and Rebel fire had routinely conspired to rob from his assault columns in each and every 
previous attack long before they reached their objective. “Shall we keep it after that?” Ewing 
asked. “If you like,” Cump responded somberly. “If you can.”846 
 Although Sherman intended that at least three coordinated assault columns, each striking 
Tunnel Hill at more or less the same moment, nightmarish terrain would nullify his numerical 
advantage and play the key role in dismantling Federal coordination and cohesion. Just as deep 
bayous and meandering tributaries had done at Chickasaw Bayou, smoke and dense woods had 
accomplished at Arkansas Post, and the maddening maze of hills effected north of Vicksburg, the 
terrain confronted by the corps’s attack exacerbated its lingering struggles with coordination and 
destroyed its cohesion in the assault. Worse, Ewing had never commanded a division in combat, 
and the challenges of attempting to learn how to do so while operating across an extended 
exterior line against a concentrated Rebel foe was altogether too much to for him to handle. 
Sherman likely knew and understood all of this prior to giving his brother the orders to attack, 
but evidently could imagine few alternatives. 
 At about 9 a.m., Sherman rode to the left to find Lightburn and order him to support 
Ewing’s main effort attack by sending “200 men to occupy Tunnel Hill.” Presumably, he meant 
for these men to step off at roughly the same time as Ewing’s lead brigade, but alas these 
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specifics seem to have been left out. Instead, Lightburn ordered the detachments across the deep 
intervening valley immediately. The 47th Ohio he left in reserve, it having seen the brunt of the 
skirmish the preceding afternoon. While an order for 200 men would have accounted for less 
than two companies a year prior, by the fall of 1863 it encompassed the entirety of the “skeleton” 
30th Ohio along with two additional companies of the 4th West Virginia in support.  “It was the 
understanding that they were to advance firing, then halt behind trees, load and advance again,” 
Captain Muenscher recalled, alluding to what had by then become the standard Second Division 
manner of attack. Encountering little resistance, “this was forgotten, and they went on a dead run 
down one side of the ravine, across the valley and up the other side … in less than five minutes.” 
A few Rebel videttes cowering in a mostly abandoned trench were scooped up in the process at 
the point of the bayonet, but little in the way of enemy fire was met until the panting riflemen 
neared the crest of the hill’s northward protruding bench. Flattening out before rising again after 
a few hundred yards, the lip of the bench provided some cover from the Rebels waiting behind 
their log works atop the summit. Catching their breath, and then working their way east around 
the hill so as to approach the works from the more densely wooded portion of the slope, the 
Buckeyes mustered a brief and meager probe toward the breastworks alone. Unsurprisingly, 
given their woeful lack of numbers, the attempt was very limited, and they fell back to the cover 
of the trees still within rifle shot of the works and began sharpshooting. As they peppered the 
Rebel logs with fire in an attempt to keep their heads down, the Ohioans awaited the next assault 
column to try its luck. Anyone who had seen the Fifteenth Corps assault before would have 
found the scene painfully predictable.847 
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 The next phase of the bloody performance brought Corse’s brigade of Ewing’s division 
hurdling off Billy Goat with a yell of confidence and the thunderous applause of every one of 
Sherman’s batteries. Although commanding four under-strength regiments, the exceedingly 
narrow ridge precluded Corse from deploying any more than one to his front, dispersed as 
skirmishers so as to take advantage of every last inch of available ground. Once again, the 
inability to mass the firepower of more than a single regiment as skirmishers against the 
imposing Rebel breastworks proved decisive. While a handful reached within a stone’s throw of 
the log works before being cut down mercilessly by both musket shot and canister, the brigade 
fell back to the protection of the lip of the bench to regroup. Once sufficiently rallied, the 
bloodied command made a second attempt, only to meet with precisely the same fate and the 
severe wounding of its commander. Even worse, smelling blood, the Rebels sallied briefly from 
their works, sweeping the survivors (along with Lightburn’s most advanced elements) from their 
positions and chasing them back to the shallow trench captured by the Buckeyes earlier that 
morning.848 
 By 11 a.m. things were going poorly, but they were about to get much worse. Finally 
managing to get Colonel John Loomis’s brigade underway on its attack route west of the ridge, 
Sherman and Ewing shifted their attention to that front. Originally intended to fall upon the 
Rebels simultaneously with Lightburn’s and Corse’s attacks, instead Loomis’s regiments 
debouched from a tree line and into a broad field in clear view of every Secessionist atop 
Missionary Ridge. Moreover, these Rebels were unoccupied after having already repelled the 
prior two brigade attacks. Hurdling his brigade forward through a dense fire, Loomis managed to 
reach the slight protection of an elevated railroad embankment near the foot of the ridge, but 
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immediately required additional units deployed from John Smith’s Seventeenth Corps division, 
and even more from an attached brigade of Pennsylvanians to secure his left flank from 
harassing Rebel sharpshooters. These reinforcements attacked eastward up the slope 
independently so as to get out of the raking fire in the bottomland, only to be halted in their 
tracks halfway up by Rebel guns in exactly the same manner as Lightburn, Corse, and Loomis. 
Once again, inspiring bravery and intrepid obedience to orders by the men and junior officers of 
the corps was squandered by a complete failure of command, control, and coordination, due in 
large part to the complex terrain and expansive distance between maneuvering elements.849 
 Fortunately, at Arkansas Post and during both Vicksburg assaults, Rebel forces ensconced 
snugly behind their protective works had never yet attempted the coup de grâce of any 
successful defensive effort: a bayonet counterattack. The peculiar contour of Tunnel Hill and 
Missionary Ridge, however, offered unique opportunities for adept Rebel leadership, embodied 
in Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne, to land a devastating counterpunch. After all six of the brigades 
Sherman had committed piecemeal to the attack had been forced to ground by Rebel fire, and 
after nearly four hours of close-range sharpshooting began dwindle supplies of ammunition, at 
about four o’clock disaster struck.850 
 Watching from the slopes of Billy Goat Hill as his regiment idled in reserve, Maj. 
Thomas Taylor, 47th Ohio, stood anxiously near an equally nervous Sherman who “chewed the 
stump of his cigar earnestly.” Suddenly, the command team distinctly heard the yipping Rebel 
yell through the din, followed by a handful of blue-coated men sprinting from the trees off the 
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hill. “Anon others and whole regiments came flying back,” Taylor watched. Shortly thereafter 
entire Federal brigades came flying off the ridge – the victims of a brutal Rebel counterattack 
that swept across the face of Tunnel Hill and took each of them in the flank. The result was pure 
pandemonium. “Oh, what a stampede – each one for himself,” Taylor lamented. “I was mad and 
uttered a few expletives,” he admitted, but took solace in an explanation he overheard for the 
disgraceful behavior before him. “I was informed they were of Chancellorsville, Va. and not 
from the 15th A.C.,” he wrote, referencing the Army of the Potomac men the corps had first 
encountered in Lookout Valley a few days prior. Certainly these could not have been rugged 
“Vicksburg rats” routing ingloriously from the hillside. “The rebels followed, shrieking like 
fiends,” he watched, as the disaster continued to unfold. “The poor, cowardly devils run over that 
space,” he added. “I never saw such a sight before.” Fortunately, the “boys of the 15th [Corps] 
held their own.” While indeed the fugitives were exclusively men of John Smith’s Seventeenth 
Corps and the lone Pennsylvanian brigade, the Fifteenth Corps had only barely “held their own,” 
and very shortly thereafter began to withdraw from their sharpshooting positions. Sherman’s 
assault had failed, at a cost of nearly 2,000 men killed, wounded, and captured.851 
 In his history of the campaign, historian Peter Cozzens deems the attack on Tunnel Hill 
“one of the sorriest episodes in this or any other battle of the war.” The failure of the Fifteenth 
Corps to succeed in turning Rebel lines “defies explanation,” he argues. That Sherman “had the 
forces needed to do it is undeniable.” Still, while Sherman’s piecemeal deployment of only a 
small fraction of his 30,000 total men available still routinely comes in for condemnation by 
historians, given the extremely limited viable frontage atop Tunnel Hill, combined with the 
nightmarish terrain and prohibitive enfilading fire to its east, it is hard to see how he could have 
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possibly done better. While Cozzens argues that “it is undeniable” that Sherman “had the forces 
needed to do it,” such an assertion is based entirely on quantitative measurements. Qualitatively, 
the general himself had every good reason to believe that, in fact, he did not.852 
 To be fair, the odds of success were by no means improved by Sherman's selection of 
brigades to make the assault. As at Chickasaw, Arkansas Post, and Vicksburg, successfully 
assaulting the entrenched Rebels atop the high ground called for high levels of confidence and 
collective efficacy – neither of which the regiments of Ewing’s new division enjoyed. None of 
the regiments in Corse’s brigade had ever before assaulted enemy breastworks, let alone fortified 
rifle pits and gun positions perched atop such a foreboding height. The very same could be said 
for Loomis’s command. In fact, the only Federal units then on the field who could claim past 
success in frontal assaults were those of John Smith’s division, resting idly in reserve to the rear 
of Billy Goat Hill for most of the battle, and finally committed only when it was too late to have 
much effect.  
 Even so, whereas most histories of the battle have focused on the bloody assault and 
repulse of Ewing’s and Smith’s brigades, relatively little effort has been made to explain the lack 
of any simultaneous coordinated attack by Tupper’s First Brigade on the backside of Tunnel Hill. 
This trend is especially curious, given that most historians continue to blame Sherman’s failure, 
to a significant degree, on the lack of any such attack. Had Tupper assaulted the hill along his 
front, they argue, Cleburne’s position atop the crest would have been doubly enveloped, if not 
completely surrounded, likely routing it in its entirety and collapsing the whole right flank of 
Bragg’s army. As such a Rebel disaster probably would have occurred almost simultaneously 
with contemporaneous breakthroughs on Bragg’s left, the maneuver may very well have secured 
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the total destruction of the Army of Tennessee, and perhaps even the end of major operations in 
the western theater.853 
 This specific criticism of Sherman’s handling of the battle first began with an operational 
narrative penned by Brig. Gen. William F. “Baldy” Smith shortly after the war. Sherman ought to 
have “put in all his force to turn Bragg’s right, instead of attacking the strongest place on the 
right,” he insisted.854 Nearly every subsequent historian has agreed. Tupper’s brigade had been 
“within rifle range of cracking the fragile shell of Cleburne’s defenses to the right of Tunnel 
Hill,” Cozzens argues. Neither Sherman nor Morgan Smith nor Tupper had apparently given 
“any serious thought to the brigade or what it might accomplish.” Although tantalizingly 
proximate to the rear of Rebel defenses atop Tunnel Hill during the day, the brigade had never 
been ordered to attack. Had things gone otherwise, the brigade “might have changed the outcome 
of the fight,” Cozzens argues. The fact that the veterans had not even been “permitted to try” 
was, by his estimation, “unconscionable.”855 Even so, although long castigated by historians as 
all but incomprehensible, Sherman’s reluctance to employ Smith’s brigade in a heavier attack up 
the backside of Tunnel Hill is far more easily explained when historicized within the broader 
context of the Fifteenth Corps’s operational history and its evolved tactical culture.  
 One artifact of the corps’s tactical culture which had, by the winter of 1863, become so 
firmly held as to approach dogma, was the tradition and principal of unit rotation on the front 
lines. Those commands which had most recently been employed in an arduous mission or under 
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fire were customarily held in reserve during the next phase of operations. This principal of using 
the “freshest” troops to spearhead each operation had been standard practice since Chickasaw 
Bayou, so much so that the men and their officers had come to expect it. Those in Second 
Division outside of Lightburn’s brigade openly assumed that Sherman's reluctance to employ 
them more directly in the assault had been motivated by this very tradition. “They were held 
back for the reason that they were the brigade which risked so much in the start, and performed 
the feat of crossing the river in boats and landing right under the enemy's works at night,” one 
explained. The nighttime crossing of the Tennessee had been exceedingly dangerous, the 
exhausted brigade had hardly slept in nearly forty-eight hours, and its beloved commander of 
more than a year had been lost to it only the night before. Thus, Sherman respectfully held the 
command in reserve the next day. In addition, of all the brigades in the corps, Tupper’s contained 
the greatest number of regiments which had comprised Sherman’s much beloved “old Division.” 
For this reason, he may very well have been moved by an even unconscious, if quite vain, urge 
not to destroy them in a maneuver he had every reason to believe would not, indeed could not, 
succeed.856 
 Not all historians have been as merciless toward Sherman’s decisions as others. Several 
undeniable practical factors also precluded any dramatic charge launched up the rear slope of 
Tunnel Hill by Smith’s brigade. By far the strongest of Sherman’s defenders, B. H. Liddell Hart, 
in his 1929 biography of the general, argued that to throw more men into the narrow corridor 
between Tunnel Hill and the South Chickamauga Creek – Tupper’s front – “would not only lead 
them to a well-blocked end but would have massed his troops along a defile under the fire of the 
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Confederate guns on the heights and on other heights beyond the river.” Indeed, aside from the 
nearly impossible terrain in the sector, Giles Smith’s command would have likely become the 
victims of enfilading fire from nearly every direction had it continued to advance. “Compressed 
cannon-fodder, indeed,” he added grimly.857 
 In the end, a number of interacting factors, some endogenous and other exogenous to the 
Fifteenth Corps, culminated to prevent any decisive attack by Tupper’s brigade during November 
25, 1863. While historians continue to debate whether or not such an attack may have, at the very 
least, destroyed or captured an entire division or more of Bragg’s army, such alternative histories 
are fundamentally less helpful to understanding the Chattanooga campaign than are maximally 
holistic explanations for the decisions and operational behaviors that did occur. Such 
explanations are only possible by placing the events of that day within the broad context of the 
particular histories of the individuals and commands involved and considering them within the 
separate but related context of the particular operational situation and terrain confronted at the 
time.  
 While never saying so explicitly, Sherman’s behavior left breadcrumbs of clues that 
suggest a powerful evolution in his awareness of the true capabilities of the men, officers, and 
regiments of his Fifteenth Corps. For a year, “the great charger S[herman],” as a dejected Henry 
Kircher once referred to him, had seemed to maintain “that everything can be forced by the 
stormers without knowing the terrain or testing it.”858 His nuanced approach to the “miniature 
Vicksburg” at Jackson had suggested to many that a change of heart, if not yet of mind, may 
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have been in process. Given the liberty of independently determining if or when to employ a 
bloody frontal assault, he happily chose not to. Given Grant’s positive orders to attack at Tunnel 
Hill, his hand had been forced. Still, despite the destruction of Ewing’s and John Smith’s 
divisions strewn across the northern and western slopes of Tunnel Hill, it seemed that Cump was 
nearing the apex of his learning curve. While never willing to consider insubordination, he also 
knew better than any other living officer what his corps was capable of, and what it was not. 
From this point on, though not without occasional missteps, he began to act accordingly. He had 
finally become one of them. 
III. “Ah, colonel, this is glorious!” 
 Divorced from their native corps as they frequently had been over the previous twelve 
months, the veteran brigades of Osterhaus’s First Division experienced a very different series of 
engagements, and thus experiences, serving under the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker. 
Initially charged by Grant with making a feint toward Lookout Mountain (considered by all to be 
less tactically important than Missionary Ridge, despite its greater elevation), Hooker was slated 
to play a bit role in the coming drama by comparison with Sherman. This was by design. After 
“Fighting Joe’s” lackluster performance at the battle of Chancellorsville in May, the entire nation 
remained ambivalent about his command capabilities. Although mostly unfair, Grant shared in 
their skepticism, and thus planned for Hooker and his Potomac veterans to do little more than 
hold the attention of those Rebels atop Lookout Mountain while his trusted friend Cump landed 
the key blow.859 
 At a height of 2,388 feet, Lookout Mountain commanded the entire region. Peering up at 
the ominous height from Lookout Valley at its base, Pvt. Calvin Ainsworth, 25th Iowa, confided 
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his thoughts to his diary. “Lookout Mountain looms up before us like a giant,” he wrote. “Our 
forces must take it.”860 Between Hooker’s camps and the mountain itself lay a wide valley 
through which ran the waters of Lookout Creek. Only four viable crossing points were evident 
on the map, at least two of which would need to be secured before any force could so much as 
begin to address the immense challenge of scaling the mountain while simultaneously 
confronting its Rebel defenders. No feint toward the mountain would convince anyone if 
exclusively conducted on the west bank of the creek.861 
 Conferring with his new temporary commander at Hooker’s headquarters on the night of 
November 23, as Second Division piled into the pontoon boats miles away to the east, Osterhaus 
was present when an urgent dispatch from Grant arrived near midnight. The message ordered 
Hooker to “abandon the scheme of a feint,” Osterhaus recalled, “and with the assistance of my 
Division to attack and dislodge the Rebels from their Lookout positions.”862 Accordingly, late 
into the night the two officers hatched a plan by which Hooker’s Potomac brigades would cross 
Lookout Creek some distance to the south, scale the mountain beyond the Rebel defenses, and 
sweep northward along its slope as if to brush the unsuspecting Secessionists off the heights and 
into the river. Meanwhile, Osterhaus would keep up appearances in the valley and repair the 
bridge he required to add his own weight to the attack. Waiting to act as the dustpan for Hooker’s 
northward sweep, once the bridge was ready, Osterhaus would advance against the face of the 
mountain at the moment he perceived the Easterners as having reached a point immediately 
adjacent to his front. By that point, the Rebels would be on the run, and First Division would 
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have little left to do but police prisoners and apply additional pressure wherever needed. It was 
the kind of parsimonious plan the Prussian could appreciate, and thus very early the next 
morning things were set in motion.863 
 In customary fashion, Osterhaus planned to fulfill his part of the operation in a manner 
most conservative with the blood of his division. Recent experience in skirmishes during the 
march to Chattanooga had illustrated to him how adept his new command was at combining 
accurate artillery gunnery with small unit maneuver as skirmishers without any need for larger 
massed infantry advances or bayonet assaults. This style of attack differed dramatically from that 
employed by Hooker’s Potomac veterans, who were to conduct nearly the entirety of the 
operation without even so much as a skirmisher screen, massed shoulder-to-shoulder until the 
terrain made such tactics impossible, just as their own particular experience in the Eastern theater 
had taught them to do.  
 As Hooker’s legions started southward toward their respective crossing points, the 
Prussian mounted the division's fourteen heavy guns atop a string of hills skirting Lookout Creek 
which afforded overwatch of all the viable crossing points in his sector, and a clear shot to the 
still fog shrouded western slopes of Lookout Mountain. Detaching a few of the “skeleton” 
regiments from both Williamson’s and Woods’s brigades to support these batteries in the event of 
a Rebel surprise, Osterhaus set the guns to suppressing enemy pickets on the east bank of the 
creek while his pioneers toiled to repair the bridges over the creek. The rest of Woods’s brigade 
fanned out as skirmishers along the west bank to add their own covering fire to that of the 
batteries in an effort to prevent any Rebel suppression of the pioneers.864 The veteran gunners of 
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First Division’s batteries employed their Vicksburg-borne skills with deadly effect. “The rebels 
can scarcely move,” one Hawkeye supporting the guns observed. “We see them dodge from rock 
to rock, the shot and shell is poured into them directly in front of Hookers advancing column so 
they have but little to oppose them.”865 From the perspective of a nearby Missourian, the frantic 
Rebels looked “so small, like ants swarming on the mountain.”866 The combined fire of riflemen 
and artillery, just as it had done at Vicksburg, achieved complete fire superiority while also 
distracting those Rebels further south from the comparatively silent advance of Hooker’s 
columns up the slopes of the mountain. The fog also assisted in this, shrouding the maneuvers of 
the Federals in the valley just as it hid the approach of Sherman’s ill-fated columns toward the 
northern end of Missionary Ridge. 
 By ten o’clock, the veteran pioneers had already finished with the bridge, and all that 
remained was to await the arrival of the Potomac men herding frantic Rebels from the right at the 
point of the bayonet. After only another hour, sounds of heavy musketry on the right made clear 
that Hooker would not disappoint. In very short time, as the fog began to dissipate, all in the 
valley caught a glimpse of the operation unfolding precisely according to plan. “Up, up, they go 
in a straight line,” one Hawkeye watched, “a long unwavering line of blue” sweeping across the 
face of Lookout Mountain.867 Another was awed by the sight of rigid discipline under fire. “How 
steadily and with a fine alignment [did] the Potomac veterans face that storm of lead,” he 
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wrote.868 As thinly-manned Secessionist defenses were visibly being rolled up by the Easterners 
from the south, Osterhaus knew it was First Division’s moment to strike. On his command, the 
batteries redoubled their fire in an effort to exacerbate the chaos whirling around the surprised 
Rebel lines and Woods’s Missourians crossed the creek and started toward the western face in 
line of battle, with a dense skirmisher “cloud” advanced well to the front.869 
 Pushing forward up the steep slope from tree to tree, Woods’s skirmishers encountered 
sharp resistance from their dispersed Rebel counterparts, but also enormous numbers of 
frightened surrendering Secessionists.870 Added to those who had been surprised in the valley by 
the sudden Federal rush over the creek, the “skeleton” regiments were quickly overwhelmed by 
the need for detachments to watch over the many prisoners. In fact, by the time the command 
had made it half way up the slope, so many of Osterhaus’s 250-man regiments had been detached 
from their “tactical battalions” that both Woods and Williamson (having advanced his Hawkeyes 
over the creek and into connection with Woods’s right) were rapidly running out of available 
manpower to contribute to a fight which continued to escalate in ferocity as their battalions 
climbed the slope. Indeed, the grade itself posed serious challenges. “It was not an easy task and 
not much fun,” John Buegel, 3rd Missouri later remembered. “If one took a step forward he 
slipped back two.”871 
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 Identifying the front line quickly became difficult. Scattered in small groups behind 
cover, just “as they had fought at Vicksburg,” each of the scattered riflemen of First Division 
fought his own independent battle to gain the initiative in the firefight, coordinating individually 
with his comrades to combine their fire and maneuver. “Each man fought his own way,” one 
Hawkeye observed, “here and there a squad but all with faces up the Steep [slope].”872 One 
“Potomac officer” nearby, anticipating that the lack of any discernible battle line would spell 
disaster for the Westerners, later spoke with surprise about how the division fought “like rats … 
broke all up, but the pieces kept a going.”873  
 Watching the adept independent maneuver, coordination, and skirmishing prowess 
displayed all along the western face of Lookout Mountain, it was hard to believe that these men, 
though a fragment of their former numbers, were the very same who less than a year prior had 
charged up the bald slopes of the Walnut Hills in “popular pictorial” fashion, straining to 
maintain their formations as their comrades were mercilessly cut down. It was hard to believe 
that they were the same men who had struggled through point-blank shock volleys at Arkansas 
Post, enduring a violent baptism by fire before they learned first-hand the psychological power 
of shooting back. It was hard to believe that the veteran sharpshooters fighting individually from 
cover could be the same men who had hurled themselves in a tightly packed mass at the 
Louisiana Lunette as their division commander screamed “Forward! Forward!” Indeed, it was 
hard to believe that the veteran officers deftly maneuvering their “tactical battalions” 
independently across the rugged terrain, and the individual skirmish teams, fighting tree to tree 
and boulder to boulder, were the same men who had terribly bungled so many seemingly 
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straightforward maneuvers in the past. But while the flesh and blood of First Division scaling the 
face of Lookout Mountain that afternoon remained the same, it no longer consisted of green 
“new” regiments full of impressionable citizen volunteers. These were “soldiers from 
experience.” 
 Upon receiving word that a nearby Potomac brigade was rapidly running out of 
ammunition, “the Red One” sprung into action, gathering together two hundred men from the 3rd 
Missouri and about the same from the 27th, forging an impromptu battalion-sized element from 
the dispersed pieces of his modular division and rushing up the slope to the rescue. Consolidating 
behind the cover of a rock wall situated on a bench of flat land running along the northern slope 
of the mountain, the riflemen of Woods’s brigade arrived just in time. Sensing that the Easterners 
had run out of ammunition, Rebel reinforcements rushed into position in an attempt to stem what 
had become a catastrophic situation for the Secessionists. Near dusk, they launched a desperate 
counterattack. Unbeknownst to the yipping Rebels, Osterhaus’s “Vicksburg rats” awaited them. 
For the first time in the Fifteenth Corps’s history, the tables were turned.874 
 Kneeling behind a rock wall with their rifles loaded, the Missourians immediately 
recognized the situation from their own painful experience. “We were well protected and knew 
the game,” John Buegel wrote, “so we let Johnny Reb approach within a hundred paces, and then 
gave them hot fire. The effect was the same as we had seen at Arkansas Post and Vicksburg.” 
This time, there was “death and destruction in the ranks of the enemy” instead of among those of 
First Division. After only “a few more salvoes of the same sort, those who were still alive ran in 
wild flight,” and that “put an end to the slaughter.”875 Having learned their own lesson, the 
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repulsed Rebels fell back and took cover, just as Buegel and his comrades had done in the 
aftermath of their own repulse at Arkansas Post. The irregular opposing lines of skirmishers 
strung out along the slopes hunkered down as dusk turned to night. 
 Riflemen continued to exchange sporadic fire through the dark for the entire chilly 
evening. Others simply lay on the ground, “wet to the skin, without fire, and hungry without 
anything to eat.”876 A few attempted to kindle small fires behind boulders until the dim light 
drew the fire of Rebel sharpshooters further up on the mountain.877 By midnight, many in 
Osterhaus’s division had expended all of the hundred rounds issued to them earlier that 
morning.878 Eventually, however, the enemy fire  slackened and then silenced altogether. At 
dawn the cause became evident: the Rebels were gone. Hooker had successfully seized Lookout 
Mountain.879 
 While their successes would have been impossible without the valiant and able efforts of 
Hooker’s main effort, Osterhaus’s veterans had proven their tactical prowess when employed in 
close accordance with their evolved skillset and tactical culture and allowed the independence to 
operate in their own inimitable fashion. Tasked with elements of the larger mission well 
calibrated to their unique capabilities as a combined arms element that coordinated the effects of 
long-range, accurate artillery gunnery with dispersed skirmisher “clouds,” those in the ranks 
gained markedly in their self-confidence. The opportunity to return the favor of repeated brutal 
repulses at the hands of entrenched Rebels only solidified their confidence and increased the 
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intense respect their history had imparted for the advantages accruing to defenders behind works 
issuing a last minute shock volley. 
 As the sun rose, and Sherman began his preparations to launch his ill-advised piecemeal 
assaults far away on the “northern extremity of Missionary Ridge,” Hooker began his own 
preparations to continue in his contributions to Grant’s larger plans. The men found the air atop 
the mountain “pure and fine as in paradise,” and the sun quickly became so warm “that our 
clothes soon dried on our bodies.”880 At ten o’clock, Osterhaus received Hooker’s orders to 
prepare First Division to lead the way off Lookout Mountain eastward into Chattanooga Valley, 
toward Rossville Gap and the southern end of Missionary Ridge in pursuit of the fleeing Rebels. 
As the division trudged off the mountain and eastward into the valley, the desperate fighting on 
Tunnel Hill was clearly audible to the northeast, even at considerable distance. “I think it is the 
heaviest I ever heard,” one Hawkeye considered.881 
 Discovering the bridge across Chattanooga Creek, halfway through the valley, burned by 
retreating Rebels, Osterhaus once again set his small 70-man bi-racial pioneer detachment to 
work. Just as at Lookout Creek the day before, they were protected by skirmishers from Woods’s 
brigade who managed to cross over a narrow “hastily constructed” foot bridge of driftwood and 
fan out among the trees along the east bank. Immediately coming under fire by Rebel infantry, 
the skirmishers of the 27th Missouri once again leaned on their skills as riflemen honed in the 
trenches at Vicksburg to keep them at bay while the pioneers toiled.882 
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 In the time it took to cross the rest of Osterhaus’s infantry over the impromptu bridge, an 
enemy battery managed to unlimber in the middle of Rossville Gap supported by two regiments 
of infantry, intent on making a last stand to protect the vulnerable extreme left of Bragg’s army 
atop Missionary Ridge. While, almost without question, the hard-charging Steele likely would 
have attempted to overwhelm the meager Secessionist gunners with the full weight of a massed 
bayonet assault by his entire division, “the Red One” was too conservative for such a blunt 
approach. Instead, he once again tapped into what he knew to be the division’s proven acumen 
for maneuverability and pursued a double envelopment of the enemy guns. First Division split 
into two diverging brigade columns. Woods’s command headed to the right to scale an 
exceedingly steep slope on the left flank of the Rebel battery and Williamson’s column cut left to 
scale the southern end of Missionary Ridge. While the frustrated Rebels managed to fire a few 
salvos in the direction of Woods’s flanking regiments, they quickly ascertained the extreme 
threat posed by their being outmaneuvered on both flanks and abandoned the gap entirely, 
fleeing to the east and out of the battle. At almost zero cost to his division, Osterhaus had single-
handedly captured the strategically vital Rossville Gap and, as no Rebel forces now held the 
terrain east of Missionary Ridge, the thinly defended extreme rear of Bragg’s entire army.883 
 Climbing back off the steep slopes after confirmation of the Rebel rout, Woods’s and 
Williamson’s ebullient commands rallied at a crossroads east of the gap to await Hooker’s 
orders. They arrived in short time. Osterhaus would continue northward along the road running 
behind Missionary Ridge toward Chattanooga, pushing any and all Rebel resistance aside and 
collecting prisoners while the Potomac men simultaneously swept across the crest and northern 
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slope of the ridge itself. In effect, the plan contemplated a repetition of the “battle above the 
clouds” the previous day. Due to the nature of the terrain, Hooker urged Osterhaus to act 
independently “as circumstances might demand,” with an understanding of the larger plan. This 
loose leash once again represented both Hooker’s confidence and respect for the Prussian’s 
tactical acumen, as well as a perfect opportunity for the division to continue to operate in a 
manner well calibrated to its strengths. 
 As Hooker’s divisions battled through consecutive lines of Rebels atop the ridge, taking 
each in the flank, Osterhaus pushed his two brigades northward “as fast as the column of infantry 
could move” along the backside of the ridge. Once he had ascertained that both brigades had 
outflanked all the Rebel units confronting Hooker, he changed front to the west, shifted the 
brigades into line of battle with skirmishers well to the front, and charged up the back slope. Lt. 
Col. A. J. Seay, long a critic of shoddy generalship, was floored at the sight of “our men running, 
yelling, shooting with furious impetuosity” as they hurdled confidently toward the Rebel rear. He 
considered it “the most restless charge I ever witnessed.” Falling almost entirely upon 
Secessionist infantry distracted by Hooker’s threat to their front, the maneuver was fantastically 
successful. “We’ve got ‘em in a pen!” the bare-headed Prussian shouted above the din, eagerly 
urging on both brigades.884 
 Bragg’s flank had been effectively converted into “a swirling, struggling mass of panic-
stricken men, signaling frantically to make us understand they surrendered,” one Buckeye wrote. 
“Each ran for himself as best he could to get out of range of our bullets,” another Missourian 
crowed.885 Continuing to surge northward through the confused masses of surrendering Rebels, 
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periodically pouring fire into the last vestiges of enemy defenders, the division was surprised to 
meet Thomas’s “Cumberlanders” also atop the crest of Missionary Ridge. Sent by Grant in a 
probing assault against the enemy pits at the base of the height designed to support Sherman’s 
flagging efforts on the northern end, the Army of the Cumberland had taken it upon themselves 
to continue all the way up the ridge that afternoon despite an absence of orders. Now, their 
impromptu actions were fortuitously coinciding with those of Hooker and Osterhaus to dismantle 
the Rebel army. Despite the total ignorance of Sherman and the remainder of the Fifteenth Corps 
to the north, shrouded from all visibility of these developments by the lay of the land, the battle 
for Chattanooga was rapidly nearing a victorious conclusion for Federal arms.886 
 As the massive attack of the “Cumberlanders” all across the entire western face of the 
ridge swept thousands of Rebels from their positions, Osterhaus’s veterans merely held their 
positions and collected prisoners. “The troops on the other side of the ridge had shaken the tree 
and we were holding the bag to get the fruit,” one Illinoisan later wrote. Overawed at the gravity 
of their success, the men of First Division let forth loud hurrahs while “the Red One” rode up 
and down the lines atop a captured Rebel horse shouting, “Two more hours daylight and we’ll 
destroy this army!” Turning to an aide, the beaming Prussian pronounced, “Ah, colonel, this is 
glorious!”887 
IV. “From the front we could not do anything” 
 Those Rebel commands on Bragg’s right that had avoided utter destruction or rout during 
the day escaped from Sherman’s front during the night, pulling out from their works silently. 
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Limping eastward, the badly damaged Army of Tennessee attempted to avoid total catastrophe 
by hurrying toward Ringgold, Georgia and a critical mountain gap of the same name. Hoping to 
bag or destroy the remainder of Bragg’s army, Grant somewhat belatedly ordered Hooker’s ad-
hoc corps to pursue.888 
 In the afternoon of November 26, First Division was on the road toward Ringgold. After 
making a distance of about six miles from Missionary Ridge, the division encountered its third 
burned bridge of the campaign at a critical crossing of Chickamauga Creek. A nearby ford served 
the purposes of ushering the infantry across the water, but there was no time to repair the main 
span adequately for the division’s batteries to join. Instead, the guns would have to wait for the 
time-consuming repair of the original bridge. Having whipped such an apparently mighty host 
without the help of artillery (the batteries having been left on the west bank of Chattanooga 
Creek) the day before, it is possible that some in First Division were not worried about 
potentially operating in their absence. Ever the consummate artillerist, Osterhaus was likely not 
among their number. Even so, when Hooker advised the Prussian that he intended to place First 
Division in the lead the next morning, and that contact with Bragg’s rear guard was likely 
somewhere near Ringgold, Osterhaus had no choice but to plan to operate without his precious 
guns.889 
 By that time the vast majority of the battered Rebel force, with the exception of the tail 
end of its baggage train, had already escaped through Ringgold Gap, leaving behind a token 
force commanded by none other than Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne, who had only two days prior 
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brutally repulsed Sherman’s legions from the works atop Tunnel Hill. The recent success of his 
regiments had left them quite confident in their ability to do so once again. Now, on the morning 
of November 27, the veteran Rebels would try their hands against the only remaining division of 
the Fifteenth Corps they had not yet encountered. Their defense, though meant to be little more 
than a delaying action, would be considerably eased by the heights of White Oak Mountain, 
towering over the gap on its northern flank. Covered with dense woods and pock-marked with 
massive boulders and irregular undulations, the western slopes of the rise offered ample 
opportunities for defensive positions, and Cleburne planned to use the mountain to prevent 
Federal efforts to flank northward while placing all his available artillery in the gap itself. As the 
gap’s southern flank was naturally protected by the waters of Chickamauga Creek, no double 
envelopment (like Osterhaus had conducted at Rossville) would be possible.890 
 Those in the ranks of First Division arriving in Ringgold west of the gap that morning 
took one look at the looming ridge they assumed held Rebels and immediately “knew the game.” 
Any direct assault would inevitably lead to the same bloody results as so many times before. 
“From the front we could not do anything,” John Buegel, 3rd Missouri, survivor of every one of 
the division’s failures from Arkansas Post to the Louisiana Lunette, scribbled in his diary. The 
enemy certainly “had all the heights fortified and well manned.” The only option was to advance 
“by flanking movements” in an attempt to dislodge the Secessionists from their strong position. 
Unfortunately, such was not to be the case.891 
  With nothing more than suppositions that the impressive heights of White Oak Mountain 
contained hidden Secessionists, Osterhaus judged that little more than tacit Rebel resistance held 
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the gap itself. Cleburne’s guns had been carefully masked from prying eyes by brush. After a 
brief conference with Hooker, the Prussian, in his typical tactically conservative fashion, offered 
that only a swift cavalry rush toward the gap was likely necessary. With no cavalry immediately 
on hand, and eager to bag Bragg’s trains, Hooker was not interested in delay. Instead, Osterhaus 
would launch a two-pronged frontal attack directly against the face of the mountain and into the 
gap itself, he explained, to be supported by an additional flanking movement by his Potomac 
veterans on the left if absolutely necessary. Ever the soldier's soldier, any reservations “the Red 
One” may have had about these orders were buried beneath his penchant for martial obedience. 
Despite his division’s heritage of failure in frontal assaults, despite the dread already recorded 
upon the pages of some in the ranks, and despite the absence of his beloved heavy guns, 
Osterhaus acceded to Hooker’s request.892 
 To their credit, Osterhaus, Wood, and Williamson approached the grim problem at hand 
with a nuance borne of their particular command experience and the culture of First Division. 
Despite a sweeping open plain extending for some distance before the mountain that offered 
plenty of room for a wide frontage of close-order formations and waving battle flags, the 
command trio instead approached the terrain and their tactics from the perspective of a 
“Vicksburg rat.” Through the middle of the plain, from north to south, ran the tracks of the 
Western & Atlantic Railroad, elevated on an earthen embankment that represented a natural 
breastwork almost identical to the levees the men had encountered at Chickasaw Bayou. 
Advancing in column and deploying into line of battle behind the embankment, the two brigades 
quickly established themselves in a defensive posture in preparation for Osterhaus’s orders to 
advance on the mountain and gap. 
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 At about nine o’clock, those orders came, and Woods’s 3rd, 12th, and 31st Missouri – 
originally nearly 2,500 men but now fewer than 600 in total – sallied over the embankment and 
toward the gap, screened by the skilled Turner skirmishers of the 17th Missouri, as usual. As the 
skirmishers neared the gap, however, Cleburne’s gunners rushed from hiding, tore away the 
brush screens from their batteries, and fired blasts of canister and shell toward the brigade that 
felled several of the Missourians and prompted Woods to immediately fall back to the protection 
of the embankment. Uninterested in risking mass casualties in any bayonet assault against the 
guns, Osterhaus took a more dynamic approach, seeking to concentrate “a converging fire on the 
enemy’s artillery, which I hoped to secure, by driving off the cannoneers and supports.” 
Harassing enemy batteries with sharpshooting fire was something the division had considerable 
experience at doing, and thus the plan was in close accordance with its tactical heritage. Ordering 
the veteran 13th Illinois to rush forward from the embankment and occupy a cluster of farm 
buildings that would allow them to employ their Vicksburg-borne sharpshooting skills to silence 
the guns, the fewer than three hundred remaining survivors of Blair’s desperate charge at 
Chickasaw Bayou once again flung themselves into the fray.893 
 Surprised at a sudden silence of Rebel arms as they approached the cluster of houses, the 
Illinoisans quickly closed the distance to the gap. The Secessionists having again masked their 
batteries, only when the regiment had neared the farmhouses did the gunners again return to their 
posts and send forth a blast of canister that tore directly into the left flank of the command. “This 
was a surprise and a severe test of our nerve and power of concession as a regiment,” one veteran 
later recalled, and “at a word from the officers, all the men lay flat on the ground but stayed in 
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place.”894 Hard won lessons for survival from past experience thrust the Suckers to the ground 
for protection. After a short time under fire, sharpshooters worked to suppress the Rebel batteries 
long enough that the regiment could sprint to the cover of the nearby farmhouses. Many never 
made it. Those who did immediately began to apply their sharpshooting skills from the windows 
of the barn and outhouses “in the most determined way.” Robbed of a consecutive series of 
commanding officers by Rebel fire, the men were mostly left to coordinate the desperate fight 
among themselves.895 
 Meanwhile, hoping to flank northward and seize the northern end of the mountain from 
Rebel units he had spied moving that direction along the crest, Osterhaus ordered Woods’s 76th 
Ohio along with Williamson’s 4th, 9th, and 25th Iowa to advance in a northeasterly direction and 
confront any Rebels they discovered on the western slope. While Williamson personally went 
forward with his Hawkeyes, Osterhaus retained the two hundred men of the 31st Iowa in reserve, 
deploying two of their companies as sharpshooters along the embankment to pepper the 
mountain with long-range covering fire as their brother Hawkeyes crossed the open expanse. 
Despite this support, Williamson’s advance faced harassing fire for the entire distance to the base 
of the hill, at which point the Buckeyes and Col. George Stone’s 25th Iowa began the long climb 
up the steep slope dispersed as skirmishers.896  
 Despite the rugged nature of the mountain, good cover for riflemen proved somewhat 
sparse. “A few large rocks and scattering trees and logs were the only places of safety,” Private 
Calvin Ainsworth observed. Having now spent more than a year fighting mostly as skirmishers 
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across all types of terrain, Ainsworth and his fellow Hawkeyes were experts at sniffing out any 
viable protection along a line of advance. Fighting across the unforgiving broken ground of the 
bayous and hills of Mississippi had imparted a particular skill and predisposition toward fighting 
“Indian fashion,” as Ainsworth called it, “each man for himself, dodging from tree to tree, from 
rock to rock, advancing in the meantime.”897 Such a tactic seemed to them the only viable 
method by which the Rebels ensconced along the crest could safely be challenged. “Every time 
we would expose ourselves the bullets would rain around us,” Ainsworth explained.898 Thus, 
each Iowan sought first and foremost “to get a tree between myself and the rebel bullets.”899 
 A considerable distance behind the four-man Hawkeye skirmisher teams creeping 
cautiously up the slope was Williamson's massed battle line. The veteran general had no 
intention of storming the ridge with a close order bayonet charge. His Iowans had attempted such 
futile maneuvers too many times before. He had no idea whether or not the Rebels hiding in the 
dense brush at the crest, engaging his skirmishers at opportunity, were already ensconced behind 
breastworks, but he had no intention of finding out the hard way. If necessary, those Iowans not 
bounding from cover to cover with the skirmishers could be deployed incrementally to support 
their dispersed comrades, but barring any unforeseen contingency, he planned to fulfill his 
mission with the least possible risk to his brigade.900 
 As the skirmisher battle on the northern end of the mountain ebbed and flowed, 
seesawing Williamson’s lines alternatively further up or down the western slope of White Oak 
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Mountain, Cleburne made a risky move. Hoping to break through Woods’s line at the railroad 
embankment in a counterattack similar to that which they had enjoyed so much luck with against 
Sherman at Tunnel Hill, several Rebel battalions came hurdling out of the gap and into the open. 
Comfortably situated behind the embankment, Woods’s veterans still “knew the game,” just as 
they had proven on Lookout Mountain a few days prior. Waiting until the Secessionists had come 
within easy range, the Missourians let loose several “well-directed volleys” that promptly 
dismantled the assault and sent the survivors hurrying back into the gap. Trying to consolidate 
their tactical victory, Woods’s riflemen continued to ply their deadly trade as marksmen borne of 
long experience in the Vicksburg works. Every time “a rebel stuck his head out from behind a 
tree, he would be fired upon,” one Missourian remembered.901 
 Hooker seems to have been as unimpressed with this defensive feat as he was frustrated 
with the lack of forward progress. Bragg’s trains were escaping, and Osterhaus and his 
Westerners seemed apparently less than up to the task at hand. Greatly annoyed at the sight of 
Woods’s initial repulse from the Rebel battery in the gap, and with Williamson’s apparent lack of 
obvious momentum on the left, he decided it was time to add more weight to the northern 
flanking effort. Casting about for available troops, he chose Brig. Gen. John Geary’s Second 
Division, and more specifically Colonel William Creighton’s brigade of Potomac veterans, for 
the maneuver. The manner in which Creighton’s command approached its mission, in stark 
contrast to its Fifteenth Corps counterparts, illustrated dramatic differences in tactical cultures – 
each derived from very different operational heritages.  
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 Delivering his orders to Creighton in person, Geary instructed him “to charge up the ridge 
and drive the enemy from it.”902 Without pause, even given the obvious difficulty Williamson’s 
Hawkeyes were having with accomplishing the same objective, Creighton ordered his four 
regiments into two tightly-packed lines of battle, each with orders to maintain a strict distance of 
one hundred yards from the other. The foremost contingents were the 28th and 147th 
Pennsylvania, with Creighton's own original 7th Ohio and 66th Ohio following behind in 
support.903 The brigade crossed most of the intervening open ground between the railroad 
embankment and the foot of White Oak Mountain without issue, given the preoccupation of most 
of the Rebels atop the height with the sharp skirmisher fight along its slopes. Creighton 
maneuvered the brigade slightly to the left of Williamson’s massed reserve waiting at the base of 
the mountain for the results of the skirmisher battle ahead. One look at the tightly packed battle 
lines of the Potomac regiments shocked the Hawkeyes, who had rarely seen any experienced 
veteran command approach combat in such a fashion. Worse, on their current trajectory, once 
upon the slope they would risk breaking up the cohesion of the Hawkeye skirmisher “cloud” 
which extended some distance beyond the flanks of the massed Iowan reserve to the rear.904 
 Spurring his mount hurriedly over to Creighton’s formation, Col. George Stone “ordered 
and begged” the onrushing regiments to shift their formation further to the left so as to avoid 
breaking up the integrity of his skirmishers, but “the officers in command said they had orders 
for doing as they did,” Williamson later reported, “and persisted in their course.” At the very 
least hoping to reduce what seemed their all but inevitable imminent destruction, Stone warned 
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the intransigent officers that should their battle lines continue approaching the slope “in the 
manner they were going,” massed in tight formation “as if on parade,” and without even the 
benefit of a skirmisher screen, the hidden enemy would most assuredly cut them to pieces just as 
soon as they came within close range. Indeed, he and his 25th Iowa had learned that very lesson 
the hard way at Arkansas Post. He advised breaking up the ranks and deploying companies into 
four-man skirmish teams as his Hawkeyes had done prior to picking their way carefully up the 
ridge behind cover. The Potomac men would have none of Stone's entreaties, brushing him aside 
with a cocky rebuff about how they intended to “teach 'Western troops a lesson.'” Another Iowan 
overheard one of Creighton's officers shout out to his men that they would “show these western 
boys how to fight.”905 
 Approaching the base of the slope, Creighton halted his Pennsylvanians and fired a volley 
blindly toward the crest, as if to announce his arrival on the field. After this ineffectual fire, the 
supporting Potomac veterans continued boldly up the slope, still with no skirmishers deployed to 
their front.906 By the time the line had crawled within sight of the Rebels atop the heights, the 
Potomac men were exhausted. “It was as much as we could do to climb the rough and steep 
mountain-side without having to fight,” one remarked. Still bent on showing “these western boys 
how to fight,” Creighton ordered his men to fire by carefully controlled volleys, into the dense 
woods without knowing precisely what was to their front. The results were less than spectacular. 
“We were tired,” one admitted, “and our fire was not delivered with that accuracy and effect that 
might have been hoped for.”907 Though the brigade had unquestionably “advanced beautifully,” 
 
905 Williamson’s OR Report, 616-617; “Report of Col. George Stone,” Nov. 28, 1863, OR, I:31, II, 623; Calvin 
Ainsworth [25 IA] Diary, Nov. 27, 1863, Calvin Ainsworth Diary, Bentley Historical Library. 
906 Krieger [7 OH] Report, Dec. 3, 1863, OR, I:31, II, 418. 
907 George Skinner, Pennsylvania at Chickamauga and Chattanooga (W. M. Stanley Bay, 1900), 84.  
398 
even given the unforgiving terrain, its combat effectiveness upon arrival before the foe left much 
to be desired.908  
 Recognizing the need to attempt to turn the Rebel line, but still wanting to do so with a 
flourish, Creighton ordered his own 7th Ohio out of reserve and up a draw to the left. “Boys, we 
are ordered to take that hill,” he shouted, characteristically adding that he wanted “to see you 
walk right up it.” Struggling mightily to maintain their useless formational integrity in the ascent, 
the Ohioans maneuvered into column and made their way up the ravine the best they could, “not 
stopping to return the fire” that emanated from every Rebel who suddenly noticed the 
opportunity to pour lead into an unprepared Federal column blindly groping its way up the slope. 
This fire rapidly grew in both volume and intensity until finally it reached a pitch altogether “too 
heavy and effective for flesh and blood to withstand.”909. The Buckeye commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Orrin Crane, was among the first to fall. Perceiving that the same fate may befall 
themselves, the Pennsylvanians fell back in panic and confusion. It was only a matter of 
moments before the valiant Creighton shared Crane's fate, and soon the entire brigade found 
itself in a panicked rout down the slope. A consummate showman to the last, Creighton pleaded 
with those nearby to “Tell my wife I died at the head of my command,” as his brigade fled for its 
life off the bloody slope of White Oak Mountain.910 
 Even during the hottest moments of the engagement, the Hawkeye skirmishers had 
watched with great interest what seemed the almost exotic behavior and tactics of the Easterners. 
“I noticed that when one of their officers fell half a dozen men would break ranks to carry him 
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off the field,” Ainsworth observed. “That is something we never did.”911 Indeed, the Potomac 
regiments operated almost as if part of an altogether different army from that in which the 
Hawkeyes had served across their previous year in uniform. When Crieighton's line finally 
broke, however, there was no time for fascinating ethnography. The Potomac veterans, so 
recently filled with bluster, routed directly through the scattered Hawkeye skirmish teams, 
carrying them all in a blue tide rushing down the steep slope “like an avalanche, carrying 
everything before them,” Williamson later grieved. Fleeing his scant cover, Hawkeye Calvin 
Ainsworth “never ran, or tried to run so hard in my life. Bullets were flying about my head and I 
could see the dust rise whenever the ball struck the ground.”912 Halting at the foot of the 
mountain, where Williamson managed to rally his command, the brigade gave up on its orders to 
seize the mountain and determined to merely hold its position instead. Hooker’s attack had 
failed. Left alone near the crest, the remnants of the 76th Ohio’s skirmisher teams rallied to form 
a defensive perimeter and independently fought off successive Rebel counterattacks until finally 
disengaging and withdrawing down the slope. In the interim, the Buckeyes suffered nearly 40% 
losses. Finally, at about one o’clock, the exhausted and disoriented brigade heard the distinctive 
thunder of Maj. Clement Landgraeber’s howitzers echo through the valley. The artillery had 
arrived at long last, but it was too late. Cleburne and his Rebel rear guard, along with the tail of 
Bragg’s army, was already gone.913 
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V. “The way in which they attempted to go” 
 Few officers or soldiers in Williamson's command came away from the battle at Ringgold 
Gap with the impression that Creighton's regiments had failed in their mission due to cowardice. 
“The fault of these regiments seemed to be more in the way in which they attempted to go up the 
hill than in anything else,” Williamson determined. His Hawkeyes had naturally “preferred the 
method of taking [the ridge] by skirmishing and cautiously advancing.” The Potomac men, in 
sharp contrast, “tried to go up as if on parade where the men could barely have gone up by 
clinging to the rocks and bushes.”914 
 Williamson’s remarks represented one of the most clear and concise elaborations of the 
Fifteenth Corps’s historically-derived tactical culture, while also highlighting the profound 
differences between the tactical preferences of his own brigade and those of Creighton’s veterans 
of other fields. The fact that his comments contained such a matter-of-fact air to them illustrates 
just how solidified the corps’s tactical culture had become. After all, a tactical culture constituted 
little more than a shared collection of habitual preferences that informed and shaped “the way in 
which [a unit] attempted to” prosecute its assigned objectives both in and out of combat. A year’s 
worth of specific experience had forged a tactical culture within the ranks of Williamson’s 
brigade, along with that of most its parent Fifteenth Corps, that habitually “preferred the method 
of … skirmishing and cautiously advancing” as opposed to boldly storming enemy positions at 
the point of the bayonet, “as if on parade,” in the manner of Creighton’s tightly-massed ranks. 
The corps’s preference for tactical conservatism had little to do with its Western sociocultural 
origins. After all, most of Creighton’s regiments were comprised of Westerners as well, having 
been raised in the very same state as Woods’s Buckeyes of the 76th Ohio. The less than subtle 
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differences in “the way in which they attempted to go” at White Oak Mountain were far more 
closely related to a much more recent history: the experiences each brigade had undergone while 
in uniform, the meanings they had attributed to those experiences, and the specific lessons 
derived from them. The resultant tactical culture that thrived within each organization shaped the 
manner in which its members collectively interpreted and anticipated the orders they were given, 
prepared themselves for what was likely to occur, and responded to it when it did. It also 
represented the full panoply of learned skills, strengths, and weaknesses maintained by all the 
members of the unit by virtue of having passed through particular ordeals together.  
 If there had been any doubt about the Fifteenth Corps's particular strengths and 
weaknesses, the long Chattanooga campaign had removed any and all lingering ambiguity. From 
the rank and file of both divisions to Sherman's headquarters, a coherent set of beliefs, 
assumptions, and predispositions governing tactical-level decision-making, behavior, and 
performance had emerged in the aftermath of the Vicksburg campaign and remained indelibly 
etched in the ranks of all the corps's subordinate regiments and batteries. Among the most 
prominent aspects of this corps-wide culture were (1) a preference for fundamentally 
conservative tactical choices, with an emphasis on the use of artillery and open order skirmisher 
“clouds” and sharpshooting details as the main effort in almost all offensive operations, (2) an 
almost complete lack of confidence in the capability of massed bayonet assaults (friendly or 
enemy) to successfully overcome even modest breastworks, (3) a corresponding affinity for 
indirect over direct maneuver solutions in general, and finally (4) a strategic preference for long-
range maneuver and resource denial over direct armed confrontation with Rebels. 
 The battles for Chattanooga ultimately had little new to teach the veterans of Sherman’s 
corps about the nature of combat that it had already gleaned over the previous year. Instead, the 
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campaign reified for the corps, and for Sherman himself, precisely what they had already 
suspected about themselves and their capabilities as a military organization. Many of those in 
First and Second divisions, who had long ago suffered through repeated confirmation of their 
staunchly held beliefs regarding the impossibility of successful assaults against Rebel works, 
learned that those lessons still applied. At Ringgold Gap, veterans of many of Steele's ill-fated 
charges, now under the disciplined guidance of Osterhaus, learned little but recalled much. At the 
same time, first at Lookout Mountain and later at Ringgold Gap, Osterhaus’s command learned 
firsthand that the intrinsic power of defensive works and point-blank shock volleys worked both 
ways. If assaulting fortified Rebels had again proven to be futile, the survivors of First Division 
remained more than willing to allow the enemy to try his own luck against works. By painful 
experience, their respect for the defensive power of breastworks had been strengthened in a 
manner that would pay great dividends in the future.  
 In the aftermath, all across the corps those in the ranks tended to focus more on their 
successes than their failures when constructing retrospective narratives of the campaign, usually 
seizing on a particular moment as the essence of the whole. Delos Van Deusen and his comrades 
of the 6th Missouri celebrated their daring nighttime crossing of the Tennessee as the “great 
success” of the campaign. “Sherman knew it would turn their right and make us masters of the 
position,” he wrote home excitedly, “which proved correct,” ignoring entirely the rest of the 
bloody story.915 An Ohioan of Lightburn’s brigade, writing after the war, still considered it “one 
of the most strategic manoeuvers of the war, and have always felt a glowing pride in the 
conspicuous part my regiment bore in that night’s work.”916 Thaddeus Capron, a quartermaster in 
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Smith's First Brigade, likewise interpreted the operation as a total success from start to finish. 
“The Confederates finding that we had flanked them, thought to drive us off, but 'Tecumseh' 
Sherman was prepared, and drove them from their outermost works, and cut their railroad to 
Richmond,” he crowed in a letter home.917 While George Hildt admitted to having been 
“despondent at Chattanooga before the battle as they were so nicely fixed,” now the victory 
seemed “only second to Vicksburg.” To his eye, no Rebel army could “stand up against Grant 
with his Western army,” and he looked forward to spring when the mighty host would “move 
forward again.”918 
 The disaster at Ringgold shook First Division to the core, and thus their reflections on the 
recent victory at Chattanooga were more subdued. “This was one of the sharpest battles that I 
was ever in,” Calvin Ainsworth, a survivor of both Arkansas Post and the Louisiana Lunette 
assault remarked the evening after the fight in his diary. “It was a very foolish thing to charge the 
hill,” he added.919 Hard facts were few and far between. “As to particulars I cannot give you 
any,” another Iowan scribbled home. “You will get them in the papers long before we do here,” 
he added. “All we know is that we have gained a glorious victory, but in doing So have lost 
many noble men and many hearth stones will be desolate and many hearts bleed for the events of 
the last week.”920 
 Despite the pain of considerable loss that hung like a pall over First Division, the net 
positive tone that emanated from all of the corps’s regiments was incontrovertible evidence of 
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one final salient element of the command’s historically derived culture: a nearly unshakable 
confidence in their abilities to crush the Rebellion, provided that “our Generals” stuck to what 
they knew from experience worked, and avoided all they knew from experience did not. “We 
have driven the enemy from another strong hold[,] have to a considerable extent destroyed his 
army and means of injuring us, have reflected great honor upon our corps and its commanding 
Officers Genl Grant & Sherman and all this with but little loss of life,” one Missourian 
proclaimed921 He and his comrades felt “as though we never could tire [of] talking and writing 
about our great success.” Indeed, the breakout from Chattanooga was “as important a victory as 
that of Vicksburg and will go as far towards ending the rebellion.” Grant's “Vicksburg rats“ had 
struck a blow which “opens up Georgia to us, and bids fair to split the rebel states in two 
again.”922 Capt. Jacob Ritner, wounded in the fighting at Ringgold Gap, expressed matters 
succinctly. “Of all the fights where we have been, no one man here knew what has been done, 
except the general result.” The “general result,” as far as he could tell, was that “the rebels have 
been out-generaled by Grant, and defeated, routed, demoralized, and the whole army gone to the 
devil where it belongs.”923 That was enough for the men of Sherman’s corps, who were already 
preparing themselves for new fields. 
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CONCLUSION & EPILOGUE: “VETERAN CHARACTER” 
“It was this veteran character that utterly dominated Sherman’s army, 
 … [and] made the March to the Sea and through the Carolinas possible.” 
 
~ Joseph T. Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond (1985)924 
 
 After five frigid months huddled in winter quarters along the banks of the Tennessee 
River in northern Alabama, on May 1, 1864 the veteran “skeleton regiments” of the Fifteenth 
Army Corps departed on what would prove to be their final combat campaign. Despite a long 
rest and the infusion of a handful of replacements, few regiments could muster more than 250 
effectives for active duty in the ranks. In many fewer than 200 men and officers still answered 
morning roll call.925 For the most part, those who remained had been present at the original 
formation of their regiments. The initial terms of service having run out during the winter for 
those in the oldest regiments, the majority had re-enlisted as “Veteran Volunteers,” for three more 
years or the duration of the war. Now commanded by Maj. Gen. John A. Logan, following Frank 
Blair’s departure for command of the Seventeenth Corps and Sherman’s to command the entire 
Military Division of the Mississippi, the Fifteenth Corps was very much a veteran’s corps.926 
Moreover, it was the command’s “veteran character” – an emergent product of its tactical culture 
– which Joseph Glatthaar identified as having “utterly dominated” the Western army and enabled 
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its exploits during the later March to the Sea, that would likewise enable the Fifteenth Corps’s 
signal contributions to Sherman’s army during the forthcoming bloody campaign for Atlanta. 
 In between leave home, routine drills, reviews, and occasional scouting forays into the 
northern Alabama hills, the corps had spent much of the winter and early spring honing its 
tactical skills. After three months of inaction after Ringgold, in mid-February all of First 
Division’s infantry conducted target practice so as to refresh their hard-won marksmanship skills. 
Each rifleman fired a total of twenty rounds on the range – five rounds apiece at targets 200, 300, 
400, and 600 yards distance.927 While the necessity of husbanding ammunition often hobbled the 
Army’s wartime efforts to conduct regular rifle practice, even rare exercise provided invaluable 
opportunities for volunteers to hone their skills and gain additional experience behind the sights. 
The fact that more than 40,000 rounds of ammunition were required to conduct the practice 
underscores the prominent place rifle marksmanship enjoyed within the division’s (and corps’s) 
tactical culture. Moreover, the opportunity to fire upon targets presented at predetermined 
distances provided all of those within the ranks a chance to practice manipulating their sights and 
estimating the distance to a particular target – skills most had initially developed in the trenches 
at Vicksburg. 
 In the aftermath of this exercise, and in preparation for the forthcoming campaign season, 
First Division’s veteran officers took the initial substantive steps to integrate the corps’s light 
infantry-centric tactical culture into its operational structure. A month prior to stepping off, the 
division established its own permanently detailed “Corps of Sharpshooters.” While all of the 
division’s “skeleton regiments” would lean on their skirmishing skills throughout the 
forthcoming campaign, this detachment would provide Osterhaus with a contingent of especially 
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skilled riflemen who could be deployed independently of any particular regiment on the 
battlefield. The sharpshooters were to be commanded by “very energetic Officers with a 
thorough administration and tactical knowledge,” and who were also “well acquainted with 
skirmishing practice.” Along with three sergeants and six corporals, the detachment was 
composed of seventy-five veteran privates who proved themselves “the very best marksmen 
according to the records of late target practice.” No evidence exists to suggest they were armed 
differently from the rest of the division. Moreover, as Special Orders from the same period do 
not survive for the corps’s other divisions, nor at the corps-level, it remains unknown whether 
such detachments were forged across the corps. Nevertheless, their existence in Osterhaus’s 
division represented a novel and contemporaneously unexampled innovation in the structure of 
U.S. volunteer infantry forces, as well as a powerful expression of the Fifteenth Corps’s tactical 
culture. While many brigades of the Army of the Potomac would eventually form their own 
impromptu sharpshooting detachments later that summer, after enduring heavy skirmishing 
across the forthcoming Overland campaign similar to that the Fifteenth Corps had long known, 
that such details emerged first in the Fifteenth Corps is testament to the impress of its unique 
experiences on its tactical evolution.928 
 Just as past experience had taught the corps the vital importance of rifle marksmanship, 
its time in the trenches at Vicksburg and its victories at Chattanooga had likewise illustrated the 
salient contributions of dependable and highly accurate artillery support provided to active 
infantry operations. Instead of simply opening engagements with heavy preliminary 
 
928 S.O. 92, HQ 1 DIV, 15 AC, Apr. 1, 1864, RG 393, NARA; By contrast, all Rebel commands had been ordered by 
the Confederate government in Richmond to form their own dedicated “sharpshooter battalions” as early as May 
1862. Andrew Haughton, Training, Tactics, and Leadership in the Confederate Army of Tennessee: Seeds of Failure 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000), 84-85. 
408 
bombardments designed to pulverize enemy positions prior to infantry assaults, the Vicksburg 
siege had taught the corps how infantry and artillery could effectively work together in 
rudimentary ways to support one another. For this reason, Osterhaus’s efforts to hone his 
division’s skills were not restricted to the infantry. All the division’s batteries were also to “so 
arrange the Target practice as to be productive of the greatest possible benefit in the instruction 
of the men,” with all loading and firing “made in strict compliance with the prescribed Manual.” 
Battery commanders were to continually order the crews to limber, move, and redeploy their 
guns “as soon as the men become habituated to the range, in order to accustom them to estimate 
distances correctly and quickly.” The loss of artillerists to Rebel rifles at Vicksburg impressed the 
artillerymen with the extreme danger accompanying the maneuver of batteries prior to going into 
action. “Experience has shown that most of the casualties occur during this critical period,” 
Osterhaus cautioned, “[and] it becomes therefore of the highest importance to shorten the time so 
occupied.” After training on quickly limbering and unlimbering the guns, and ensuring “proper 
discipline” was maintained at all times, the division’s batteries would be able to deploy and 
redeploy quickly and safely in order to support the light infantry “clouds” operating to their 
front. Officers kept meticulous records of the target practice and submitted them to division 
headquarters for review. The speed and accuracy with which the veteran batteries could provide 
support had proven itself of great value at Chattanooga, and Osterhaus sought to refine these 
skills for the benefit of future operations.929 
I. “One universal skirmish” 
The campaign for Atlanta during the spring and summer of 1864, arguably the most 
strategically important of the Civil War, was to prove profoundly well calibrated for the Fifteenth 
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Corps’s evolved tactical culture. This was in no small part due to the similarity of the rugged and 
unforgiving terrain of northwestern Georgia with that which the corps had confronted before at 
Chattanooga and Vicksburg. Nearly 70% of the area over which the armies clashed during the 
campaign was still covered in dense pine forests as late as 1870, all but prohibiting the kinds of 
large-scale textbook bayonet assaults arrayed in massed lines of battle that the corps had 
habitually proven itself incapable of achieving.930 
Instead of pummeling successive Rebel lines of defense arrayed between Chattanooga and 
Atlanta with bloody frontal assaults, Sherman’s southward progress was mostly marked by an 
adept marriage of the strategic offense with the tactical defense. Digging earthworks to defend 
part of his army group while the men skirmished constantly all along the line in an effort to hold 
their Rebel counterparts in place, another element launched repeated “whiplash” turning 
movements designed to out-flank fortified enemy positions and plunge ever deeper southward 
toward Atlanta while avoiding any major direct confrontation. Through this “indirect approach,” 
forward momentum toward the army’s ultimate objective was still possible despite the general 
avoidance of major battles between the two competing forces.931 Cump habitually relied upon his 
trusted Army of the Tennessee and Logan’s Fifteenth Corps to conduct these “whiplash” turning 
movements, perhaps in hopes of reducing the amount of combat they might have to endure. His 
choice leveraged the corps’s proven capacity to move swiftly across difficult terrain. Its parent 
Army of the Tennessee, then under the command of Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson, amounted 
to what one historian has termed “Sherman’s prize pedestrians,” and their consistent and 
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dependable capacity for arriving at each and every assigned objective on time allowed Cump to 
hone the “tedious and risky process” of maneuver warfare “to a fine art.”932 
 In large part because of Sherman’s initial careful avoidance of major clashes with the 
Rebel host to his front whenever possible, rolling firefights between scattered skirmishers hidden 
behind natural cover quickly defined the character of infantry combat during the campaign. After 
the first full month of fighting and maneuvering Sherman concluded that the campaign had yet to 
be distinguished by any “real battle,” but rather constituted “one universal skirmish extending 
over a vast surface” or even “a Big Indian War.” Another member of his army thought the almost 
perpetual contact with Rebels in densely wooded terrain ought to have been described as a 
“skirmisher’s war.” Indeed, as Earl Hess observes, more than any other campaign of the war, the 
drive to Atlanta “offered skirmishers their best opportunity to shine.” The consistent forward 
momentum of Sherman’s columns through the rugged pine woods of northwestern Georgia was 
entirely contingent upon the ability of dense “clouds” of skirmishers to screen the army’s front 
and maintain the tactical initiative. Even when Rebels managed to blunt the forward progress of 
the leviathan Federal host, “aggressive skirmishing … helped to shape the contour of 
operations,” Hess argues, as Sherman’s veterans habitually dug-in and relied upon skirmisher 
“clouds” to regain the initiative and hold Rebel attention while turning movements unfolded on 
the flanks. The consistent success of Federal skirmishers to achieve and maintain this initiative 
enabled U.S. forces to exhaust and degrade the Rebel capacity to resist the army’s inexorable 
advance toward Atlanta. “Federal skirmishers were seriously degrading the stamina and fighting 
 
932 James Pickett Jones, Blackjack: John A. Logan and Southern Illinois in the Civil War Era (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1967), 195; WTS to John Sherman, June 9, 1864, SCW, 645; Hess, Fighting for Atlanta, 4. 
411 
effectiveness of troops on the Confederate battle line,” Hess observes. As a direct result, many 
Secessionist commands gradually found themselves “too weakened to fight effectively.”933 
 Few of Sherman’s several corps performed as adeptly along the skirmish line as his 
original Fifteenth. If the Atlanta campaign was defined by its character as a “skirmisher’s war,” 
John Logan commanded what, by 1864, had evolved into a veritable skirmisher’s corps. Each of 
its “skeleton regiments” had been organically molded by experience into a premier light infantry 
force. Moreover, Sherman’s operational art and the tangled terrain of the region played to the 
greatest strengths of the command’s tactical culture. “With years of experience behind them,” 
Hess observed of Federal skirmishers during the campaign, the veteran riflemen utterly 
“dominated no-man’s land.”934 In a similar vein, historian Andrew Haughton has observed how 
the relative willingness of Federal and Rebel forces in the western theater to be “flexible and 
innovative” in their tactics played a major role in determining victory and defeat on the 
battlefield. Whereas, by the spring and summer of 1864, the Fifteenth Corps conducted nearly all 
of its offensive operations arrayed in strong skirmisher “clouds,” the Rebels they confronted still 
emphasized the use of massed battle lines bristling with bayonets in the assault. This 
intransigence is even more striking given their innovative embrace of dedicated sharpshooter 
detachments years prior to their creation in any Federal command. Thus, while the western 
Rebels cannot be accused of neglecting the employment of light infantry entirely, their 
comparative inexperience actually employing such tactics on the battlefield, as well as their own 
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tactical culture, played a major role in allowing Sherman’s riflemen to gain and maintain the 
tactical initiative at most every turn.935 
 To be sure, there were dramatic missteps. On two separate occasions during the 
campaign, the corps was once again forced to launch desperate frontal assaults against deeply 
entrenched Rebel positions. As at Missionary Ridge, Sherman and his lieutenants always showed 
considerable reluctance when ordering such maneuvers, but in both instances the assaults seemed 
all but unavoidable. Also as upon earlier fields, uncooperative terrain dismantled the cohesion 
and coordination of massed formations, rendering success nearly impossible. While during the 
first of these attacks, undertaken by the corps at the battle of Resaca, advanced skirmisher 
“clouds” screening the corps’s main assault formations proved mostly capable of carrying thinly 
held Rebel trenches by themselves, this fortuitous success proved dangerously misleading.936 
 
 
Figure 1. Combat Sketch: Atlanta Campaign. While photography was rare in the Western theater of the Rebellion, 
this combat sketch by an eyewitness illustrates the Fifteenth Corps’s habitual employment of open-order tactics in 
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 When again charged with launching a similar frontal attack against supposedly thinned 
Rebel lines at Kennesaw Mountain in late June, the corps paid a heavy price. Although screened 
by skirmisher “clouds,” which managed to adeptly brush away most outlying Rebel pickets, this 
time the veterans dispersed in open order proved insufficient to overcome the much more 
formidable works atop Pigeon Hill at the base of towering Kennesaw Mountain. Passage of the 
main body of three brigades over intractable terrain marked by every conceivable natural 
obstacle from creeks to forests to bogs mercilessly dismantled the corps’s cohesion prior to its 
arrival at the enemy abatis. “The underbrush through which we advanced was so thick that it was 
impossible to preserve a line,” Brig. Gen. Lightburn later observed with frustration. “The 
consequence was the entire line was broken … which was impossible to reform.”938 One Hoosier 
in his brigade described the tangled thickets as “indescribable confusion,” adding that “it was 
difficult to tell our position, or see from what quarter danger threatened us.” Attacking adjacent 
to Lightburn’s brigade was Giles Smith, returned from convalescing after his Chattanooga 
wounds. “The ground advanced over proved to be worse than anticipated,” he later reported. The 
“steep and rugged [hillside], covered with brush and felled trees, ledges of rock, and an abatis 
ingeniously and firmly constructed … render[ed] the advance in the line of battle entirely 
impracticable.” Just as so many times before, the rugged terrain eradicated the coordination and 
thus massed cohesion of the attack, again giving most participants the perception of being 
entirely unsupported. “There could be no concert of action and little leadership,” one Illinoisan 
later lamented. “Nothing we had surmounted at Vicksburg equaled it in natural difficulties.”939 
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 After suffering 571 men killed or wounded on the wooded slopes and insurmountable 
thickets, the Fifteenth Corps fell back from its final bloody repulse of the war. Sherman would 
never make the same mistake again. Still, his private reaction to the brutal repulse at Kennesaw 
proved that while he had a firm grasp of the command’s lingering incapacity for frontal assaults, 
he still retained an incomplete understanding as to why. “Had the assault been made with one-
fourth more vigor,” it would have succeeded, he later asserted, echoing the same conclusions he 
had arrived at in the bloody aftermath of Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post. “I was forced to 
make the effort, and it should have succeeded, but the officers & men have been so used to my 
avoiding excessive danger and forcing back the enemy by strategy that they hate to assault,” he 
explained in a letter home. Despite the exceptional experience of the Fifteenth Corps at Resaca, 
it appeared that Logan, like Sherman, still had “no troops which can be made to assault,” even if, 
as Cump pronounced, “to assault is sometimes necessary, for its effect on the Enemy.” Indeed, 
Sherman was correct in his perception of the corps’s tactical culture being founded in no small 
part upon a trust in the capacity of “Uncle Billy” to “avoid excessive danger and force back the 
enemy by strategy,” but in his frustration Cump misunderstood the true causes of his perpetual 
tactical failures in the attack. Even so, from Kennesaw onward, Sherman would do everything in 
his power to avoid direct assaults on fortified Rebel positions if at all possible.940 
 In between the two bloody assaults at Resaca and Kennesaw, another even more 
nightmarish engagement in the dense woods outside Dallas, Georgia marked the most chaotic 
contest of the campaign. After launching one of its characteristic “whiplash” turning movements, 
McPherson’s “skeleton” army stumbled into nearly two weeks of an intensely traumatic siege-
like gridlock with entrenched and desperate Rebels less than 30 miles from Atlanta. Fortunately 
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for Logan's veterans, their experience with field fortifications and finesse in skirmishing paid off 
in the “Hell Hole” despite several close run-ins with massed Rebel assaults through the 
thickets.941 
 Despite the immense hardship and bloodletting of the first three months of operations, the 
true crucible of the corps’s participation in the campaign came at the very eastern gates of 
Atlanta on July 22. After approaching the apparently abandoned outlying works of the city from 
the east, the men had not yet enjoyed an opportunity to establish respectable defensive works like 
those at Dallas before an entire Rebel corps fell upon two of Logan’s most advanced brigades. 
Although the veterans of Morgan Smith’s Second Division, caught in the open, did their best to 
repulse the sudden Secessionist onslaught, their complete inexperience with defending a position 
outside the protection of a trench, along with an unfinished railroad cut on the division’s flank, 
combined to catalyze total disaster. As wildly yipping South Carolinians and Alabamians poured 
from the railroad cut onto the Federal flank, much of Smith’s veteran division routed in terror 
and pandemonium to the rear. Only the combination of the urgent support of First Division’s 
massed artillery to the north – “accurate in the extreme,” according to one Rebel officer – a 
frantic counterattack led by Logan in person, and bungled Secessionist orders ultimately saved 
the corps from complete destruction. While ultimately a victory for U.S. arms, the close call 
deeply impressed upon the survivors of Logan’s battered corps the importance of fieldworks and 
carefully protected flanks when defending against a charging foe.942 
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Figure 2. Combat Sketch: Battle of Ezra Church.This combat sketch by an eyewitness illustrates the Fifteenth 
Corps’s massed defensive tactics employed during the battle of Ezra Church. While the Rebel attackers are 




 Both of these tactical lessons were on clear display during the final two major 
engagements of the campaign. Slung westward around Atlanta by Sherman in yet another 
“whiplash” maneuver designed to cut the city’s final remaining rail lifelines, the Fifteenth Corps 
led the Army of the Tennessee’s van. Diligently entrenching at each and every nightly halt, the 
corps’s still traumatized veterans refused to be caught unprepared again. On July 28, less than a 
week after their ignominious rout, these tactics paid off. Sensing Sherman’s bid to isolate the 
Rebel bastion, General John Bell Hood launched a counterstroke aimed at destroying the Army 
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of the Tennessee west of the city near Ezra Church. Arrayed in massed lines of battle, several 
successive waves of Secessionist infantry hurled themselves at Logan’s riflemen, ensconced 
snugly behind impromptu log breastworks and church pews packed with bulging knapsacks. As 
at Dallas, the veteran regiments fired volley after volley into the Rebels at near point-blank 
range, utterly destroying their formations. Sherman, too, had learned his lesson. With the tables 
now finally turned, and his own beloved original corps now unleashing the same punishment it 
had so often painfully received, Cump knew precisely what was on the menu. “Just what I 
wanted, just what I wanted,” he shouted reflexively aloud to staffers: “Invite them to attack, it 
will save us trouble, save us trouble, they’ll only beat their brains out, beat their brains out!” 
Indeed, the Rebels did just that, suffering more than 3,000 casualties compared to 562 (50 killed) 
across the entire Fifteenth Corps. One in every three Rebels making the attack had been cut 
down in a battle that lasted only two hours. The morale of the Atlanta garrison having been all 
but completely destroyed by the combined losses of July 22 and 28, Hood’s final bid to once 
again assail Logan’s corps at Jonesboro on August 31 feel with even less vigor. Once again 
suffering mightily in sequential uncoordinated and practically suicidal frontal assaults arrayed in 
massed battle lines, the Secessionist defense of Atlanta was decisively crushed. On September 1, 
the Rebel army abandoned the city, and with it much of any hope for the so-called Confederacy’s 
bid for independence.944 
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II. “The dawn of the tactics of the present day” 
 The campaign for Atlanta marked the apotheosis of the Fifteenth Corps’s combat 
effectiveness on the battlefield. Despite occasional dramatic misadventure, the corps performed 
well in large part due to the ideal calibration of its tactical culture with the objectives it was 
called upon to pursue. Just as at Chattanooga, when the corps was required to conduct operations 
for which its tactical culture and operational heritage had prepared it, its veteran regiments 
performed admirably. On the other hand, when required to launch frontal assaults across 
intractable terrain, its signature weaknesses were on vivid display. While Logan and his “veteran 
volunteers” were appropriately proud of their accomplishments during the drive to Atlanta for 
the rest of their lives, soldier scholars had much to learn from the experience of the Fifteenth 
Corps during the campaign as it related to the future of infantry warfare. 
 More than any other factor, the particular terrain upon which the Fifteenth Corps had 
confronted its enemies during its early campaigns shaped the command’s light infantry-centric 
tactical culture on the battlefield, and prepared it to excel during the decisive campaign for 
Atlanta. Both its penchant for open-order skirmishing and its perpetual struggles with the 
coordination of frontal assaults were direct byproducts of its traumatic experiences fighting 
Rebels over the broken ground and dense woods of Mississippi, Arkansas, and Tennessee. 
Reflecting upon his own “Military Lessons of the War” within his 1875 memoirs, Sherman drew 
upon his experience of commanding the corps when he wrote: 
Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European 
text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, maneuvering by corps, divisions, and 
brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed 
according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage 
of the shape of ground, and of every cover. We were generally the assailants, and in 
wooded and broken countries the ‘defensive’ had a positive advantage over us, for they 
were always ready, had cover, and always knew the ground to their immediate front; 
whereas we, their assailants, had to grope our way over unknown ground, and generally 
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found a cleared field or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under a close and 
withering fire.945 
 
 This passage has recently come under a close and withering fire itself by historian Earl 
Hess. Europe’s battlefields were also “cluttered with obstacles,” he argues, and Sherman 
“generalized far too recklessly” about Civil War tactics based almost exclusively upon his army’s 
unique experiences fighting for Atlanta.946 These criticisms ignore the fact that Sherman’s 
observations of “the battles in which I have participated” were limited to his own “personal angle 
of vision,” just as the tactical culture of the Fifteenth Corps had likewise been forged by the 
content of its own specific experiences. Never having witnessed the titanic “open field fights” of 
Antietam or Gettysburg in the East, or even their rare counterparts in the West, the entire corpus 
of combat experience Cump and his corps developed over the course of the war neatly matched 
his description. Much the same could have be said of Grant. “Our old systems of tactics were 
translations from the French, and altogether not adapted to territory such as that in which the 
greater part of the rebellion was fought,” he told a New York Times reporter in 1881. “In wooded 
country with narrow roads, we might as well have had no tactics at all, so far as the old system 
served us. Indeed, it was not infrequently the case that we were obliged to entirely abandon the 
system and depend upon plain common sense,” he added.947 Of course, there were plenty of 
cleared fields in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Georgia, just as there was rugged and nightmarish 
terrain in Europe and the eastern United States, but the Fifteenth Corps, like both Grant and 
Sherman, rarely if ever encountered the Rebel enemy upon such ground. Instead, combat came 
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primarily within “wooded and broken countries,” and the corps’s tactical culture represented a 
powerful expression of that fact. 
 Even by 1870, the first postwar census to tabulate cleared versus wooded acres of land in 
the United States, the difference between Eastern and Western areas of operations remained 
stark. In Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, where the majority of the major battles of the 
Eastern theater took place, and where Creighton’s brigade and the Army of the Potomac had 
learned its trade, only 45% of the land was still covered in forest. Within the eight counties of 
northern Virginia that experienced the most bloodshed during the conflict, that number dropped 
to 38%. By contrast, in Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee, where the Fifteenth 
Corps had fought its battles, 65% of the ground in these much younger states remained densely 
wooded as late as 1870. In stark contrast, less than a quarter of the acres of Adams County, 
Pennsylvania, where the Army of the Potomac fought its most climactic engagement at 
Gettysburg, were still forested at the time of the battle. While the nightmarish bloodletting of the 
James Peninsula and the Wilderness obviously represented major and important exceptions to the 
rule, Western battlefields were on average far more heavily forested and cluttered with vegetation 
than were their Eastern counterparts.948 
 The terrain of American battlefields had long proven far more vexing than those in 
Europe, and European armies had been forced to adapt their tactics to this environmental reality 
since the era of initial colonization. Much of prevailing eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
Western tactical art having been first devised during the Enlightenment era of “limited war” in 
Europe, theorists assumed that most major clashes between armies would take place upon mostly 
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open ground. Even by the early nineteenth century, although much of Europe remained blanketed 
with dense woodlands, most of the fields upon which Napoleon I fought his great battles were 
distinguished by “relatively open, gentle countryside where both armies could manoeuvre with 
ease.”949 The contrasting lack of such expanses of cleared terrain in the Americas forced 
Europeans to adapt their tactics accordingly. For the most part, they did so with remarkable 
effectiveness, few quite so adeptly as the British. 
 At least as early as the Seven Years War, the British Army had adapted to the exigencies 
of congested American terrain by leaning heavily on American colonial militia with their 
especial skill in light infantry combat when fighting upon heavily wooded battlefields. 
Habitually extending the distance between the files of their battle lines, the Crown’s infantry 
learned from experience that “no maneuvers may ever be carried out in serried ranks in these 
districts that are so terribly wooded.”950 Far from the rigid tactics of Hollywood’s “redcoats,” 
historian Matthew Spring has recently shown that British infantry during the American 
Revolutionary War once again learned quickly from experience to emphasize open-order 
skirmishing and a consistent pursuit of Rebel flanks in order to avoid bloody frontal attacks 
across cluttered ground against an often entrenched enemy. Many conservative British tacticians 
worried about this trend, arguing that skirmishers had, in America, “instead of being considered 
an accessory to the battalion … become the principal feature of our army.”951 Although the 
Continental Army eventually achieved victory for reasons that extended well beyond infantry 
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tactics, the natural evolution of British infantry deployments during the conflict was powerful 
testament to the impact American geography could have in shaping tactical culture.952  
 While both European and American officers across the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries consistently sought to master maneuvers “as described in European text-
books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order,” the geography of the United States routinely 
refused to comply.953 The unforgiving terrain of American battlefields dismantled the cohesion of 
“touch of the elbow” infantry formations learned and practiced on small manicured parade 
fields.954 While the much smaller commands of earlier conflicts could often conceivably wedge 
themselves into the meager acreage cleared for planting on American farms, as the sheer size of 
formations and armies ballooned exponentially during the War of the Rebellion, the same small 
plots could never hope to play host to even a small portion of titanic battles that involved tens of 
thousands of men at a time. In the still mostly uncleared portions of Arkansas and Mississippi, 
where the Fifteenth Corps faced its baptism by fire, the distinctively nightmarish terrain spurred 
what amounted to an American tactical renaissance in infantry warfare as armies of volunteers 
trained on the drill field to operate in massed formations learned the same lessons their European 
counterparts had perennially derived from experience before. 
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 Many antebellum military professionals had long anticipated that such a renaissance was 
coming, though they had incorrectly judged it a “revolution,” and had fundamentally misjudged 
what its cause would be. They had harbored grave concerns about the mass arrival of the rifle 
musket onto modern battlefields for decades prior to the Civil War. While there remained much 
heated and contentious debate as to what impact the weapon’s increased effective range and 
improved accuracy would have on infantry tactics, most agreed that infantrymen armed with 
rifles would open engagements at distances far greater than those common to the Napoleonic era 
of predominately smoothbore muskets. Because of this, massed formations in “serried ranks” 
assaulting with bayonets across the open ground typical of Napoleonic battlefields would be 
utterly butchered by the rifle fire of defenders long before they could strike with cold steel. Only 
by either speeding up the pace at which such attacks were conducted, or by opening up and 
extending massed battle lines, could the deadly effects of prolonged exposure to rifle fire be 
avoided. For this reason, several theorists prophesied, future battlefields would necessitate a 
heavier reliance upon open-order infantry formations and light infantry-style skirmisher tactics. 
At the same time, others vehemently disagreed, Napoleon III of France the most influential 
among them. Arguing that the complicated process of accurate long-range firing would likely 
prove beyond the pale of comprehension for the dullards who often filled the ranks of European 
armies, these critics argued that infantry engagements would continue to unfold at more or less 
the same distance as they had for the last several centuries. Massed bayonet charges following 
point-blank offensive volleys would continue to define the traditional infantry attack, they 
argued, and relatively little adaptation would be required. 
 In the end, the experience of the American Civil War indirectly proved both parties 
correct. As episodes like Blair’s bloody charge at Chickasaw Bayou made clear, on occasion 
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defending infantry did pepper onrushing attackers with rifle fire from distances nearing the 
maximum range of their weapons. This attritional tactic eroded the cohesion and mass of the 
assaulting force long before its arrival at the defensive abatis, just as many antebellum theorists 
argued it would. At the same time, the vast majority of defenders still relied upon massed “shock 
volleys” at ranges sufficiently proximal that the extended range of their rifles made little 
difference. Historians continue to hotly debate the average ranged at which the “average” Civil 
War infantry engagement (if such a thing existed) unfolded, but as the corps rarely encountered 
long-range rifle fire when conducting frontal assaults, the fact that the Rebels it confronted were 
frequently armed with rifles cannot itself explain the corps’s learned tendency to rely chiefly 
upon open-order skirmishing in battle.955 
 Although antebellum military writers had emphasized the capacity of the rifled musket to 
revolutionize defensive infantry tactics, the experience of the Fifteenth Corps suggests the 
weapon had a far more significant impact on offensive maneuvers, most especially when 
conducted across broken and cluttered American terrain against an enemy ever increasingly 
hidden behind field fortifications. If the landscape itself motivated the first vestiges of what 
historians have deemed an “open-order revolution” during the Civil War in the Western theater, 
the arrival of the rifled musket played a powerful role in enabling it. While the difference of 
accuracy between smoothbore and rifled muskets at extremely close range when firing at a 
massed target of standing men in the open was negligible, when engaging an enemy half-
shrouded by cover or hidden in the depths of a rifle pit, exposing only his face and forearm 
below a protective headlog, the increased accuracy of a rifle could make all the difference. When 
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firing close-range massed volleys designed to pummel an infantry line arrayed in “serried ranks” 
before driving home a bayonet charge, the performance disparity between smoothbore and rifled 
muskets mattered little. When attempting to strike fleeting and mostly shrouded targets from the 
protection of a forward trench amid a prolonged siege, or sniping the gunners of an enemy 
artillery battery from hundreds of yards away, the rifle was irreplaceable. Indeed, the impressive 
ranges at which several members of the corps reported engaging Rebel targets with their rifles 
during the Vicksburg siege suggests that in the capable hands of experienced veteran volunteers, 
the rifled musket’s full capabilities could be and were often realized on Civil War battlefields, 
despite the assertions of many historians to the contrary. Moreover, as the men of the Fifteenth 
Corps almost never fired massed offensive volleys (restricting such tactics to defense against 
enemy bayonet charges) their particular experience taught them little about the rifle’s relative 
utility in such circumstances. Instead, when ordered to attack an entrenched enemy that routinely 
proved resistant to frontal assault but still vulnerable to a skilled rifleman’s ball, the rifle’s 
increased range and accuracy paired with a veteran’s marksmanship skill, honed over months of 
practice, frequently proved the ideal tools for the task.956 
 The offensive advantages organic to such tools were squandered when employed within 
massed formations of “serried ranks.” In order to take full advantage of the rifled musket’s 
capabilities, individual riflemen needed cover, opportunities to take careful aim, considerable 
experience behind their weapon, and the independence to take advantage of each and every 
chance to improve their positions and those of their comrades. Just as Sherman’s loose leash 
would soon allow his army’s “veteran character” to flourish during his forthcoming raids through 
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Georgia and the Carolinas, only by leveraging individual freedom and hard won marksmanship 
skill on the skirmish line could Sherman’s veteran skirmishers achieve, secure, and maintain the 
critical tactical initiative that facilitated his “indirect” way of war.957 While the broken and 
rugged Mississippi, Tennessee, and Georgia terrain regularly destroyed the cohesive mass and 
critical coordination of their frontal assaults against Rebel works, by 1864 most of the men and 
officers of the Fifteenth Corps had determined that such assaults were futile anyway. By instead 
learning to use the same cluttered Southern terrain, their learned tactical skills as skirmishers, 
and their modern rifled weaponry to maximum advantage, the volunteer regiments of the corps 
had naturally evolved into the expert skirmishers who enabled Sherman’s drive southward 
toward Atlanta. 
 While military professionals had long recognized the tactical utility of skirmishers and 
light infantry in infantry combat, very few anticipated that they would ever wholly supplant 
massed lines on the battlefield. As historian Rory Muir observes, Napoleonic contingents of 
riflemen and light infantry were meant to play an exclusively “negative role” in combat, 
screening and protecting massed main bodies while “preparing the way for the decisive attack” 
with the bayonet.958 In his Elementary Treatise on Advanced Guard, Outposts, and Detachment 
Service of Troops (1847), widely read and digested by volunteer officers on both sides before, 
during, and even after the Civil War, Dennis Hart Mahan identified two basic forms of infantry: 
light and line. The two were meant to habitually support one another in the attack. Light infantry 
led the way as skirmishers, opened engagements, and kept the enemy suppressed with accurate 
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fire while massed line infantry maneuvered for advantage. Once in a sound striking position, the 
line would launch its bayonet assault, covered on the flanks by the fire of the dispersed 
skirmishers who ceased firing once the friendly line passed to the front.959 Only if the foe proved 
a particularly meager host would light infantry ever constitute the main effort.960 On the defense, 
both light and line infantry combined their firepower within a massed battalion to repel enemy 
assaults with volleys of fire before launching a counter-charge when the exhausted attacker 
“shows, by the wavering or confusion of his line, a want of confidence.”961 While Mahan 
acknowledged that an infantryman capable of operating exclusively as either line or light 
infantry would prove “inconvenient, at the least,” he still admitted that “perfection is more easily 
reached by confining the individual to one branch of his art, than by requiring him to make 
himself conversant with the whole.”962 Sherman and his subordinates learned this lesson from 
experience as their corps, trained on the drill field to act as both line and light infantry, 
organically transformed into a corps of almost exclusively the latter. 
 Their transformation probably would have come as little surprise to Mahan, given the 
corps’s particular experiences while under arms. After all, the success of massed line infantry, he 
explained, “depend[ed] upon the action of the mass, ensemble [coordination], coolness, and 
determination.”963 Packed elbow-to-elbow in line, they fired by volley, maneuvered in column, 
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and habitually “attack[ed] with the bayonet.”964 The “ensemble,” or coordination of an attacking 
massed line was the ultimate key to its success. As the corps had learned painfully on many 
occasions, large-scale attacks that fell upon Rebel works in piecemeal fashion never had any 
hope of decisive success. Each and every assault column needed to arrive simultaneously all 
along the enemy line in order to effectively overwhelm his defenses. Routinely incapable of 
effecting such cohesive and well-coordinated assaults due to the difficult and densely wooded 
terrain the Fifteenth Corps habitually found itself operating within, its successive traumatic 
failures in turn eroded the confidence of its member regiments whenever ordered to assault en 
masse. That very lack of confidence – Mahan’s “coolness, and determination” – when added to 
the lack of any concerted attempt by their officers to remedy the command’s coordinative 
challenges, sustained the corps’s signature tactical disability throughout the war. 
 On the other hand, light infantry, Mahan instructed, fighting habitually in “the dispersed 
order,” relied instead upon its skill at laying down effective small arms fire upon the enemy for 
success in its much more limited offensive role. Each skirmisher, though supported by another 
scattered some distance to his right and left, regularly found himself “thrown upon his own 
resources, being obliged to take cover where he can most conveniently find it.” To become a 
master of his trade, the skirmisher needed to “be a good marksman, cool, deliberate, and 
circumspect.”965 The Fifteenth Corps enjoyed plentiful opportunities to develop these skills 
thoroughly throughout the war. Continually required to fragment into small groups – either four-
man skirmish teams on the battlefield or widely scattered fatigue details off of it – the men and 
officers were more than comfortable operating independently without the direct oversight of 
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superiors. Cluttered terrain had naturally broken their massed lines into skirmisher “clouds,” 
even when officers did seemingly everything in their power to prevent it. The very ground and 
vegetation of the lower Mississippi valley had thrust small units and individual soldiers upon 
their “own resources.” Pairing the natural fruits of these experiences with the unexampled 
opportunities the corps enjoyed to master the art of musket, rifle, and artillery marksmanship 
during the Vicksburg and Jackson sieges, along with the veteran’s “cool, deliberate, and 
circumspect” approach to combat, it should come as little surprise that Sherman’s command 
matured into a premiere skirmisher’s corps. That it did, however, also meant that its true tactical 
capabilities were markedly limited, forcing its commanders to either adapt their operational art 
accordingly, or neglect doing so at great peril. 
 By 1864, the Fifteenth Corps could reliably be expected to march great distances at 
impressive speed, sustain itself off the countryside, extensively denude a region of valuable 
foodstuffs, and swiftly destroy Rebel railroads and strategic infrastructure. In combat, it could 
reliably gain and maintain fire supremacy and the tactical initiative on the skirmish line. It could 
also rapidly construct impressive “hasty” field fortifications from which it could repel even the 
most savage of Rebel assaults with great confidence. On the other hand, nothing in its 
operational heritage suggested that it could or should have been reliably expected to successfully 
carry Rebel positions at the point of the bayonet by a frontal assault. Nor could it dependably 
stand up against an enemy in the open without the benefit of defensive works. To be sure, these 
two capabilities arguably represented the most crucial tactical skills for a mid-nineteenth century 
military organization, but nevertheless had proven time and again to be irrepressible handicaps 
for the corps’s veteran regiments. Successful prosecution of their assigned objectives was in no 
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small part contingent upon the relative calibration of assignments with the command’s evolved 
tactical culture. 
 Having commanded the Fifteenth Corps during the formational period of his lengthy 
career as a grand tactician and strategist, Sherman’s own operational art during the latter years of 
the conflict as an army group commander showed the indelible impress of the corps’s tactical 
culture. Although historians and military professionals have long lauded Cump’s apparent 
mastery of the “indirect approach” during the latter years of the war, his own personal evolution 
into a master of maneuver warfare came initially at a great cost in blood and suffering paid by 
the Fifteenth Corps. Sherman’s place in the annals of America’s “great captains” was only earned 
due to his proven intellectual malleability, and a capacity to learn from experience what he could 
realistically expect his corps (and later army) to achieve given its own specific past experiences. 
While he always retained an incomplete understanding as to why the command chronically 
suffered from an inability to carry enemy works from the front, he did apparently finally accept 
it, and acted accordingly. 
 The emergent tactical culture of the Fifteenth Corps, borne of its specific historical 
experiences, was in many ways similar to, but also markedly distinct from, that which an 
observer may have witnessed at work within any other of the U.S. Army’s several corps d’armee 
by the end of the war. Despite similar ultimate evolutionary trajectories, the tactical cultures 
organic to each corps were likewise the direct byproducts of the specific experiences each 
formation underwent while in service. The same perfect marriage between the Fifteenth Corps’s 
tactical culture and the specific operational tasks it was called upon to perform during the 
Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns was not initially enjoyed by those corps serving 
within the Army of the Potomac during the final year of the conflict in the East. The dense 
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thickets, Rebel entrenchments, and relentless operational tempo of the Overland campaign 
introduced most of the Army of the Potomac to a much enlarged and prolonged version of the 
Fifteenth Corps’s earlier week-long “nightmarish sensation[s]” at Chickasaw Bayou for the first 
time. While much of Sherman’s vast army group outside of the Army of the Tennessee, most 
especially those elements imported from the East, underwent their own rapid crash course in the 
art of operating predominately as “strong skirmish-lines” under near perpetual fire in the dark 
and deadly woods of northern Georgia, most units within even the Army of the Potomac had 
eventually learned the same or similar lessons by the end of the war that the Fifteenth Corps had 
arrived at long before.966 
 Attempting to retrospectively survey the real tactical significance of the Army’s wartime 
experience during the fall of 1865, military critic John Watts De Peyster spoke with an “officer 
of experience” who had served in the Army of the Potomac during the war. While most of the 
Eastern army, as evidenced by the behavior of Creighton’s brigade at Ringgold Gap, long 
maintained a tactical culture which emphasized the continued efficacy of brazen massed frontal 
bayonet assaults, often without even a protective screen of skirmishers, even the Potomac men 
had started to evolve into expert light infantry by the end of the war. As during the Fifteenth 
Corps’s experience in the West, this evolution was likely more the result of the vicious terrain 
confronted by the army during the bloody Overland campaign than it was any reflection of 
modern military technology’s effects on the battlefield. “In actual conflict, unless our lines 
formed behind a barricade or protective work of some kind,” the officer told De Peyster, “they 
very soon resembled, as to relative formation, a ‘Virginia rail-fence,’ or a skirmish-line where 
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squads of fours, distinct and irregularly placed, kept up relatively the direction or emplacement 
of a line.” Reflecting later upon this statement, and others similar in tone, De Peyster concluded 
that the veteran “soldiers from experience” in both Western and Eastern theaters of the Civil War, 
though at different rates, had stumbled upon an important truth of modern infantry combat.967 
 The rigid linear maneuver doctrine of the era of Napoleon I, still enshrined in the 
officially prescribed drill manuals of the Army, needed to go and fast. While fine for 
maneuvering massed lines to, about, and from the battlefield, such rigid drill seemed “the very 
reason why it took four years to make our soldiers what they should have been at the outset,” he 
complained. “Experience alone taught them that the success of battles depends more on 
intelligent individual action properly combined, than the hurling of large masses forward to 
slaughter.” Moreover, given the extreme challenges confronting the command, control, and 
coordination of attacks in difficult terrain during the mid-nineteenth century, such “hurling of 
large masses” was almost always ill-fated. Fortunately, by virtue of experience, most “became 
accustomed to act for themselves, when the actual circumstances of battle or duty found them 
alone and distant from support.” Indeed, “the very word VETERAN,” he emphasized, “actually 
expresses that the soldier has become more or less perfectly self-reliant.”968 
 De Peyster remained convinced that the experience of the war proved that the 
“conversion of the customary main ‘line of battle,’ which is a continuous line of mutually 
dependent combatants, into a vast dislocated skirmish line of independent marksmen, should be a 
prominent feature in the infantry tactics of the future.”969 If rugged terrain and modern weaponry 
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was to disperse massed attacking lines anyway, it was best to build a tactical doctrine that 
accepted this reality as fait accompli. His visionary conclusion was borne not of the somber 
hindsight of massed battalions maneuvering with antiquated tactics while being mercilessly cut 
down in windrows by an enemy at long range as antebellum theorists had prophesied, but rather 
merely a logical conclusion drawn from direct observation of what the veteran “soldiers from 
experience” who filled the Union Army had already fashioned into their own informal tactical 
doctrine by the end of the war. It was now up to the Army to catch up to innovations in the ranks, 
just as Sherman had. 
 After several decades of careful study, clearly including Sherman’s memoirs, tactical 
theorist Colonel Arthur Lockwood Wagner determined, like De Peyster decades before him, that 
the Rebellion had represented a veritable “turning-point of tactics, there being scarcely a feature 
of the tactics of the present day that did not have its germ, its prototype, or its development” 
during the conflict. The first of these developments, infantry “attacks by rushes,” Wagner 
credited to none other than Morgan L. Smith. First employed by his 8th Missouri Zouaves at Fort 
Donelson, later by all of Second Division at Arkansas Post and Vicksburg, and eventually by the 
entire Fifteenth Corps, Wagner deemed the Zouave rush a “brilliant movement … far in advance 
of the tactics then generally in use.”970 
 Since at least the mid-eighteenth century, skirmishers had been utilized “merely to feel 
and develop the enemy,” but the lessons of the Civil War, most especially in the West, made clear 
how light infantry had become “the most important element in modern tactics,” Wagner 
observed.971 Much more than rifled weaponry, he credited the “wooded country which formed 
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the theater of so many of the principal campaigns” for the habitual heavy reliance on skirmishers 
in many commands “to a degree before unknown” in Western warfare. He took especial notice of 
Sherman’s command in particular for having “habitually fought in strong skirmish lines, the men 
taking advantage of every feature of the ground.”972 By 1864, the army’s massed battle lines had 
become primarily reserves of light infantry, following in the rear “ready to reinforce the 
skirmishers.” This dramatic change marked “the dawn of the tactics of the present day,” he 
predicted.973 In the future, as within the Fifteenth Corps, the effective employment of skirmishers 
would remain “the prime consideration in tactics.”974 
 In 1891 the U.S. Army finally caught up with these tactical lessons. A new infantry 
manual included nearly every aspect of the informal tactical doctrine the “soldiers from 
experience” of the Fifteenth Corps had organically developed during the war. It also, for the first 
time in Army history, instructed readers in more than just linear maneuver on the parade field, 
providing guidance to commanders at every level on how to actually conduct combat operations. 
As Upton had written to Sherman in 1880, drill manuals up to that point “have been simply a 
collection of rules for passing from one formation to another. How to fight has been left to actual 
experience in war.” Now, drawing directly from the mountain of experience the Army had 
accrued while prosecuting the Rebellion, it would craft explicit instructions for “how to fight.”975 
 Dispersed “extended order” lines were to thenceforth be the primary mode by which U.S. 
infantry habitually deployed and fought its battles. Instead of the “touch of the elbow” tightly 
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packed “serried ranks” in line of battle, eight man squads commanded by non-commissioned 
officers became the primary units of maneuver under fire, much as had become the case for the 
Fifteenth Corps’s “skeleton regiments” as early as 1863. Instead of manicured fields, drills were 
to be conducted “on varied ground, making use of the accidents of the surface for cover,” and the 
manual included an entire page of suggestions for how riflemen could potentially use various 
forms of cover. When cover was not  availing, firing from the kneeling and prone positions were 
foregrounded in training, just as they had been for Smith’s Zouaves during their initial training in 
1861. Also like the Zouaves, individual recruits were trained to practice “advancing from cover 
to cover” against their comrades, as the rest of their squad took note of each and every time they 
caught a glimpse long enough to take aim. Soldiers were advised to “stoop and even creep or 
crawl” when necessary in combat, just as the riflemen of the Fifteenth Corps had done in every 
engagement since Chickasaw Bayou. Maintaining proper alignment in tight formations was all 
but abandoned, and “close order” marching relegated exclusively to what officers called 
“maneuver tactics,” meant to carry a command into battle, wherein loose-order “fighting tactics” 
were employed once a unit was actually engaged with the enemy.976 When advancing across 
open ground, squads were to cross the dangerous expanse “by rushes of about thirty yards,” 
going prone in between, “and raising the head in order to see the enemy,” just as Second 
Division had done since Corinth. By no means were these Zouave-style rushes to exceed fifty 
yards, “else the skirmishers will be winded and unable to aim accurately,” as the exhausted 
Hawkeyes of Steele’s division had learned the hard way in their charge at “the Post.” Finally, and 
probably most importantly, the doctrine now included explicit instructions for how to coordinate 
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organic suppressive fire elements detached from a battalion with a charging main body by bugle 
– representing the Army’s first substantive attempt at authentic “fire and maneuver” tactics.977 
 As the men and officers of the Fifteenth Corps knew well, this light infantry-centric 
tactical doctrine came with both advantages and disadvantages that the U.S. Army would 
encounter on future fields. While relying on dispersed skirmisher squads to carry the main effort 
of an attack significantly reduced the dangers posed by enemy small arms and artillery, such 
open-order lines were exceedingly unlikely to overcome a well-entrenched foe by themselves. 
Prior to the invention of indirect artillery and aerial bombardment to systematically support the 
advance of open-order infantry, overcoming a snugly dug-in enemy fighting from behind a dense 
abatis still required either out-flanking their position or overwhelming them at the point of 
massed bayonets. While dispersed riflemen could suppress entrenched defenders to an extent that 
made it dangerous for them to reply in kind, the unavoidable break in their suppressive fire 
requisite for the safe passage of a charging friendly line across the front proved ample time for 
defenders to reply with a brutal shock volley. The Fifteenth Corps had learned this the hard way 
during both Vicksburg assaults. Once survivors were forced to ground, they could begin to apply 
their own suppressive fire to keep enemy heads down, but at the expense of any and all 
additional forward momentum. 
 Although every man in the corps was made to understand and actively practice the 
concept of what would eventually be termed “alternating bounds” on the parade field during 
skirmish drill – during which one soldier in a pair fired to cover the advance of another – pairing 
suppressive fire with maneuver at the regimental or brigade levels proved mostly beyond the 
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capabilities of even the most veteran commands during the Civil War. Indeed, even coordinating 
the far more simplistic simultaneous advance of adjacent formations across broad fronts of 
challenging terrain consistently proved beyond the pale. The problem of effectively and 
cohesively “crossing the deadly ground” would continue to vex the Army until the era of indirect 
artillery support, radio communications, and the machine gun, but was always far more a 
problem of coordination (and thus also of terrain) than of weapons technology. Once the 
potential firepower of an entire Civil War regiment could effectively be replaced by a single 
machine gun crew, the potential for combining suppressive fire with an open-order advance of 
light infantry increased dramatically. Even so, as late as 1918, many of the old guard still 
bemoaned failures of unsupported frontal assaults they attributed to the very same crippling lack 
of sufficient motivation, spirit, and confidence among the attackers that Sherman had decades 
prior. Not until the Second World War would the manifold advantages of the “indirect approach,” 
learned by experience in the ranks of the Fifteenth Corps, finally become standard fare among 
American tacticians. Armed with the myriad mobility advantages provided by the internal 
combustion engine and aerial transport, by the mid-twentieth century most military professionals 
agreed that if the “deadly ground” did not absolutely have to be crossed in order to defeat an 
enemy, unless ample supporting firepower was available, it was best to avoid it altogether.978 
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III. “The diabolical 15th” 
 The affinity of the Fifteenth Corps’s men and officers for “avoiding excessive danger and 
forcing back the enemy by strategy” was borne of its traumatic experiences on the confusing 
battlefields of the lower Mississippi Valley. This tactical predisposition played a powerful and 
erstwhile overlooked role in seeding the ground for their wholehearted embrace of “hard war” 
and the government’s strategic turn toward a more direct assault on the South’s “peculiar 
institution.” Scholars continue to highlight the ways in which repeated military reversals, most 
especially that suffered by the Army of the Potomac during the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, 
provided powerful inspiration for the Lincoln administration’s belated decision to target 
Southern slavery directly. Apparently incapable of decisively besting Rebels on the battlefield, 
the erstwhile conservative Lincoln government, goaded on by countless acts of self-emancipation 
by slaves themselves, added aggressive exploitation of the Rebellion’s real center of gravity to its 
arsenal of strategic methods. This revolutionary policy shift occurred at almost the exact moment 
of the Fifteenth Corps’s organization: the winter of 1862-63.979 
 Much ink has been spilled in debating precisely when, why, and to what extent the U.S. 
military effort to put down the Southern rebellion transformed from a conciliatory “kid glove” 
approach that mostly spared Southern slavery to a “hard hand” of “war in earnest” intended to 
destroy slavery as a means by which to crush the Rebellion. For the most part, the definitive 
account of this evolution remains that of Mark Grimsley’s The Hard Hand of War (1995). 
Arguing that a “series of Union military reversals convinced many Northerners to abandon 
conciliation,” Grimsley asserts that the United States government gradually and reluctantly 
 
979 By far the best work concerning the influence of the Peninsula Campaign on the Lincoln administration’s 
embrace of emancipation is Glenn David Brasher, The Peninsula Campaign & the Necessity of Emancipation: 
African Americans & the Fight for Freedom (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012). 
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embraced “actions against Southern civilians and property made expressly in order to demoralize 
Southern civilians and ruin the Confederate economy” by the second winter of the war. At the 
heart of this transformation was not so much rational calculation by the Lincoln administration, 
but rather “tens of thousands of Union soldiers — toughened by war, hungry for creature 
comforts, and often angry at the civilians in their midst” who embraced “hard war” because they 
“understood the logic” of the indirect strategy. First emerging in the logistically-strained and 
sparsely-inhabited Western theater, Federal tactics of foraging liberally off the country naturally 
evolved over time into the explicit targeting of Southern economic infrastructure more broadly, 
including most importantly the liberation of millions of slaves. Grimsley argues that this 
transformation was due in no small part to the perpetual inability of Federal commanders to 
control hungry, chronically under-supplied, and ill-disciplined volunteers who consistently 
showed an almost insatiable urge for the theft and destruction of private property, whether loyal 
or “Secesh.” Indeed, it seems “quite likely that the zest with which soldiers embraced foraging 
pulled the generals along farther than they might otherwise have gone,” Grimsley asserts.980 
While Grimsley has most likely accurately identified the origins of “hard war” policies as 
laying within the enlisted volunteer ranks of the Union Army, his insightful assessment missed 
an opportunity to address the vital connections between the apparent penchant of Western theater 
U.S. volunteers for “hard war” and the tactical imperatives of mid-nineteenth century infantry 
warfare within the “wooded and broken countries” of the “Old Southwest.” Highlighting these 
connections allows historians to bridge the operational history of the war with the historiography 
of its broader political contours. Moreover, the experience of the Fifteenth Corps provides a 
 
980 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union military policy toward Southern civilians, 1861-1865 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3-4, 104. 
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vivid example of these very connections. Just as the frustrating and somber experience of 
military reversal after the Peninsula campaign convinced many Northern civilians, those in the 
ranks of McClellan’s Army of the Potomac, and the Lincoln administration that only “war in 
earnest” stood a realistic chance at defeating the so-called Southern Confederacy, the near 
contemporaneous traumatic experience of successive and brutal repulse at the hands of 
entrenched Rebels protected by apparently impassable terrain convinced the men and officers of 
the Fifteenth Corps that only an alternative strategy of defeating the Rebellion could ever 
succeed. While most remained reluctant emancipators throughout the war due to their prevailing 
anti-black attitudes and fundamentally conservative politics, the Westerners of Sherman’s corps 
evolved into “practical liberators” and hard warriors in large part because of their traumatic 
experiences of tactical failure and rebuff on Western battlefields. When such failures were paired 
with the striking and comparatively bloodless successes of the Deer Creek and Steele’s Bayou 
raids, those in the ranks emerged from their experiences convinced that “we are crushing the 
rebellion and will continue to crush it though we be repulsed from every stronghold for months 
to come.” While what happened on the battlefield would always of course remain important to 
the men of the corps, their hard-won understanding of the inherent limitations of mid-nineteenth 
century land warfare in the heavily wooded American South spurred their embrace of “war in 
earnest” against Southern slavery far more powerfully than any pyromania or wartime 
transformation of moral convictions.981 
 While the long and bloody “skirmisher's war” for Atlanta represented the culmination of 
the Fifteenth Corps's tactical culture on the battlefield, its original commander's legendary 
 
981 Kristopher A. Teters, Practical Liberators: Union Officers in the Western Theater during the Civil War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018). 
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raiding campaigns through Georgia and the Carolinas during the final months of the conflict 
proved likewise perfectly calibrated for the command’s strengths. Once again, this was no 
coincidence. Sherman had been forged as a strategist in the very same fires that produced his 
original Fifteenth Corps’s tactical culture, and thus by the fall of 1864 the two shared an 
understanding of how the war ought to be prosecuted and won. Although Southern civilians like 
those of Columbia, South Carolina bemoaned and “diabolical 15th” as it wrecked the so-called 
Confederacy’s capacity for self-sustainment, just as it had done in the Deer Creek valley, in 
Jackson, Mississippi, and across a wide swath of Georgia only months before, the corps was in 
reality not composed of demons. Instead, it was made up of men who, as Sherman would later 
assert, would throughout the rest of their lives prove “first rate men — farmers and mechanics, 
and men who are to-day as good citizens as we have in our country, but who went to war in 
earnest.” There was nothing naturally malevolent about their character. They had been forged 
into expert skirmishers, hard warriors, and “practical liberators” in the very same manner they 
had transformed from citizen-soldier Western recruits into “Veteran Volunteers.” They were, after 
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